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Maruša T. VEBER*

PALESTINSKO-IZRAELSKI KONFLIKT: MEDNARODNO PRAVO – *QUO VADIS*?**

Povzetek. *Palestinsko-izraelski konflikt odpira številna mednarodnopravna vprašanja, ki so v prispevku analizirana z vidika pravice narodov do samoodločbe, prepovedi uporabe sile (jus ad bellum), mednarodnega prava oboroženih spopadov (jus in bello), pravil za ugotavljanje individualne odgovornosti in odgovornosti držav (jus post bellum) ter obveznosti mednarodne skupnosti pri odzivanju na grobe kršitve mednarodnega prava. Razumevanje teh pravil je nujno za ugotavljanje morebitne odgovornosti različnih akterjev, poleg tega pa razkriva dva vidika modernega mednarodnega prava. Na eni strani situacije uporabe sile nedržavnih akterjev tako z vidika jus ad bellum kot jus in bello terjajo poglobljeno analizo in odpirajo številna vprašanja, na katere »na državno suverenost« osredinjeno mednarodno pravo nima enoznačnih odgovorov. Po drugi strani pa se s pripoznanjem erga omnes (partes) narave nekaterih obveznosti iz področja prava človekovih pravic ter oboroženih spopadov, vse bolj utemeljuje prepričanje, da se vse države v mednarodni skupnosti lahko odzivajo na najhujše kršitve mednarodnega prava in uveljavljajo odgovornost zadevne države. Vendar pa prispevek zaključi, da selektivnost implementacije ob odsotnosti politične volje ostaja temeljna pomanjkljivost mednarodnega prava, za katero se zdi, da jo bo težko premostilo.*

Ključni pojmi: *Palestina, nedržavni akterji, odgovornost, pravica narodov do samoodločbe, pravica do samoobrambe, mednarodno pravo oboroženih spopadov, erga omnes (partes).*

UVOD

Napad, ki ga je oborožena skupina Hamas izvedla na območju Izraela 7. oktobra 2023, in dogodki, ki so sledili, so več kot 70 let trajajoči Palestinsko-izraelski konflikt znova postavili v ospredje svetovne javnosti, tudi mednarodnopravne. Vrstile so se obsodbe zoper nasilje Hamasa nad izraelskimi civilisti, da gre za

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terorizem in vojno hudodelstvo, pri čemer so številne države Izraelu izrazile podporo za uporabo sile v samoobrambi kot odziv na ta napad (European Council, 15. oktober 2023; The Economic Times, 7. oktober 2023; Deklaracija o trenutnih razmerah na območju Palestine in Izraela, 2023). Vse bolj pa so v ospredju mednarodnopravnih analiz tudi aktivnosti Izraela, ki je sprožil kopensko in zračno vojaško operacijo na območju Gaze z namenom preprečitve nadaljnjih napadov. Številne civilne žrtve, uničenje civilne infrastrukture ter okrnjen dostop do humanitarne pomoči pod vprašaj postavljajo zakonitost vojaških napadov Izraela tako z vidika *jus ad bellum* kot z vidika *jus in bello*. Vse pogostejši so tudi vprašanja o morebitnih dolžnostih mednarodne skupnosti glede dogajanja v Gazi in pozivi k uveljavljanju odgovornosti vseh vpletenih, pri čemer je situacija v fazi preiskave pred Mednarodnim kazenskim sodiščem (MKS), nedavno pa je Južna Afrika na podlagi Konvencije o preprečevanju in kaznovanju zločina genocida (Konvencija o genocidu) proti Izraelu sprožila postopek pred Meddržavnim sodiščem (MS).

Da se izognemo pavšalnim opredelitvam glede zakonitosti ravnanja udeleženih akterjev, do katerih pogosto prihaja v situacijah z močno politično konotacijo, je ključna podrobnejša mednarodnopravna analiza relevantnih vidikov palestinsko-izraelskega konflikta. Namen tega prispevka je osvetliti številna mednarodnopravna vprašanja, ki jih situacija v Gazi odpira in so nujna za razumevanje morebitne odgovornosti različnih akterjev (Izraela, Hamasa in mednarodne skupnosti). Čeprav gre po vsebini za obsežna mednarodnopravna področja, ki bi terjala samostojne prispevke, se dodana vrednost pregleda relevantnih pravil, onkraj paradigme odgovornosti, kaže zlasti v razkritju dveh vidikov modernega mednarodnega prava. Kot bo pojasnjeno v nadaljevanju, situacije uporabe sile nedržavnih akterjev tako z vidika *jus ad bellum* kot *jus in bello* terjajo poglobljeno analizo in odpirajo številna vprašanja, na katere »na državno suverenost« osredinjeno mednarodno pravo nima enoznačnih odgovorov. Slednje implicira potrebo po razmisleku, ali je »tradicionalno« mednarodno pravo ustrezno za urejanje kompleksne mednarodne stvarnosti, v kateri imajo vse pomembnejšo vlogo nedržavni akterji. Po drugi strani pa primarna pravila s področja prava oboroženih spopadov in mednarodnega prava človekovih pravic jasno opredeljujejo obveznosti vpletenih akterjev in tudi mednarodne skupnosti, zato se zdi vztrajanje pri spoštovanju teh pravil in odgovornosti za njihovo kršitev smiselna in tudi nujna pot. Nezmožnost učinkovite implementacije in uresničevanja mednarodnopravnih pravil je sicer že tradicionalno predmet kritik (Austin 1998, 14–15; Morgenthau 1940, 260–84; Goldsmith, Posner 2005), saj je pogosto neuspešno ali nezadovoljivo. Vendar pa je v zadnjem času zaznati pomemben razvoj na tem področju. Vse bolj je namreč uveljavljen obstoj splošnega pravnega interesa za ugotavljanje odgovornosti držav v primeru kršitev *erga omnes (partes)* obveznosti, kamor med drugim sodijo temeljna pravila, ki izhajajo iz mednarodnega prava človekovih pravic, kot so pravica narodov do samoodločbe in prepoved genocida ter osnovna pravila prava oboroženih spopadov (*Barcelona Traction* 1970, 33–34). Na podlagi pravil o odgovornosti držav se

vse države v mednarodni skupnosti lahko odzivajo na takšne kršitve in uveljavljajo odgovornost države kršiteljice (48. in 54. člen, Členi o odgovornosti držav za mednarodno protipravna dejanja (ARSIWA)). Zdi se, da s tem razvojem »na individualne interese držav« osredinjeno mednarodno pravo želi premostiti pomanjkanje delujočega centraliziranega sankcijskega režima.

Mednarodno pravo je z Društvom narodov, Organizacijo združenih narodov (OZN) in s pravico narodov do samoodločbe v osrčju palestinsko–izraelskega spora že od samega začetka, torej od ideje o nastanku dveh suverenih držav na tem območju. V prispevku je zato najprej na kratko predstavljen zgodovinski pregled (ne)uresničitve pravice narodov do samoodločbe na območju Palestine, ki je v osrčju tega spora (2. poglavje). V nadaljevanju so predstavljena temeljna mednarodnopravna vprašanja, ki se porajajo z vidika pravil o uporabi sile (*jus ad bellum*) (3. poglavje), čemur sedi analiza relevantnih pravil mednarodnega prava oboroženih spopadov (*jus in bello*) (4. poglavje). V drugem delu so predstavljene možnosti za ugotavljanje individualne odgovornosti in odgovornosti držav (*jus post bellum*) (5. poglavje) ter kratek pregled mednarodnopravnih določb, iz katerih bi lahko izpeljali določene obveznosti mednarodne skupnosti pri odzivanju na grobe kršitve mednarodnega prav (6. poglavje). Prispevek se zaključi s sklepnimi mislimi (7. poglavje).

Pravica narodov do samoodločbe

Pravica narodov do samoodločbe je široko pripoznano temeljno načelo mednarodnega prava, ki ima osrednjo vlogo pri nastanku držav (Summers 2023) in je bilo v drugem odstavku 1. člena Ustanovne listine OZN (UL OZN) opredeljeno kot eno izmed temeljnih ciljev OZN.[1] Zlasti s sprejetjem Deklaracije o podelitvi neodvisnosti kolonialnim državam in narodom, ki jo je leta 1960 brez glasu proti sprejela Generalna skupščina OZN (GS OZN), je prišlo do kristalizacije tega načela na običajno pravni ravni (Resolucija GS OZN 1514 1960; *Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago* 2019, odst. 142, 150–53). Načelo je poleg tega kodificirano v 1. členu obeh paktov o človekovih pravicah – kot kolektivna pravica narodov, s katero si »svobodno določajo svoj politični status in svobodno zagotavljajo svoj ekonomski, socialni in kulturni razvoj«. Čeprav je zaradi odsotnosti podrobnejše definicije vsebina tega načela predmet številnih razprav (Summers 2023), so pogosto izpostavljeni naslednji štirje elementi pravice narodov do samoodločbe: pravica naroda do ozemeljske celovitosti; pravica naroda do trajne suverenosti nad naravnimi viri; pravica naroda, da ni podvržen demografskim manipulacijam s strani tuje države; pravica naroda, da svobodno določa svoj politični status in svobodno zagotavlja svoj ekonomski, socialni in kulturni razvoj.[2] V svojem tradicionalnem pomenu ima pravica narodov

[1] Glej tudi 73. člen Ustanovne listine Organizacije združenih narodov (UL OZN); Resolucija GS OZN 66(I), 1946.

[2] Za pregled teh vidikov glej: *Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago*, 2019, odst. 160; Resolucija GS OZN 1514 (XV) (1960); 1. člen Mednarodni pakt o državljanskih in

do samoodločbe osrednjo vlogo v mednarodni skupnosti, saj je predpostavka za uresničevanje ostalih človekovih pravic posameznikov zadevnega naroda.[3] MS je potrdilo *erga omnes* naravo te pravice (C*ase Concerning East Timor* 1995, odst. 29; *Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos,* 2019, odst. 182; *Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall* 2004, odst. 155), Komisija za mednarodno pravo (KMP) pa je v svojem delu o peremptornih normah mednarodnega prava pripoznala njeno *jus cogens* naravo (Draft conclusion 23, KMP 2022),[4] kar med drugim pomeni, da je spoštovanje te pravice v interesu mednarodne skupnosti kot celote (*Barcelona Traction* 1970, odst. 33–34) in imajo torej vse države določene obveznosti glede spoštovanja in uresničevanja te pravice.[5]

Zgodovinski pregled dogajanja in mednarodnopravnih vprašanj, ki so bila v ospredju v različnih obdobjih palestinsko-izraelskega konflikta, bi terjal samostojni prispevek, zato bomo na tem mestu izpostavili samo nekatere vidike, ki so zlasti pomembni z vidika pravice narodov do samoodločbe.[6]

Po prvi svetovni vojni je bilo ozemlje Palestine določeno kot mandat pod upravo Združenega kraljestva, ki je imelo skladno z 22. členom Pakta Društva narodov obveznost delovati v interesu blaginje in razvoja Palestincev, kot »svetim skrbništvom civilizacije«. Vendar pa je bil – v primerjavi z drugimi mandatnimi ozemlji s tega območja, ki so uspešno zaključila pot do neodvisnosti (Irak leta 1932, Sirija in Libanon leta 1945 in Jordanija 1946) (Türk 2015, 96) – proces samoodločbe Palestine otežen.[7] Vse pogostejši nemiri in spori med arabskim in judovskim prebivalstvom so vodili v predajo reševanja tega vprašanja OZN, ki je z Resolucijo GS OZN 181 (II) (1947) predvidela konec mandata in umik Združenega kraljestva s tega območja ter sprejela rešitev v obliki delitvenega načrta in ustanovitvi dveh držav: arabske Palestine in judovske države, pri čemer je bilo mesto Jeruzalem postavljeno pod poseben pravni režim. Leta 1948 je judovska država razglasila neodvisnost in leto zatem postala članica OZN (Resolucija GS OZN 273 (III), 1949). Na drugi strani pa do polnopravne uresničitve pravice palestinskega naroda do samoodločbe do danes še ni prišlo.

Razlogi za neuresničitev te pravice so večplastni, zlasti pa so ključne kontinuirana okupacija Izraela na območju Zahodnega brega, vzhodnega Jeruzalema in

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političnih pravicah in Mednarodni pakt o ekonomskih, socialnih in kulturnih pravicah. Glej tudi Written comments of the State of Palestine, Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel, 2023. Več glej tudi Summers (2023). Splošno o pravici narodov do samoodločbe glej Cassese (1995), Crawford (2006).

[3] Pravica narodov do samoodločbe je tradicionalno obravnavana v kolonialnem kontekstu, medtem ko se t. i. moderna pravica narodov do samoodločbe, nanaša na vprašanje odcepitve dela suverene države in nastanek nove suverene države v primeru hudih kršitev človekovih pravic ali ko je ogrožen sam obstoj nekega naroda. Glej Christakis (2019); Kohen (2006). Glej tudi 1 (2). člen UL OZN; Resolucija GS OZN 2625 (XXV) (1970); Musgrave (1997); Quane (1998, 537–72).

[4] O *jus cogens* naravi načel UL OZN glej Petrič (2016, 71–85).

[5] Glej spodaj.

[6] Za podrobnejši pregled pravice narodov do samoodločbe v kontekstu Palestine glej Šterbenc (2016, 659–75).

[7] Ključno vlogo pri tem je imelo uresničevanje Balfourjeve deklaracije, na podlagi katere je mandatna upraviteljica dovolila naseljevanje judovskega prebivalstva na to območje.

Gaze od leta 1967 naprej (*Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall* 2004, odst. 73–78) ter množične prisilne preselitve Palestincev z okupiranih območij.[8] Poleg tega je Izrael leta 2002 začel gradnjo zidu na Zahodnem bregu in sprejel politiko priseljevanja judovskega prebivalstva in izgradnjo judovskih naselbin na okupiranih območjih, kar je, kot je poudarilo MS, v nasprotju z mednarodnim pravom, vključno s pravico Palestincev do samoodločbe (*Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall* 2004, odst. 118–22). Med drugim Izrael Palestincem sistematično onemogoča izkoriščanje vodnih virov (Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry 2022, odst. 35) in ohranja diskriminacijski pravni režim, ki krši politične, državljanske ter ekonomske, socialne in kulturne pravice Palestincev (Human Rights Council 2013). Zaskrbljujoče je, da Izrael – kljub pozivom po umiku z okupiranih območij – tudi leta 2024 nadaljuje izgradnjo zidu in politiko priseljevanja, pri čemer se je stopnja nasilja na teh območjih med vojno na območju Gaze izrazito povečala (International Crisis Group 2023).

Na ravni GS OZN je bilo v tem času sprejetih več resolucij, ki palestinskemu narodu priznavajo pravico do samoodločbe in samostojne države ter pozivajo k umiku Izraela z okupiranih območij.[9] Leta 1993 sta Izrael in PLO sprejela Deklaracijo o načelih glede palestinske prehodne samouprave (Sporazum iz Osla), s katero sta PLO priznala kot predstavnico palestinskega ljudstva, čemur je sledila ustanovitev Začasne palestinske uprave in izvolitev Sveta za palestinsko ljudstvo na okupiranem zahodnem bregu reke Jordan in v Gazi ter razdelitev Zahodnega brega na tri administrativna območja: A, B in C (Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements 1993). Nadaljnje je Palestina leta 2012 pridobila status države nečlanice opazovalke v OZN (Resolucija GS OZN 67/19 2012), kar je mogoče šteti kot »močan izraz politične podpore palestinski državnosti,« pri čemer je po mnenju Türka Palestina »po več mednarodnopravnih značilnostih država, četudi zaradi tuje vojaške okupacije še ni vzpostavila polne efektivnosti državne oblast« (Türk 2015, 78–79). Da Palestina izpolnjuje pogoje državnosti po mednarodnem pravu[10] je tudi izhodišče tega prispevka. Kot tako jo je priznalo 139 držav, vključno z nekaterimi evropskimi državami.[11] Poleg tega je Palestina članica MKS,[12] specializirane agencije Organizacije ZN za

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[8] Množične prisilne preselitve so se zgodile zlasti med letoma 1947 in 1949 ter 1967 in 2023. First Interim Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East (1949).

[9] Glej npr. Resolucija GS OZN 3236 (XXIX), 1974; Resolucija GS OZN 43/176, 1988; Resolucija GS OZN 66/17, 2011; Resolucija GS OZN 66/146, 2011.

[10] Kriteriji za nastanek države se po mednarodnem pravu presojajo na podlagi 1. člena Konvencije iz Montevidea: »Država kot subjekt mednarodnega prava mora imeti naslednje značilnosti: (a) stalno prebivalstvo; (b) definirano ozemlje; (c) vlado in (d) sposobnost vstopiti v odnose z drugimi državami.« (Convention on Rights and Duties of States adopted by the Seventh International Conference of American States 1933; Türk 2015, 71).

[11] Za seznam glej *Permanent Observer Mission of The State of Palestine to the United Nations New York*, Diplomatic relations. 10. januar 2024. http://palestineun.org/about-palestine/diplomatic-relations/. Podrobneje o pomenu priznanja države v mednarodnem pravu glej Türk (2015, 74–76).

[12] International Criminal Court, State of Palestine. 10. januar 2024. https://www.icc-cpi.int/palestine.

izobraževanje, znanost in kulturo (UNESCO),[13] Ekonomske in socialne komisije Združenih narodov za Zahodno Azijo (ESCWA),[14] Arabske lige (AL)[15] in Organizacije islamskega sodelovanja (OIC).[16]

Obstoj pravice narodov do samoodločbe v mednarodnem pravu je nesporen, prav tako Palestinci predstavljajo narod, ki mu takšna pravica pripada (Resolucija GS OZN 66/146 2011*; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall* 2004, odst. 118). Vendar pa Izrael s svojimi aktivnostmi, vključno z vojaško operacijo v Gazi, okupacijo in nadzorom nad naravnimi viri, prisilno preselitvijo prebivalstva ter spreminjanjem demografske sestave prebivalstva, krši to pravico.

JUS AD BELLUM

Mednarodno pravo uporabe sile (*jus ad bellum*) temelji na načelu prepovedi uporabe sile v meddržavnih odnosih, kot izhaja iz četrtega odstavku 2. člena UL OZN[17] in običajnega mednarodnega prava (*Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities*, 1986, odst. 188), pri čemer sta dopustni zgolj dve izjemi od tega načela: pravica do samoobrambe (51. člen UL OZN) ter avtorizacija s strani Varnostnega sveta OZN (VS OZN) (42. člen UL OZN). Izrael vojaško operacijo v Gazi utemeljuje na pravici do samoobrambe, kot odziv na napad, ki se je zgodil 7. oktobra 2023.

Za zakonito uporabo sile v samoobrambi morajo biti izpolnjeni določeni pogoji: iti mora za odziv na predhodni vojaški napad,[18] sila, ki se pri tem uporabi, pa mora biti nujna in sorazmerna (*Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities* 1986, odst. 187–201 in 226; *Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo* 2005, odst. 147). Poleg tega je treba ukrepe, sprejete v okviru samoobrambe, sporočiti VS OZN in z uporabo sile prenehati, takoj ko slednji sprejme ustrezne ukrepe za zagotovitev mednarodnega miru in varnosti.[19]

Čeprav je obstoj primarnega mednarodnopravnega pravila o samoobrambi nesporen (*Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities* 1986, odst. 38 in 96), pa so nekatere modalitete pravice do samoobrambe nejasne in predmet različnih interpretacij tako v praksi držav kot tudi v razpravah med mednarodnopravnimi strokovnjaki. Sklicevanje na to izjemo v kontekstu Gaze odpira

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[13] UNESCO, *State of Palestine*. 10. januar 2024. https://www.unesco.org/en/countries/ps.

[14] ESCWA, Member States. 10. januar 2024. https://www.unescwa.org/about/member-states.

[15] Masters in Sergie (2023).

[16] Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, Member States. 10. januar 2024. https://www.oic-oci.org/states/?lan=en.

[17] Pred tem je Pakt Društva Narodov uporabo sile omejil zgolj delno, države so namreč še vedno lahko sprejele ukrepe, ki vključujejo uporabo sile, če spor ni bil uspešno rešen po mirni poti. Glej 10., 11. in 16. člen Pakta. League of Nations, Covenant of the League of Nations, 28. april 1919. Glej tudi: General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, (Kellog-Briand Pact) 1928; Deklaracija načel mednarodnega prava o prijateljskih odnosih in sodelovanju, Resolucija GS OZN 2625 (XXV) 1970; Resolucija GS OZN 3314 (XXIX) 1974; T. Veber (2022a, 32–33).

[18] V izjemnih primerih je samoobramba dopustna, še preden je bila država žrtev vojaškega napada: če druga sredstva niso več mogoča in ni več časa za razmišljanje. Glej Türk (2015, 403).

[19] Ta procesna zahteva sicer ni del običajnega mednarodnega prava. *Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities* 1986, odst. 200 in 235.

naslednja pravna vprašanja: 1) zakonitost sklicevanja na samoobrambo s strani okupacijske sile; 2) možnost sklicevanja na samoobrambo pri uporabi sile zoper nedržavnega akterja (Hamas); 3) skladnost uporabljene sile s strani Izraela s kriterijema nujnosti in sorazmernosti. Nekateri avtorji k tem naboru dodajajo tudi vprašanje uporabe samoobrambe zoper entiteto, katere status v mednarodnem pravu je nejasen (Milanovic 2023). Ta argument je v danih razmerah relevanten z vidika dejstva, da Izrael statusa države Palestini ne priznava, vendar pa se hkrati pri odzivu zoper Hamas na območju Gaze sklicuje na pravico do samoobrambe, ki je, kot bo pojasnjeno, izrazito meddržavne narave in vsaj implicitno kaže na to, da Izrael dojema, da ozemlje Gaze pripada drugi suvereni državi, Palestini (Milanovic 2023). Vendar pa ta prispevek izhaja iz predpostavke, da je Palestina izpolnjuje pogoje »državnosti« po mednarodnem pravu, in torej tega vprašanja podrobneje ne naslavlja.

Uporaba sile v samoobrambi s strani okupacijske sile

Izhodiščno vprašanje, ki se zastavlja v primeru uporabe sile na območju Gaze, se nanaša na možnost sklicevanja na samoobrambo s strani okupacijske sile. Mnogi namreč menijo, da je ozemlje Gaze okupiral Izrael, ki je kljub umiku oboroženih sil s tega območja leta 2005 ohranil *de facto* nadzor nad njim (Dinstein 2019, 298–301; Resolucija GS OZN A/ES-10/L.25 2023, odst. 5; ICRC, 2023; Geneva Academy RULAC). Izrael tega stališča sicer ne sprejema in glede tega vprašanja tudi ne obstaja splošen konsenz v mednarodnem pravu,[20] vendarle pa je smiselno na kratko povzeti nekatere ključne vidike tega vprašanja.

Če sprejmemo stališče, da gre v Gazi za ozemlje, ki ga je Izrael okupiral, je z vidika samoobrambe to relevantno zaradi stališča, ki ga je MS zavzelo v svetovalnem mnenju *Pravne posledice gradnje zidu na okupiranem palestinskem ozemlju* iz leta 2004. V tem primeru je sodišče ugotovilo, da izgradnja zidu s strani Izraela na okupiranem palestinskem ozemlju, krši mednarodno pravo (pravico narodov do samoodločbe, pravo oboroženih spopadov in mednarodno pravo človekovih pravic). Da bi izključil protipravnost svojih ravnanj, se je Izrael skliceval na samoobrambo na podlagi 51. člena UL OZN. Sodišče je pri obravnavi tega argumenta poudarilo, da »Izrael izvaja nadzor nad okupiranim palestinskim ozemljem in da, kot Izrael sam zatrjuje, grožnja, ki naj bi upravičevala izgradnjo zidu, izvira znotraj in ne izven tega (okupiranega) ozemlja«, zato se ne more sklicevati na pravico do samoobrambe zoper teroristične napade, ki izvirajo s tega območja. Na podlagi navedenega je sodišče sklepno ugotovilo, da sklicevanje na 51. člen UL OZN ni mogoče (*Legal Consequences of the Construction of a* Wall 2004, odst. 139).

[20] Nekateri so zavzeli stališče, da ne gre za okupacijo: Milanovic (2009); Vrhovno sodišče Izraela, *Jaber al-Bassiouni Ahmed et al. v. The Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence* 2008, odst. 12; Shany (2009, 101–16); Schmitt (2023). Glej tudi Dannenbaum (2023).

Z vidika pravil jus *ad bellum* pa je relevantno tudi, da vojaška okupacija Izraela pomeni kontinuirano prepovedano uporabo sile na območju Palestine od leta 1967 dalje (Akande, Tzanakopoulos 2021, 1299–1307).[21] Wilde zato opozarja, da se Izrael ne more sklicevati na zakonito uporabo sile v samoobrambi zoper oboroženi upor, ki se v osnovi odziva na predhodno nezakonito uporabo sile. Če bi bilo sklicevanje na samoobrambo v takšnih primerih dopustno, bi prišli do krožnega argumenta, ki bi prvotno nezakonito uporabo sile (okupacijo) spremenila v zakonito, zaradi upora ljudstva, ki v kontekstu uresničevanja pravice do samoodločbe lahko v skrajnih primerih vključuje tudi uporabo sile,[22] proti prvotni nezakoniti uporabi sile (okupaciji). Izhodišče za analizo pravil *jus ad bellum* mora namreč biti prvotna protipravna uporaba sile s strani Izraela, ki zaradi dolgotrajne okupacije območja Gaze traja od leta 1967 dalje (Wilde 2023). Slednje pa, kot bo pojasnjeno v nadaljevanju, ne vpliva na nezakonitost aktivnosti Hamasa, npr. namerno ciljanje civilistov, nediskriminatorni napadi in jemanje talcev, na podlagi prava *jus in bello*.

Uporaba sile v samoobrambi zoper nedržavne akterje v mednarodnem pravu

Če ne sprejmemo argumenta o okupaciji Izraela na območju Gaze, potem je izhodišče za razpravo glede pravil *jus as bellum* dejstvo, da Izrael uporablja silo na območju Gaze (ozemlju Palestine) brez njenega soglasja, zato mora zaradi zgoraj omenjenega načela o prepovedi uporabe sile svoje ravnanje upravičiti po mednarodnem pravu. Vendar pa se Izrael ne odziva na vojaški napad, ki bi ga lahko pripisali Palestini, temveč na napad nedržavnega akterja (Hamas), ki deluje na območju te države. Predsednik palestinske oblasti Mahmud Abas je glede tega poudaril, da je Palestinska osvobodilna organizacija (PLO) edini legitimni predstavnik palestinskega ljudstva, pri čemer samo njene politike, programi in odločitve izražajo palestinsko ljudstvo, in ne politike katere koli druge organizacije (The Times of Israel 2023).

Z vidika pravil o samoobrambi je ključna opredelitev, ali napad, ki ga je izvedel Hamas, izpolnjuje kriterij »vojaškega napada«[23] iz 51. člena UL OZN. Medtem ko je večinoma sprejeto, da nedržavni akterji lahko izvedejo napad, ki izpolnjuje intenziteto vojaškega napada državne vojske (Couzigou 2016), pa je v mednarodnem pravu sporno, ali moramo za aktivacijo pravice do samoobrambe s strani države, ki je žrtev (terorističnega) napada, ta (teroristični) napad pripisati določeni državi. Povedano drugače, gre za vprašanje, ali je pravica do samoobrambe

[21] Za nasprotno mnenje (da oboroženi odpor zoper okupacijo po poteku določenega časa ni več mogoč) glej Ruys, Rodriguez Silvestre (2021, 1287–97).

[22] Glej tudi Resolucija GS OZN 3070 (XXVIII) 1973; Resolucija GS OZN 35/35A, 1980.

[23] MS je v primeru Nikaragve opredelilo kot napad, ki »[ne vključuje zgolj dejanj rednih oboroženih sil čez mednarodne meje, temveč tudi pošiljanje s strani ali v imenu države oboroženih skupin, neregularnih sil ali plačancev, ki izvedejo napad proti drugi državi, pri čemer ima napad naravo oborožene sile in po obsegu dosega prag (inter alia) dejanskega vojaškega napada, storjenega s strani rednih oboroženih sil«. *Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities 1986*, odst. 195.

omejena na razmerja med državami ali pa je morda mogoča tudi v razmerju do nedržavnih akterjev (Korošec, T. Veber 2016, 41–68). Mnenja med mednarodnimi pravniki glede tega so deljena.

MS (*Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities* 1986, odst. 277; Case Concerning Oil Platforms 2003, odst. 51; *Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall* 2004, odst. 139) institucije, kot je KMP (ARSIWA Commentary, 74–75), ter nekateri teoretiki (Shaw 2014, 1132; Gray 2008, 199) pravico do samoobrambe omejujejo na meddržavne odnose. Zlasti MS je v pretekli sodni praksi zavzelo izrazito državnocentrično razlago 51. člena UL OZN in s tem vsaj implicitno zavrnilo možnost, da bi bili vir vojaškega napada lahko izključno nedržavni akterji, čeprav tak napad lahko doseže destruktivnost državnega vojaškega napada (*Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities* 1986, odst. 195). V svetovalnem mnenju o *Pravnih posledicah gradnje zidu na okupiranem palestinskem ozemlju* je na primer zapisalo:

> *51. člen Ustanovne listine OZN priznava obstoj inherentne pravice do samoobrambe v primeru vojaškega napada ene države proti drugi državi. Vendar pa Izrael ne trdi, da so napadi, usmerjeni vanj, pripisljivi drugi državi.* (Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall 2004, odst. 194)

Vendar pa se zlasti po 11. septembru 2001 in po posredovanju koalicije zoper Islamsko državo Iraka in Levanta (ISIL) (angl. *Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant*) v Siriji vse bolj krepi razumevanje, da se tudi država, ki je utrpela hude posledice zaradi terorističnega napada, lahko odzove z uporabo sile v samoobrambi, pri čemer se razprave osredinjajo na vlogo »držav gostiteljic« terorističnih skupin, ki napade izvajajo. V okviru doktrine »nepripravljenosti ali nezmožnosti« države gostiteljice se je razvil argument, na podlagi katerega bi v primeru, ko država gostiteljica ni pripravljena ali ni zmožna preprečiti takšnih terorističnih napadov, sklicevanje na samoobrambo vendarle dopustno.[24] Bistvo doktrine nepripravljenosti ali nezmožnosti je v tem, da lahko napadena država uporabi silo na ozemlju države »gostiteljice« tudi brez njene privolitve, če ni sposobna ali pripravljena preprečiti terorističnih napadov na drugo državo z lastnega ozemlja (Lubell 2010, 42). Podrobna analiza razvoja tega koncepta presega okvir tega prispevka in jo je avtorica naslovila drugje (Korošec, T. Veber 2016, 41–68). Z vidika analize dogajanja v Gazi se zdi, da – kljub nesoglasjem in kljub napetosti med pravico odzivanja na vojaški napad s strani napadene države (Izrael) in suverenostjo države, v kateri se nedržavni akter nahaja (Palestina) – vse bolj prevladuje ekspanzivni vidik, na podlagi katerega bi Izraelu pravico do samoobrambe zoper napad Hamasa, v katerem je umrlo več kot tisoč ljudi, večinoma civilistov, morali priznati.

[24] Glej npr. VS OZN, Letter dated 7 October 2001, 2001; VS OZN, Letter dated 23 September 2014, 2014. Več o tem glej Reinold (2011, 188–92); Steenberghe (2010, 207); Deeks (2012, 483–550); Lubell (2010, 42).

Kriterij nujnosti in sorazmernosti

Če zavzamemo stališče, da je uporaba sile v samoobrambi s strani Izraela dopustna (in pri tem sprejmemo naslednje predpostavke: morebitna okupacija Izraela na območju Gaze ne vpliva na pravico do samoobrambe; pravica do samoobrambe je dovoljena zoper nedržavnega akterja (Hamas)),[25] pa se postavlja vprašanje, ali je ta samoobramba skladna z omejitvami za zakonito uporabo sile v samoobrambi, torej sorazmernostjo in nujnostjo. Gre za vsebinsko odprta pogoja, ki sta znatno odvisna od okoliščin posameznega primera. Sorazmernost v samoobrambi se v mednarodnem pravu razlaga na več različnih načinov: 1) kot odziv na predhodni vojaški napad mora biti »po obsegu in učinkih na splošno podoben napadu« (Kretzmer 2013, 235–82); 2) kot sorazmernost ciljev in sredstev, pri čemer je uporaba sile v samoobrambi upravičena le kot zadnja možnost, ki je nujno potrebna za dosego dopustnega cilja (International Law Association 2018, 11–12); 3) v ožjem smislu pa se pogosto razlaga kot ravnovesje med (možno) koristjo, pridobljeno z uporabo sile, in (dejansko) škodo, ki jo ta povzroči (Milanovic 2023; Haque 2023).[26] Ne da bi podrobno analizirali omenjene vidike sorazmernosti, lahko preliminarno zaključimo, da je zakonitost uporabe sile s strani Izraela vprašljiva. Obseg vojaške akcije Izraela v Gazi zlasti z vidika uničenja in smrtnih žrtev se zdi nesorazmeren s predhodnim napadom, ki se je zgodil 7. oktobra 2023.

Analiza potrjuje, da je odgovor na izhodiščno vprašanje, ali Izrael svojo vojaško operacijo v Gazi lahko upraviči na podlagi samoobrambe, kompleksno in odvisno od številnih predpostavk. Mednarodnopravno opredelitev med drugim zamegljujejo aktivnosti nedržavnega akterja, Hamasa, glede katerih na države osredinjeno mednarodno pravo (za enkrat še) ne daje enoznačnega odgovora.

JUS IN BELLO

Medtem ko vprašanje zakonitosti uporabe sile s strani Izraela na podlagi *jus ad bellum* pravil odpira številna teoretična vprašanja, na katera težko podamo enoznačne odgovore, pa so pravila *jus in bello* (razen klasifikacije narave oboroženega spopada) in prava varstva človekovih pravic bolj enoznačna ter bi v kontekstu Gaze morala v praksi imeti osrednjo vlogo. Uvodoma je treba poudariti, da na območju Gaze poleg prava oboroženih spopadov velja tudi mednarodno pravo človekovih pravic, pri čemer se v določenih primerih, zlasti v primeru okupacije, odgovornost države za kršitve človekovih pravic lahko ugotavlja tudi ekstra teritorialno (*Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall* 2004, odst. 106).[27] Slednje vključuje pravice, ki izhajajo iz Mednarodnega pakta o političnih in državljanskih pravicah,[28] Mednarodnega pakta o ekonomskih, socialnih in

[25] Podobno Milanovic (2023).

[26] O sorazmernosti glej tudi: Kels (2023); Kretzmer (2013, 235–82); Akande, Liefander (2013, 563–70).

[27] Glej tudi Benedek, Bilkova, Sassoli (2022, 50–53).

[28] Izrael je pogodbenica od leta 1991.

kulturnih pravicah,[29] Konvencije o genocidu,[30] Mednarodne konvencije o odpravi vseh oblik rasne diskriminacije,[31] Konvencije o odpravi vseh oblik diskriminacije žensk,[32] Konvencije o preprečevanju mučenja in nečloveškega ali ponižujočega ravnanja ali kaznovanja,[33] Konvencije Združenih narodov o otrokovih pravicah,[34] pa tudi človekove pravice, ki so del običajnega mednarodnega prava. Vendar pa podrobna analiza vseh kršitev prava človekovih pravic presega namen tega prispevka, ki se osredinja na analizo pravil *jus in bello,* z vidika človekovih pravic pa se omejuje na analizo pravice narodov do samoodločbe[35] ter obveznosti, ki izhajajo iz Konvencije o genocidu.[36]

Izhodišče za vprašanje uporabe in analize morebitnih kršitev prava oboroženih spopadov je klasifikacija oboroženega spopada. Vendar pa tudi s tega vidika situacija v Gazi ni enoznačna. Klasifikacija oboroženega spopada je namreč v določeni meri odvisna od stališča, ki ga zavzamemo glede morebitne okupacije Izraela na območju Gaze.[37]

Če sprejmemo stališče, da je Izrael okupacijska sila na območju Gaze, bi to pomenilo, da na tem območju velja pravo oboroženih spopadov, ki se nanaša na mednarodne oborožene spopade (skupni 2. člen Ženevskih konvencij). Če po drugi strani sprejmemo stališče, da Izrael Gaze ne okupira, pa so mnenja glede narave oboroženega spopada med Hamasom kot nedržavnim akterjem, ki ne deluje v imenu Palestine, in Izraelom, deljena. Nekateri menijo, da gre kljub čezmejnem elementu v takih primerih za nemednarodni oboroženi spopad med državo in nedržavnim akterjem (Hamasom).[38] Vendar pa je vse bolj sprejeto stališče, da je v takih primerih ključno vprašanje soglasja države, kjer se oborožena skupina nahaja. Ob odsotnosti soglasja za izvajanje vojaških operacij s strani države, v kateri se nedržavni akter nahaja, bi na podlagi komentarja Mednarodnega odbora Rdečega križa k 2. členu I. ženevske konvencije šlo za mednarodni oboroženi spopad, saj gre v takem primeru za »vdor v suverenost države« brez njenega soglasja (Convention (I), Commentary 2016, odst. 257–63; Akande 2011). Glede na pozive palestinskega predsednika k takojšnjem prenehanju agresije zoper palestinsko prebivalstvo (Arab News 2023) lahko sklepamo, da takšno soglasje za

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[29] Izrael je pogodbenica od leta 1991.

[30] Izrael je pogodbenica od leta 1950.

[31] Izrael je pogodbenica od leta 1979.

[32] Izrael je pogodbenica od leta 1991.

[33] Izrael je pogodbenica od leta 1991.

[34] Izrael je pogodbenica od leta 1991. Glej: United Nations Huma Rights Office of the High Commissioner, *Status of ratification interactive dashboard*. 10. januar 2024. https://indicators.ohchr.org/. Določene človekove pravice države sicer lahko derogirajo, glej 4. člen MPPDP ter International covenant on civil and political rights, General Comment No. 29, States of emergency, 31. avgust 2001.

[35] Glej zgoraj.

[36] Glej spodaj.

[37] Nekateri avtorji kot ključno okoliščino opredeljujejo tudi status Palestine po mednarodnem pravu, pri čemer bi zaključek, da Palestina ni država po mednarodnem pravu, pripeljal do sklepa, da gre za nemednarodni oboroženi spopad. Hemptinne (2023).

[38] To stališče so zlasti zavzele ZDA v okviru »vojne proti terorizmu«. Glej *Hamdan v: Rumsfeld 2006*, 548 U.S. 557.

aktivnosti izraelske vojske v Gazi ne obstaja. Tudi če torej ne sprejmemo, da gre za okupacijo, bi lahko trdili, da gre v primeru spopadov med Izraelom in Hamasom na območju Gaze za mednarodni oboroženi spopad, saj Izrael izvaja vojaške operacije na območju Gaze, ne da bi Palestina s tem soglašala.[39]

To pomeni, da se za aktivnosti Hamasa in Izraela uporablja mednarodno pravo oboroženih spopadov. Pri tem pa je treba podariti, da so pravila o izvajanju sovražnosti zelo podobna tako v mednarodnih kot tudi v nemednarodnih oboroženih spopadih, vendar pa večja razhajanja nastajajo pri pravilih o zaščitenih osebah in ugotavljanju individualne kazenske odgovornosti posameznikov na podlagi mednarodnega kazenskega prava (Hemptinne 2023), saj Rimski statut razlikuje med inkriminaciji vojnih hudodelstev, storjenih v času mednarodnega oboroženega spopada[40] in nemednarodnega oboroženega spopada[41].

Aktivnosti Hamasa

Dandanes je splošno sprejeto, da mednarodno pravo oboroženih spopadov zavezuje tudi nedržavne akterje, ki sodelujejo v mednarodnem ali nemednarodnem oboroženem spopadu, kar izhaja tudi iz običajnega in pogodbenega prava oboroženih spopadov (Pravilo 139, Študija MORK).[42] Vendar pa so mnenja o tem, kaj je pravna podlaga za zavezujočo naravo teh pravil, različna in vključujejo naslednje argumente: 1) pravo oboroženih spopadov je za nedržavne akterje zavezujoče prek države, na ozemlju katere delujejo; 2) s pravom oboroženih spopadov so zavezani posamezni pripadniki nedržavnih oboroženih skupin; 3) pravila prava oboroženih spopadov zavezujejo oborožene skupine, ker izvajajo *de facto* državne funkcije; 4) običajno mednarodno pravo je zavezujoče za oborožene skupine zaradi njihove (omejene) mednarodnopravne subjektivitete; 5) oborožene skupine so s pravom oboroženih spopadov zavezane, ker so na to pristale s soglasjem (Kleffner 2011, 443–61). Podrobna analiza teh vidikov presega namen tega prispevka, zato bo dovolj, da izhajamo iz njihovega skupnega izhodišča, da so oborožene skupine, ki sodelujejo v oboroženem spopadu, s pravom oboroženih spopadov zavezane.

Od 7. oktobra 2023 dalje je Hamas z območja Gaze na območje Izraela izstrelil več tisoč raket, zlasti na poseljena območja na severu države (Verbruggen 2023). Hkrati je Hamas 7. oktobra izvedel obsežno kopensko akcijo na mejnem območju med Gazo in Izraelom, v kateri je zavzel izraelske vojaške cilje in vdrl v izraelska mesta in kibuce. V tem obsežnem napadu so bili civilisti namerno ciljani, pri čemer so pripadniki Hamas nad civilisti izvajali brutalno nasilje. Hamas je poleg tega zajel 240 talcev, med katerimi so bili tudi ženske, otroci in

[39] Za podoben zaključek glej Dannenbaum (2023). Glej tudi ICC, *Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of The Prosecutor v: Bosco Ntaganda* (ICC-01/04-02/06) 2019, odst. 728.

[40] 8(2).(a) in 8(2).(b) člen Rimskega statuta. Rimski statut, Zakon o ratifikaciji Rimskega statuta Mednarodnega kazenskega sodišča (MRSMKS), Uradni list RS št. 101/2001, 13. 12. 2001.

[41] 8(2).(c) in 8(2).(e) člen Rimskega statuta.

[42] Glej tudi skupni 3. člen Ženevskih konvencij in 1.(1) člen Dopolnilnega protokola II k ženevskim konvencijam. Ženevske konvencije in dopolnilni protokoli, I. del (Konvencije) in II. del (Protokoli) (2019).

starejši (Vinograd, Kershner 2023). Gre za aktivnosti, ki so po pravu oboroženih spopadov prepovedane in bi lahko pomenile vojno hudodelstvo na podlagi Rimskega statuta. Napad je bil namreč v nasprotju s temeljim načelom razlikovanja, ki je del običajnega mednarodnega, prava in na podlagi katerega so napadi lahko usmerjeni zgolj proti borcem in vojaškim ciljem, in ne proti civilistom ali civilnim objektom (Pravilo 1 in 7–10, Študija MORK). Poleg tega je na ravni običajnega prava prepovedano »nasilje ali grožnje z njim, katerih glavni namen je širjenje strahu med civilnim prebivalstvom« (Pravilo 2, Študija MORK). 34. člen IV. ženevske konvencije pa izrecno prepoveduje jemanje talcev, pri čemer je prepoved tudi del običajnega mednarodnega prava (Pravilo 96, Študija MORK).

Omenjene aktivnosti Hamasa bi torej lahko pomenile vojno hudodelstvo na podlagi 8. člena Rimskega statuta, vključno z naklepnim pobijanjem,[43] jemanjem talcev,[44] napadi na osebno dostojanstvo,[45] naklepnimi napadi na civilno prebivalstvo in civilne objekte.[46] Zaradi »velikega ali sistematičnega napada na civilno prebivalstvo« pa bi lahko govorili tudi o hudodelstvih zoper človečnost, vključno z umorom,[47] prisilnim izginotjem,[48] preganjanjem[49] in drugimi nečlovečnimi ravnanji[50] (The Situation in Israel and Gaza: Legal Analysis by Eminent Professors 2023; Dannenbaum 2023).

Aktivnosti izraelske vojske

Izrael je napad Hamasa označil za terorizem in v odziv začel z obsežno vojaško operacijo »železni meč« na območju Gaze, katere namen je popolno uničenje vojaških zmogljivosti Hamasa. V okviru te vojaške operacije prihaja do napadov na civiliste, gosto poseljena območja, vključno s trgi, šolami, bolnišnicami in civilnimi konvoji. Med drugim je izraelski minister za obrambo ukazal popolno blokado območja Gaze vključno s preprečitvijo dovoza hrane, vode, zdravil, elektrike in goriva (Pacchiani 2023),[51] kar je vodilo v razpad javne oskrbe z električno energijo, s hudimi posledicami za delovanje bolnišnic in oskrbo s pitno vodo. Poleg tega je Izrael 13. oktobra 2023 vsem, ki so se nahajali v severnem delu Gaze (približno 1.1 milijona ljudi), dal 24-urni rok za evakuacijo na območje v južnem delu Gaze – z namenom zagotovitve njihove varnosti in zaščite (BBC 2023). Tako generalni sekretar OZN kot tudi posebni poročevalec OZN za človekove pravice notranje razseljenih oseb sta poudarila, da je takšen premik prebivalstva nemogoče izvesti in bo povzročil nadaljnje uničujoče humanitarne posledice (UN News 2023). Na podlagi mednarodnega pritiska je Izrael pozneje

[43] 8(2).(a)(i) člen Rimskega statuta
[44] 8(2).(c)(ii) člen Rimskega statuta
[45] Glej 8(2).(a)(viii) člen in 8(2).(c)(iii) člen Rimskega statuta.
[46] 8(2).(b)(i) člen in (ii) člen Rimskega statuta.
[47] 7(1).(a) člen Rimskega statuta.
[48] 7(1).(i) člen Rimskega statuta.
[49] 7(1).(h) člen Rimskega statuta.
[50] 7(1).(k) člen Rimskega statuta.
[51] Glej tudi Iran's UN mission denies involvement in Hamas attacks (2023).

(v zelo omejenem obsegu) omogočil dostavo humanitarne pomoči prek prehoda Rafah na meji z Egiptom ter pristal na 7-dnevno premirje, v okviru katerega je Hamas izpustil 50 talcev, Izrael pa 150 palestinskih ujetnikov, na območje Gaze pa je prišlo tudi več humanitarne pomoči in goriva (The Political Impact of the Israel-Hamas Ceasefire 2023). Ne glede na to pa je vojaška operacija Izraela na območju Gaze znatno onemogočila dostop do humanitarne pomoči in prizadejala veliko škodo infrastrukturi, ki je bistvena za ohranitev življenja v Gazi (The Situation in Israel and Gaza: Legal Analysis by Eminent Professors 2023). Po poročilih Svetovne zdravstvene organizacije (SZO) so bila prizadete tudi bolnišnice, pri čemer so bili številni zdravniški delavci ubiti ali ranjeni (WHO, Emergency situation report 2023).[52]

Kot smo ugotovili v uvodu tega poglavja, se v zadevnih razmerah uporablja mednarodno pravo oboroženih spopadov, vključno s IV. ženevsko konvencijo, katere pogodbenica je Izrael.[53] Izrael pa ni pogodbenica Prvega in Drugega dopolnilnega protokola k ženevskim konvencijam, zato je to pogodbeno pravo ne zavezuje, razen v primeru, ko je prešlo v običajno mednarodno pravo.

Omenjene aktivnosti Izraela kažejo na kršitve nekaterih pravil mednarodnega prava oboroženih spopadov, zlasti z vidika zagotovitve humanitarne pomoči in izvajanja sovražnosti. Na podlagi prava oboroženih spopadov morajo tako v mednarodnem kot tudi v nemednarodnem oboroženem spopadu stranke dovoliti in olajšati hiter in nemoten prehod humanitarne pomoči (Pravilo 55, Študija MORK). Med drugim je v preteklosti tudi izraelsko Vrhovno sodišče poudarilo, da mora Izrael skladno z mednarodnim pravom oboroženih spopadov na območju Gaze zagotoviti bistveno humanitarno pomoč civilnemu prebivalstvu (*Jaber al-Bassiouni Ahmed et al. v. The Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence* 2008, odst. 11). Pri tem je popolna blokada določenega območja na podlagi prava oboroženih spopadov prepovedana na pogodbeni (54. člen, Dopolnilni protokol I k ženevskim konvencijam) in običajno pravni ravni (Pravilo 53 do 56, Študija MORK)[54] ter lahko pomeni vojno hudodelstvo naklepnega stradanja »civilnih oseb kot način vojskovanja, tako da se jim odvzamejo stvari, nujne za njihovo preživetje, vključno z naklepnim preprečevanjem dobave pomoči, kot so predvidene po Ženevskih konvencijah« (8(2).(b)(xxv) člen, Rimski statut), kot tudi hudodelstvo zoper človečnost.[55] Poleg tega je v primerih okupacije naloga okupacijske sile na podlagi 55. člena IV. ženevske konvencije »z vsemi razpoložljivimi sredstvi zagotavljati hrano, zdravila in medicinske pripomočke za prebivalstvo«.[56]

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[52] WHO, Emergency situation report 2023.

[53] Npr. 53. člen IV. ženevske konvencije, ki prepoveduje uničevanje nepremičnin ali premičnin s strani okupacijske sile in 49(6). člen, ki prepoveduje prisilno priseljevanje dela svojega prebivalstva s strani okupacijske sile na ozemlje, ki ga okupira.

[54] Glej tudi Vrhovno sodišče Izraela, *Jaber al-Bassiouni Ahmed et al. V: The Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence*, HCJ 9132/07 (2008), odst. 13–15.

[55] Npr. 7(1).(k) člen Rimskega statuta. Glej tudi Dannenbaum (2023).

[56] Glej tudi 59. člen IV. ženevske konvencije; Sharpe (2023).

Na drugi strani je presoja zakonitosti ravnanja vojskujočih se strani pri izvajanju sovražnosti bolj zapletena in tudi z vidika dokazovanja zahtevna, saj presoja v znatni meri temelji na presoji sorazmernosti, ki je odvisna konkretnih okoliščin posameznega napada, npr. informacij, ki jih je izvajalec napada imel v trenutku izvedbe napada. Uvodoma je treba poudariti, da je kolektivno kaznovanje v času vojne prepovedano (Pravilo 103, Študija MORK). Poleg tega so na podlagi načela razlikovanja napadi na civilno prebivalstvo in civilne objekte prepovedani (Pravilo 1–13, Študija MORK),[57] prav tako tudi napadi, ki ne razlikujejo vojaškega cilja od civilnih oseb ali objektov (51. člen, Dopolnilni protokol I k ženevskim konvencijam; Pravilo 11–13, Študija MORK). Vendar pa v konkretnem napadu lahko pride tudi do civilnih žrtev, ki so lahko na podlagi načela sorazmernosti (tehtanja med resnično vojaško prednostjo in civilnimi žrtvami) upravičene kot kolateralna škoda ali pa so upravičene zaradi izgube statusa civilne osebe. V razmerah v Gazi so zlasti v ospredju argument neposredne udeležbe palestinskih civilistov v sovražnostih ter zloraba živega ščita in zloraba civilnih objektov s strani Hamasa.

Med drugimi je na primer napad na begunsko taborišče Jabalia, ki se je zgodil 31. oktobra 2023 in v katerem je bilo ubitih 200 ljudi in 800 ljudi ranjenih, izraelska vojska upravičevala z zatrjevanjem, da naj bi bilo v napadu ubitih tudi več deset Hamasovih pripadnikov (The Washington Post 2023). Podobno je tudi napad na bolnišnico Shifa, ki po pravu oboroženih spopadov uživa posebno zaščito (Pravilo 30, Študija MORK), Izrael utemeljeval z napadi na sistem tunelov, v katerih deluje organizacija Hamas (The Guardian, 'A spider's web of tunnels' 2023) in ki naj bi se nahajali v bližini bolnišnice ter z domnevno zlorabo bolnišnice s strani te skupine za vojaške namene.

Ti argumenti so z vidika mednarodnega prava oboroženih spopadov relevantni, saj v takšnih primerih civilisti, civilni objekti in zaščiteni objekti (npr. bolnišnice) lahko izgubijo zaščito in postanejo vojaški cilj. V primeru neposredne udeležbe civilistov v sovražnostih bodo slednji izgubili zaščito in posledično lahko postanejo legitimna vojaška tarča (Pravilo 6, Študija MORK; 51(3). člen Dopolnilnega protokola I k ženevskim konvencijam; 13(3). člen Dopolnilnega protokola II k ženevskim konvencijam). Podobno velja v primeru prostovoljnih živih ščitov,[58] tj., ko se civilisti z namenom zaščite določenega vojaškega cilja postavijo v neposredno bližino tega cilja (Pravilo 96, Študija MORK). Mednarodno pravo oboroženih spopadov prepoveduje tudi situacije, v katerih branitelj (v našem primeru Hamas) civiliste zlorabi z namenom, da bi odvrnil napade izraelske vojske na določen vojaški cilj (t. i. neprostovoljni živi ščit) (58. člen, Dopolnilni protokola I k ženevskim konvencijam), in primere, v katerih branitelj zlorabi civilne objekte za vojaške namene. V slednjem primeru civilni objekti lahko izgubijo zaščito in postanejo vojaška tarča (57. člen, Dopolnilni protokola

[57] Podrobneje o tem glej Sancin, Švarc, Ambrož (2009, 127–40).
[58] Splošno o tem glej Bouchie´ de Belle (2008, 883–906).

I k ženevskim konvencijam). Vendar pa je treba poudariti, da je izguba zaščite na podlagi mednarodnega prava oboroženih spopadov v konkretnem primeru praviloma omejena na primere, ki izpolnjujejo določene pogoje (Dinstein 2008, 1–16; Gasser, Dörmann 2008, 231–320; ICRC, Third Expert Meeting on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities 2005). Določena aktivnost posameznika bo na primer morala izpolnjevati tri kumulativne kriterije, da bi se lahko štela za neposredno udeležbo v sovražnostih: 1) prag škode *(angl. treshold of harm)* kar v praksi pomeni obstoj verjetnosti, da bo sovražno dejanje škodljivo vplivalo na vojaške operacije ali vojaško zmogljivost strani v oboroženem spopadu ali, nasprotno, da bo povzročilo smrt, poškodbo ali uničenje oseb ali predmetov, ki so zaščiteni pred neposrednim napadom; 2) neposredna vzročnost *(angl. direct causation),* ki terja obstoj neposredne vzročne zveze med sovražnim dejanjem in škodo, ki bo verjetno izvirala iz tega dejanja ali iz koordinirane vojaške operacije, katere integralni del je omenjeno dejanje; 3) napadalna povezava z vojskujočimi se stranmi v spopadu *(angl. belligerent nexus)*, pri čemer mora biti sovražno dejanje posebej zasnovano tako, da neposredno povzroči zahtevani prag škode v podporo eni od strani v spopadu in v škodo nasprotni strani (ICRC, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities 2009).

Poleg tega je treba poudariti, da tudi morebitna zloraba civilnega objekta ali uporaba prisilnega živega ščita s strani ene od strani v spopadu izvajalca napada ne razbremeni dokazovanja, da je pred izvedbo napada sprejel vse previdnostne ukrepe, »da se izogne in v vsakem primeru zmanjša na najmanjšo možno mero naključno izgubo življenj civilistov, njihovo poškodovanje in škodo na civilnih objektih« (Pravilo 15, Študija MORK). Breme dokazovanja, da je določen objekt izgubil zaščito, je torej na strani tiste vojskujoče se strani, ki izvaja napad, pri čemer v primeru dvoma, ali je prišlo do izgube zaščite v konkretnem primeru, obstaja domneva, da gre za civilni objekt, ki je zaščiten (50(1). člen, Dopolnilni protokol I k ženevskim konvencijam). To je v svoji izjavi poudaril tudi tožilec MKS Karim Khan:

> *Za tiste, ki so odgovorni za ciljanje in izstreljevanje raket, želim biti jasen predvsem glede treh točk. Prvič: glede vsake stanovanjske hiše, glede katere koli šole, katere koli bolnišnice, katere koli cerkve, katere koli mošeje – ti prostori so zaščiteni, razen če je zaščitni status izgubljen, ker se uporabljajo v vojaške namene. Drugič: če obstaja dvom, da je civilni objekt izgubil status zaščite, mora napadalec domnevati, da je zaščiten. Tretjič: breme dokazovanja, da je ta zaščitni status izgubljen, nosijo tisti, ki izstrelijo zadevni izstrelek ali raketo.* (The Guardian 2023*)*

Poleg tega mora biti napad izveden v skladu z načelom sorazmernosti, kar pomeni, da je kolateralna civilna škoda sorazmerna z nujno vojaško prednostjo. Mednarodno kazensko sodišče za območje nekdanje Jugoslavije je glede tega vzpostavilo test »razumnega vojaškega poveljnika« (*Prosecutor v: Stanislav Galić*

2003, odst. 719),[59] pri čemer je na ravni običajnega mednarodnega prava prepovedano »sprožiti napad, za katerega se lahko pričakuje, da bo povzročil naključno izgubo življenj civilistov, njihovo poškodovanje, škodo na civilnih objektih ali kombinacijo navedenega, ki bi bili prekomerni v razmerju do pričakovane konkretne in neposredne vojaške prednosti« (Pravilo 14, Študija MORK).[60] Vprašanje sorazmernosti je bilo s strani mednarodnih kazenskih sodišč med drugim obravnavano v primeru *Galić*. V tem primeru je sodišče potrdilo, da napad na nogometni tekmi, v katerem je umrlo 12 ljudi, več kot sto pa je bilo ranjenih, in na kateri so bili sicer prisotni tudi vojaki, ni bil skladen z načelom sorazmernosti. V takem napadu bi se namreč lahko pričakovalo, da bo povzročil naključno izgubo življenj in poškodbe civilistov, ki so pretirane v primerjavi s pričakovano neposredno in konkretno vojaško prednostjo (*Prosecutor v: Stanislav Galić* 2003, odst. 372–87).

JUS POST BELLUM

Glede na zgoraj opisane domnevne kršitve prava oboroženih spopadov bo imelo pomembno vlogo pri naslavljanju situacije v Gazi zlasti zagotavljanje pravičnosti po vojni (*jus post bellum),* prek ugotavljanja odgovornosti posameznikov in tudi vpletenih držav za morebitne kršitve pravil mednarodnega prava.

Uveljavljanje individualne kazenske odgovornosti

V okviru palestinsko–izraelskega konflikta domnevno prihaja do številnih kršitev prava oboroženih spopadov in tudi prava človekovih pravic, čeprav slednje niso bile podrobno analizirane v tem prispevku. Z vidika ugotavljanja individualne kazenske odgovornosti je zlasti pomembna pristojnost MKS v teh razmerah. Palestina je leta 2015 namreč pristopila k Rimskemu statutu in postala članica tega sodišča (ICC, State of Palestine). Poleg tega je Palestina skladno s 13.(a) in 14. členom Rimskega statuta kot država pogodbenica naznanila tožilcu situacijo na njenem ozemlju od 13. junija 2014 dalje. Februarja 2021 je predobravnavni senat MKS odločil, da ima sodišče pristojnost za obravnavo situacije v Palestini kot državi pogodbenici Rimskega statuta, ki se razteza tudi na območja, ki jih je okupiral Izrael: Gaza, Zahodni breg, vključno z Jeruzalemom (ICC, Pre-trial Chamber I, Situation in the State of Palestine 2021, odst. 114–31). Skladno s to odločitvijo ima MKS pristojnost za obravnavo kaznivih dejanj palestinskih državljanov (tudi na ozemlju Izraela) (12(2).(b) člen, Rimski statut) kot tudi za obravnavo kaznivih dejanj, do katerih je prišlo na ozemlju Palestine (tudi s strani Izraelskih državljanov) (12(2).(a) člen, Rimski statut). MKS ima torej pristojnost za obravnavo hudodelstev, ki jih je Hamas izvedel od 7. oktobra 2023 dalje, pa tudi za obravnavo vojaških aktivnosti Izraela na območju Gaze.[61]

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[59] Podrobneje o tem glej npr. Schack (2023); Manea (2023).
[60] Več o tem glej Boogaard (2023).
[61] Glej tudi Dannenbaum (2023).

Marca 2021 je MKS uradno uvedel preiskavo v Palestini za dogodke, ki so se zgodili po 13. juniju 2014, pri čemer je preiskava še vedno v teku in zajema tudi dogodke, ki so se zgodili po 7. oktobru 2023. Poleg tega je 17. novembra 2023 na podlagi 13.(a) in 14. člena Rimskega statuta tožilca MKS seznanilo s situacijo v Palestini pet držav pogodbenic Rimskega statuta: Južna Afrika, Bangladeš, Bolivija, Komoros in Džibuti, ker naj bi bilo na območju Palestine storjenih več kaznivih dejanj v pristojnosti MKS: hudodelstev zoper človečnost, vojnih hudodelstev in genocida (State Party referral in accordance with Article 14 of the Rome Statute, 2023).

Tožilec MKS je v svojih izjavah glede Gaze jasno povedal, da blanketna uporaba vseh sredstev pri doseganju vojaških ciljev ni dovoljena, pri čemer pravo in Rimski statut jasno zamejujeta in opredeljujeta obveznosti Hamasa in Izraela, ter napovedal preiskavo aktivnosti obeh akterjev (ICC, Statement of ICC Prosecutor Karim A. A. Khan, oktober 2023). Poleg tega je obsodil nasilje priseljencev na okupiranih območij in poudaril odgovornost Izraela kot okupacijske sile, da razišče in preganja njihove zločine ter prepreči njihovo ponovitev (ICC, Statement of ICC Prosecutor Karim A. A. Khan, december 2023).

Predstavniki OZN in tožilec MKS so izrecno izpostavili tudi morebitno odgovornost vojaških pravnih svetovalcev izraelske vojske. Posebna poročevalka za neodvisnost sodnikov in odvetnikov in posebna poročevalka za spodbujanje in varstvo človekovih pravic in temeljnih svobočin v boju proti terorizmu sta poudarili, da je del »poklicne dolžnosti« pravnih svetovalcev izraelske vojske, da preprečijo kršitve prava oboroženih spopadov, pri čemer imajo dolžnost zavrniti avtorizacijo ukaza, ki bi lahko pomenil vojno hudodelstvo (UN, Israel/Gaza, UN experts, 2023).

Vse to nakazuje, da bo MKS preiskalo situacijo v Gazi in vodilo postopke zoper posameznike, ki so za hudodelstva odgovorni. Vendar pa bo za uspeh teh postopkov ključno sodelovanje držav s sodiščem, zlasti pri privedbi obtoženih oseb pred sodišče, kar se je v preteklosti že izkazalo za eno temeljnih pomanjkljivosti postopkov pred MKS (npr. v primeru zapornega naloga zoper Al Baširja ter Putina).

Uveljavljanje kazenske odgovornosti posameznikom pa bi se lahko odvilo tudi na nacionalni ravni Izraela (zlasti na podlagi proti teroristične zakonodaje (Krebs 2015, 511–42)) in Palestine ter tudi pred nacionalnimi sodišči drugih držav prek izvajanja univerzalne jurisdikcije.[62] Slednje se je v preteklosti izkazalo za učinkovito v sodnih postopkih pred nemškimi sodišči glede ugotavljanja odgovornosti za vojna hudodelstva in hudodelstva zoper človečnost, storjena v Siriji in Gambiji v obdobju režima Yahya Jammeha (Aboueldahab, Langmack 2022, 1–34).

[62] Glej npr. 49. člen I. ženevske konvencije; 50. člen II. ženevske konvencije; 129. člen III. ženevske konvencije in 146. člen IV. ženevske konvencije. Glej tudi Sancin, Švarc, Ambrož (2009, 378–80).

Uveljavljanje odgovornosti držav

Na mednarodni ravni centralizirana sodna oblast ne obstaja, saj je možnost uveljavljanja odgovornosti držav pred MS omejena s predhodnim soglasjem zadevne države, ki se odraža v eni izmed podlag za pristojnost sodišča.[63] Vendar pa se je na podlagi mednarodnih konvencij, ki dajejo pristojnost za reševanje sporov MS in hkrati kodificirajo *erga omnes partes* obveznosti, razvila sodna praksa, ki do določene mere presega manko centralizirane sodne oblasti. Kot bo pojasnjeno v nadaljevanju, lahko v primerih kršitev *erga omnes partes* obveznosti katerakoli država pogodbenica sproži postopek pred MS zoper državo kršiteljico.

Izrael je članica OZN in s tem tudi *ipso facto* pogodbenica Statuta MS (35. (1) člen, Statut MS; Türk, 2015: 380), vendar pa ni sprejela splošne fakultativne klavzule, s katero bi pristala na reševanje sporov pred MS. Leta 2018 je Palestina kot država nečlanica OZN pri MS sicer podala posebno izjavo, s katero je sprejela pristojnost sodišča, vendar jo je zamejila za reševanje sporov na podlagi 1. člena Izbirnega protokola Dunajske konvencije o diplomatskih odnosih o obveznem reševanju sporov (ICJ, States not parties to the Statute). Palestina in Izrael sta pogodbenici nekaterih pogodb, ki vsebujejo kompromisorno klavzulo za reševanje sporov pred MS in bi lahko bile relevantne v kontekstu Gaze, npr. Konvencije proti mučenju in drugim oblikam krutega, nečloveškega in ponižujočega ravnanja ali kaznovanja (30. člen) in Konvencije o genocidu. Ker pa je Izrael podal pridržek k kompromisorni klavzuli Konvencije proti mučenju, ki bi omogočila morebitno sprožitev postopka pred MS,[64] podlaga za pristojnost obstaja zgolj na podlagi Konvencije o genocidu, ki v IX. členu vsebuje kompromisno klavzulo za reševanje sporov glede razlage in uporabe te pogodbe pred MS.[65] Vendar pa je slednja zamejena zgolj na ugotavljanje odgovornosti v povezavi s hudodelstvom genocida, pri čemer je izključena obravnava morebitnih drugih kršitev prava o uporabi sile, mednarodnega prava človekovih pravic in prava oboroženih spopadov. Za morebitno celovito obravnavo Palestinsko-izraelskega spora pred MS bi zato moral biti sprejeti poseben predhodni sporazum med obema državama, za kar pa trenutno verjetno ne obstaja politična volja.

Zaradi zgoraj navedenih omejitev pristojnosti MS v teh razmerah je vse bolj v ospredju možnost, da bi postopek proti Izraelu začele tretje države, ki v palestinsko-izraelski konflikt niso neposredno vpletene. MS je v nedavni sodni praksi izrecno potrdilo, da imajo v primeru kršitev *erga omnes partes* obveznosti pravni interes za uveljavljanje odgovornosti države kršiteljice tudi države, ki s predhodno kršitvijo niso neposredno prizadete. *Erga omnes partes* obveznosti so pogodbena različica *erga omnes* obveznosti, gre torej za obveznosti, ki so dolgovane

[63] Podlaga za pristojnost pred MS lahko izhaja iz: fakultativne klavzule, kompromisorne klavzule, dogovor med strankama ali *forum prorogatum* (Türk 2015, 380–83).

[64] Glej Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Dostopno na https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&clang=_en#EndDec, 10. januar 2024.

[65] Glede možnosti podajanja pridržkov k tej konvenciji glej *Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* 1951.

vsem strankam določenega pogodbenega režima in uresničitev katerih je v skupnem interesu vseh strank, onkraj posameznih individualnih interesov, ki lahko obstajajo v danem primeru (T. Veber 2022a, 153–80).

Konec decembra 2023 je Južna Afrika pred MS proti Izraelu sprožila postopek *Uporaba Konvencije o preprečevanju in kaznovanju zločina genocida na območju Gaze*, v katerem zatrjuje, da Izrael na območju Gaze izvaja genocidna dejanja,[66] katerih namen je uničenje pomembnega dela palestinskega naroda (ICJ, Application Instituting Proceedings 2023), in od sodišča zahtevala izdajo začasnih ukrepov na podlagi 41. člena Statuta MS. Januarja 2024 je MS izdalo sklep o začasnih ukrepih in odločilo, da mora Izrael skladno s svojimi obveznostmi na podlagi Konvencije o genocidu v povezavi s Palestinci v Gazi sprejeti vse ukrepe, ki so v njegovi moči za preprečitev vseh genocidnih dejanj na območju Gaze, vključno s strani izraelske vojske, ter zagotoviti osnovna sredstva in humanitarno pomoč na območju Gaze. Sodišče je svojo odločitev utemeljilo na zaskrbljujočem dejanskem stanju, kot izhaja iz poročil različnih organov in agencij OZN ter genocidnih izjavah izraelskih državnikov. Na podlagi teh dokazov je potrdilo obstoj verjetnosti (angl. *plausibility*), da prihaja do kršitev Konvencije o genocidu, torej naklepnega uničenja neke narodnostne, etnične, rasne ali verske skupine deloma ali v celoti (ICJ, Sklep o začasnih ukrepih 2024; T. Veber 2024, 13–15).

Na podlagi pretekle sodne prakse lahko utemeljeno pričakujemo, da bo MS v fazi odločanja o pristojnost le-to potrdilo. V nedavni sodbi o pristojnosti v primeru *Uporaba Konvencije o preprečevanju in kaznovanju zločina genocida* (Gambija proti Mjanmaru) je MS namreč izrecno potrdilo, da upravičenje za uveljavljanje odgovornosti držav za kršitev *erga omnes partes* obveznosti vključuje pravni interes za uveljavljanje odgovornosti države kršiteljice pred MS – tudi s strani držav, ki niso neposredno prizadete s protipravnim ravnanjem, pri čemer morajo biti ob tem izpolnjeni pogoji za pristojnost sodišča za odločanje v konkretnem primeru (*Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* 2022; T. Veber 2022a, 153–80). V nadaljnji, vsebinski fazi pa se bo MS dejansko tudi opredelilo do izpolnjenosti elementov kaznivega dejanja genocida (obarvanega naklepa za delno ali popolno uničenje določene skupine (2. člen, Konvencija o genocidu)), pri čemer pa ostalih mednarodnopravnih kršitev ne bo analiziralo.

MS je sicer situacijo v Palestini že obravnavalo v okviru svoje svetovalne funkcije. Leta 2004 je podalo svetovalno mnenje o *Zakonitosti gradnje zidu na okupiranem palestinskem ozemlju*, v katerem je ugotovilo, da Izrael z gradnjo zidu na okupiranem palestinskem ozemlju krši pravico narodov do samoodločbe, pravo oboroženih spopadov in pravo človekovih pravic (*Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall* 2004). Poleg tega je konec leta 2022 GS OZN na

[66] MS je v pretekli sodni praksi potrdilo, da Konvencija o genocidu vsebuje tudi obveznosti držav ne storiti genocida ter obveznost preprečiti in kaznovati zločin genocida. *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* 2007, odst. 155–68.

MS podala novo zahtevo za izdajo svetovalnega mnenja, ki se nanaša na pravne posledice, ki izhajajo in politik in prakse Izraela na okupiranem palestinskem ozemlju, vključno z vzhodnim Jeruzalemom (*Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem* 2022). MS je postopek za izdajo mnenja že začelo in utemeljeno lahko pričakujemo, da se bo sodišče pri obravnavni tega vprašanja opredelilo tudi do situacije v Gazi.

ODZIV MEDNARODNE SKUPNOSTI

V mednarodnopravni ureditvi, osredinjeni na suverenost, se v situacijah, ko prihaja do hudodelstev in množičnih napadov na civiliste, vedno znova zastavlja vprašanje, kakšna je vloga mednarodne skupnosti in držav pri naslavljanju in preprečevanju takšnih dogodkov in ali lahko govorimo tudi o morebitni odgovornosti ob njihovi pasivnosti ali podpori akterjem, ki hudodelstva izvajajo. Po drugi svetovni vojni je bil zasnovan sistem kolektivne varnosti v okviru OZN z namenom zagotavljanja mednarodnega miru in varnosti, tudi prek sprejema prisilnih ukrepov s strani VS OZN. Vendar pa je zaradi pomanjkanja politične volje in možnosti uporabe veta s strani stalnih članic VS OZN sprejem takšnih ukrepov pogosto onemogočen, kar se je v praksi izkazalo za problematično tudi v primeru Palestine. V preteklosti je situacijo v Palestini VS OZN[67] sicer obravnaval, vendar pa je bil sprejem konkretnih ukrepov onemogočen zaradi tega, ker je ena izmed stalnih članic uporabila veto. Po 7. oktobru 2023 je po več neuspešnih poskusih za sprejem odločitve VS OZN sprejel resoluciji 2713 in 2720, v katerih je vse strani pozval k spoštovanju mednarodnega prava oboroženih spopadov, vzpostavitvi humanitarnih koridorjev in zagotovitvi humanitarne pomoči in izpustitvi vseh talcev, ki jih je zajel Hamas, vendar pa (pričakovano) ni sprejel prisilnih ukrepov (Resolucija VS OZN 2713, 2023; Resolucija VS OZN 2720, 2023). Po sprejemu začasnih ukrepov MS v zadevi *Uporaba Konvencije o preprečevanju in kaznovanju zločina genocida na območju Gaze* je VS OZN poleg tega sprejel resolucijo s katero je zahteval takojšnjo ustavitev sovražnosti, izpustitev talcev in dostop humanitarne pomoči(VS OZN, 9552nd Meeting 2024), vendar v na namen ni predvidel sprejema konkretnih ukrepov (Resolucija VS OZN 2728, 2024). GS OZN je v odziv na nedavne dogodke v Palestini sprejela dve resoluciji, ki sicer nista zavezujoči. Oktobra je GS OZN pozvala k humanitarnemu premirju in zagotovitvi humanitarne pomoči na območje Gaze in se zavzela za dolgoročno rešitev v obliki dveh držav (Resolucija GS OZN ES–10/21, 2023). Polega tega pa je decembra 2023 sprejela resolucijo, v kateri je s podporo 153 držav znova pozvala k takojšnji prekinitvi sovražnosti (Resolucija GS OZN ES–10/22, 2023).

[67] Glej npr. Resolucija VS OZN 242 (1967); Resolucija VS OZN 2334 (2016), ki je potrdila veljavnost meje iz leta 1967 in rešitev dveh držav na tem območju ter pozvala Izrael k prenehanju izvajanja politike priseljevanja na območjih pod njegovo okupacijo. Več o tem Šterbenc (2016, 666–70).

V odsotnosti konkretnega odziva s strani OZN, v takšnih situacijah mednarodni pravniki vedno znova problematizirajo, ali bi se mednarodna skupnost v takšnih primerih lahko (ali morala) odzvala tudi zunaj okvirov sistema kolektivne varnosti – prek institutov, kot sta humanitarna intervencija in načelo Odgovornosti zaščititi (angl. *Responsibility to Protect* (R2P)) (Resolucija GS OZN 60/1, 2005, odst. 138–39).[68] Medtem ko enostranska uporaba sile s strani držav v takšnih primerih praviloma ni dovoljena,[69] pa se zdi splošno sprejeto, da se države, ki z zadevno situacijo, v kateri prihaja do grobih kršitev mednarodnega prava, sicer niso prizadete, lahko odzivajo s sprejetjem ukrepov brez uporabe sile (sankcij) zoper zadevno državo (T. Veber 2022b, 305–61). To izhaja iz *erga omnes* narave obveznosti, ki so v takšnih primerih kršene, tj. obveznosti, ki so dolgovane mednarodni skupnosti kot celoti in dajejo vsem državam upravičenje za njihovo zaščito (*Barcelona Traction* 1970, odst. 33–34). MS je v sodni praksi priznalo *erga omnes* naravo obveznosti, kot so npr. prepoved agresije in genocida (*Barcelona Traction* 1970, odst. 34; *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* 1996, odst. 31), pravica narodov do samoodločbe (*Case Concerning East Timor* 1995, odst. 29; *Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall* 2004, odst. 155–59; *Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago*, 2019, odst. 182), nekatere temeljne obveznosti mednarodnega prava oboroženih spopadov (*Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall* 2004, odst. 155–59) ter nekatere temeljne človekove pravice (npr. zaščita pred suženjstvom in rasno diskriminacijo) (*Barcelona Traction* 1970, odst. 34). Na podlagi pravil o odgovornosti držav imajo v primeru kršitev *erga omnes* obveznosti tudi države, ki niso neposredno prizadete s predhodnim protipravnim dejanjem, priznan pravni interes za uveljavljanje odgovornosti zadevne države za zaščito splošnega interesa (48. člen ARSIWA) in v ta namen lahko sprejmejo protiukrepe v obliki sankcij (54. člen ARSIWA).[70] Vendar pa je treba poudariti, da gre v teh primerih za možnost in ne za obveznosti držav, da sprejmejo sankcije, zaradi česar prihaja do njihove neenotne, selektivne uporabe v praksi. Kot bo pojasnjeno v nadaljevanju, države te možnosti niso uporabile v primeru palestinsko-izraelskega konflikta, medtem ko je na primer EU v odzivu na rusko agresijo v Ukrajini sprejela že trinajst sankcijskih paketov (European Council, EU sanctions against Russia).

Ne glede na to pa obstajajo nekatera primarna in sekundarna pravila mednarodnega prava, iz katerih lahko izluščimo določene obveznosti držav v primeru grobih kršite mednarodnega prava. Iz skupnega 1. člena Ženevskih konvencij na primer izhaja zaveza pogodbenic, »da bodo spoštovale« ženevske konvencije »in

[68] Podrobneje glej Sancin (2010); Sancin (2016, 118–34).

[69] Glede morebitnega enostranskega vojaškega posega v takšne situacije, brez soglasja zadevnih držav in brez avtorizacije VS OZN, ni enotnega mnenja med mednarodnimi pravniki, pri čemer prevladuje stališče, da uporaba sile zunaj omenjenih izjem (avtorizacija VS OZN in samoobramba) ni dovoljena. Glej Sancin (2010, 51–74).

[70] Glej Dawidowicz (2016); Dawidowicz (2017, 239–84); Tams (2005, 250); Dopagne (2010); d'Aspremont (2011); Sicilianos (2010, 1137–48).

zagotavljale«, da se upoštevajo v vseh okoliščinah. V komentarju k temu členu je zapisano, da to pravilo vsebuje tudi obveznost vzdržati se ravnanj, ki bi pomenila kršitev prava oboroženih spopadov in obveznost, da si države v največji možni meri prizadevajo za prenehanje kršitev. Iz pravila 144 študije MORK o običajnem mednarodnem pravu prav tako izhaja:

> *Države ne smejo spodbujati strank v oboroženem spopadu h kršitvam mednarodnega humanitarnega prava. Kolikor je to mogoče, morajo uporabiti svoj vpliv, da zaustavijo kršitve mednarodnega humanitarnega prava.*
> (Pravilo 144, Študija MORK)

Države so se tudi prek 89. člen Dopolnilnega protokola I k ženevskim konvencijam zavezale, »da bodo pri hudih kršitvah konvencije ali tega protokola ukrepale skupaj ali posamično v sodelovanju z OZN in v skladu z UL OZN«. Podobno iz 1. člena Konvencije o genocidu izhaja obveznost držav preprečiti genocid (*Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* 2007, odst. 155–68).

Določene obveznosti za države izhajajo tudi iz sekundarnih pravil o odgovornosti držav, ki v primeru kršitev *jus cogens* pravil, ki jih:

> *je sprejela in priznala celotna mednarodna skupnost držav kot pravilo, od katerega ni dovoljeno nobeno odstopanje in ga je mogoče spremeniti samo s poznejšim pravilom splošnega mednarodnega prava enake narave.*
> (Dunajska konvencija o pravu mednarodnih pogodb, 53. člen)[71]

KMP je v svojem delu o identifikaciji in pravnih posledicah peremptornih norm mednarodnega prava naravo *jus cogens* pravil pripoznala prepovedi agresije, genocida, hudodelstev zoper človečnost, temeljnih načel prava oboroženih spopadov, prepovedi rasne diskriminacije in apartheida, prepovedi suženjstva, prepovedi mučenja in pravico narodov do samoodločbe (Draft conclusion 23, KMP 2022). Na podlagi 41. člena ARSIWA imajo države, ki sicer niso neposredno prizadete s predhodno kršitvijo, v primeru hudih kršitev peremptornih norm obveznost sodelovanja, da s pravno dopustnimi sredstvi odpravijo hude kršitve mednarodnega prava, obveznost ne priznati kot pravno dopustnega stanja, ki je nastalo zaradi kršitve *jus cogens* obveznosti in ne nuditi pomoči ali podpore pri ohranjanju takšnega protipravnega stanja.

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[71] Splošno o pravilih *jus cogens* glej Tomuschat Thouvenin (2006); d'Aspremont (2015, 85–114). Vprašanje razmerja med pravili *ius cogens* in obveznostmi *erga omnes* v mednarodnem pravu presega obseg tega prispevka. Dovolj je, da omenimo, da med mednarodnimi pravniki prevladuje mnenje, da prisilna pravila (*ius cogens*) vzpostavljajo obveznosti *erga omnes*, ki so v interesu mednarodne skupnosti kot celote, vendar pa ni mogoče sklepati, da vse obveznosti *erga omnes* nujno izhajajo iz pravil *ius cogens*. Z drugimi besedami, krog obveznosti *erga omnes* večinoma sovpada s pravili *ius cogens*, vendar je širši in lahko zajema tudi druga pravila mednarodnega prava Sicilianos (2010, 1137).

MS je v svetovalnem mnenju iz leta 2004 poudarilo, da imajo zaradi *erga omnes* narave pravice narodov do samoodločbe in nekaterih obveznosti, ki izhajajo iz prava oboroženih spopadov, tretje (neprizadete) države določene obveznosti glede dogajanja v Palestini: ne priznati protipravne situacije, ki je nastala z izgradnjo zidu, ne dajati pomoči za vzdrževanje te protipravne situacije ter prizadevati si, da se kršitve pravice narodov do samoodločbe s strani Izraela prenehajo ter pričnejo spoštovati pravila mednarodnega prava oboroženih spopadov. MS je pripoznalo tudi obveznost OZN prizadevati si za razrešitev spora (*Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall* 2004, 202).

Iz kršitev pravice narodov do samoodločbe, temeljnih pravil prava oboroženih spopadov in nekaterih temeljnih človekovih pravic, na podlagi primarnih in sekundarnih pravil (zaradi *jus cogens* in *erga omnes* narave teh obveznosti), izhajajo določene obveznosti za države, ki niso neposredno prizadete s kršitvijo. Vendar pa je treba poudariti, da gre pri teh obveznostih za obveznosti prizadevanja (in ne rezultata), pri čemer imajo države prosto polje presoje na kakšen način oziroma s katerimi ukrepi bodo to obveznost izpolnile (Convention (I), Commentary, 2016). Države so se na grobe kršitve mednarodnega prava na območju Gaze sicer odzvale in pozivale k dostavi humanitarne pomoči in spoštovanju mednarodnega prava,[72] vendar pa specifičnih ukrepov, katerih namen bi bil doseči prenehanje kršitev (npr. zaostritev diplomatskih odnosov, sprejem sankcij), niso sprejele in še naprej ohranjajo trgovinske in diplomatske odnose z Izraelom. Na to je opozorila tudi skupina strokovnjakov OZN, ki je izrazila zaskrbljenost zaradi nevarnosti, da v Gazi prihaja do genocida, pa tudi zaskrbljenost zaradi kontinuirane podpore nekaterih držav izraelski vojaški strategiji v Gazi in neuspeha za preprečitev genocida (Gaza: UN experts call on international community to prevent genocide 2023). V tej luči so nevladne organizacije sprožile postopek zoper nizozemsko vlado zaradi njenega sodelovanja in prispevka k obsežnim in resnim kršitvam mednarodnega prava oboroženih spopadov. Tožniki so med drugim trdili, da mora Nizozemska nemudoma ustaviti dobavo delov F-35 Izraelu, saj je to njena obveznost, ki izhaja iz 1. skupnega člena Ženevskih konvencij in Pogodbe o genocidu (Lawsuit Accuses Netherlands' Government of Complicity in Israeli War Crimes 2023). V nedavni sodbi je sodišče odločilo, da mora nizozemska vlada ustaviti izvoz zadevnih delov bojnih letal F-35, saj bi bili le-ti lahko uporabljeni v vojaških operacijah, ki niso sklade s pravom oboroženih spopadov (Prizivno sodišče v Haagu, Gerechtshof Den Haag 2024).

Zgolj peščica držav pa je sprejela bolj odločne ukrepe proti Hamasu in Izraelu. Kot že omenjeno, je skupina petih držav situacijo v Palestini naznanila tožilcu MKS, Južna Afrika je začela postopek pred MS, nekatere države so odpoklicale svoje diplomate iz Izraela (npr. Bahrain, Čad, Čile, Kolumbija, Honduras, Jordanija in Turčija).

[72] Na ravni Slovenije je bila sprejeta Deklaracija o trenutnih razmerah na območju Palestine in Izraela, Uradni list RS št. 119/2023.

Na ravni EU so države članice sprejele izjavo, v kateri so obsodile teroristični napad, ki ga je izvedel Hamas, in poudarile potrebo po zagotovitvi humanitarne pomoči v Gazi (European Council, Statement of the Members 2023). EU je poleg tega na teroristični sankcijski seznam (Sklep Sveta (SZVP) 2023/2764) dodala pripadnike Hamasa (European Council, Fight against terrorism 2023), vendar pa je ohranila razvojno pomoč Gazi (Začasni Evro-mediteranski pridružitveni sporazum, 1997) in tudi ni sprejela sankcij zoper Izrael (npr. v obliki prenehanja izvajanje bilateralnega sporazuma o trgovini med EU in Izraelom na podlagi klavzule o spoštovanju človekovih pravic) (2 in 76. člen, Evro-mediteranski sporazum o pridružitvi med evropskima skupnostma in njunimi državami članicami na eni strani ter državo Izrael na drugi strani). EU sicer redno sprejema sankcije zoper tretje države na podlagi klavzul o človekovih pravicah, na primer na podlagi Sporazuma iz Cotonouja, kot odziv na kršitve človekovih pravic ali državne udare v zadevnih državah (T. Veber 2022b, 362–75), zato bi upravičeno lahko pričakovali, da bi sankcije v obliki prekinitve gospodarskih odnosov sprejela tudi v primeru Gaze.

SKLEP

Palestinsko-izraelski konflikt odstira številna kompleksna mednarodnopravna vprašanja, ki terjajo poglobljeno analizo in poznavanje različnih, med seboj prepletenih mednarodnopravnih področij: pravice narodov do samoodločbe, prepoved uporabe sile (*jus ad bellum*), pravil mednarodnega prava oboroženih spopadov (*jus in bello*), pravil za ugotavljanje individualne odgovornosti in odgovornosti držav (*jus post bellum*) ter pravil, iz katerih bi lahko izpeljali določene obveznosti mednarodne skupnosti pri odzivanju na grobe kršitve mednarodnega prava. Podrobnejših prikaz dejavnosti obeh akterjev, Hamasa in Izraela, nakazuje, da na območju Gaze prihaja do številnih kršitev mednarodnega prava, do katerih se bodo vsebinsko morala opredeliti zadevna sodišča. V tem prispevku pa smo – onkraj zaskrbljujoče humanitarne situacije in omenjenih kršitev – skušali prikazati, da palestinsko-izraelski konflikt razodeva dva vidika mednarodnega prava.

Zlasti zaradi ključne vloge nedržavnega akterja, Hamasa, situacija v Gazi odstira pomanjkljivosti na države osredinjenega[73] oziroma s suverenostjo utemeljenega mednarodnega prava. Pri uporabi sile s strani nedržavnih akterjev je namreč uporaba pravil *jus ad bellum* (pa tudi določeni vidiki *jus in bello*, kot je klasifikacija oboroženega spopada) v mnogih pogledih nejasna. Ta vrzel se v teoriji skuša premostiti prek institutov, kot je doktrina »nepripravljenosti ali nezmožnosti države gostiteljice«, ki pa (za zdaj še) ni splošno sprejeta. Postavlja se vprašanje, ali je »tradicionalno« mednarodno pravo ustrezno za urejanje kompleksne mednarodne stvarnosti, v kateri imajo vse pomembnejšo vlogo nedržavni akterji, kar nakazuje potrebo po ustrezni prilagoditvi temeljnih paradigem

[73] Za kritiko državnocentričnosti v mednarodnih odnosih glej Hedžet (2023, 787–813).

mednarodnega prava. Na drugi strani pa so pravila, ki izhajajo iz mednarodnega prava človekovih pravic, na primer pravica narodov do samoodločbe in prepoved genocida, ter mednarodnega prava oboroženih spopadov, široko sprejeta in jasna, zaradi česar terjajo oziroma prepovedujejo določeno ravnanje držav in posameznikov. Res je, da izvrševanje teh obveznosti v mednarodnem pravu ni centralizirano oziroma avtomatizirano, vendarle pa v povezavi z mehanizmi ugotavljanja odgovornosti, kot sta npr. MS in MKS, ta pravila pomenijo vzvod, s katerim lahko (tudi) mednarodna skupnost od vpletenih akterjev terja in sankcionira protipravna ravnanja. V tem pogledu tradicionalno, na individualne interese držav osredinjeno mednarodno pravo skuša premostiti pomanjkanje ali nedelovanje centraliziranih sankcijskih režimov s pripoznanjem obstoja *erga omnes (partes)* obveznosti v mednarodnem pravu. Vse bolj se utemeljuje prepričanje, da se vse države v mednarodni skupnosti lahko odzivajo na najhujše kršitve mednarodnega prava in uveljavljajo odgovornost zadevne države, npr. prek sprejema sankcij ali začetka postopka pred MS, kar potrjuje tudi postopek proti Izraelu, ki ga je nedavno sprožila Južna Afrika na podlagi Konvencije o genocidu, v katerem pa bo MS materialnopravno sicer omejeno na ugotavljanje morebitnih kršitev te konvencije in ne bo ugotavljalo drugih kršitev mednarodnega prava.

Vendar pa selektivnost in počasnost implementacije – ob odsotnosti politične volje – ostajata temeljni pomanjkljivosti mednarodnega prava; zdi se, da ju bo kljub razvoju v prispevku analiziranih mehanizmov mednarodno pravo težko premostilo. Medtem ko mednarodna skupnost prek organizacij, kot sta OZN in EU, krepi pritisk na udeležene strani in poziva k spoštovanju mednarodnega prava, pa konkretni učinkoviti ukrepi za preprečitev nadaljnjih žrtev v Gazi in uveljavljanje odgovornosti še niso bili sprejeti. Zlasti bode v oči primerjava z odzivom mednarodne skupnosti na vojno v Ukrajini, kjer večje število držav sodeluje v zadevnih postopkih pred MS in MKS, pri čemer so številne države in mednarodne organizacije – v odziv na kršitve mednarodnega prava – sprejele tudi enostranske sankcije (T. Veber 2022b, 333–38).

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LEGITIMACY: MYTH AND POLITICS THE CASE OF POLITICAL SPEECHES OF FRANJO TUĐMAN[1, 2]**

Abstract. *The article explores the significance held by political myths for legitimacy and politics. To that end, we examine political myth in line with the contemporary theory of political myth, which understands political myths as an integral part of all political communities that is not inherent to just authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. Every political community has their own stories/narratives that are accepted by most of the population and form the base of the legitimacy of the political order, whether it be a democratic or a non-democratic political order. In the final part of the article, we examine which narratives had such a legitimising power by analysing the political speeches of Franjo Tuđman while he was in office.*
Keywords: *legitimacy, politics, political myth, political speech analysis, Tuđman.*

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this article is to explore the significance held by political myths for the legitimacy of politics while considering the case of Croatia during the process of re-creating nation-building in the 1980s and 1990s. In pursuit of this goal, we examine political myth as it is theorised in contemporary political theory.

Political myth may be described as an ideologically marked narrative that purports to give a true account of a set of past, present or predicted political events and is accepted as valid in its essential aspects by a certain group (Flood 2002). It represents a summary of narratives about political events (yet at the

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same time not too many of them) that are true pertaining to the group which believes in these narratives. In earlier periods of conceptualisation in modern social sciences, mythical thought was understood as belonging solely to primitive or at least antient societies (Eliade 1998). Myth acquired a pejorative connotation in the Enlightenment since it is not based on reason and its connection with politics therefore arouses passions, emotions and the irrational, all of which have been recognised as bad. In this sense, myth has become synonymous with non-reality or fiction. Myth in connection with politics has held a pejorative meaning. This explains why myth is used in modern politics only in connection with totalitarianism, which is supposed to be committed to irrationalism, manipulation of the people, the production of illusions and false political goals, and hence also to myth and mythology. In fact, the concept of myth has met a similar fate to that of ideology. Myth is, from a Gramscian point of view, part of the field of ideology and hegemony (Hočevar and Lukšič 2018).

In the first half of the 20th century, at least two exceptions emerged in the field of political theory. Georges Sorel (see Ohana 1991) and after him Antonio Gramsci[3] used the concept of myth as a tool for understanding politics in the early 20th century.

Today, in contemporary political theory (under the influence of political anthropology) political myth has moved into a new phase of researching as an aspect of everyday life (Edelman [1967] 1975; Flood 2013; George and Bennett 2005). In line with this theory, no polity, i.e., political community, is free from producing, having and believing in myths. Myth creation is a common characteristic of political life and occurs in all communities, ideologies, and orders of political life for the purpose of offering validation to a community, even including liberal democratic orders. Political myths are also employed today as a tool for the emotional engineering of political communities or, more technically, as a tool for energising voters.

Political myths should be based on (some) real historical events. The political communities attached to those myths are not primarily interested in determining the historical reality of those events but in the value and legitimacy a given historical event holds for a specific political community today.

Political myths are political because and to the extent that they are mediated through the relations of political forces and carry their content. They are concentrates of the political situation and therefore can serve to enable individuals and groups to recognise themselves in and identify with them, and thus help to legitimise the political actor or system using it in this form.

[3] In *Quaderni dell carcere*, Gramsci analysed Benedetto Croce and Georges Sorel's position on passions and myth in politics and realised that "'theory of myth' is nothing else but 'theory of passions' in language which is less precision and formally coherent" (Gramsci 1977, 888). Gramsci even noted that the party as a modern ruler should be spoken of as a "myth-prince", i.e., in no way reduced to its legal formal and organisational level. "Sorelian 'myth' should be studied as a political ideology" and as an "expression of collective will" (*volonta coletiva*) (Gramsci 1977, 950). According to Gramsci, with Sorel myth is on the level of a trade union, that is, on the level where the collective will is still in formation.

Political myths that legitimise a certain movement, actor or system are so embedded in the mental structure, they form such a strong part of the ruling ideology and the ruling consciousness that the ordinary eye cannot see them. Yet, in times of the rapid transformation of political regimes they come into view because the new regime needs new myths and must transform or even eliminate the old myths that gave legitimacy to the previous actors and system.

In this article, we look at the creation of new political myths that Croatia needed in the process of gaining independence, which is also a process of building new legitimacy. We analyse the establishing of new myths by considering key speeches President Franjo Tuđman gave during the 1990s.[4]

A point of departure of this article is the cultural approach to political science (Landman 2008) in line with the cultural shift that unfolded in political science in the 1980s (Cipek 2007a). This approach implies "culture as a system of symbols, practice, and values that influence political processes and institutions" (ibid.). The cultural approach provides a strong contribution to comparative politics in terms of both methodology and content. With respect to methodology, it facilitates the removal of certain typical mistakes (like the Galton problem, individualistic and ecological fallacy (Landman 2008)), and solves the issue of the potential travel of a term from one part of the world to another. Culture provides us with the context for understanding political institutions and processes; namely, the entire political system. Culture and history represent key qualitative elements required for supplementing quantitative research and while interpreting results avoiding common methodological mistakes, which often arise from a poor choice of research design due to insufficient understanding of the cases being analysed. In terms of content, the cultural approach explains certain phenomena in the political system that other approaches cannot explain. The fertility of the cultural approach proved quite significant in research of political identities, political communities, and nationalism (Cipek 2007b). In alignment with the demonstrated postulates of the cultural approach, this article does not seek to establish a new model or offer a general theory, but to more deeply understand the processes underway during the disintegration of the former state and formation of an independent state. The study is conducted from a cultural perspective with a central goal to interpret and hence it is focused on understanding more than explaining and on disclosing more than designing (Mudde 2002, 22). This study is be conducted through the cultural approach as the aim of the study is to interpret, more deeply understand, and reveal the nuances of regime change.

[4] Franjo Tuđman (1922–1999) was the first president of Republic of Croatia from 1990 until his death. He served following the country's independence from Yugoslavia. He reached the rank of major general of the Yugoslav Army in 1960. Tuđman participated in the Croatian Spring movement that called for reforms in the country and was imprisoned for his activities in 1972. He lived relatively anonymously in the following years until the end of communism, whereupon he began his political career by founding the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) in 1989. While supporters point out his role in achieving Croatian independence, critics have described his presidency as authoritarian.

THE LEGITIMACY OF A POLITICAL REGIME

The concept of legitimacy is perceived as a *par excellence* term in political science[5] today. Nevertheless, it can hardly be understood without political philosophy and a historical context, as well as the emotional dimension associated with the term.[6]

The political theory of legitimacy has established two dominant theories of political legitimacy: normative and descriptive. The normative theory of political legitimacy requires a moral foundation of legitimacy. The descriptive or 'historical-sociological' theory rejects standardisation and seeks to describe sources of legitimacy outside the norms of justice and looks at sources of legitimacy in those who are governed, i.e., the reasons they recognise as valid for being governed. Both theories consider the notion of legitimacy relative to the state, its institutions and the decisions made within the regime.

Although this usage is the most common, it in fact places political science in the position of a handmaiden of morality. Political actions and systems are legitimate if they are in accordance with moral principles, yet with the moral principles of the one who is judging them. Political science must not overlook the fact that this kind of moral judgment is always the judgment of the dominant centre of power, which means it is mediated by its interest. In daily politics, by morally condemning the opponent, the centres of power do not simply strip off the opponent's moral values, but also delegitimise and discredit them politically, meaning that they limit the opponent's power of political action.

Legitimacy as a concept is strictly connected to the concept of the state and politics. Even for Plato, the legitimacy of the state is an important element for ensuring the good functioning of the state. The focus on the importance of education is so strong that even the state is planned as an educational machine. "Obviously, then, we must first control the creators of fables; that fable which they make beautiful must be approved, and that which they do not make beautiful must be rejected" (Plato 2006, 1047). One must not tell fables in which the gods and heroes are portrayed badly, one must not say that the one who is acting unjustly is not doing anything strange, even if he punishes his father who had wronged him. The purpose of politics is to educate people to become virtuous citizens. A good government is one led by men holding the highest of virtues. Leaders without virtue or those ruled by the worst parts of the soul push the political community into a bad state, even into tyranny (Lukšič 2013).

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[5] Pye (1966) defines six key political processes that political science must conceptualise and research: legitimacy, identity, penetration, integration, participation and distribution. Oxford's A New Handbook of Political Science (1996) defines the questions of institutions and legitimacy as two key issues of political science since antiquity.
The German Political Science Association devoted its congress in 1975 entirely to the topic of legitimacy.

[6] Weber uses the term *Legitimitätsglaube* – a thought on legitimacy. Castles highlights that institutions have the need for "moral support, that is, to be recognized as legitimate" (Castles, in Keman (ed.) 2002, 235).

Thomas Aquinas assigned to the monarch the right to rule given by God. Therefore, it is indisputable and unquestionable, and does not require much argumentation, whether there is a Church that has a guaranteed clear hierarchy. The fundamental idea of his political philosophy is the supremacy of popes over secular rulers. It justifies the theocratic absolutism of the Pope in a theological way. He was convinced, and here he follows Aristotle, that there are two parts in man: body and soul. Two types of government correspond to this: secular and religious. "The duty of the king is to look after the good of the community" (Aquinas 1990, 85). Yet, on the other hand: "The common good is found only in God" (Aquinas 1990, 82). If man alone could reach his final destination, the king could rule both spheres, but since this requires God's help, kings must be subordinate to the pope and the church, Aquinas states.

The change is brought about by the Renaissance and Machiavelli's *The Prince*. The power of the bourgeoisie and the new social order (capitalism) changed the legitimation with God and replaced it with the legitimation with nature. The state and monarch no longer work in the name of God but according to the laws of nature. In The Prince, Machiavelli sets himself the task of discovering "what is actually true, not what someone makes up about it" (Machiavelli 1966, 41). A ruler must know the nature of the people well, and he will be able to rule well and for a long time.

Machiavelli opened up space for a different interpretation of the question of when and on what basis rulers can exercise power over the people. While discussing the civil rule in the city (*principate civile*), Machiavelli (1990, 37) stresses that it is established not by crime or violence, but "by the benevolent favor of other citizens", which means "either by the favor of the people or by the favor of the magnates". We may conclude from this that people's republics and oligarchic republics could be separated by this criterion. Whoever comes to power with the support of the people has a better chance of staying in power for a long time than someone else who comes with the support of the bigwigs. The latter must make sure that he also gains the support of the people, otherwise he will have no help in times of trouble (Lukšič 2019). Machiavelli was a republican, not a monarchist.

Social contract theory tried to offer another interpretation with the normative approach using the metaphor of a social contract. In *Leviathan*, Hobbes opposes the revelation of the law and derives legitimacy from the monarch's ability to save his subjects from the natural state of chaos and secure their safety and welfare. The ruler's success secures the obedience of his subjects. Hobbes was aware of the power held by conventional politics in establishing the legitimacy of authority. The context of the civil war in England, together with modern scientific findings, dictated to him "the constitution of completely different arguments for determining the criteria for establishing the legitimacy of the authorities" (Spruk and Lukšič 2017, 465) Even though he referred to nature and the natural in the spirit of the times, Hobbes understood the shortcomings of the naturalistic conception of politics.

For Locke, a social contract equals consent, that is, the legitimacy which creates the regime. When Locke (1978, 11, 13) introduces the understanding of political power, he demands that we must exercise it "from its origin, we must examine in what state all men are by nature". Still, this is a state of complete freedom and equality, one in which "the execution of natural law is committed to the hands of every man". According to Locke, property is "the only legitimizing basis, the pillar of the modern state" (Lukšič 2016, 636).

Rousseau notes that one must first know the natural man to be able to determine the natural law. He wrote a treatise on the origin of inequality based on what he "read, not in books like you, which are false, but in nature, which never lies. All that comes from her is true; nothing is inauthentic except that which is mine" (Rousseau 1993, 30).

Legitimacy is the political process of accepting power, agreeing to the system, to the power holders and recognising the validity of the system and its holders. A legitimate authority enjoys the consent of the people. The consent of those who are governed is a precondition for the exercise of political authority. This compliance is based on higher principles than the legal system since compliance with the legal system is subsumed under the concept of legality, on something that is before the law, and for political science it is political relations that include political ideals, political subjects, their goals, and work methods. Legitimacy is a two-track process in the ruler–ruled relationship: the people supply legitimacy to the system and the government and, on the other hand, the government takes care of and procures its own legitimacy. There are also two levels of legitimacy: internal and external. The system and the rulers within this system must take care of legitimacy in their own country and in the international space. In the transformation of the political system, in our case the system of the Republic of Croatia, ensuring external legitimacy was very important. The international community had to acknowledge Croatia in the new relationship of political forces, which then led to the legalisation of this relationship with the international formal recognition of the new country.

Max Weber (1990)[7] was the first to develop the typology of legitimacy, which is also the best known and most recognised. The three types are: 1) rational, which is legal, bureaucratic, modern; 2) traditional, which is based on unwritten fixed rules; and 3) charismatic, which is based on the leader or his/her charisma. Weber notes that all three types complement each other and that all systems are based on all three types, except that the dominance of legitimacy types varies from system to system. If we look again at the Republic of Croatia as a new country, although it also built a new legitimacy on the charisma of the new leader Tuđman, in our article we are more interested in that part of the new legitimisation related to the forming of a new self-understanding of the country, which is linked to new myths.

[7] This theory was first published in 1922 by Marrinae Weber in *Preussische Jahrbücher*.

If legitimacy is understood as the consent of those who are being governed, in a democratic regime it is not essential to talk about legitimacy. The disintegration of the Eastern Bloc triggered key changes in the development of political science and its discipline of comparative politics, chiefly in terms of geographical focus. Comparative politics is faced with the proliferation of geographical areas of research, while political legitimacy, stability of order, opposing regimes and ideologies are becoming key research concepts. The way in which institutions acquire the right to perform the socio-political functions for which they are appointed by those they govern emerges as the central issue. Like their individual parts,[8] entire political systems survive so long as they possess political legitimacy. The end of the Cold War showed that a path that leads to a liberal-democratic regime, a path which would suggest 'the end of history', is not being followed by all countries, and it would be incorrect to say that all of these regimes are illegitimate. Non-democratic regimes, just like democratic ones, need the consent of the majority of those ruled over, or at least powerful elites (military, bureaucratic or others) for their survival. The regime may be legitimate for some, but not for others, and thus legitimacy is something that many undemocratic regimes seek to prove to the international community and to their own citizens, through semi-competitive or non-competitive elections, as a form of procedure that should be unquestionable. But even when a regime uses such farcical procedures to prove its legitimacy, it is impossible to imagine a ruling regime that does not achieve some kind of legitimacy. Illegitimate political systems or regimes cannot survive. A system can be in a crisis of legitimacy and may develop into another type of legitimacy or type of system. "Only governments that have some legitimacy can implement and maintain policies with high short-term costs" (Wintrobe, in Breton (ed.) 2002, 398). Policies lacking legitimacy can only be implemented with the support of force, but no regime can survive only by using force. Further, the use of force must be recognised in the process of legitimisation as legitimate. "The dialectic of repression lies in the fact that it also presupposes what it is supposed to replace: namely, faith in the validity of the supporting norms and their recognized value, a validity that must therefore be maintained even with repressive means" (Offe 1985, 176).

Looking for a single source of legitimacy (justice, tradition, or rational-impersonal rules) is another shortcoming of modern theories of legitimacy. Linz noted that, given the division of power in the regimes for which individual elections are held, it is possible that each branch of government (legislative, executive or judicial) derived its legitimacy from a different source. Moreover, it is reasonable

[8] Political legitimacy has been observed in many segments of the political system, such as electoral systems – "democratic electoral systems survive until they suffer from a serious lack of democratic legitimacy" (Pennings, in Keman (ed.) 2002, 110); institutions – "institutions are important because they structure behavior and receive support within the framework of widespread legitimacy of public policies – "governmentalization of function, i.e. the transience of public policy is requested because the legitimacy of its sanctions makes social controls more effective" (Lowi 1979, 37).

to assume that one branch can draw its legitimacy from several sources: rules, traditions, culture etc.

In modern political science, elections are understood as an event where legitimacy is created. And that is what they are, but only in one respect – the transfer of legitimacy from the bottom up. Yet what had was happening before the elections took place? When they go to the polls, in most cases voters know who they will vote for, the legitimacy that they would transfer to the system and individuals by circling names on the ballot was determined earlier. We may thus conclude that elections are acts as both confirmation and the creation of legitimacy; for the elected, they represent the creation of legitimacy, whereas for voters they serve to confirm previously created beliefs, they give legitimacy to the system and the elected representatives.

Which processes were previously implemented to create legitimacy? This question relates to the understanding of an individual who, as a political subject, transfers legitimacy to the institutions and policies of the state. Establishing the legitimacy attributed to the modern state based on rational, impersonal rules implies that those who are governed make their decisions in an equally rational and impersonal way. Yet, people do not make decisions based solely on rational reasons, and it is completely impossible for personal decisions to be made impersonally. Human decisions are mediated by emotions as well as cultural conditioning, and the end of a regime does not mean its complete erasure from the collective and individual memory. Legitimacy should hence be understood as a dynamic process that seeks constant reaffirmation by the state which must be ready to respond to the challenges posed to its legitimacy by various segments of society, explaining why this article uses the definition of political myth while conducting the qualitative and quantitative analysis of the speeches of Tuđman.

TUĐMAN'S SPEECHES: BUILDING THE LEGITIMACY OF A NEW STATE

Already in the process of gaining its independence, the Republic of Croatia began to build the legitimacy on which the new state was to be founded. Franjo Tuđman was one of the key actors in this process; in fact, he was the main individual actor who even personified the movement for independence. This means it is no coincidence that he was elected the first president of the Republic of Croatia. His speeches summarised the core ideas from which new myths about the political community and the newly independent Croatian state were formed.

The speeches by Franjo Tuđman[9] considered for this research were selected to cover the entire period of Tuđman's political involvement and thus all publicly available speeches made during his presidency were included and subjected to quantitative and qualitative analysis.

[9] All of the speeches along with the research materials and detailed analysis documentation are available from the author.

Among all of the speeches analysed, the narrative about Croatia's 1,000-year statehood and Croatia being at the crossroads of Europe appears in most of them (8 out of 13). The narrative contained in the idea of reconciliation appears in five analysed speeches, four of which were intended for a domestic audience, and just one for an international audience (admission to membership of the Council of Europe). The last narrative analysed, that of Bleiburg, appears in only 2 of the 13 cases considered; of which, one in the domestic context, and that in a narrower domestic context, i.e., upon celebration of the seventh anniversary of the First Assembly of the HDZ, and one in the international context (admission to membership of the Council of Europe). The only two speeches that include all three analysed narratives are the speech on the admission of the Republic of Croatia to becoming a member of the Council of Europe on 6 November 1996, and the speech to mark the celebration of the seventh anniversary of the First Assembly of HDZ on 23 February 1997. These speeches were held 3.5 months apart.

The narrative about the 1,000-year statehood is the narrative most represented in Tuđman's speeches and remains constant over time. The idea of reconciliation appears as early as the 1990s, but not in such a significant proportion. After not being represented for some time, this narrative reaches its peak in 1995 during a speech in Split to which Tuđman had come on the "Freedom Train".

The narrative about Bleiburg appears for the first time in the analysed speeches in 1996 when Croatia was admitted to the Council of Europe, and in a speech held only 3.5 months later on the anniversary of the First Assembly of HDZ. In 1996, the most changes occur in Tuđman's discourse, and it is also the year when he discovered that he was suffering from cancer. It was in November 1996 when Tuđman was staying in the United States of America that he became aware of the seriousness of his condition, while at the same time he was experiencing considerable pressure from civil society and citizens in domestic politics. On 21 November, protests in which 100,000 citizens participated were held in the main square in Zagreb following the decision of the Telecommunications Council to cancel the concessions of Radio 101. Radio 101 was one of the key media establishments that had been strongly critical of Tuđman.

The trend of the three narratives in Tuđman's speeches, which clearly outlines the constant representation of the narrative about the 1,000-year statehood and the strengthening of the idea of reconciliation in the period after 1995, that is, after the war, and the narrative about Bleiburg, which can be described as isolated cases between November 1996 and February 1997. Towards the end of his life, in his speeches Tuđman once again returned to the idea of the 1,000-year statehood as his key political idea which, ultimately, in the last analysed speech, completely took over his speech given to the diplomatic corps at the start of the last year of his life.

The legitimation myth of Yugoslavia was the national liberation struggle, and the secondary legitimation myths derived from it are the leader Tito who personified the idea of brotherhood and unity of Yugoslav nations and nationalities,

antifascism, and socialism. In this part of the article, we consider the presence of this narrative in the speeches of the Croatian sovereign. In his speeches, Tuđman refers to the national liberation struggle and Tito, primarily in speeches in the early 1990s when Croatia was not yet a consolidated state, nor was it internationally recognised. Tuđman did not attempt to devalue the anti-fascist struggle, nor the role of Josip Broz Tito. Likewise, as we know, in 1941, as a 19-year-old, he immediately recognised the Ustasha as a failed Quisling project and left school to participate in the anti-fascist struggle in the Zagorje region.

What Tuđman sees as the key problem of the socialist Yugoslavia in realising the rights of the Croatian people was the one-party communist system. In his speech upon the promulgation of the Constitution, Tuđman devoted a large part to the communist regime, but also to possible challenges to the new constitutional order that had just been established. During that time in December 1990, Tuđman was still hoping that the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) would not side with Milošević and implement his goal of creating a Greater Serbia that was to include all Serbs in the territory of former Yugoslavia. Hence, in a speech on promulgation of the Constitution he called on them to accept the changes that had taken place in the republics. To accept Croatia as part of Yugoslavia through a republican parliament, with clearly defined borders *vis-à-vis* neighbouring republics, thus placing it among European states through the values they share. In his speech during the constituent session of the Parliament, he cites this very fact as one of the vital moments that enabled Croatia to be internationally recognised.

He incorporated the anti-fascist struggle into the preamble of the first Croatian Constitution. Accordingly, the preamble of the first Croatian Constitution, as one of the historical sources of Croatian statehood, cites the decisions of the National Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Croatia from 1943 (AVNOH) in their opposition to the declaration of the Independent State of Croatia (Pavelić's regime during the Second World War, NDH), and in opposition to the later republican constitutions of Croatia during Yugoslavia.

During the whole period of office of the Croatian president, he never deviated from recognising the value of anti-fascism. He also proudly emphasised his participation in the anti-fascist struggle, especially in the international arena, including when Croatia was admitted as a member of the United Nations. This was because anti-fascism is a value cherished by all countries relevant to Croatia's international recognition and since Tuđman wanted to see Croatia in the UN, as a NATO ally, and as a member of the EU from the very beginning. Further, he did not want to allow the narrative to prevail about the Croats as being exclusively Ustasha (the army of the collaborating Pavelić regime of ISC (NDH)) aimed at exterminating the Serbs, a narrative which Milošević used in both the Yugoslav and international arenas.

Two key ideas in Franjo Tuđman's political thinking are inextricably linked. According to him, in fighting for their statehood Croats had fought against empires, first of course the Ottoman Empire. The struggle against the Ottoman

Empire brought Croatia to the bulwark of Europe. The struggle against the Ottoman Eastern cultural circle, that is against the encroaching Islam, brought it to the bulwark of Christianity.

Another central idea in Franjo Tuđman's political speeches aimed at consolidating the nation was the idea of reconciliation. Consolidation is built on a single national entity that must not be torn apart by political divisions on the left and right, mainly into the partisans and Ustasha.

Tuđman deemed it important to reject the narrative about the bloodthirsty Ustashas. This led him to include the Chetniks in the same process of rationalisation:

> *Not all Ustashas in the ISC (NDH) were fascists, not all of them committed crimes, just as, from the Serbian point of view, not all Chetniks were fascists and perpetrators of crimes. Historical circumstances led to the division of the Croatian people into partisans, Home Guards, and Ustashas, and on the other hand, the Serbian people into partisans and Chetniks. Both of them had their own positive ideas, not only crimes.* (Tuđman, 1993a)

The idea of reconciliation also had an element of publicly tackling the problem of low natural growth with respect to which Tuđman saw a way out of the situation in the return of emigrants.

Still, the desired mass return never happened. The now independent Croatia has lost almost one-fifth of its population over the last 30 years. The Washington and Dayton Agreements could have been reached after the Croatian people, with the joint struggle of the homeland and the expatriate Croatia, and particularly with the unity of the Croats from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, prevented the goals of the Yugoslav and Greater Serbian aggression to subjugate both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina; yet also the intention to establish a separate Muslim state at the expense of Croatian areas (Tuđman 1993a).

The question remains whether the idea of reconciliation also included the Serbian population in Croatia. Among the analysed speeches, Tuđman addressed the Serbian population of Croatia directly when the Constitution was being adopted in December 1990. The "Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina" was proclaimed on 21 September 1990. In his speech given on promulgation of the Constitution, Tuđman stated that it was a matter of political deception that had misled part of the Serbian population with the aim of achieving the Greater Serbia. In this speech, he states that it is now necessary to "regulate all civil and national rights, which this Constitution guarantees to Serbs and others, but with it we will resolutely protect the territorial integrity and legal order of the Republic".[10] Tuđman therefore does not condemn all Serbs in Croatia in this speech but, of course, expresses the

[10] Speech on the occasion of the promulgation of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, Zagreb, 22 December 1990.

intention of defending Croatia against military and terrorist actions. Moreover, he says that the vast majority of Serbs in Croatia does not question the new Croatian government, for which he cites the example of elected representatives of the Serbian minority participating in the work of the Parliament. This example shows his policy towards the Serbs, which tried to be as conciliatory as possible and with the aim of integrating the Serbian population into the new democratic order. Tuđman further declares a general amnesty for all who have not committed war crimes, and addresses Vojislav Stanimirović directly,[11] who at the time held the position of president of the transitional Executive Council for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srijem regions, stating that the presumption of innocence is on the side of the Croatian state, which had been attacked.

The post-Second World War at Bleiburg[12] (Austria) and the Way of the Cross belong to a set of topics that have still to be sufficiently historically explored. The responsibility for the large number of extradited civilians and soldiers, who died during this event as victims, has not been fully examined. Precisely for this reason, this historical event is more susceptible to mythological narration. Daily political conflicts often manipulate this event and thus an individual's relationship to Bleiburg is used to determine where the individual is on the political spectrum. Martina Grahek's research on the ways of presenting Bleiburg and the Way of the Cross in Croatian history textbooks is interesting.[13] The author analysed the presentation of events in history textbooks for primary and secondary schools in the period 1991–2004. Grahek shows that "the textbooks in earlier editions (1992–1995) contain more detailed descriptions of the events, which fits perfectly with the picture of the events of that time in these areas, when, after all, Bleiburg and the Way of the Cross have become more written about, which were up until then taboo topics" (Grahek, in Fleck and Graovac (eds.) 2005, 641). The author concluded that a smaller number of textbooks state that preparations for the withdrawal were carried out, that the ISC (NDH) leadership had responsibility for the event, as well as that the British participated in the events.

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[11] Vojislav Stanimirović was the mayor of Vukovar during the Serbian occupation and a minister without portfolio in the Government of Republika Srpska Krajina, while in 1995 he received the Order for Special Merit in the War in Banja Luka, presented by Radovan Karadžić. He was also among the founders of the Independent Democratic Serbian Party (SDSS), and as a member of that party he was also a representative in the Croatian Parliament.

[12] The Bleiburg tragedy in Croatian history refers to a set of post Second World War events that happened in May 1945. At that time, most of the armed forces of the Independent State of Croatia (ISC/NDH) had started to withdraw towards the Austrian border with the intention of surrendering to the Allies, which was a preferred option than to surrendering to the Yugoslav Partisans. A significant number of civilians, who had fled their homes in fear of the Yugoslav Partisan Army, was following these units. The British forces just outside of Bleiburg stopped the group and the surrender negotiations were initiated. Upon the alleged expiration of the surrender deadline, the Yugoslav Army that was also present at the site opened fire indiscriminately. Yugoslav units reported that 95,000 soldiers (NDH Army, Slovenian Domobrans and Chetniks from Serbia and Montenegro) surrendered in Bleiburg. No independent data are available on the precise numbers of dead soldiers and civilians. Further, the troubles of those who survived did not finish there and they had a long way ahead to march for their lives, known in the literature as the Way of the Cross (referring to a tragedy of biblical proportions).

[13] Published in *Dialogue of Historians – Historians 9*, Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, Zagreb 2005.

It was not until the beginning of the 1990s, after the attainment of Croatian independence, that the topic of Bleiburg ceased to be taboo and, as we discussed earlier, the topic of Bleiburg entered the cultural sphere only in 1999 with Aralica's book *Četverored*. This makes it interesting to consider what Franjo Tuđman's attitude to Bleiburg was in his speeches and whether he intended to mythologise this historical tragedy. Analysis of Franjo Tuđman's key speeches showed that Bleiburg was not a frequent topic of his speeches. Bleiburg and the Way of the Cross do not appear in any of them as a complete narrative, just as they do not appear as a theme of the literary works observed in the earlier part of the article.

As already stated, the only time Tuđman mentions Bleiburg in one of the analysed speeches was when Croatia was admitted to the Council of Europe in 1996, and in just one sentence while comparing potential regional integration with a defeat equal to the one at Bleiburg. In the period during which Tuđman gave this speech, the political context was not particularly favourable to him. He was strongly criticised for his treatment of civil society and media freedom, even though Croatia still managed to fulfil the criteria for membership in the Council of Europe. The second time Tuđman mentions Bleiburg was 1 year later in a speech celebrating the seventh anniversary of the Parliament dominated by his party the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ).

The three basic narratives of political myths in Franjo Tuđman's speeches we have observed are as follows: the 1,000-year Croatian statehood on the bulwark of Europe and Christianity, the idea of reconciliation, and the post Second World War tragedy in Bleiburg. As it emerges, the most represented narrative throughout Tuđman's political career was the one about the 1,000-year-old Croatian statehood at the crossroads of Europe and Christianity. At the same time, it quantitatively occupied the lion's share of his speeches, and was present in the speeches he gave to both domestic and international audiences. It is therefore unsurprising that this myth is incorporated into the preamble of the Croatian Constitution.

CONCLUSION

This article has explored the significance held by political myths for legitimacy and politics using the contemporary theory of political myth. The mentioned theory of political myth understands it as an ideologically marked narrative that purports to give a true account of a set of past, present or predicted political events which a particular social group accepts as valid in its essential aspects (Flood 2002). As such, political myth is present in all political communities as the connecting tissue, contrary to the earlier belief that it can solely be found in authoritarian or totalitarian regimes or as part of primitive societies. Every political community has their own stories/narratives that are accepted by most of the population and form the base of the political legitimacy of the political order, no matter the nature of the order (whether it be a democratic or

a non-democratic political order). Legitimacy is a dynamic concept that seeks constant reaffirmation by the state, which must be ready to respond to the challenges posed to its legitimacy by various segments of the political community. Therefore, even in liberal democratic systems elections are not the only source of legitimacy. Although they are the most practical form, that is a mechanically measurable expression of the political will of the citizens, their will is formed even before they come to the election polls through the established relationship of political forces that operates through all possible channels for creating common-sense such as the media, culture, education system etc. Contemporary political theory has shown that policies lacking legitimacy can only be implemented by force. Nonetheless, even in that case, the force used must be legitimised and that process entails high transaction costs for those who implement such legitimacy.

Political systems must legitimise themselves in various ways in a process that also includes the creating of relevant myths and dismantling of myths upon which previous regimes and political systems were based.

Bearing this in mind, this article has analysed one such source for Croatian citizens in the 1990s – speeches given by the most important political figure of the time. The article identified which narratives served as such a primary legitimising tool for the first Croatian President Franjo Tuđman and analysed publicly available political speeches during the entire time he held office until his death in 1999. Through quantitative and qualitative methods, the research sought to show that for Franjo Tuđman the two most important narratives were the uninterrupted statehood and the idea of reconciliation, whereas the Bleiburg narrative appears in only a small portion of his speeches, namely, just two isolated instances. On the other hand, the first two narratives refer to a more present theme in Tuđman's speeches and as such represent two main ideas that Tuđman used as stories to strengthen the Croatian national identity and served in the process of legitimising the new political system of the Republic of Croatia. The research has also shown that the 1,000-year statehood is the narrative which is the most represented, and remains the only constant narrative in Tuđman's speeches. This allows us to conclude that this narrative is the most fundamental idea of Croatian unity and statehood for Franjo Tuđman.

APPENDIX I

Table 1: LIST OF ANALYSED SPEECHES

List of analysed speeches	
30. 5. 1990	Speech during the constituent session of the Croatian Parliament
22. 12. 1990	Speech on the occasion of the promulgation of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia
22. 5. 1992	Speech to mark the admission of the Republic of Croatia to UN membership
28. 9. 1993	Speech at a session of the United Nations General Assembly
3. 5. 1995	An epistle on the occasion of the liberation action Bljesak
4. 8. 1995	Proclamation to Croatian citizens of Serbian nationality on the eve of Operation Storm
26. 8. 1995	Freedom Train – speech given in Split
6. 11. 1996	Letter on the occasion of the admission of the Republic of Croatia to membership of the Council of Europe
23. 2. 1997	Presentation to mark the seventh anniversary of the First Assembly of HDZ
8. 6. 1997	Train of Peace – speech given in Vukovar
8. 6. 1997	Train to Vukovar – speech given in Zagreb
5. 8. 1997	Sworn letter – inauguration in Zagreb
15. 1. 1999	Speech for the diplomatic corps on the occasion of the Christmas and New Year's holidays

Source: Authors.

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POLITICAL LIBERALISM VS. RIGHT-WING LIBERTARIANISM: JOHN RAWLS IN ENCOUNTER WITH ROBERT NOZICK**

Abstract. *Among twentieth-century political philosophers, Americans John Rawls and Robert Nozick are generally recognized as giants – both for the boldness of their arguments and for the influence they have exerted. They sketched rival visions. Rawls, inspired by Immanuel Kant, argued for a world characterized by tolerance, equality, and justice as fairness. Nozick, claiming a Lockean heritage but actually inspired by Adam Smith (the "invisible hand") and Herbert Spencer ("survival of the fittest"), outlined a program for a minimal state, with very little taxation, offering no cushion at all against poverty, and providing no state assistance for the poor, the sick, the disabled, or the widowed. Rawls' vision is clearly part of the liberal tradition, while Nozick's championing of a minimal state contains illiberal elements.*
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INTRODUCTION

After the conclusion of World War Two, liberal democratic ideology could be said to have become hegemonic. Royal absolutism had been dying in the course of the nineteenth century and was effectively killed off, in the European context, in the course of World War One. Nazism and Fascism had been defeated in the Second World War while anarchism had run its course and proven unable to establish a stable society operating on the basis of direct collaboration among people. Peasant democracy, understood as an alternative to liberal democracy, had been crushed before it could get off the ground (in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland most obviously), and Stalinism had resulted in the peacetime extermination of an estimated 42 million people (Medvedev 1972, *passim*). Anti-communist uprisings in the German Democratic Republic in 1953 and in Hungary

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in 1956 confirmed that Soviet-style communism could be maintained only by force. For the Western world, that left liberal democracy – whether in the form of a constitutional monarchy, a parliamentary republic, or a presidential system – effectively hegemonic. For this reason already, liberalism entered a new phase after 1945.

But there is a second reason why it makes sense to speak of liberalism entering into a new phase after World War Two, albeit with 1971 as the watershed year, viz., it was in that year that John Rawls' *Theory of Justice* was published. Rawls looked back to Kant for inspiration and not only rehabilitated Kant back into mainstream political thought, but also effected a change in the way liberals more generally thought of their tradition. Prior to the publication of *A Theory of Justice,* twentieth-century liberals tended to look back to John Stuart Mill as having defined the basic principles of liberalism and the advantages of and challenges faced by systems of representative government. With the publication of Rawls' *Theory of Justice,* Immanuel Kant was decisively elevated to this position, and Kantian universalism made gains against utilitarian consequentialism both in terms of numbers of publications on each of these thinkers and in terms of the way they have been evaluated. Mill remains of high interest to students of political thought, of course, but no one can have failed to notice the surge of interest in Kant following the publication of *A Theory of Justice.* Rawls was influenced by Kant's writings and, in taking Kant's corpus as his point of departure, Rawls opened a new chapter in the history of liberalism and, thus, of Western political thought. But a direct challenge to Rawlsian liberalism was not long in coming and took the form of right-wing libertarianism, which asserted that "each person enjoys, over herself and her powers, full and exclusive rights of control and use, and therefore owes no service or product to anyone else that she has not contracted to supply" (Cohen 1995, 12, as quoted in Brenkert 1998, 30). Since people have no pre-contractual duties to anyone, according to consistent right-wing libertarians, it follows that government has no business imposing a tax on anyone who has not given his or her explicit consent to be subject to taxation. Robert Nozick challenged the central premises of liberalism directly, raising the anti-tax banner and figuring as probably the leading advocate of right-wing libertarianism. Reflecting on Nozick's *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (1974), Brian Barry concluded that Nozick was proposing nothing less than

> *to starve or humiliate ten percent or so of his fellow citizens (if he recognizes the word) by eliminating all transfer payments through the state, leaving the sick, the old, the disabled, the mothers with young children and no breadwinner, and so on to the tender mercies of private charity.* (Barry 1975, 332)

As for Rawls' notion of "justice as fairness" (1988, 251), Nozick expressed no interest in either justice or fairness in his 1974 volume. Indeed, like Robinson

Crusoe until he met Friday, Nozick insisted that "We all lead separate lives. We have separate existences" (Wolff 1991, 7, paraphrasing Nozick), as if people did not live in communities and as if people were not interdependent, whether for food or medical care or services and products of various kinds. Thus, when Nozik embraced a doctrine of the "absolute liberty" of each individual (Papaioannou 2010, 19), he was confirming his complete rejection of the notion that there are universal moral standards. This is one of a number of reasons why right-wing libertarianism, such as outlined by Nozick, should be seen, not as a branch of the liberal tradition, but rather as an open repudiation of liberalism in all its forms (see Freeman 2001, 105–51).

The clash between Rawlsian liberalism and Nozickian libertarianism should not be seen as a matter of only arcane interest. On the contrary, in contemporary America, we are witnessing a battle between the Democratic Party's championing what is *de facto* justice as fairness and Trump's Republican Party seeking to wipe out as much of the welfare function of the state in order to cut the already low taxes being paid by the rich.

JOHN RAWLS (1921–2002)

Whatever one makes of his premises and arguments, it is undeniable that John Rawls stands as a giant among political philosophers of the twentieth century. He single-handedly transformed liberal discourse, made justice – rather than freedom or property rights – the centerpiece of his liberal philosophy, and offered a refinement of social contract theory based, alternatively, on notions of rationality (in *A Theory of Justice)* or reasonableness (in his *Political Liberalism).* Although his 1971 work, *A Theory of Justice,* has received more attention than his other works, Rawls himself would admit, in the preface to the second edition of that work (1999) that there had been "certain weaknesses in the original edition" and that, if he had been writing the book only at that point in time, there were some things which he would have done differently (Rawls 1999a, xii, xiv). Rawls cleared up these matters in his *Political Liberalism,* which, although somewhat less ambitious than his earlier book, is in some ways a greater achievement.

Born in Baltimore, Maryland, he was educated at Princeton University. His first teaching post was at Cornell University; in 1960 he took a position at MIT, and in 1962 assumed a chair in philosophy at Harvard University, where he remained until his retirement in 1991. Rawls' major works are: *A Theory of Justice* ([1971] 1999); *Political Liberalism* ([1993] 1996); and *The Law of Peoples* (1999). The central idea in all of these works is the idea of justice.

A Theory of Justice

Rawls' *A Theory of Justice* was directed against teleological political doctrines in general and utilitarianism in particular. By *teleological doctrines,* Rawls understood doctrines which aim to maximise what is good. For Rawls, it was a matter of indifference whether such doctrines sought to maximise equality (as in

Stalin's Russia) or "racial hygiene" (as in Nazi Germany) or security or, for that matter, the greatest happiness for the greatest number (as per Jeremy Bentham). What mattered for Rawls was that

> *Whenever a society sets out to maximize the sum of intrinsic value or the net balance of the satisfaction of interests, it is liable to find that the denial of liberty for some is justified in the name of this single end. The liberties of equal citizenship are insecure when founded upon teleological principles.* (Rawls 1999a, 185)

It may seem surprising that Rawls considered utilitarianism an example of teleological thinking. But, as Rawls viewed it, utilitarianism – which he identified not only with Bentham and Mill, but also with F. Y. Edgeworth and Henry Sidgwick – "is not individualistic…in that, by conflating all systems of desire, it applies to society the principle of choice for one man" (Rawls 1999a, 26). Far from respecting the rights and needs of individuals, utilitarianism ends up arguing – Rawls believed – that

> *…there is no reason in principle why the greater gains of some should not compensate for the lesser losses of others; or more importantly, why the violation of the liberty of a few might not be made right by the greater good shared by many. It simply happens that under most conditions, at least in a reasonably advanced stage of civilization, the greatest sum of advantages is not attained in this way.* (Rawls 1999a, 23)

While this criticism of a mathematical calculation of benefits would seem to be aimed at Bentham, rather than Mill, Rawls found fault also with the latter's reasoning which, he concluded, could not support equal liberty for all (Rawls 1999a, 185).

The problem with the slogan, *the greatest good (or happiness) for the greatest number*, was precisely its failure to prioritize *justice.* For Rawls, by contrast, the concept of right must take priority over any concept of what is good (Rawls 1999a, 347; and Rawls 1988, 251–76); accordingly, "laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust" (Rawls 1999a, 3). In *A Theory of Justice,* justice figured, in the first place, as a moral concept; indeed, Rawls sometimes used the terms "moral theory" and "political philosophy" interchangeably, in recognition of the interdependence and interconnection of moral and political concepts and arguments (Wallach 1987, 583; and Schaefer 1977, 192–93). For Rawls, a just society should be understood as "a well-ordered society" characterized by some measure of equality and by individual liberty, limited "only in the special cases when it is necessary for preserving equal liberty itself" (Rawls 1999a, 193). In his vision, civic virtue and civility also played important parts, with mutual respect underpinning both of

these (Abbott 1976, 341; Johnson 2008, 1997). William Edmundson (2017, 29) has offered the interesting comment that Rawls nowhere excludes the possibility that a system based on the principles of liberal socialism could be equally effective in assuring fairness. Edmundson continued by claiming that Rawls could envisage a socialist system "that is both liberal and democratic…In Rawls's view, there is nothing in socialism itself that is inimical either to [the] liberal rights of the individual or to democratic governance" (Edmundson 2017, 29).

Rawls did not wish to offer his vision of a liberal society either as a prescription or as merely an endorsement of one or another political system. Rather, his argument in *A Theory of Justice* was that liberalism was what people would choose, when thinking rationally – under conditions he specified – over any other system. To make this argument, Rawls sketched what he called "the original position" – a condition in which we should imagine ourselves negotiating a political constitution without knowing whether we will find ourselves male or female, black or white, rich or poor, healthy or infirm, intelligent or dim-witted, talented or not, or even what religious beliefs, if any, we will hold. This lack of knowledge about our own eventual individual advantages and disadvantages Rawls termed "the veil of ignorance" (Rawls 1999a, 118, 121). Since no one would want to agree to a system in which he or she would suffer, the result – Rawls argued – would be a just society. In effect, "the combination of mutual disinterest and the veil of ignorance achieves much the same purpose as benevolence," he suggested (Rawls 1999a, 128).

Curiously, Rawls chose to presume the rationality of all parties in this "original position": "everyone is equally rational and similarly situated, each is convinced by the same arguments" (Rawls 1999a, 120). This presumption of identity of reasoning among people seems to be at variance with his criticism of utilitarianism, elsewhere in the volume, for "not tak[ing] seriously the distinction between persons" (Rawls 1999a, 24). Even more problematic were his optimistic claim that "[t]he veil of ignorance makes possible a *unanimous* choice of a particular conception of justice" (Rawls 1999a, 121), and his further assertion that "the veil of ignorance insures that everyone should reason in the same way" (Rawls 1999a, 494). Rawls thereby presumed, as David Lewis Schaefer has pointed out, "that there is an orderly set of rules underlying men's judgments of what is just, akin to those that underlie their speech, which can be made manifest only through a theoretical inquiry such as men who are not professional philosophers are unlikely to undertake" (Schaefer 1977, 194). Rawls would modify his position on these matters in *Political Liberalism*.

As already noted, Rawls associated his ideas about justice with Kant's moral theory, although he admitted that he had not remained within the boundaries set by the German philosopher (Rawls 1999a, 222). But he argued that his idea of the veil of ignorance was "implicit… in Kant's ethics" and that the principle of justice derived in the original position functioned in a way analogous to Kant's categorical imperative, noting in particular that neither the original position nor the categorical imperative presumed any particular goal or objective (Rawls

1999a, 121, 222–23). Yet Rawls believed that people thinking rationally would inevitably reach consensus on what he called *justice as fairness,* which he hoped would reconcile the imperatives of liberty and equality. His notion of equality thus embraced: political equality, including equal rights of liberty of thought and conscience; a fair measure of equality of opportunity; and the difference principle, whereby differences in income and wealth would be regulated and limited by government.

Political Liberalism

In his book, *Political Liberalism,* Rawls asked at the outset, how is it possible at all for people "divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines" to maintain a just system in which people are free and equal (Rawls 1996, 4). As in *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls once more asked us to imagine people in an "original position" (comparable in some ways to Locke's 'state of nature') operating under a "veil of ignorance". But unlike the people in Locke's state of nature, who are already bound by Natural Law before agreeing on their founding contract or constitution and who must constrain the constitution to conform to Natural Law, in Rawls' "original position", people cannot assume any agreement on fundamental moral principles. On the contrary, revising the conception he had articulated in his earlier book, what Rawls would now have people reach is not rationality, but reasonableness. The distinction between rationality and reasonableness is this:

> *Persons are reasonable in one basic aspect when, among equals say, they are ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do so… and they are ready to discuss the fair terms that others propose.* (Rawls 1996, 49)

A person is rational, said Rawls, when prioritizing goals and calculating the means required to reach these goals. A person is reasonable insofar as s/he honors the principle of reciprocity and is prepared to consider the arguments and evidence presented by a person or persons with a different view, and is open to changing her or his mind in the face of compelling arguments. On this basis, Rawls insisted that the reasonable cannot be derived from the rational. It followed that people in the original position are engaged in construction and negotiation, not in the discovery of timeless moral laws. In other words, the criterion of reasonableness is an element in a political constructivism which may be associated with an underlying conventionalism. What is reasonable is, after all, defined in procedural terms, rather than in substantive terms. And yet there remains a substantive substratum – the idea that citizens must be free and equal.

The very freedom of citizens excludes enforcement of unity around any religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine. Hence, a pluralism of moral and religious outlooks develops naturally. This led Rawls to assert that it is illegitimate to

use force even to impose one or another version of liberal teachings (Rawls 1996, 37). Excluding force, thus, a just society can be founded only on a "political conception [which] is the focus of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines," and in which public discussion takes place freely concerning the essentials of the system (Rawls 1996, 44).

Toleration of intolerance? In *Political Liberalism,* Rawls revised his earlier thinking on the question of the limits of toleration. He had previously suggested that, in most cases, an "intolerant sect" would, if it survived, gradually shed its intolerance over time and that, in a system practising "justice as fairness", people would limit toleration to sects which did not persecute or suppress those not accepting the sects' views (Rawls 1999a, 192–93). In *Political Liberalism,* by contrast, he distinguished between toleration as a stop-gap measure, introduced to bring an end to interreligious conflict, and toleration understood as a matter of principle. Toleration, according to Rawls, presumes the validity of the norm of equality within a community. Pushing toleration a bit further, one may urge that toleration of the members of minority religious groups (or, for that matter, of members of sexual minorities) may be understood as accepting them as having equal moral worth as human beings and as deserving of equal liberty – assuming, of course, that they do not seek to persecute others, that they too behave in a civil way, and that they do not organise to overthrow the liberal order. Not surprisingly, Rawls recognised that any liberal project worthy of the name has to address the oppression of women and promote measures to advance the cause of gender equality (Laden 2013, 25). In any event, as Mill suggested in *On Liberty,* threats to liberal democracy are more likely (on the whole) to emanate from tyrannical majorities than from ambitious minorities.

As Samuel Freeman pointed out in 2007, it was Kant whom Rawls credited as his most important inspiration (as cited in Taylor 2011, 4). In spite of that, a number of scholars have argued that Rawls' professed Kantianism must be qualified (Taylor 2011, 3). In distinguishing his own theory from Kant's, Rawls argued that, insofar as Kant's theory is "a comprehensive moral view in which the ideal of autonomy has a regulative role for all of life," it is "incompatible with the political liberalism of justice as fairness" (Rawls 1996, 99). Rawls recognised Kant's attempt to reconcile moral freedom with the moral law, but insofar as Kant believed that what practical reason constitutes or grasps is an independent and transcendent order of values, Rawls rejected the Kantian system as claiming more than it can deliver. Rawls concluded that,

> *Once we accept the fact that reasonable pluralism is a permanent condition of public culture under free institutions, the idea of the reasonable is more suitable as part of the basis of political justification for a constitutional regime than the idea of moral truth. Holding a political conception as true, and for that reason alone the one suitable basis of public reason, is exclusive, even sectarian, and so likely to foster political division.* (Rawls 1996, 129)

As in *A Theory of Justice,* Rawls once again offered his theory as an alternative to utilitarianism (consequentialism), perfectionism, and intuitionism (the way in which he characterised Natural Law theory). He identified two central principles:

> *a. Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all.*
>
> *b. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions. First, they must be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they must be of the greater benefit [to] the least advantaged members of society.* (Rawls 1996, 291)

He claimed that a liberal society cannot embrace or promote a comprehensive doctrine, but admitted that some people claim that, in demanding tolerance and fair play and in emphasising individual rights, liberalism does just that. Rawls denied the charge, claiming that these restrictions and provisions are no more than "reasonable measures to strengthen the forms of thought and feeling that sustain fair social cooperation between its citizens" (Rawls 1996, 195). But what is to be tolerated? Not intolerance, as we have seen, nor other doctrines or religions or political movements which endanger the system of justice (Rawls 1996, 196–97).

THE LAW OF PEOPLES

In this 1999 publication, Rawls distinguished among five types of society:

1. reasonable liberal peoples, living in a society organized along liberal-democratic lines;
2. decent peoples, living in "nonliberal societies whose basic institutions meet certain specified conditions of political right and justice (including the right of citizens to play a substantial role, say through associations and groups, in making political decisions) and lead their citizens to honor a reasonably just law for the Society of peoples" (Rawls 1999b, 3 n. 2). ('Society of Peoples = all those peoples who follow and observe the Law of Peoples (below));
3. outlaw states;
4. societies burdened by unfavourable conditions;
5. benevolent absolutisms: "They honor human rights; but because their members are denied a meaningful role in making political decisions, they are not well-ordered" (Rawls 1999b, 4).

What is striking in this typology is Rawls' extension of the concept of political decency (which we may understand as legitimacy) to include also other societies respecting the Law of Peoples. So what is the Law of Peoples? Rawls lists eight central principles:

1. *Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples.*
2. *Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings.*
3. *Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them.*
4. *Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention.*
5. *Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defense.*
6. *Peoples are to honor human rights.*
7. *Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war.*
8. *Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime* (Rawls 1999b, 37).

For Rawls, regimes which refuse to comply with the Law of Peoples should be considered "outlaw states". Moreover – and this is critical for Rawls – the principle of non-intervention does not afford any protection for outlaw states. On the contrary, Rawls tells us, "…liberal and decent peoples…simply do not tolerate outlaw states…[Indeed,] liberal and decent peoples have the right, under the Law of Peoples, not to tolerate outlaw states" (Rawls 1999b, 81).

A final point: in allowing that there can be "decent" but nonliberal societies, Rawls was by no means granting merely "decent" societies equal status with liberal-democratic societies; for Rawls, political liberalism, as he defined it, remained the highest ideal (Rawls 1999b, 8).

ROBERT NOZICK (1938–2002)

Not since Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan* (first published in 1651) had any work of political thought provoked as much outrage and anger as Robert Nozick's 1974 book *Anarchy, State, and Utopia.* Denying the liberal notion that the state bore any obligations to the poor or that progressive taxation was the appropriate remedy for inequalities of wealth, the book argued that "No state more extensive than the minimal state can be justified" (Nozick 1974, 297). Drawing his inspiration from the Scottish economist and philosopher Adam Smith (1723–90), Nozick argued that a minimal state could safeguard individuals' "absolute rights" as if by an "invisible hand" (Papaioannou 2010, 57). Ironically, Smith used the expression the "invisible hand" on only three occasions: first, in his posthumously published *History of Astronomy,* where he noted that people in polytheist societies attributed "irregular events of nature" to "the invisible hand of Jupiter"; second, in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759), where he wrote that underpaid workers "are led by an invisible hand to…without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of society"; and third, in *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), where he claimed that a self-seeking merchant is "led by an invisible hand to promote an end which is no part of his intention" (Rothschild 1994, 319). Nozick, by contrast, used the expression "invisible hand" routinely.

Yet Nozick presented his libertarianism as a logical extension of the writings of John Locke (1632–1704), thus implying that his book could be seen as part of the liberal corpus, and claimed to take over Locke's ideas about a pre-political state of nature (Lacey 2001, 58). In so doing, Nozick imagined that Locke was an armchair philosopher, spinning out his ideas without intending any practical application to the issues of his day. In fact, Locke developed his theory of a state of nature to justify both the enclosure movement by which farmers took over land which had hitherto been used to graze sheep, withdrawing the land from the state of nature (Moulds 1964, 179–88) and English colonization of the New World by claiming (falsely) that the indigenous peoples living there had no government or laws, did not live in settled communities, and were not working the land (Arneil 1996, 4, 38–39, 137, 139; and Locke 1988, 328–29). To repeat, these characterizations of how the indigenous people were living were entirely false. Thus, Nozick presumed to cite Locke as his inspiration, without understanding Locke in the context of the politics and issues of the seventeenth century.

But there is a second problem with Nozick's effort to trace his philosophical lineage to Locke. Quite apart from the fact that Adam Smith's idea of an invisible hand held more importance for Nozick than the use he made of Locke's state of nature, there is the fact that Nozick's *Anarchy* reflects the influence also of the English social Darwinist Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) and the Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek (1899–1992) as well as of the individualist anarchists Benjamin Tucker and Lysander Spooner (Papaioannou 2010, 7, 12). In addition, it is easy to discern a striking affinity on Nozick's part for the anti-government and anti-morality ravings of the nihilist-egoist Max Stirner (1806–1856) (Stirner 1995; Paterson 1971; Kolm 1977, 429). Born in Brooklyn and educated at Columbia College, Nozick received his M.A. and Ph.D. from Princeton University, later joining the philosophy faculty at Harvard University. He died in 2002, at the age of 63.

Anarchy, State, and Utopia (hereafter, *Anarchy)* is a bold book, which opens with the challenge that any state which aspires to do more than protect people from force, theft, and fraud, enforce contracts, protect property, and perform similar policing functions is unjustified. In particular, he emphasised that "the state may not use its coercive apparatus for the purpose of getting some citizens to aid others, or in order to prohibit activities to people for their *own* good or protection" (Nozick 1974, ix, Nozick's emphasis). Although he has been viewed as a conservative, the foregoing passage makes clear that his strain of libertarianism embraces both positions associated with the political right (minimal taxation and minimal state services) and positions associated with the political left (no limitations on the use of recreational drugs, no legal restrictions on gay/lesbian unions).

Nozick agreed with the anarchists that the state is potentially dangerous, but rejected the anarchist tenet that it would be possible to sustain a stateless society beyond a (short) transitional phase. There were other problems with anarchism,

according to Nozick, viz., its aspiration to abolish private property in land and to promote not only social and political equality, but also economic equality. Against this notion, Nozick argued that there is no reason why we should think that justice presumes equality. Even the doctrine of equal opportunity – a holy cow for many liberals – should be rejected, Nozick argued, because it entails depriving persons who, on the face of things, would seem to be entitled to certain jobs, emoluments, services, etc. precisely of those things to which they may be entitled (Nozick 1974, 233, 236, 238).

In turning to issues of property rights and taxation, however, Nozick had Rawls in mind as his adversary. Specifically, he objected to Rawls' assertion "that social and economic inequalities, for example, inequalities of wealth and authority[,] are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society" (as quoted in Nozick 1974, 190). Against Rawls' notion of justice as fairness, Nozick postulated what he called *entitlement theory,* which he said involved the principle that people were entitled to whatever property they had obtained legally from other legal owners (Nozick 1974, 151). This had the corollary that the indigent had no right to demand assistance from the rich or, to put it differently, from a government which would need to tax the more well-to-do in order to assist the poor. His argument turned on the claim that his entitlement theory was based on and derived from the premises of John Locke's theory of property but, as already mentioned, had more to do with Adam Smith's philosophy of *laissez faire*. The resulting plea for a minimal state put property rights at the core of his theory and entailed a defence of the notion that, once procedurally unjust acquisitions have been undone, the "haves" are entitled to their holdings, regardless of their extent. If the reference to unjust acquisitions would seem to leave a loophole open for redistributive measures in a democratic state, Nozick was quick to close that loophole. "A nation or protective agency [i.e., the state]," he argued, "may not compel redistribution between one community and another." However, he allowed that a self-enclosed community "such as a kibbutz may redistribute within itself (or give to another community or outside individuals" (Nozick 1974, 321). Nozick believed that some people might want to eliminate the police altogether, on the grounds that taxing the population as a whole in order to provide public protection services was itself a form of redistribution. He was not prepared to embrace this position (Nozick 1974, 114). At the same time, he allowed that individuals or groups might choose to opt out of certain arrangements – an allowance which could, for example, sanction the withdrawal of more well-to-do sections of a community from that community (along the lines of what was attempted some years ago in Los Angeles County by residents of the more well-to-do sections of that county). That this freedom to withdraw would threaten the survival of poorer persons (such as those dependent on county services) has seemed obvious to a number of commentators (for example, Pocklington 1980, 105–106; and Barry 1975, 331–36). Among those commentators, Brian Barry has linked Nozick with

Socrates' foe in Book I of Plato's *Republic,* Thrasymachus. According to Barry, "[j]ustice for Nozick, as for Thrasymachus, is the interest of the stronger. Any contract that anyone makes, so long as he is not actually threatened with deliberately produced harm by the person with whom he makes it, is just" (Barry 1975, 334). Interestingly enough, Nozick would later admit to having an affinity for Thrasymachus, declaring, in his *Philosophical Explorations,* that "[w]hen in the *Republic* Thrasymachus says that justice is in the interests of the stronger, and Socrates starts to question him about this, Thrasymachus should hit Socrates over the head. [Thrasymachus] concedes too much when he enters an activity, discussion, that assumes that there is some mark of correctness and rightness other than (and superior to) strength" (Nozick 1981, 434).

Although Nozick's *Anarchy* attracted both enthusiasts and detractors, Michael Davis summed up what is probably the closest thing to a consensus about this book when he characterised it as "an interesting work," adding that "[t]o be interesting is, of course, not necessarily to be right" (Davis 1977, 219). Calvin Normore put it somewhat differently but with much the same effect, in judging that "[s]ome of Nozick's views are perverse but seldom have such perverse views been so brilliantly defended" (Normore 1977, 187). The moral consequences of Nozick's theory – in denying that the more well-to-do have any intrinsic responsibility toward the less well-off – have been widely noted. It has also been noted that "property accumulation has threshold effects on liberty, such that small appropriations might nurture it while larger doses can be fatal" (Reiman 1981, 91). Yet there are also non-moral grounds for disputing Nozick's theory; specifically, his contention that a society – which would leave the powerless to their own devices, with little or no provision for low-cost medical care, education beyond high school, or perhaps even public transport – could continue to function is open to question. System stability depends on a minimum threshold of system legitimacy; indeed, as East Europeans showed in 1989, when enough people reject the system and take to the streets, not only does a system cease to be stable, it may even fail altogether.

In addition to Nozick's aforementioned ignorance about Locke's notion of a state of nature and his moral callousness, there are other problems with the framework presented in *Anarchy.* To begin with, Nozick places absolute individual rights and what he calls "self-ownership" at the pinnacle of his hierarchy of values, while claiming that promoting these two values will foster the public good. Yet, as Papaioannou notes (2010, 28), if individual rights are "absolute", then they stand *higher* than the public good, with the public good needing to be sacrificed whenever necessary to maximise the supposedly "absolute" rights of (certain) individuals. Then again, what if the rights asserted by one individual clash with the rights claimed by another individual? Nozick offers no clear answer on this point. Or again, after declaring that individual rights must be absolute, Nozick later admits that they could (and should) "be violated in order to avoid catastrophic moral horror" (Nozick 1974, as quoted in Papaioannou 2010,

44). Yet Nozick's *Anarchy* lacks a clear foundation for any concept of morality, as revealed in his denial of the existence of any duties not contractually agreed as well as in his admission that he could identify very few arguments buttressing assertions of fundamental human equality (Scheffler 1976, 59).

Turning to Nozick's concept of *self-ownership,* by this he meant to construe a person in terms of property with market value (Brenkert 1998, 48); when combined with his abnegation of the existence of duties, the result is the undermining of any notion of integrity. Nozick suggested that the diversity of human nature, including values and policy preferences, was so great that it would be impossible to find a socio-political formula that would fully satisfy everyone. Without providing any reason or justification for this, Nozick assumed that it was highly desirable both to undertake, somehow, to satisfy everyone and to erect something one might all a utopian framework. His solution to this dual imagined challenge was to conjure up a vision of a network of autonomous local communities, with the central government providing only the bare minimum of services (chiefly to combat crime) and with people in each local community deciding how they wished to live. This vision is, up to a point, reminiscent of the *millet* system in the old Ottoman Empire, in which each religious establishment regulated affairs within its own community. Nozick now produced the bizarre result that, in the interest of promoting absolute individual rights, he ended up sanctioning that any autonomous community could be "as authoritarian as it wishe[d]" (Lacey 2001, 67; see also Fowler 1980, 551–52). Nozick did allow that individuals not satisfied with the conditions in the community in which they lived could always move to another community or simply collaborate with others to effect the secession of their neighbourhood from the overarching community. This suggests that there could be a proliferation of secessions, resulting in general instability. Yet another problem with this scheme is that the degree of diversity in human nature and values postulated by Nozick would entail that there could never be a sufficient consensus to set up the framework of autonomous communities in the first place (Lacey 2001, 71). And, of course, this very framework "would impose the values and institutions of the market – in the name of liberty – upon all citizens regardless of their wishes" (Nock 1992, 694), thereby undermining the very absolute rights the framework was supposed to maximise. Riddled with inconsistencies, self-contradictions, and impossible fantasies, Nozick's theory, as presented in *Anarchy,* must be judged to be "internally incoherent", as Nock has argued (1992, 680). Nozick himself ultimately approached the same conclusion, writing in *The Examined Life,* "The libertarian position I once propounded now seems to me seriously inadequate" (Nozick 1989, 286, as quoted in Papaioannou 2010, 115).

Nozick wrote several more books after *Anarchy,* including the widely praised *Philosophical Explanations* and *The Nature of Rationality* (1993). But no other book of his made even remotely as huge an impact as his *Anarchy, State, and Utopia.*

CONCLUSION: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LATE TWENTIETH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHICAL REVISIONS

What should be emphasised is that Rawls and Nozick made original contributions to political thought, staking out entirely irreconcilable positions. Rawls, in spite of his professed affinity for Kant, criticized him on certain points and revised his theory. Thus, when Rawls claimed that his notion of an "original position" was related to Kant's categorical imperative, that by no means diminishes Rawls' originality in developing that idea. Rawls distanced himself from both universalism and consequentialism, but the moral-political theory he developed retained some elements of universalism; this is perhaps most obvious in Rawls' book, *The Law of Peoples*. Yet his moral-political theory cannot be classified as either contractarian or conventionalist, but seems to involve a synthesis of the two. It is contractarian to the extent that he refers legitimate politics to the consensus of the community; but, at the same time, what that consensus generates, in Rawls' ideal world, is laws by which the community is to be regulated. Rawls also grappled with the problem of integrating religious believers and nonbelievers into a community based on mutual respect, and suggested ways of achieving this.

Nozick, of course, followed an entirely different path. As noted above, while he asserted a supposed debt to John Locke, his book had more in common with the views expressed by Adam Smith, Friedrich Hayek, and even Max Stirner. *His* originality consisted in several things – his denial that justice implies or entails equality, his support for an absolutely minimal state, his claim that neither the state nor the community owed anything to the indigent, and his belief that any unit of society was entitled to split off from the rest of the community.

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Viljem MERHAR*

AKTUALNOST TEORETIČNIH REŠITEV ADAMA SMITHA (1723–1790)**

Povzetek. *Članek analizira aktualnost teoretičnih rešitev škotskega ekonomskega misleca Adama Smitha za dobo poznega kapitalizma. Zagovarja re-aktualizacijo vseh tistih Smithovih teoretičnih rešitev, ki so bile v zadnjem obdobju zanemarjene, vključno z nakazano Smithovo motivacijsko dohodkovno-profitno in sistemsko tržno-plansko dualnostjo gospodarjenja. Zavzema se za oživitev Smithove ekonomske misli, s katere pomočjo je treba ugotoviti, kako manj polno zaposlena gospodarstva bolj polno zaposliti. Članek Smithovo teorijo nadgrajuje s Keynesovimi rešitvami ekonomskih kriz. Poudarja pomembnost reafirmacije politične ekonomije kot družbene znanosti, ki je povezana z družbeno odgovornim gospodarjenjem.*
Ključni pojmi: *ekonomija, ekonomska teorija, ekonomska politika, Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Alfred Marshall, John M. Keynes, Paul A. Samuelson, Thomas Piketty.*

UVOD

Klasični ekonomist Adam Smith, na katerega se sklicujejo vsi kasnejši ekonomisti, je bil zagovornik delovne teorije vrednosti, ki v razmerah proste konkurence nagrajuje producente blaga sorazmerno z družbeno potrebnim abstraktnim delom. Za uveljavljanje te zakonitosti – nevidne roke mora poskrbeti država z odpravljanjem vseh mogočih monopolizacij v procesih gospodarjenja. V začetnem prostokonkurenčnem liberalnem kapitalizmu je bilo treba najprej s poudarjeno vlogo države v procesih gospodarjenja odpraviti predkapitalistične fevdalne odnose na vasi in cehovske odnose v srednjeveških mestih, da bi se lahko del denarja spremenil v kapital – v vrednost, ki se oplaja s presežno vrednostjo: z dobičkom! Pretvorba denarja v kapital spreminja dohodkovno motivacijo enostavnih blagovnih producentov v profitno motivacijo kapitalističnih. Delovna sila pa mora postati blago, ker mora biti osebno svobodna in brez produkcijskih sredstev (meščanske revolucije in prvotna akumulacija kapitala)!

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Smith (2010) je torej zaznal motivacijsko dualnost gospodarjenja. Transformacija dohodkovne v profitno motivacijo je Smitha spodbudila, da je opustil delovno teorijo vrednosti in jo nadomestil s teorijo produkcijskih stroškov, ki so jo sprejeli vsi kasnejši meščanski neoklasični ekonomisti. Ti so torej zavrgli delovno teorijo vrednosti in jo nadomestili s teorijo koristnosti in teorijo stroškov, ki tavtološko pojasnjuje cene s cenami proizvodnih dejavnikov. Na ta način so politično ekonomijo kot družbeno znanost nadomestili z meščansko naravoslovno ekonomiko. S tem pa so produkcijske odnose med ljudmi nadomestili z odnosi ljudi do poizvedenih dobrin, ki morajo s svojimi koristnimi lastnostmi zadovoljevati njihove vsakokratne potrebe, z blagoznanstvom in načini proizvajanja dobrin s tehnologijo.

Smith je tudi opozoril na razvojno tendenco padanja profitne mere, ki destimulira kapitaliste kot podjetnike, da bi denar uporabljali kot kapital! Zato se s padanjem profitne mere povezujejo zastoji v gospodarstvu. Saj se po Smithu, če akumulacije kapitala ne spremljajo procesi poglabljanja delitve dela, ne spremljajo produkcijske in organizacijske inovacije, ne uresničujejo Sayevi (1960) zakoni trga, ki nekritično enačijo produkcijo s potrošnjo, ponudbo s povpraševanjem in varčevanje z naložbami.

Po Smithu so torej meščanski neoklasični ekonomisti povzeli le vero v tržni mehanizem, ki da bo avtomatsko uresničeval Sayeve (1960) zakone trga na ravni polne zaposlitve. S tem pa so spregledali Smithovo ekonomsko vlogo države na javnih uporabnovrednostnih neprofitnih infrastrukturnih produkcijskih in storitvenih področjih gospodarjenja. Gre za spregledano motivacijsko- dohodkovno-profitno in gospodarsko sistemsko tržno-plansko dualnost gospodarjenja, ki jo je nakazoval že Smith.

Neoklasična preobrazba politične ekonomije v ekonomiko, ki pojasnjuje družbene procese gospodarjenja le z okrnjeno Smithovo (2010) nevidno roko – s tržnim mehanizmom ponudbe in povpraševanja, ki da bo s sprotnim odpravljanjem parcialnih neravnovesij tendenčno uresničeval Sayeve zakone trga in s tem polno zaposlitev kapitalističnega gospodarstva –, je meščanske ekonomske teoretike onesposobila, da bi z maksimiranjem družbenih dohodkov in njihovo uporabo pojasnili in odpravljali depresijska stanja, ki zaostrujejo krizo kapitalizma kot družbenoekonomskega sistema.

Prav kriza kapitalizma kot družbenoekonomskega sistema je spodbudila teoretični nastop Johna M. Keynesa (2006), da je ugotovil, da mu teorija, v kateri je bil vzgojen s predpostavljeno polno zaposlenostjo oz. uresničevanjem Sayevih zakonov trga, ne daje odgovorov na depresijska gospodarska stanja, ki jih tržne zakonitosti ne odpravljajo. Zato je treba odgovoriti in ugotoviti, kako manj polno zaposlena gospodarstva bolj polno zaposliti. S temi odgovori je treba aktivirati vse tiste teoretične Smithove rešitve, ki so bile z ekonomiko zanemarjene, vključno z nakazano Smithovo motivacijsko dohodkovno-profitno in sistemsko tržno-plansko dualnostjo gospodarjenja!

AKTUALNOST ADAMA SMITHA

Ob tristoti obletnici rojstva A. Smitha, najpomembnejšega in največkrat citiranega škotskega filozofa in začetnika klasične meščanske politične ekonomije, moramo spoznati in priznati, da je njegov znanstveni prispevek, na katerega se sklicujejo vsi kasnejši ekonomski teoretiki, zaradi zaostrene krize kapitalizma kot družbenoekonomskega sistema aktualen še dandanes. Smith je živel v času začetnega liberalnega kapitalizma, ko je sproščena konkurenca s prostim vstopom v produkcijske dejavnosti, ki jo je morala zagotavljati in sankcionirati država z odpravljanjem cehovskih solidarnostnih produkcijskih odnosov, omogočila, da sta se trgovski in posojilni kapital začela pretvarjati v produktivni kapital. Ta je enostavno blagovno produkcijo, ki ne more z destrukcijo starih načinov proizvajanja postati prevladujoči produkcijski način, pretvoril v kapitalistično blagovno produkcijo, ki postane z razvojem kapitalizma prevladujoča.

V razmerah blagovne produkcije produkcija dobrin dobi lastnost blaga – lastnost produktov človeškega dela, ki jih po družbeni delitvi dela razčlenjeni proizvajalci med seboj kot menjalne vrednosti zamenjujejo za uporabne vrednosti, ki jim zadovoljujejo vsakokratne potrebe. Po delovni teoriji vrednosti, ki jo je Smith zagovarjal za razmere enostavne blagovne produkcije, je vrednost blaga določena z družbeno povprečnim abstraktnim delom, potrebnim za proizvodnjo posamezne blagovne vrste. Vrednostna vsebina je torej družbeno povprečno potrebno abstraktno delo, ki se kot družbeno potrebno potrjuje na trgu z menjalno vrednostjo – s količinskim menjalnim odnosom *x blaga A = y blaga B*. Zakon vrednosti, Smithova nevidna roka, bo s tržnim mehanizmom ponudbe in povpraševanja, s sprotno realokacijo produkcijskih faktorjev po področjih družbene delitve dela, odpravljal odstopanja cen od vrednosti. Tendenčno se bodo zato cene usklajevale z vrednostjo, ki nagrajujejo producente sorazmerno z vloženim abstraktnim družbeno potrebnim delom.

Afirmacija produktivnega kapitala – pretvorba denarja v kapital v razširjenih cehovskih delavnicah, tj. kapitalističnih kooperacijah – zahteva še osebno svobodne kvalificirane delavce, ki so brez produkcijskih sredstev. Gre za propadle cehovske obrtnike, ki jih je selekcioniral zakon vrednosti – selekcionirala jih je Smithova nevidna roka. Produktivnejši podjetniki, ki so z razširjeno delavnico postali kapitalisti, so propadle kvalificirane obrtnike in njihove pomočnike zaposlili v svojih obratih. S širjenjem kapitalističnih kooperacij se zato povpraševanje po kvalificiranih delavcih povečuje. Zato se z razvojem povečuje cena delovne sile, je bil optimističen Smith, ki pa je prezrl, da so prav kapitalistične kooperacije spodbudile njegovo načelo o poglabljanju delitve dela – manufakturno delitev dela, ki omogoča zaposlovanje tudi nekvalificirani delovni sili. Ta se namreč s procesi prvotne akumulacije kapitala sprošča tudi na agrarnem področju gospodarjenja.

Smith je načelo poglabljanja delitve dela, ki s poenostavljanjem delovnih faz omogoča zaposlitev nekvalificirani delovni sili, povezoval s količinsko gospodarsko rastjo, ki jo omogoča akumulacija kapitala in ki se prav s poglabljanjem

delitve dela sproti pretvarja v kakovostni družbenoekonomski razvoj. Saj bi se, če ne bi akumulacije kapitala spremljalo načelo poglabljanja delitve dela (če je ne bi spremljale tehnološke in organizacijske inovacije proizvajanja), povečevala produkcija – povečevala družbena ponudba z nespremenjeno tehnologijo proizvedenih produktov, ki bi zniževala cene in s tem dobičke. To pa bi zavrlo količinsko rast, ki se ne spreminja v družbenoekonomski razvoj.

Za tržni koordinacijski mehanizem družbene ponudbe in povpraševanja, s pomočjo katerega se rešujejo vsakokratni družbenoekonomski problemi: kaj, koliko, za koga in kako proizvajati, je potrebno uporabljati omejene prvotne in z delom ustvarjene produkcijske dejavnike po področjih družbene delitve dela. Za to je po proizvodnji vseh blagovnih vrst, ki se jih tendenčno prodaja z uravnoteženimi normalnimi vrednostnimi cenami na ravni polne zaposlitve proizvodnih dejavnikov, Smith, ki je prvi sistemsko uredil klasično politično ekonomijo, figurativno uporabil izraz nevidna roka.

Smith z enačenjem dohodka z vrednostjo zanemarja vrednost predmetov dela (surovin) in delovnih sredstev (orodij in predvsem strojev), katerih vrednost se s konkretnim delom postopoma prenaša kot minulo delo na nov produkt. Zato je vrednost proizvodov enaka seštevku prenesene in na novo ustvarjene vrednosti. Gre za stroške, ki jih ima kapitalistični podjetnik z nabavo predmetov dela in sredstev za delo ter delovne sile, ki so odbitna postavka od realizirane cene blaga, da bi se ugotovil dobiček kot cilj kapitalističnega poslovanja. Prav profitni motiv poslovanja kapitalističnih blagovnih proizvajalcev, ki so zahtevali na enake kapitalske vložke po področjih družbene delitve tudi enake profite, je spodbudil Smitha, da je nadomestil delovno teorijo vrednosti s teorijo stroškov proizvodnje, ki so jo povzeli kasnejši apologeti kapitalizma.

Smithova argumentacija nevidne roke je pogojena z začetnim liberalnim prostokonkurenčnim liberalnim kapitalizmom, ki z atomizacijo ponudnikov in povpraševalcev onemogoča, da bi posameznik kot ponudnik oz. povpraševalec imel vpliv na ceno, ampak se morata posameznika s svojima ponudbama oz. povpraševanjem prilagoditi veljavni tržni ceni. Zato mora država po Smithu poskrbeti tudi za prostokonkurenčne razmere gospodarjenja z odpravljanjem fevdalnih odnosov na podeželju (zagotoviti osebno svobodo) in za odpravo cehovsko solidarnostnih odnosov v mestih (prost vstop v gospodarske dejavnosti). Gre torej za odpravljanje vseh možnih starih fevdalnih in z akumulacijo – koncentracijo in centralizacijo kapitala pogojenih novih monopolizacij ponudnikov in povpraševalcev.

Zaradi tega mora država po Smithu že v razmerah prostokonkurenčnega liberalnega kapitalizma poskrbeti za uporabnovrednostno neprofitno motivirane gospodarske dejavnosti na infrastrukturnih produkcijskih (sedanjih zelo razvitih primarnosurovinskih in energetskih, transportno-komunikacijskih, stanovanjsko-komunalnih … dejavnostih) in storitvenih (sedanjih bančno-zavarovalnih, socialno-zdravstvenih, državno-varnostnih, komunalno-stanovanjskih, vzgojno-izobraževalnih in kulturnih … dejavnostih) področjih gospodarjenja,

ki – z omejevanjem in odpravljanjem monopolnih cen – podpirajo in omogočajo nemoteno prosto konkurenčno menjalnovrednostno tržno motivirano profitno gospodarjenje. Saj bi menjalnovrednostno, in s tem profitno, motivirani zasebni upravljavci infrastrukturnih dejavnosti prakticirali monopolne cene – monopolne profite, ki jih Smithova nevidna roka ne odpravlja!

Gre torej za Smithov gospodarskosistemski motivacijski dualizem gospodarjenja, ki ga zahteva nemoteno delovanje tržnega mehanizma – nevidne roke. Oziroma za Marxov zakon vrednosti, ki v razmerah enostavne blagovne proizvodnje, ki ne more postati prevladujoči produkcijski način, tendenčno z vrednostnimi cenami poskrbi:

- Za družbeno optimalno alokacijo produkcijskih virov po področjih družbene delitve dela v modelu popolne konkurence. Začetni prostokonkurenčni liberalni kapitalizem se je s pospešenim spreminjanjem enostavne v kapitalistično blagovno produkcijo temu modelu z atomizacijo ponudnikov in povpraševalcev s kapitalistično kooperacijo in manufakturo le približal ter se hkrati s kapitalistično tovarno od njega z akumulacijo – koncentracijo in centralizacijo kapitala, ki sta vodili v monopolizacijo gospodarstva, tendenčno oddaljeval!
- Za nagrade z začasnimi ekstra dohodki – profiti nadpovprečno produktivnih producentov, ki kot nosilci družbenoekonomskega razvoja uvajajo produktivnejše nove metode proizvajanja – inovacije (K. Marx, J. A. Schumpeter). S patentno zakonodajo, ki omejuje konkurente pri uporabi produktivnejših produkcijskih metod, se podaljšuje čas pridobivanja ekstra profitov. Upoštevati je treba čas, da postane bolj produktivna metoda proizvajanja na splošno uporabljena. Takrat ekstra profit iz prve inovacije odpade, seveda pa se s pojavljanjem novih inovacij, ki spodbujajo družbenoekonomski razvoj, ekstra profiti ohranjajo. Z njimi pa se potrjujeta zgodovinska vloga in naloga kapitalizma, da razvija produktivne sile dela!
- Za poslovne zgube, ki s selekcijo kaznujejo in odpravljajo podpovprečno produktivne producente.

Govorimo o posledicah Smithove nevidne roke, ki se povezujejo s poglabljanjem delitve dela in sta jih teoretično dorekla Marx z zakonitim naraščanjem organske sestave kapitala (tj. je razmerja med sredstvi za delo in predmeti dela – konstantnim c ter nakupi delovne sile založenega – variabilnega kapitala, torej v (c > v)) in Schumpeter (1949) z inovativnimi novimi kombinacijami produkcijskih dejavnikov, ki ohranjajo in obnavljajo ekstra profite.

Ekstra profiti namreč spodbujajo kapitalistične podjetnike, da z akumulacijo kapitala – z novimi naložbami kapitala in s poglabljanjem delitve dela količinsko gospodarsko rast sproti pretvarjajo v družbenoekonomski kakovostni razvoj. Če namreč akumulacije kapitala že po Smithu ne spremljajo poglabljanje delitve dela in inovacije, se povečuje enaka struktura družbenega produkta, ki vodi v hiperprodukcijo družbene ponudbe, ko je mogoče prodati le po nižjih cenah. Z

njimi se s padanjem profitnih stopenj povezujejo gospodarske krize, ki se s sinusovo krivuljo (kriza – oživljanje – polet – depresija – kriza) ciklično ponavljajo in z nezaposlenostjo delovne sile najbolj ogrožajo socialno eksistenco delavcev.

Zaradi tega mora biti po Smithu akumulacija kapitala, ki med drugim povečuje povpraševanje po delovni sili (povečanje realnih mezd), prav tako podprta s poudarjeno ekonomsko vlogo države, ki mora blažiti družbena protislovja s spodbujanjem poglabljanja delitve dela, ki gospodarsko rast sproti spreminja v družbenoekonomski razvoj. Smith optimistično napoveduje, da se bosta tako uresničevala splošna družbena blaginja in bogastvo narodov.

Gre za spodbudno Smithovo napoved, ki je David Ricardo (1962) ne sprejema v celoti. Saj mezde naraščajo le nominalno, ne pa hkrati tudi realno! Dodana na novo ustvarjena vrednost – dohodek, ki ga tudi Ricardo enači z vrednostjo – se namreč razdeli med delavce, ki dobijo mezdo, kapitaliste, ki imajo dobičke, in lastnike zemlje, ki dobijo rente. Sestavni deli dohodka pa se spreminjajo. In to tako, da zaradi Malthusovega zakona naraščajoče populacije, ki zahteva pridobivanje hrane za naraščajočo populacijo na čedalje manj plodnih mejnih zemljiščih, ki določajo cene, zvišujejo cene agrarnih proizvodov. S tem se povečujejo diferencialne rente bolj plodnih zemljišč, ki jih dobijo lastniki zemlje. Povečevanju cen agrarnih produktov mora slediti naraščanje nominalnih mezd, ki morajo zagotoviti vsakokratno reprodukcijo delovne sile, profiti kapitalističnih podjetnikov, ki so najzaslužnejši za kapitalistični razvoj produktivnih sil dela, pa padajo. Padanje profitov oz. profitnih mer – razmerja med profiti P in založenim kapitalom K, torej P/K – je po Ricardu mogoče zavreti z liberalizacijo mednarodnega trgovanja po načelih primerjalnih prednosti tega poslovanja ali s spodbujanjem in uvajanjem inovacij v agrarnem gospodarstvu.

Ricardovo (1962) argumentacijo, da naraščajočim rentam sledi naraščanje nominalnih, ne pa realnih mezd, in da si naraščajoče rente, ki jih prejema in z žitnimi zakoni brani in ohranja ter povečuje neproduktivna fevdalna agrarna aristokracija, so uporabili meščanski kritiki angleških žitnih zakonov. Ti so z omejevanjem uvoza žit onemogočali uresničevanje primerjalnih prednosti mednarodne trgovine, ki da jo je treba z odpravo angleških žitnih zakonov liberalizirati.

MARXOVA KRITIKA KLASIČNIH EKONOMISTOV

Karl Marx (1961; 1967; 1973) je po angleških klasičnih ekonomistih povzel in nadgradil njihovo delovno teorijo vrednosti z zakonom vrednosti – s Smithovo nevidno roko, ki v razmerah enostavne blagovne produkcije tendenčno uresničuje vrednostne cene, ki z dohodki nagrajujejo enostavne blagovne producente sorazmerno s priznanim in na trgu potrjenim družbeno potrebnim abstraktnim delom. Z zakonitim spreminjanjem enostavne blagovne produkcije v kapitalistično blagovno produkcijo, ki je dobila ime po kapitalu – vrednosti, ki se oplaja s presežno vrednostjo, se dohodkovni motiv gospodarjenja enostavnih blagovnih producentov spremeni v profitni motiv kapitalističnih blagovnih producentov.

Ta uresničuje kapitalistično zahtevo, da morajo biti kapitalistični blagovni producenti tendenčno nagrajeni sorazmerno z vloženim kapitalom! Zaradi tega se v razmerah kapitalistične blagovne produkcije zakon vrednosti – Smithova nevidna roka po Marxu preoblikuje v zakon kapitalistične produkcijske cene. To transformacijo zakona vrednosti je Smith zaradi enačenja vrednosti z dohodkom spregledal, saj se je zadovoljil s tem, da je pojasnil dobičke le s stroški proizvajanja, ki so tedaj vključevali tudi stroške delovne sile.

Kasnejši meščanski ekonomisti so po Smithu povzeli le njegovo teorijo stroškov, ki so jo nekritično povezovali s Smithovo nevidno roko. Zato so cene tavtološko povezovali s stroški proizvodnje, vrednost blaga pa s koristnostjo. S tem so začeli opuščati in nadomeščati politično ekonomijo kot družbeno in zgodovinsko ter razredno znanost z meščansko apologetsko ekonomiko, ki odnose med ljudmi spreminja v odnose ljudi do koristnosti dobrin (blagoznanstvo) in v produktivno potrošnjo – stroške produkcijskih faktorjev in njihovo kombinacijo v proizvodnih procesih (tehnologijo proizvajanja).

Oploditev kapitala s profitom se povezuje z delovno silo kot blagom. Da bi postala delovna sila blago, mora biti osebno svobodna in brez produkcijskih sredstev. Ta pogoja sta se zgodovinsko uresničila z odpravo fevdalizma – reformo fevdalizma in meščansko revolucijo ter s prvobitno akumulacijo kapitala: z odtujevanjem delavcev od produkcijskih sredstev. Delovna sila mora torej postati blago, da se bo denar lahko spremenil v produktivni kapital. Uporabna vrednost delovne sile je delo, ki je – kot abstraktno delo – vsebina in merilo vrednosti vseh blagovnih vrst. Vrednost delovne sile kot blaga je prav tako določena z družbeno potrebnim abstraktnim delom, ki je potrebno za proizvodnjo blagovnih vrst, ki omogočajo vsakokratno reprodukcijo delovne sile. Vsakokratni delovnik se namreč razdeli na potrebni in presežni delovni čas. V prvem se ustvarja ekvivalent vrednosti delovne sile, v drugem pa ekvivalent presežne vrednosti, ki se pojavlja kot profit.

Denar D se spremeni v kapital K z nakupom temeljnih elementov vsakega produkcijskega procesa – predmetov dela in delovnih sredstev –, produkcijskih sredstev c ter delovne sile v, ki se jih združi v proizvodnih procesih P za proizvajanje blagovnih vrst B, ki se jih na trgu proda za več denarja – s profitom D*, ki ga v presežnem delovnem času ustvarja delovna sila. To je formula produktivnega kapitala D – K = (c + v) … P… B (c + v + m) – D*, D* > D!

Odločilna je združitev produkcijskih sredstev z delovno silo – z delom v produkcijskem procesu. Tu uporabna vrednost delovne sile – delo kot merilo in vsebina vrednosti – s konkretnim delom prenese vrednost produkcijskih sredstev na nov produkt c, z abstraktnim delom pa ustvarja dodatno vrednost – dohodek (Y = (v + m)), ki v potrebnem delovnem času reproducira vrednost delovne sile v, v presežnem delovnem času pa še presežno vrednost m. Zato je vrednosti blaga W enaka seštevku prenesene c in novo ustvarjene vrednosti (v + m) – W = (c + v + m), ki je za preneseno vrednost c kapitala večja od Smithovega dohodka: Y = (v + m).

Z vključitvijo konstantnega kapitala Marx popravlja Smithovo enačenje dohodka z vrednostjo, ki je prav zaradi spregledane vloge konstantnega kapitala v produkcijskih in reprodukcijskih procesih – v krožnem toku denarja kot kapitala in njegovem obnavljanju (obratu kapitala) – zavrgel delovno teorijo vrednosti in jo nadomestil s teorijo podjetniških stroškov. Gre za Smithovo dogmo in za to, da njegova nevidna roka tendenčno poskrbi za polno zaposlitev; to so sprejeli vsi kasnejši meščanski ekonomisti, čeprav je anticipirala »stoletni tabu« – Sayeve zakone trga, ki proizvodnjo neupravičeno enačijo s potrošnjo, ponudbo s povpraševanjem in prodaje z nakupi.

Vključitev konstantnega kapitala v strukturo vrednosti (W = (c + v + m)) je Marxu omogočila, da je opredel tri teoretično zelo pomembna merila spremljanja in analiziranja razvojnih tendenc kapitalizma:

- organsko sestavo kapitala z razmerjem med konstantnim in variabilnim kapitalom (c : v), ki s spreminjanjem – inoviranjem tehnike proizvajanja zakonito narašča (c > v), in s tem uresničuje zgodovinsko vlogo in nalogo kapitalizma, da razvija produktivne sile dela;
- stopnjo presežne vrednosti m* z razmerjem med presežno vrednostjo m in v nakupe delovne sile založenim variabilnim kapitalom v – (m* = m : v), ki zaradi naraščanja organske sestave kapitala – zviševanja družbene produktivnosti dela prav tako raste;
- profitno stopnjo p* z razmerjem med presežno vrednostjo m, ki se pojavlja kot profit p, in založenim kapitalom ((c + v) – (p*= m : (c + v)), ki zaradi naraščajoče organske sestave kapitala tendenčno pada. To padanje pa zavira naraščajoča stopnja presežne vrednosti, ki narašča zaradi naraščanja produktivnosti dela v panogah, ki proizvajajo blagovne vrste, s katerim se reproducira delovna sila.

Naraščajoča organska sestava družbenega kapitala vpliva hkrati na padanje in zaviranje padanja profitne stopnje. Zaviranje padanja profitne stopnje se povezuje z absolutno metodo (podaljševanjem delovnika in povečevanjem intenzivnosti dela) in za kapitalizem pomembnejšo relativno metodo (zniževanjem vrednosti delovne sile) povečevanja presežne vrednosti. Ta metoda zahteva naraščajočo družbeno produktivnost dela v produkciji blagovnih vrst, ki reproducirajo delovno silo – najmnožičnejše potrošnike v kapitalizmu.

Do povečane družbene produktivnosti dela pride v produkcijskih panogah, ki proizvajajo življenjske potrebščine – v drugem oddelku družbene produkcije se to zgodi z zamikom, šele potem, ko so v prvem oddelku družbene produkcije – v produkciji produkcijskih sredstev, ki raste hitreje kot drugi, razvili bolj produktivno produkcijsko opremo za drugi oddelek družbene produkcije. S temi ugotovitvami je Marx nasprotoval Smithovi teoretično pomanjkljivi razlagi padanja profitne stopnje le zaradi konkurence, če akumulacije kapitala ne spremlja poglabljanje delitve dela, in tudi proti Ricardovi razlagi, da do padanja profitne stopnje prihaja zaradi vse manjše plodnosti kmetijskih mejnih zemljišč, ki jih

je treba obdelovati, da bi se prehranilo populacijo. Po Marxu namreč pride do padanja profitne stopnje zaradi naraščajoče organske sestave kapitala – povečevanja, ne pa padanja produktivnosti družbenega dela. To je zaradi zgodovinske vloge in naloge kapitalizma, da razvija produktivne sile dela, ki so jih zavirali predkapitalistični produkcijski odnosi (tlačanski na vasi in cehovski v srednjeveških mestih)!

Ricardo je z delitvenimi zakonitostmi novoustvarjene vrednosti med delavce, kapitaliste kot podjetnike in lastnike zemlje, ki pojasnjujejo naraščajoče diferencialne rente plodnejših zemljišč in padanje profitne mere, dokazoval, da ne potrjujejo Smithovega optimističnega pogleda v prihodnost. S to kritiko Smitha pa je Ricardo spregledal, da je po Smithu za uresničevanje nemotenega delovanja nevidne roke potrebna družbena oziroma državna intervencija, ki bo z zagotavljanjem prostokonkurenčnih pogojev gospodarjenja vplivala na delitvene zakonitosti. Gre za koordinacijsko – zasebno tržno in javno – zavestno plansko in motivacijsko – profitno in uporabnovrednostno neprofitno dualnost gospodarjenja.

Skratka, za nemoteno delovanje Smithove nevidne roke mora država poskrbeti za družbeno koordinacijsko tržno-plansko in motivacijsko profitno-neprofitno dualnost gospodarjenja, ki jo je z opredeljevanjem ekonomske vloge države v gospodarstvu prvi zagovarjal prav Smith. Kasnejši meščanski apologetski ekonomisti so seveda zavestno prezrli tudi to Smithovo motivacijsko in sistemsko dualnost gospodarjenja, ki je aktualna še dandanes!

Marxova namenska uporabnovrednostna delitev družbene produkcije na produkcijo produkcijskih sredstev, tj. prvi oddelek, in produkcijo potrošnih sredstev, tj. drugi oddelek družbene produkcije, je omogočila Marxu, da je z razmerji skladnosti med oddelkoma družbene produkcije opozoril na pogoje nemotene realizacije in s tem nemotene reprodukcije družbenega bruto produkta. Za primer enostavne družbene reprodukcije, ko se vsa presežna vrednost neproduktivno uporabi, morajo biti uresničena naslednja razmerja skladnosti med oddelkoma družbene produkcije:

- Vrednostna struktura (prenesena vrednost produkcijskih sredstev c in novoustvarjena vrednost (v + m)) produkcije produkcijskih sredstev W* – ponudba prvega oddelka I = (c + v + m) – mora biti usklajena s porabljenimi produkcijskimi sredstvi in njihovo vrednostno in uporabnovrednostno strukturo v prvem I in drugem II oddelku družbene produkcije, torej I (c + v + m) = (Ic + IIc).
- Vrednostna in uporabnovrednostna struktura produkcije potrošnih sredstev W** – ponudba drugega oddelka II (c + v + m) – pa mora biti v primeru enostavne družbene reprodukcije usklajena z družbenim potrošnim skladom: s potrošnjo delavcev in kapitalistov (v + m) iz obeh oddelkov, torej II (c + v + m) = I (v + m) + II (v + m).
- Sledi, da mora biti usklajena tudi medoddelčna zamenjava družbenega bruto produkta. Potrošnja delavcev in kapitalistov prvega oddelka I (v+m) mora biti

usklajena s potrebo po produkcijskih sredstih iz drugega oddelka IIc, torej I (v + m) = IIc.

- Tem temeljnim razmerjem medoddelčne skladnosti družbenega bruto produkta je treba dodati še skladnost, ki se povezuje z naravo fiksnega kapitala – dela vrednosti produkcijskih sredstev, ki jih je v začetku krožnega toka kapitala treba v celoti založiti. Njihova vrednost pa postopoma prehaja na nove produkte. Gre za strošek uporabe fiksnega kapitala – za amortizacijsko-varčevalne in akumulacijske sklade, ki se oblikujejo z zgolj prodajami (B – D) enih, ki oblikujejo te sklade – varčevanje iz kapitala in dohodka S. Zgolj prodaje enih pa je treba uskladiti z zgolj nakupi drugih (D – B), ki za obnavljanje fiksnega kapitala za enostavno in za razširjeno družbeno reprodukcijo aktivirajo te sklade (D – B) – investirajo I, torej (S = I). Prvi varčujejo S, drugi pa investirajo I – torej družbeno varčevanje je treba za nemoteno družbeno realizacijo in reprodukcijo uskladiti z družbenim investiranjem (S = I)!

Vsi ti strogi pogoji za nemoteno družbeno realizacijo in reprodukcijo pa se naključno uresničujejo. Gre za protislovje med družbenim značajem produkcije in zasebno kapitalističnim profitno motiviranim odločanjem o produkciji in njeni uporabnovrednostni strukturi. Neuresničevanje teh razmerij se povezuje z družbenoekonomskimi krizami hiperprodukcije kot načini nasilnega uveljavljanja razmerij skladnosti družbene ponudbe z družbenim povpraševanjem.

Navedenim razmerjem skladnosti med oddelkoma družbene ponudbe in povpraševanja, ki jih na trgu ex post z denarjem kot menjalnim sredstvom tendenčno uresničuje tržni mehanizem, dodaja torej Marx še nujnost usklajevanja enostranskih prodaj blaga (B – D) – oblikovanja denarnih amortizacijskih in akumulacijskih skladov (S) z enostranskimi nakupi blaga (D – B) – aktiviranja teh skladov z realnimi investicijami (I) – torej (S = I).

S temi teoretičnimi rešitvami se je Marx odzval na klasični spor med zagovorniki omejenih in neomejenih realizacijskih in s tem reprodukcijskih možnosti v kapitalizmu:

- Prvi so z deficitarnostjo družbenega efektivnega povpraševanja – s padanjem profitne stopnje opredeljevali družbene realizacijske in s tem reprodukcijske možnosti in zastoje (Smith, Malthus, Sismondi). Zato so s »tretjimi osebami«, domačimi in tujimi kupci, ki niso producenti, odgovorili na vprašanje, od kod denar za realizacijo presežne vrednost oz. profitov.
- Drugi, torej zagovorniki družbeno neomejenih realizacijskih in s tem neomejenih reprodukcijskih možnosti (Smith, Ricardo, Say, Mill), pa so s Smithovo nevidno roko in s poglabljanjem delitve dela zagovarjali Sayeve zakone trga, ki izenačujejo produkcijo s potrošnjo, ponudbo s povpraševanjem in prodajo z nakupi brez kakršnih koli omejitev. S tem pa se tendenčno uresničuje polno zaposlitev v kapitalizmu.

Kasnejši meščanski ekonomski teoretiki sprejemajo Sayeve zakone trga, ker

naj bi se nemoteno uresničevali; s tem naj bi se zagotavljalo polno zaposlitev kapitalističnega gospodarstva. In to kljub Marxovi kritiki Sayevih zakonov trga, ki se uresničujejo le z uresničenimi razmerji skladnosti med oddelkoma družbene proizvodnje – produkcijo produkcijskih in potrošnih sredstev. Meščanski neoklasični ekonomski teoretiki so torej z Marshallovo ekonomiko zagovarjali Sayeve zakone trga – po Keynesu stoletne tabuje s fetišizmom denarja v meščanski ekonomski znanosti!

Jasno je, da Marxova razmerja skladnosti med oddelkoma družbene realizacije in reprodukcije veljajo tudi za razširjeno družbeno reprodukcijo, ki jo omogoča pretvarjanje presežne vrednosti v dodatni kapital – akumulacija kapitala, ki s svojima zakonoma centralizacije in koncentracije kapitala spreminja liberalni kapitalizem s prosto konkurenco v monopolni kapitalizem z omejeno konkurenco in monopolnimi profiti, ki jih Smithova nevidna roka ne odpravlja več. Stalnost monopolnih profitov dosegajo monopolisti z monopolnimi cenami, ko prečrpavajo dobičke iz prostokonkurenčnih sektorjev gospodarstva in predvsem iz tujine. Zato se s stalnostjo monopolnih profitov povezuje družbeno podoptimalna zaposlitev družbenih produkcijskih dejavnikov, ki prikrajšuje družbe za potencialni družbeni proizvod, ki bi bil lahko večji od dejanskega, je temeljna ugotovitev J. M. Keynesa (2006). Z njo se je teoretično zbližal z Marxom.

Spreminjanje liberalnega v monopolni kapitalizem je z zgodovinsko tendenco kapitalistične akumulacije kapitala napovedal Marx s teoretičnim spoznanjem o zgodovinski minljivosti kapitalističnega produkcijskega sistema, ker se monopolni kapitalizem povezuje s kolonializmom in imperializmom ter z imperialističnimi vojnami, ki zaostrujejo krizo kapitalizma kot družbenoekonomskega sistema in kličejo po družbenih reformah – po poudarjeni ekonomski vlogi države. Te morajo vsaj s Smithovo že prikazano družbeno koordinacijsko (tržno-plansko) in motivacijsko (profitno-neprofitno) dualnostjo gospodarjenja z Galbraithtovimi (1967) protimonopolnimi »nasprotnimi silami« blažiti in odpravljati krizo monopolnega kapitalizma kot družbenoekonomskega sistema!

Smithove dualnosti gospodarjenja s poudarjanjem ekonomske vloge države v procesih družbenega gospodarjenja in Ricardovega pojasnila padanja profitne stopnje z družbenimi zakonitostmi delitve družbenega dohodka na naraščajoče nominalne mezde in padajoče profite ter naraščajoče zemljiške diferencialne rente zemljiških lastnikov ter predvsem Marxovih zakonov akumulacije kapitala s koncentracijo in centralizacijo kapitala in njuno zgodovinsko tendenco, ki prostokonkurenčni kapitalizem razvija v omejeno konkurenčni monopolni kapitalizem in s tem v krizo kapitalizma kot družbenoekonomskega sistema, pa ne sprejemajo finančne oligarhije kot upravljavke združenega produktivnega, trgovskega in denarnega kapitala – finančnega kapitala oziroma to odklanjajo. Zato zahtevajo in lobirajo ekonomske teoretike in nosilce oblasti, da jih apologetsko branijo, in ne da jih z delitvenimi zakonitostmi (njihovimi nedelovnimi dohodki, ki zavirajo družbenoekonomski razvoj) krivijo za poglabljanje družbenih nasprotij in protislovij.

PREOBRAZBA POLITIČNE EKONOMIJE V EKONOMIKO

Apologetsko branjenje kapitalističnih nedelovnih dohodkov lastnikov finančnega kapitala, ki se ne spreminjajo v produktivni kapital, je meščanske neoklasične ekonomske teoretike spodbujalo, da so politično ekonomijo nadomestili z Marshallovo ekonomiko. Ta je poudarjala in proučevala predvsem gospodarsko fazo menjave, podcenila in zanemarjala pa celovitost in povezanost vseh faz gospodarjenja, ki so predmet politične ekonomije – produkcijo, delitev, menjavo in potrošnjo s primatom produkcije in dialektično povezanostjo. Zato so neoklasični teoretiki opustili klasično delovno teorijo vrednosti z Marxovo teorijo presežne vrednosti ter ju nadomestili s subjektivno teorijo koristnosti in s Smithovimi stroški proizvodnje. S tem so produkcijske odnose med producenti nadomestili z odnosi ljudi do dobrin, ki zadovoljujejo njihove potrebe. Seveda so naraščajočo ponudbo kupci pripravljeni kupiti po nižji ceni, ker pada krivulja povpraševanja. S povečevanjem ponudbe se povečajo stroški proizvodnje, ki vodijo v naraščajočo krivuljo ponudbe. Z uravnoteževanjem silnic ponudbe in povpraševanja na trgu so določene ravnovesne cene dobrin s točko, na kateri je ponudba producentov usklajena s povpraševanjem kupcev – potrošnik je kralj! V ravnovesju krivulj ponudbe in povpraševanja je cena P v prostokonkurenčnih razmerah enaka mejnim stroškom proizvodnje MC – torej P = MC.

Z razvojnimi zakonitostmi se seveda prosta konkurenca spreminja v omejeno monopolno, ki cene zviša za stalni monopolni profit. Zato so monopolne cene višje od prostokonkurenčnih cen. Zaradi monopolnih profitov, ki jih tržni mehanizem ne odpravlja več, se morajo mejni dohodki MR, ki padajo hitreje kot naraščajo mejni stroški (MR > MC), uskladiti s ceno P, torej P = MR. Tako določeni optimalni obsegi proizvodnje v razmerah monopolov so torej manjši od prostokonkurenčnih. Zato so družbe v razmerah razvitejšega monopolnega kapitalizma prikrajšane za potencialni družbeni proizvod. Hkrati pa so soočene z nezaposlenostjo proizvodnih dejavnikov. Saj Smithova nevidna roka, ki jo z Marshallovo mikroekonomiko zagovarjajo neoklasični meščanski ekonomisti, ne uresničuje več predpostavljene polne zaposlitve produkcijskih dejavnikov.

KEYNESOVO REŠEVANJE EKONOMSKIH KRIZ

Marshallova ekonomika je bila temeljno učno gradivo študentov ekonomije od osemdesetih let 19. stoletja. Z njo je bil seznanjen tudi J. M. Keynes, ki je doživljal veliko družbenoekonomsko krizo med letoma 1929 in 1933. Krizne razmere v gospodarstvu z vidno in bolečo ter politično nevarno brezposelnostjo delavcev in proizvodnih dejavnikov so Keynesa spodbudile, da je zavrnil teorije, po katerih so ga vzgajali, in se je vprašal, kako manj polno zaposlitev spremeniti v bolj popolno: kako potrošiti celoten družbeni dohodek Y, ki ga je treba na družbeni ravni maksimirati. Ustvarjen družbeni dohodek Y pa uporabiti za individualno, skupno in splošno konzumno potrošnjo C ter za družbeno varčevanje S (torej Y = (C + S)), ki se mora uporabiti za investicijsko produktivno potrošnjo I (torej Y

= (C + I)). Na družbeni ravni je namreč treba v družbi ustvarjeno varčevanje S v celoti spremeniti v družbene realne naložbe: I – (S = I). Na ta način se Y = (C + S) z izenačitvijo varčevanja z investicijami (S = I) pretvori oziroma spremni v Y = (C + I)! Keynesova zahteva, da se mora varčevanje iz dohodka S uporabiti in uskladiti z neto investicijami I tega varčevanja – torej (S = I), je podobna Maxovi, ki varčevanju iz dohodka dodaja še varčevanje iz kapitala. Zato se mora po Marxu bruto varčevanje uskladiti z bruto investiranjem.

Gornja Keynesova delitev dohodka na konzumne in investicijske sklade spominja na Kidričevo (1979) delitev narodnega dohodka Y na individualno potrošnjo, ki jo omogočajo plačni skladi P, in na državno organizirano in posredovano akumulacijsko produktivno ter javno skupno in državno splošno potrošnjo: Af – torej Y = (P + Af). Z javnimi akumulacijsko-potrošnimi skladi Af upravlja torej država prek uporabnovrednostnih in neprofitno motiviranih in družbeno-plansko koordiniranih infrastrukturnih produkcijskih in storitvenih dejavnosti, ki bi kot zasebno organizirane prakticirale monopolne cene! Zato mora biti država udeležena v delitvi dohodka. Delež države v delitvi pa je določen z državno davčno stopnjo – stopnjo akumulacije in skladov: x = Af/P.

Iz enačbe x = Af/P sledi, da je Af = Px in da je Y = (P + Px) oziroma Y =P (1 + x), plačni sklad pa P = Y/(1 + x). Po tej logiki je mogoče razčleniti tudi Keynesovo enačbo Y = (C + I) z investicijsko stopnjo x = I/C, C = Cx, Y = (C + Cx), Y = C (1 + x) in C = Y/(1 + x)! Dobili smo podoben rezultat – s to razliko, da ja Keynesov C večji od Kidričevega P. Če bi Kidričevi individualni potrošnji P dodali še javno skupno (socialno-zdravstvenovarstveno, pokojninsko, šolsko-izobraževalno, kulturno-prosvetno, znanstveno-raziskovalno …) in splošno državnovarstveno, represivno, s potrošnjo državnega aparata vred, bi dobili Keynesovo konzumno potrošnjo C .

Tudi Keynes je iz novoustvarjene vrednosti – družbenega dohodka, ki ga je treba maksimirati in uporabiti za konzumne in investicijske namene Y = (C + I), definiral dve spremenljivki, ki ju dobimo, če delimo enačbo Y = (C + I) z dohodkom – torej Y = (C + I)/Y. Tako dobimo 1 = (C/Y + I/Y) – torej C/Y, ki meri nagnjenost k potrošnji, ki z naraščajočim dohodkom pada, ter I/Y, ki meri nagnjenost k investiranju, ki z naraščajočim dohodkom prav tako pada. Tema meriloma dodaja Keynes še profitno mero p* = P/K, ki z razvojem prav tako pada, kot ugotavljajo vsi Keynesov predhodniki.

Vsa ta padanja, ki jih je mogoče statistično verificirati, vodijo v Keynesovo deflacijsko vrzel (S > I), ker destimulirajo profitno motivirane podjetnike, da bi varčevanje iz družbenega dohodka, ki mu je treba dodati še naraščajoče Marxovo amortizacijsko varčevanje za obnavljanje fiksnega kapitala, v celoti investirali. Zaradi tega je treba usposobiti državo, da bo profitno motivirano in tržno koordinirano mikrogospodarjenje nadgradila z neprofitno dohodkovno motiviranim in plansko koordiniranim javnim makrogospodarjenjem. S tem bi odpravljala deflacijske vrzeli – usklajevala varčevanje iz dohodkov in varčevanje iz kapitala S z realnimi investicijami I – torej (S = I)!

Skratka, demokratično državo je treba usposobiti, da bo lahko s podružbljanjem javnih infrastrukturnih produkcijskih (transportno-komunikacijskih, surovinsko-energetskih, komunalno-stanovanjskih …) in storitvenih (bančno-zavarovalnih, javnovarstvenih, socialno-zdravstvenih, vzgojno-izobraževalnih, znanstveno-raziskovalnih, kulturno-prosvetnih …) področij poslovala z uporabnovrednostnim dohodkovnim, ne pa s profitnim motivom. Infrastrukturna področja gospodarjenja bi namreč – kot privatno, profitno motivirana in organizirana – prakticirala monopolne cene, ki ne odpravljajo, ampak poglabljajo deflacijsko vrzel (S > I), ki jo mora s poudarjeno ekonomsko vlogo odpravljati država z:

- javnimi deli oziroma investiranjem in financiranjem na infrastrukturnih področjih družbenega javnega gospodarjenja in s subvencioniranjem profitno motiviranega tržnega gospodarstva za premagovanje posledic gospodarskih, finančnih, ekološko-podnebnih, zdravstvenih in drugih kriz; javno investiranje in financiranje države s povečevanjem naložb prispevata k odpravljanju deflacijskih stanj v družbenem gospodarstvu;
- transfernimi plačili, ki z redistribucijo nedelovnih dohodkov (od onih z manjšo k tistim z večjo nagnjenostjo k potrošnji), s povečevanjem družbenih konzumnih izdatkov zmanjšujejo deflacijska stanja v družbenem gospodarstvu;
- s smiselno kombinacijo državnega investiranja in financiranja ter transfernimi plačili, ki s povečevanjem konzuma (C) in realnih investicij (I) usklajujejo družbeno varčevanje z naložbami – torej (S = I) in odpravljajo deflacijska stanja v družbenem gospodarstvu!

Izbor možnih direktnih in indirektnih sredstev državne ekonomske politike – posegov države v gospodarstvo za odpravo deflacijskih stanj v družbenem gospodarstvu, ki se povezujejo s krizo kapitalizma kot družbenoekonomskega sistema, zahteva povečevanje deleža države v delitvi novoustvarjene vrednosti – družbenega dohodka. Zahteva redistribucijo družbenih dohodkov v korist države, ki se mora iz liberalističnega »nočnega čuvaja« spremeniti (reformirati) v demokratični aparat, ki v razmerah zrelejšega monopolnega kapitalizma pomirjuje družbena nasprotja in protislovja.

Krizo kapitalizma kot družbenoekonomskega sistema je z javnimi deli in s pomočmi brezposelnim začel reševati ameriški predsednik F. D. Roosevelt. Za teoretično podporo teh rešitev pa je, kot smo predstavili, poskrbel Keynes (2006).

Keynesovo teoretično utemeljeno reševanje ekonomskih kriz z odpravljanjem deflacijskih vrzeli je monopolni kapitalizem začelo pretvarjati v državni kapitalizem; to je bilo na splošno z navdušenjem sprejeto. Saj smo »vsi postali keynesijanci«, so bile izjave ekonomistov in politikov. S prehodom mirnodobnega v vojnodobno in povojno obnovitveno gospodarjenje se je ekonomska vloga države v gospodarstvu še bolj okrepila. Ta je spodbudila, da so udeleženci valutne in finančne komisije OZN v Bretton Woodsu (1944) vključno s Keynesom predlagali, naj se ustanovita Mednarodni monetarni sklad in Svetovna banka.

Keynes s predlogom, da bi s Svetovno banko povezali s svetovno valuto – denarjem, ni uspel. Zato je ameriški dolar – s pravili vzdrževanja njegove stabilnosti z možnostjo zamenjav dolarskih presežkov z zlatom – postal svetovna obračunska enota. Kriza tega sistema se je z dolarsko in dolžniško krizo začela v začetku 70. let prejšnjega stoletja.

Pred- in povojna uspešnost keynesijanskega reševanja deflacijskih vrzeli je spodbudila Keynesove meščanske teoretične sledilce, da so s Samuelsonovo (1966) neoklasično sintezo Marshallovo liberalistično mikroekonomiko nadgradili s Keynesovo makroekonomiko. Z njo so priznali in utemeljevali družbeni koordinacijski – tržno-planski in motivacijski – profitni-neprofitni dualizem gospodarjenja. Gre za dualne mešane tržno-planske gospodarske sisteme, ki jih je OZN priporočala svojim članicam in ki po Galbraithu konvergirajo. V pretežno tržno organiziranih in koordiniranih gospodarstvih se mora z odpravljanjem deflacijskih vrzeli krepiti družbenoplanski element gospodarskega sistema; v zbirokratiziranih administrativnih povsem planskih gospodarstvih pa se mora, zaradi čedalje večjih in usodnih planskih zmot, krepiti tržni element gospodarskega sistema. S konvergenco gospodarskih sistemov se torej dosega optimalna razmejitev med ex-post – posledično – tržno in ex-ante vnaprejšnjo plansko koordinacijo družbenega gospodarstva.

Z neoklasično sintezo opredeljeni sodobni mešani tržnoplanski oziroma planskotržni gospodarski sistemi se seveda povezujejo z redistribucijo nedelovnih in neproduktivno uporabljenih dohodkov, ki ji finančne oligarhije, ki upravljajo s »kapital-lastnino« – s finančnim kapitalom, niso naklonjene. Podjetniško »kapital-funkcijo« so prenesle na sodobne, dobro kompenzirane menedžerje, ki kot dobro nagrajeni podpirajo in lobirajo proti redistribuciji dohodka – povečevanju deleža države v delitvi, s katerim država z Galbraithovimi (1967) »protisilami« odpravlja deflacijske vrzeli in zmanjšuje razlike med dejanskim in možnim družbenim produktom.

Če je nakazano protideflacijsko delovanje države blokirano z zaostajanjem rasti redistribucijskih davkov, se državi ponuja, da z ekspanzijsko monetarno ekonomsko politiko – z zadolževanjem pridobiva manjkajoča denarna sredstva za usklajevanje družbenega varčevanja z naložbami (S = I). Keynes je bil – podobno kot pred njim Marx – sicer oster kritik Sayevih zakonov trga, kljub temu pa je ob neki priložnosti nekritično izjavil, da povečano povpraševanje vse do polne zaposlite družbenih produkcijskih dejavnikov ne bo zviševalo cen – delovalo inflacijsko, ampak bo povečevalo zaposlitev in z njo družbeni produkt – odpravljalo deflacijsko vrzel.

S to Keynesovo (2006) trditvijo je bila spregledana razlika med družbeno ponudbo in družbenim povpraševanjem, ki ga omogoča monetarna ekspanzija. Družbeno povpraševanje se namreč z njo lahko nenadoma spremeni z odločitvijo nosilcev oblasti, družbena ponudba pa vedno potrebuje čas, da se prilagodi družbenemu povpraševanju s strukturo te ponudbe, ki mora biti usklajena, kakor ugotavlja Marx, s strukturo družbenega povpraševanja. Gre za razmerja skladnosti

med oddelkoma družbene produkcije – produkcijo produkcijskih sredstev in produkcijo potrošnih sredstev. Tem temeljnim razmerjem skladnosti je treba dodati še razmerje, ki zaradi narave fiksnega kapitala v krožnih tokovih kapitala z amortizacijo postopno prenaša svojo vrednost na nove proizvode. Zato se morajo zgolj prodaje enih (B – D), ki oblikujejo varčevalne amortizacijske in akumulacijske sklade za kasnejšo obnavljanje fiksnega kapitala in nove realne investicije S, uskladiti z zgolj nakupi drugih (D – B), ki aktivirajo te sklade – realno investirajo I, torej (S = I). Oblikovanje S in sproščanje varčevalno-investicijskih skladov iz kapitala in dohodkov I je torej treba po Marxu in Keynesu sproti usklajevati!

Možnost financiranja usklajevanja družbenega varčevanja z investicijami, ki se ponuja nosilcem oblasti z ekspanzivno fiskalno in monetarno politiko, ko lobistom finančnih oligarhij uspe zavirati ali celo zmanjševati deleže države v delitvi družbenega dohodka, se torej povezuje z Marxovimi razmerji skladnosti med oddelkoma produkcije produkcijskih in potrošnih sredstev. Če so razmerja medoddelčne skladnosti porušena, bo ekspanzivna monetarna politika deflacijsko vrzel spremenila v inflacijsko – v stagflacijo, tj. v inflacijo in stagnacijo družbenega gospodarstva.

Ne glede na pravila, s katerimi so udeleženci konference v Bretton Woodu ustoličili ameriški dolar kot svetovno obračunsko enoto, se je v začetku 70. let v ZDA zaradi ekspanzivne fiskalne in monetarne politike pojavila dolarska in dolžniška kriza, ki je deflacijsko vrzel spremenila v inflacijsko – v stagnacijo ob inflaciji. To krizo so reševali z revalvacijo valut v nedolarskih državah in z devalvacijo dolarja v ZDA.

NEOLIBERALISTIČNA PROTIREFORMACIJA DRŽAVNEGA KAPITALIZMA

Prav dolarska kriza z naraščajočim državnim zadolževanjem je spodbudila monetarnega teoretika M. Friedmana (1968), da je kot vnet zagovornik liberalizma in kvantitativne teorije o denarju z ostro kritiko zavrnil ekspanzijsko monetarno politiko, ker da vsako povečanje količine denarja v obtoku deluje inflacijsko. Temu mnenju so sledili še drugi v ekonomski liberalizem zagledani ekonomisti (Hayek 1991), ki so se obrnili proti keynesijanstvu, in s tem proti poudarjeni ekonomski vlogi države v gospodarstvu. Ta naj ostane pri svoji liberalistični vlogi »nočnega čuvaja«, ki bo ohranjala privilegiran monopolni status nedelovnih finančnih oligarhij, ki so podjetniške in poslovodne funkcije prenesle na dobro kompenzirane kadre, opremljene z znanjem, ki jo oligarhi zagovarjajo in skupaj z neoliberalističnimi fundamentalisti podpirajo.

Dobro kompenzirani kadri zato lobirajo pri nosilcih oblasti, da z liberalizacijo in deregulacijo ter s privatizacijo in denacionalizacijo gospodarstva – z reaganizmom in thatcherizmom – izrinjajo in odpravljajo pomembne in teoretično podprte družbenoekonomske pridobitve keynesijanstva. Na ta način se je državni kapitalizem vrnil v razmere liberalističnega imperialnega monopolnega kapitalizma s krizami in vojnami ter z zaostreno ekološko problematiko.

Z liberalizacijo in deregulacijo gospodarstva se je namreč zameglila meja med legalnostjo in legitimnostjo, ki je finančnim oligarhijam omogočala moralno vprašljive selitve firm v države z najmanjšimi davčnimi stopnjami in denarne transakcije v davčnih oazah ter družbeno škodljive in neproduktivne denarne špekulacije na sekundarnih borznih trgih kapitala. Z vsemi temi »manipulacijami« so se izogibale plačevanju davkov in prispevkov v matičnih državah. Zato so se – poleg lobističnih pritiskov na zmanjševanje davčnih in prispevnih stopenj – s floskulo, da je treba državo omejevati, ker da je «slab gospodar«, začeli zmanjševati tudi javni državni dohodki, ki so spodbujali privatizacijo in denacionalizacijo tudi na infrastrukturnih področjih plansko koordiniranega in dohodkovno motiviranega gospodarjenja. S privatizacijo teh področij gospodarjenja se je začelo družbeno planiranje z uporabnovrednostno dohodkovno motivacijo pretvarjati v podjetniško planiranje s profitno motivacijo, ki z maksimiranjem monopolnih profitov ne odpravlja, ampak ohranja in poglablja Keynesove deflacijske vrzeli (S > I), ki se pojavljajo kot Pikettyjeve razlike med stopnjami rasti dohodkov iz kapitala, ki se s fevdalizacijo kapitalizma pretvarjajo v rente (R), večje od stopenj rasti družbenega gospodarstva oz. družbenega razvoja (G) – torej (R > G)!

Te razlike med stopnjama rasti dohodkov iz kapitala in gospodarsko rastjo pojasni dejstvo, da se znaten del denarnega kapitala iz družbenih varčevalnih amortizacijskih in akumulacijskih skladov (S) ne uporablja za realne, ampak nerealne – kvazinaložbe (I). To je za nakupe delnic na sekundarnem trgu kapitala ali za nakupe (sovražne) prevzeme že delujočih podjetji, ki s centralizacijo kapitala, ki ji ne sledi njegova koncentracija, povečujejo le kapital – lastnino finančnih oligarhij, ne povečujejo pa produkcije in zaposlitve, »kapital-funkcije«. Zaradi tega se ohranja Keynesova deflacijska vrzel, ki kliče po vnovični reformi kapitalizma kot družbenoekonomskega sistema.

Z liberalizacijo in deregulacijo ter privatizacijo in denacionalizacijo gospodarstva se je torej s keyenesijsko ekonomsko teorijo utemeljeni in z družbenimi reformami izoblikovani državni kapitalizem kot farsa vrnil v družbenoekonomske razmere, iz katerih je izšel – v »liberalistični« monopolni kapitalizem z vsemi njegovimi nasprotji in protislovji, ki jih je začel uspešno reševati keynesijanstvo z mešanimi tržno-planskimi gospodarskimi sistemi, ki nadgrajujejo *ex post* tržno z *ex ante* plansko koordinacijo družbenega gospodarjenja, ki jo je z motivacijsko – profitno-neprofitno in sistemsko – tržno-plansko dualnostjo družbenega gospodarjenja nakazoval že Smith.

SKLEP

Že klasični ekonomist A. Smith kot prvi urejevalec politične ekonomije kot družbene znanosti je torej opozoril na ekonomsko vlogo države, ki mora zagotavljati prostokonkurenčne razmere na menjalno-tržno organiziranih področjih gospodarjenja, na infrastrukturnih netržno uporabnovrednostno motiviranih javnih dejavnostih pa preprečevati monopolizacijo teh dejavnosti. Saj bi sicer kot

zasebno organizirane prakticirale monopolne cene, ki jih tržni mehanizem ne odpravlja več, čeprav kot javno organizirane in neprofitno motivirane podpirajo in omogočajo delovanje tržno menjalnovrednostno profitne motivirane dejavnosti. Zato mora infrastrukturna področja gospodarjenja, z nadgradnjo profitnega z uporabnovrednostnim dohodkovnim motivom, organizirati in upravljati država. Gre torej za Smithov dualizem gospodarjenja, ki so ga spregledali vsi kasnejši meščanski klasični in neoklasični ekonomisti, ki so spodbudili keynesijance, da so ga s Samuelsonovo (1966) neoklasično sintezo oživeli in se s tem približali Marxu.

Keynesijansko reševanje krize kapitalizma kot družbenoekonomskega sistema, ki se povezuje z redistribucijami dohodkov in premoženja, pa, kot smo poudarjali, finančne oligarhije ne sprejemajo z navdušenjem. Zato so se upirale in lobirale za zniževanje davkov, čemur so sledili nosilci oblasti, odvisni od finančnih oligarhij. Ti so začeli odpravljati obetavni keynesijanski način reševanja krize kapitalizma kot družbenoekonomskega sistema. Državni kapitalizem pa so – z ekonomskim fundamentalizmom, z vero v zadostnost samo Smithove nevidne roke brez Smithovih teoretičnih opozoril, da mora država zagotavljati prostokonkurenčne – nemonopolne razmere gospodarjenja – vrnili v razmere (neo)liberalističnega monopolnega kapitalizma. Ta pa je z neoimperialistično globalizacijo gospodarstva in neprimernim odnosom do primarnih produkcijskih dejavnikov znova zaostril in poglobil krizo kapitalizma!

Obnovljeno krizo kapitalizma kot družbenoekonomskega sistema, ki je s svojimi pojavnimi oblikami: gospodarskimi, finančnimi, vojnimi, zdravstvenimi, okoljevarstvenimi, klimatskimi, begunskimi in drugimi krizami znova zaostrila družbena nasprotja in protislovja, bo torej mogoče reševati tudi z reafirmacijo vseh tistih Smithovih teoretičnih rešitev, ki so jih neoliberalistični fundamentalisti zavestno zavrgli. Politično ekonomijo kot temeljno družbeno znanost so nadomestili z ekonomiko kot naravoslovno znanostjo, ki produkcijo pojasnjuje s tehniko, vrednost pa s koristnostjo dobrin.

Skratka, zaradi poglobljenih družbenih nasprotij in protislovij sedanjega neoliberalističnega fundamentalizma je treba reafirmirati politično ekonomijo kot družbeno znanost. Ta pa se povezuje z družbenoodgovornim gospodarjenjem – s trajnostnim razvojem in z njim usklajenim družbenoekonomskim sistemom. To je s Smithovo motivacijsko – menjalno- in uporabnovrednostno ter sistemsko – ex post tržno in *ex ante* plansko dualnostjo družbenih koordinacijskih mehanizmov, s katerimi se rešuje družbenoekonomski problem: kaj, za koga oz. koliko, kako, kje, kdaj … proizvajati oz. uporabljati družbeno omejene primarne in z delom pridobljene kapitalske produkcijske faktorje. Te pridobivamo z ustvarjalnim človeškim delom »očetov bogastva« iz zemlje – »matere« bogastva narodov« (Petty 2014; Smith 2010). »Očeti z materjo bogastva narodov« pa s poglobljeno krizo kapitalizma kot družbenoekonomskega sistema po našem esejistu E. Kocbeku že dolgo »družno kličejo na pomoč!«

Gre za družbeno odgovorno gospodarjenje, ki zahteva reafirmacijo politične ekonomije kot družbene znanosti. To so nakazali že keynesijanci, ki so odpravljali deflacijske vrzeli z družbeno povpraševalne strani, in tako prezrli družbeno ponudbeno stran in njeno strukturo, ki mora biti usklajena s strukturo družbenega povpraševanja. Prav zaradi zanemarjanja ponudbene strani, ki jo poudarjajo marksisti, je monetarna ekspanzija deflacijsko vrzel spremenila v inflacijsko vrzel; ta je spodbudila neoliberalistične fundamentaliste, da so, kot kritiki poudarjene keynesijanske vloge države v gospodarstvu, zahtevali, da so se z liberalizacijo in deregulacijo ter privatizacijo in denacionalizacijo gospodarstva začele odpravljati obetavne keynesijanske pridobitve, ki spodbujajo sintezo keynesijanstva z marksizmom.

Družbenoodgovorno gospodarjenje torej z reafirmacijo politične ekonomije zahteva postliberalistično sintezo keynesijanstva z marksizmom, ki bo uresničevala Smithovo motivacijsko in sistemsko dualnost gospodarjenja z mešanimi plansko-tržnimi oz. tržno-planskimi gospodarskimi sistemi, ki konvergirajo!

Ali nas bo družbenoneodgovorno gospodarjenje imperialistične faze monopolnega kapitalizma v odnosu do primarnih proizvodnih dejavnikov, ki jih ponuja zemlja in jih pridobiva človeštvo z delom delovne sile, s pojavljanjem gospodarskih, finančnih, energetskih, vojnih, zdravstvenih, ekoloških, podnebnih in drugih kriz, ozavestilo, da neodgovorno gospodarjenje, ki se povezuje s krizo kapitalizma kot družbenoekonomskega sistema, nadomestimo z družbenoodgovornim gospodarjenjem? To od družboslovnih znanstvenikov zahteva neapologetski znanstveni napor, da z reafirmirano in renovirano politično ekonomijo uskladi z družbeno odgovornostjo.

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EXPLORING FACTORS AFFECTING PAKISTANI STUDENTS' INTENTIONS TO ACCEPT AND USE MOBILE ADVERTISING: A UTAUT2 PERSPECTIVE**

Abstract. *The article aims to explore factors that influence respondents' intentions to accept and use mobile advertising by proposing an extension of the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) with perceived enjoyment, perceived irritation, and personalisation. To identify the factors affecting the acceptability of mobile advertising, the intentions and behaviours of respondents regarding mobile advertising are reviewed. The study was conducted in Pakistan by using online survey. Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM) was applied to examine the sample size of 446 respondents. The findings revealed certain crucial factors (such as effort expectancy, performance expectancy, perceived enjoyment, perceived irritation, and personalisation) that can affect respondents' intentions to accept mobile advertising. Also revealed was the relationship between respondents' intentions to accept and use behaviour regarding mobile advertising. It is established that respondents expect more personalised promotional messages to be shown to them in line with their needs and preferences. Here, advertisers must pay attention to the contextual relevance of the ads while noting the element of irritation that can be felt among consumers, as such ads create negative attitudes and intentions towards mobile advertising.*

Keywords: *mobile advertising, consumer intentions, use behaviour, unified theory of acceptance and use of technology (UTAUT), Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM), Pakistan.*

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INTRODUCTION

At the start of the new millennium, the world has witnessed tremendous technological advancements in wireless communication. These not only enable users to communicate with others but also present a range of opportunities for marketers to deliver their messages in innovative ways. The practices of mobile advertising are rapidly growing due to the high penetration rate of mobile phones among consumers around the world. According to Rosenkrans and Myers (2012), the mobile phone as a medium of marketing communications is different from conventional media like radio, TV, outdoor advertising, and magazines. Murillo-Zegarra et al. (2020) state that consumers are more prone to hold negative attitudes towards mobile advertising compared to traditional means of advertising.

Mobile devices have become a personal fashion statement for users, and a symbol of a user's social status (Lou et al. 2022). Second, the most important characteristic of mobile devices is their mobility as they can be carried around most of the time, making the users accessible to marketers at any time of the day (Garcia 2023). Users do not need to turn their TV or radio on to be exposed to advertising. The recent advancements in mobile technology enable marketers to trace the geographical location of consumers and this allows them to send precise information and appropriate advertising material (Oven et al. 2012). Third, the distinctive features of mobile devices, such as touchscreens, cameras, and audio/video multimedia, provide a unique and interactive experience for consumers, which thereby increases consumers' participation in persuasive communication (Taneja 2021).

Some negative aspects of this new medium of advertising must be considered. For example, consumers sometimes feel irritated when faced with numerous unwanted/uninvited ads without their consent, which causes them to develop a negative attitude to mobile advertising (Dwivedi et al. 2021; Sharma et al. 2021). There is an urgent need to explore the negative aspects in order to limit the chances of consumers having negative attitudes towards advertising. Further, various factors have a strong impact on creating positive and negative attitudes to mobile advertising, and these also need to be explored. Accordingly, the main objective of the article is to uncover the effects of different factors on consumers' intentions to use mobile advertising.

The relevant literature shows that consumers have started to become indifferent to mobile advertising due to inappropriate ad content, unsolicited promotional messages, bad timing of message delivery, and the lack of rational, emotional or entertaining appeal in promotional messages (Alwreikat and Rjoub 2020; Chung and Kim 2021; Morimoto 2021; Niu et al. 2021; Oven et al. 2012). All of these issues have negatively affected consumers' intentions to use mobile advertising. The central problem of the research is hence to discover the factors that not only affect consumers' intentions but also have the ability to convert present negative intentions into positive ones.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

In the area of technology acceptance and adoption, the unified theory of acceptance and use of technology (UTAUT) is one of the latest and most comprehensive theories. Many recent research studies have applied UTAUT to explore consumers' acceptance of new technologies. Examples of such studies come from areas such as mobile banking (Zhou et al. 2010), electronic learning (Tan 2013), course management software (Marchewka and Kostiwa 2007), online shopping (Celik 2016), mobile commerce (Min et al. 2008), computer applications (Al-Gahtani et al. 2007) and mobile advertising (Wong et al. 2015). UTAUT was developed by Venkatesh et al. (2003) with the goal of analysing consumers' intentions to use/accept a particular technology.

Venkatesh et al. (2012) further extended UTAUT to explore consumers' acceptance and use of technology. The authors added three more constructs and named the extended theory UTAUT2. These additional constructs are habit, hedonic motivation, and price value of technology. Venkatesh et al. (2012) found substantial improvements in variance (56% to 74%) explaining consumers' intentions to use and use behaviour towards mobile Internet (40% to 52%). The major difference between UTAUT and UTAUT2 lies in the unit of analysis of the study. UTAUT was in an organisational context whereby employees of different companies were surveyed; in contrast, in UTAUT2 Venkatesh et al. (2012) focused on consumers by questioning them regarding their use of mobile Internet. Therefore, the current research is based on UTAUT2 as the unit of analysis of this study refers to consumers.

In an attempt to extend UTAUT2, the theoretical model of this research also includes factors like perceived enjoyment, personalisation, and perceived irritation as direct factors of consumers' intentions to accept/use mobile advertising in order to obtain extensive predictive explanations. Perceived enjoyment was conceptualised as "hedonic motivation" in the Venkatesh et al. (2012) UTAUT2 model, whereas the present study conceptualises it as perceived enjoyment. The research model incorporates perceived enjoyment based on the suggestions made by Bagozzi (2007). Perceived enjoyment is an intrinsic motivational factor in motivation theory, which states that satisfaction in the shape of enjoyment gained from performing an activity can be a significant predictor of consumers' intentions to use new technology (Davis et al. 1992).

Consumer Attitude Towards Mobile Advertising

Attitudes play an important role in shaping consumers' behaviour and buying decisions and thus while assessing and exploring the effectiveness of any new medium of advertising it is important to research how the attitudes to that particular medium can be affected, changed and modified to make promotional campaigns successful (Karjaluoto et al. 2002). Elliott and Speck (1998) point out that commercial clutter and the increasing number of promotional messages foster negative attitudes concerning advertising. However, Noor et al. (2013)

conclude that consumers actually like mobile advertising. Saadeghvaziri and Hosseini (2011) found in their study that attitudes to advertising depend highly on the channel of advertising, and further conclude that attitudes to mobile advertising are more positive than those to advertising through conventional media. Moreover, Blanco et al. (2010) established in their research that mobile advertising is more informative, entertaining and trustworthy than advertising through conventional media. The nature of attitudes is complex to understand and explore, which means better understanding thorough research is needed to assure efficient promotional campaigns (Petty and Brinol 2010).

Hypotheses Development

The theoretical framework is comprised of a two-stage model (see Figure 1). First, the relationship between independent concepts (such as social influence, effort expectancy, performance expectancy, facilitating conditions, perceived enjoyment, perceived irritation, and personalisation) and intentions to use (the first dependent construct) is suggested. Second, the relationship between intentions to use and use behaviour (the second/final dependent construct) is implied. Independent theoretical constructs are defined as follows:

Social Influence: The social influence in terms of using a new technology is defined by Venkatesh et al. (2003) as "the degree to which an individual perceives that important others believe he or she should use the new system". Several research studies have asserted the importance of social influence in influencing consumers' choices, attitudes, and purchase patterns. For example, López-Nicolás et al. (2008) found that users' instructors, superiors, colleagues, peers, friends and relatives had a strong impact on consumers' behavioural intentions. These findings should be considered also when exploring intentions to use mobile advertising. Thus, we hypothesise:

H1: Social influence is positively related to intentions to use mobile advertising.

Effort Expectancy: Venkatesh et al. (2003) describe effort expectancy as the level of effort a person perceives a technology or system requires to be used or understood. Rogers (2003) argues that the level of effort involved in learning or using a system or technology acts as a major barrier to the acceptance of such a system or technology. If an individual believes that a particular system or technology is easy to use, their acceptance of that technology/system will then be higher (Tero et al. 2004). Any technology that calls for considerable effort to learn and operate is believed to be less useful (Venkatesh and Davis 2000). It can thus be said that the more a user perceives mobile advertising to be easy to use and access, the more users are likely to perceive mobile advertising as a useful platform. This leads us to hypothesise:

H2: Effort expectancy is positively related to intentions to use mobile advertising.

Performance Expectancy: Venkatesh et al. (2003) explain performance expectancy as the level to which a person perceives that using a technology or system

will improve his/her overall performance for a given activity. The construct of performance expectancy in UTAUT is equivalent to the construct of perceived usefulness (PU) in the technology acceptance model. Various past studies (Celik 2016; Marchewka and Kostiwa 2007; Tan 2013) applied the construct of performance expectancy and validated the construct's significance in exploring behavioural intentions. Park et al. (2007) conducted a study to explore the adoption of mobile technologies. The authors sampled Chinese nationals and applied structural equation modelling during their research. The results of the study show that performance expectancy has a significant impact on consumers' intentions to adopt mobile technologies. With the results of these studies in mind, it is strongly believed that performance expectancy and intention to use mobile advertising have a positive relationship. We thus hypothesise:

H3: Performance expectancy is positively related to intentions to use mobile advertising.

Facilitating Conditions: Venkatesh et al. (2003) define facilitating conditions as "the degree to which an individual believes that an organizational and technical infrastructure exists to support use of the system". The authors add that there is a greater chance of a new technology or system being accepted when the user believes there is easy access to the resources and technical infrastructure required to use the system. These resources can be in the shape of easy access to technical support (Chang et al. 2007), IT knowledge (Taiwo and Downe 2013), hardware and software resources (Chang et al. 2007), Internet facilities, assistance from others, and compatibility between the technology and system (Bhattacharjee et al. 2003). Wu et al. (2007) conducted a study that explored 3G mobile communication services. The authors established a strong positive relationship between facilitating conditions and consumers' behavioural intentions to use 3G mobile communication services. Noting the results of such past studies, it is believed that consumers' intentions to accept mobile advertising are positively affected when consumers have adequate resources. Thus, we hypothesise:

H4: Facilitating conditions are positively related to intentions to use mobile advertising.

Perceived Enjoyment: Davis et al. (1992) explain that perceived enjoyment is the extent to which a certain activity of using a product/system/technology is perceived to be enjoyable in addition to the anticipated performance outcome. Sung and Yun (2010) regard perceived enjoyment as a dimension of intrinsic motivation as it provides a crucial intrinsic drive to perform a particular action or activity. Van der Heijden (2004) argues that people are more likely to adopt a new technology if using it brings them immediate pleasure. The authors further note that if a technology is personally enjoyable, people will more extensively use it. Davis et al. (1992) view perceived enjoyment as an important predictor in the acceptance and usage of new technology. Based on the results of previous studies, it is suggested that consumers will be more willing to accept mobile advertising that is enjoyable and playful. This leads us to hypothesise:

H5: Perceived enjoyment is positively related to intentions to use mobile advertising.

Perceived Irritation: Van der Waldt et al. (2009) describe irritation as a negative emotional reaction to advertising. Studies (e.g., Martí-Parreño et al. (2013)) have regarded irritation as an affective antecedent of attitude towards advertising in general and mobile advertising in particular. At the same time, Martí-Parreño et al. (2013) believe research is lacking on the irritation caused by advertising as a direct antecedent of consumers' overall attitude to mobile advertising. In fact, the study of emotions forms an important field in the area of marketing research. Wells et al. (1971) suggested six basic dimensions of emotions, including irritation, for analysing consumers' reactions to advertising. Aaker and Bruzzone (1985) explained irritating advertising as that which causes displeasure among viewers. Grant and O'Donohoe (2007) conducted a study on young consumers and determined that they were very concerned about commercial intrusion on their mobile devices. The authors further concluded that intrusiveness could lead to higher levels of irritation among consumers. Martí-Parreño et al. (2013) found that respondents were highly concerned about receiving unsolicited promotional messages or 'spam' on their mobile devices. It may therefore be expected that the perceived irritation of mobile advertising will have a negative influence on consumers' intentions to use mobile advertising. We accordingly hypothesise:

H6: Perceived irritation is negatively related to intentions to use mobile advertising.

Personalisation: Leppäniemi and Karjaluoto (2008) defined personalisation as the degree to which the contents of an advertising message are customised based on a consumer's geographical location, cultural background, lifestyle, needs, preferences and mindset. The concept of personalisation derives from congruence theory, which suggests that people tend to be more responsive to messages that are consistent with their own beliefs and attitudes (Dodoo and Wen, 2019). Aguirre-Rodriguez et al. (2012) stressed that an advertisement which is congruent with a person's self-concept and self-image is perceived as personalised, which eventually increases its perceived relevance and acceptance. Heckler and Childers (1992) viewed self-congruent promotional messages as being more relevant. Feng et al. (2016) concluded in their research that consumers prefer to receive highly personalised messages on their mobile devices that reflect their needs and wants. Smith (2019) argued that marketers can collect information related to consumers' preferences from consumers' feedback and shopping history in a way to customise/personalise the advertising messages and also to adjust the offerings accordingly. Smith (2019) added that the personalising of advertising messages enables marketers to build strong relationships with customers and reach customers in an individualised way. Feng et al. (2016) also established that consumers become more receptive to advertising when the content of advertising messages is more personalised. Considering the results of past studies, it is expected that personalisation positively affects consumers' acceptance of mobile advertising. Thus, we hypothesise:

H7: Personalisation is positively related to intentions to use mobile advertising.

The dependent theoretical constructs are defined as follows.

Intentions to Use and Use: The term "intention to use" has seen different uses by different authors. Taylor and Todd (1995) explored the concept and referred to it as consumers' behavioural intentions, which is defined as perceived attitude. Taylor and Todd (1995) also referred to use behaviour as consumers' actual behaviour. Several researchers (Hansen et al. 2004; Hartmann and Apaolaza-Ibáñez 2012; Hsiao and Chang 2014; Leong et al. 2013) indicated consumer intention as one of the major determinants for predicting use behaviour. In a study by Chang et al. (2019), UTAUT2 was utilised to explore factors influencing consumers' use behaviour and it was found that behavioural intentions are highly influential in determining use behaviour. This leads us to hypothesise:

H8: Intentions to use positively influence consumers' use of mobile advertising.

Figure 1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK



Source: Created by the Authors.

METHODOLOGY

Sampling Method and Procedure

The study participants were students aged 18–30 years from five major universities in various regions of Pakistan, i.e., Punjab, Sindh, KPK, Islamabad Capital Territory, and Balochistan. One university from each region was selected: Punjab University from Punjab, Karachi University from Sindh, Peshawar University from KPK, Quaid-e-Azam University from Islamabad Capital Territory, and University of Balochistan from Balochistan. The purpose of having respondents from all five regions of the country was to ensure people from across the country were represented, noting that students from all around the country are enrolled at these universities. The study focused on young people because they are known to be immersed in the digital world. Buckingham (2013) argued that young people are suited to the various different challenges posed by new technologies and new types of media. In addition, Van der Waldt et al. (2009) concluded in their research that young people are an attractive target for marketers around the globe since they are heavy users of mobile devices and more interested in using mobile devices than older consumers. A link to an online survey was sent to respondents via emails, personal messages, and social media posts, with a total number of 446 respondents answering all the questions. The study utilised non-probability sampling methods, i.e., judgmental sampling and convenience sampling.

Instrument Development

The research questionnaire was divided into three parts. The first part of the questionnaire contains six questions for assessing the usage pattern of mobile devices, mobile Internet, and mobile advertising. The second, i.e., the central, part of the questionnaire was further divided into three subsections where the first section was focused on assessing factors that may affect respondent's intentions to use mobile advertising. There were 27 items associated with 7 different factors (such as 4 items to assess social influence, 4 items for effort expectancy, 4 items for performance expectancy, 4 items for facilitating conditions, 4 items for perceived enjoyment, 4 items for perceived irritation, 3 items for personalisation). The responses concerning factors that can affect respondents' intentions to use mobile advertising were gathered on a five-point Likert scale, where 1 meant 'strongly disagree' and 5 'strongly agree'. The second subsection included three items to assess the dependent variable (i.e., Intentions to use). The responses regarding intentions to use mobile advertising were also gathered on a five-point Likert scale, where 1 meant 'strongly disagree' and 5 'strongly agree'. The third subsection was concentrated on assessing the respondents' use behaviour, where four items were included. The responses to use behaviour were gathered via a five-point Likert scale, where 1 meant 'never' and 5 'many times'. The final part of the questionnaire was related to the demographic profile of respondents where

five questions aimed to assess the respondents' age, gender, family income, education, and province. As per the suggestion of Hair et al. (1998), in order to assure the scale validity all of the instruments were adopted from previous literature (see Table 1).

Table 1: ITEMS OF SURVEY WITH SOURCES

Constructs	No. of Items	Question Items	Sources
Social Influence	4	People in my social circle influence me to buy from mobile ads	Teo and Pok (2003)
		People who buy from mobile ads are trendy	
		People in my social circle suggest me to use mobile ads for purchasing	
		Purchasing from mobile ads can improve my image within my social circle	
Effort Expectancy	4	I find mobile advertising easy to use	Venkatesh et al. (2012) and Yang (2010)
		It is easy for me to become skilful at purchasing from mobile advertising	
		Learning how to view and buy from mobile advertising is easy for me	
		My interaction with mobile advertising is clear and understandable	
Performance Expectancy	4	Using mobile advertising increases my productivity	Venkatesh et al. (2012)
		Using mobile advertising helps me to accomplish things more efficiently	
		I find mobile advertising useful in my daily life	
		Using mobile advertising increases the chances of achieving things that are important to me	
Facilitating Conditions	4	Mobile advertising for purchasing is compatible with other technologies I use in my daily life	Venkatesh et al. (2012)
		I have the appropriate knowledge needed to use mobile advertising	
		I have the resources needed to use mobile advertising	
		I can get help from people in my social circle when I have difficulties in purchasing from mobile advertising	
Perceived Enjoyment	4	It is fun to use mobile advertising for purchasing	Nysveen et al. (2005)
		It is pleasing to use mobile advertising for purchasing	
		It is exciting to use mobile advertising for purchasing	
		It is enjoyable to use mobile advertising for purchasing	

Constructs	No. of Items	Question Items	Sources
Perceived Irritation	4	It makes me annoyed upon receiving mobile advertising messages at odd times	Xu (2006) and Haghirian; Madlberger (2005)
		It makes me irritated upon receiving mobile advertising that are not related to me	
		It makes me irritated upon receiving multiple mobile advertising messages for the same product on the same day	
		It makes me irritated when I am forced to see a mobile advertising message while doing important tasks	
Persona-lisation	3	I would like to receive mobile advertising whose contents are more personalised	Feng et al. (2016)
		I would be willing to spend time providing my personal details and preferences to make mobile advertising to better match my needs	
		I would like to receive mobile advertising as per my previous search history of goods	
Intentions to use mobile advertising	3	1) I intend to see mobile advertising in my daily life	Venkatesh et al. (2012)
		2) I intend to use mobile advertising for shopping in the future	
		3) I intend to receive mobile advertising in the future	
Use behaviour	4	1) I have read the advertising content completely in mobile ads	Venkatesh et al. (2012)
		2) I have clicked on mobile advertising to check the offer of an advertised product/service	
		3) I have visited the website/social media page of the company to obtain more information after seeing the mobile advertising	
		4) I have bought products/services advertised in mobile ads	

Source: Created by the Authors.

Data Analysis

Profile of Respondents

The profile of the respondents is shown in Table 2 where it may be seen that there were more females (n = 270, 60.5%) than males (n = 176, 39.5%). The same participation trend can be observed in other similar studies (Ahmed and Qazi, 2011) where the share of female respondents was higher than for males. The current study sampled university students from Pakistani universities. It is observed that nearly half the respondents had an intermediate level of education, noting that the minimum entry requirement to attend university in Pakistan is the intermediate level education. Hence, the respondents who mentioned they had an intermediate level of education were enrolled in bachelor's programmes.

All the respondents in the study possessed a smart phone. In Table 2, one may see that over half the respondents came from Punjab, followed by Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Balochistan. Punjab is the most populous province in Pakistan and is followed by Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Balochistan. At the same time, it is important to mention that representatives of all provinces in Pakistan are included in the sample. The respondents of the study are regular Internet users, either through wi-fi or mobile data. More than half the respondents (53.8%) had access to wi-fi either at home or at their educational institutes, and 85.2% of them have a contract with a mobile data provider.

Table 2: DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF THE SAMPLE (n = 446)

Demographic Variables		Frequency	%
Gender	Male	176	39.5
	Female	270	60.5
Education Level	Intermediate	212	47.5
	Bachelor's	132	29.6
	Master's	56	12.6
	Doctorate/PhD	46	10.3
Income Level (PKR)	30,000 or below	132	29.6
	30,001 to 50,000	118	26.5
	50,001 to 70,000	56	12.6
	70,001 to 90,000	42	9.4
	90,001 or above	98	22.0
Province of Residence	Baluchistan	31	7.0
	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	62	13.9
	Punjab	266	59.6
	Sindh	87	19.5
Access to wi-fi	Home	194	43.5
	At Workplace/University	46	10.3
	All of the Above	74	16.6
	None of the Above	132	29.6
Buying Mobile Data	Only in urgent need	116	26.0
	Monthly	100	22.4
	Weekly	102	22.9
	Daily	18	4.0
	When previous package is consumed	44	9.9
	I don't buy mobile data	66	14.8

Source: Created by the Authors.

Testing Measurement Model

The relationship between independent and dependent variables was examined through Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM). PLS-SEM was applied to data using SmartPLS software. Many of the recent research studies (Martins et al. 2014; Venkatesh et al. 2012; Wong et al. 2015) for an under-researched area employed the same technique and software due to its capability of handling a smaller sample size. Assessment of the presence of Common Method Bias (CMB) was done through Harman's single factor test. According to Hair et al. (1998), the value of Harman's single factor should be less than 50% to eliminate the chances of CMB. For this study, the result of the CMB test was 42.76%, namely, below the benchmark of 50%. The measurement model's validity was ensured before applying any further tools of analysis to the data. For this, three different tools such as factor loadings, Average Variance Extracted (AVE), and Composite Reliability were applied to data. As per the recommendation of Hair et al. (1998), the cut-off value of factor loadings should exceed 0.70. It was found that the values of factor loadings for all constructs (except SI2, i.e., slightly lower than 0.70) were over 0.70 (see Table 3). Second, the value of CR was found to be greater than the cut-off level of 0.60 recommended by Hair et al. (1998). Finally, the value of AVE was found to exceed the cut-off value of 0.50 recommended by Hair et al. (1998). Moreover, the internal reliability of all the constructs was assured by assessing Cronbach's alpha. As per the recommendation of Hair et al. (1998), the value of Cronbach's alpha should be greater than 0.70. The values of Cronbach's alpha for all constructs were found to be more than 0.70 (see Table 3). Regarding all the applied statistics, the measurement model can safely be confirmed.

Core Model Testing

Anticipated relations among the constructs were tested through PLS-SEM. With respect to respondents' intentions to use mobile advertising, the structural model explained 59% of the variance. In terms of use behaviour regarding mobile advertising, the structural model explained 50% of the variance.

Constructs-wise, the results (as shown in Table 3) indicate that five of the seven constructs affect the respondents' intentions in the anticipated way: EE (beta = 0.133, $p < 0.05$), PE (beta = 0.292, $p < 0.01$), PENJ (beta = 0.295, $p < 0.01$), PERSO (beta = 0.261, $p < 0.01$) have a significant positive relationship with respondents' intentions to use mobile advertising and PI (beta = –0.105, $p < 0.01$) has a significant negative relationship with respondents' intentions to use mobile advertising. However, two constructs, namely SI (beta = –0.011, $p > 0.05$) and FC (beta = –0.019, $p > 0.05$), are unable to predict respondents' intentions to use mobile advertising. Finally, the results indicate a strong and positive relationship between respondents' intentions to use mobile advertising and their use behaviour towards mobile advertising (b = 0.707, $p < 0.01$).

Table 3: FACTOR LOADINGS OF RESEARCH VARIABLES

Variables	Items	SI	EE	PE	FC	PENJ	PI	PERSO	INTEN	USE
Social Influence	SI1	0.747								
	SI2	0.669								
	SI3	0.730								
	SI4	0.777								
Effort Expectancy	EE1		0.839							
	EE2		0.862							
	EE3		0.856							
	EE4		0.779							
Performance Expectancy	PE1			0.824						
	PE2			0.895						
	PE3			0.906						
	PE4			0.856						
Facilitating Conditions	FC1				0.846					
	FC2				0.841					
	FC3				0.844					
	FC4				0.805					
Perceived Enjoyment	PENJ1					0.833				
	PENJ2					0.898				
	PENJ3					0.918				
	PENJ4					0.919				
Perceived Irritation	PI1						0.782			
	PI2						0.881			
	PI3						0.908			
	PI4						0.912			
Personalisation	PERSO1							0.834		
	PERSO2							0.859		
	PERSO3							0.850		
Intentions to Use	INTEN1								0.797	
	INTEN2								0.865	
	INTEN3								0.900	
Use Behaviour	USE1									0.761
	USE2									0.801
	USE3									0.830
	USE4									0.770
Cronbach's alpha		0.710	0.855	0.893	0.855	0.915	0.899	0.804	0.815	0.800
Composite Reliability		0.821	0.902	0.926	0.902	0.94	0.927	0.884	0.891	0.870
Average Variance Extracted		0.535	0.697	0.759	0.696	0.797	0.761	0.719	0.731	0.626

Source: Created by the Authors.

Figure 2: PLS-SEM Model



Source: Created by the Authors.

Notes: ———— Significant Path
--------- Non-significant Path
** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

Table 4: HYPOTHESES TESTING USING PLS-SEM

Relationship	Original Sample (O)	Sample Mean (M)	Standard Deviation (STDEV)	T Statistics (|O/STDEV|)	P-Values	Decision
H1: SI → INTEN	-0.011	-0.007	0.048	0.228	0.82	Not Supported
H2: EE → INTEN	0.133	0.133	0.054	2.458	0.014	Supported
H3: PE → INTEN	0.292	0.293	0.067	4.337	0.000	Supported
H4: FC →INTEN	-0.019	-0.02	0.058	0.324	0.746	Not Supported
H5: PENJ → INTEN	0.295	0.292	0.058	5.138	0.000	Supported
H6: PI → INTEN	-0.105	-0.105	0.035	2.964	0.003	Supported
H7: PERSO → INTEN	0.261	0.264	0.05	5.229	0.000	Supported
H8: INTEN → USE	0.707	0.707	0.029	24.139	0.000	Supported

Source: Created by the Authors.

DISCUSSION

The results show that social influence does not have a significant relationship with respondents' intentions to use mobile advertising. This is an important finding because it implies that respondents in Pakistan are not influenced by the people in their social circle when it comes to accepting or using mobile advertising. One explanation of this finding might be that an individual's intention to either accept or reject mobile advertising is not affected by the opinion of the people in their social circle. Moreover, Castañeda et al. (2009) also established in their research that if people hold negative attitudes to a certain phenomenon, then this is hardly affected by the opinions of others. Other studies (An et al. 2016; Setyahadi and Dewi 2019) also found no significant effect of social influence on consumers' behavioural intentions.

The results of this research point to a significant relationship between effort expectancy and respondents' intentions to use mobile advertising. This implies that the more respondents find mobile advertising usage easy, the more positive intentions they have towards the use of mobile advertising. Martins et al. (2014) also found that users tend to use such technologies that are easier to learn and involve less effort to handle. In addition, Venkatesh et al. (2012) also established a significant impact of effort expectancy on behavioural intentions.

A significant positive relationship was found between performance expectancy and respondents' intentions to use mobile advertising. This implies that the more respondents have expectations related to the performance of mobile advertising as a platform, the more they have positive intentions to use mobile advertising. Authors such as Carlsson et al. (2006) and Park et al. (2007) also determined that users tend to use technologies for which there are higher performance expectations. Further, Chang et al. (2019) found a significant impact of performance expectancy on behavioural intentions.

The findings do not show that facilitating conditions have a significant relationship with respondents' intentions to use mobile advertising. This finding implies that respondents' intentions to use mobile advertising are not affected even if they possess all the compatible resources to use mobile advertising. In the first version of UTAUT, Venkatesh et al. (2003) did not find a significant relationship between facilitating conditions and behavioural intentions. Saprikis et al. (2021) conducted a study to explore the determinants of intentions to adopt mobile augmented reality apps in shopping malls, and did not find any significant relationship between facilitating conditions and behavioural intentions.

Perceived enjoyment was found to have a significant positive relationship with respondents' intentions to use mobile advertising. Feng et al. (2016) conclude that the more the content of mobile advertising is entertaining and enjoyable, the more consumers will be intrinsically motivated to accept mobile advertising. In addition, Basak et al. (2015) established a significant impact of perceived enjoyment on behavioural intentions.

Perceived irritation was found to have a significant negative relationship with respondents' intentions to use mobile advertising. This implies that the more the content of mobile advertising is perceived to be irritating, the less respondents will intend to use mobile advertising. Boateng et al. (2016) concluded in their research that if the contents of mobile ads are irritating consumers have lower intentions to use such mobile ads.

The findings reported a significant positive relationship between personalisation and respondents' intentions to use mobile advertising. This implies that the more ad content is personalised to respondents' needs and matches their personality, the more positive intentions to use mobile advertising they have. Smith (2019) concluded that if the contents of mobile ads are more personalised and customised to suit the needs of the consumers then consumers develop more positive intentions to use such mobile ads. Feng et al. (2016) also found a significant impact of personalisation on behavioural intentions.

Finally, intention to use mobile advertising was shown to be significantly and positively related to respondents' use behaviour. This implies that the more respondents possess positive intentions to use mobile advertising, the more they will use mobile advertising for purchasing. Many previous studies (Jeong and Lambert 2001; Venkatesh et al. 2012) established a strong relationship between behavioural intentions and actual use behaviour.

Theoretical Implications

The current study made efforts to eliminate the gap between UTAUT2 and respondents' intentions to use mobile advertising. Venkatesh et al. (2003) came up with UTAUT, allowing users' acceptance of new technologies to be analysed. It is important to mention here that the first version of UTAUT was targeted at business users; the sample comprised employees of four organisations and examined their attitudes and intentions concerning the use of different new technologies in the workplace. Venkatesh et al. (2012) further extended UTAUT and introduced UTAUT2. The second version of UTAUT was focused on analysing consumers' intentions to use mobile Internet. The theoretical base for the present research derives from UTAUT2. This research attempted to validate UTAUT2 in the area of mobile advertising. Along with this, the current research extended UTAUT2 by including factors like perceived irritation and personalisation. Various studies (Brinson et al. 2018; Chen and Hsieh 2012; Smith 2019; Xu 2006) acknowledge the importance of personalisation and the element of irritation in shaping consumers' attitudes to technology adoption. Accordingly, this research empirically tested both personalisation and perceived irritation alongside the other constructs of UTAUT2 model. This research also contributes by providing insight into the complex relationship between mobile device users, their mobile devices, their intentions, and their use of mobile advertising.

Managerial Implications

The presented research holds several implications for marketers. First, advertisers must align their promotional messages and ad content with the needs and preferences of their audience. To that end, advertisers need to understand the relationship between users and their mobile devices in order to improve the advertising experience. The results identify several important factors and their relative impacts on respondents' intentions to use mobile advertising. Moreover, it was found that respondents expect more personalised promotional messages in line with their needs and preferences to be shown to them. The study findings underscore the need for advertisers to pay attention to the contextual relevance of ads and the element of irritation that can be felt among consumers, as such ads create negative attitudes and intentions regarding mobile advertising.

Research Limitations

The research aimed to reduce the number of limitations as much as possible so as to improve the generalisability of the results and ensure greater validity. However, there are always some limitations attached to any study. First, it is important to mention that the research did not record actual behaviour; instead, the respondents were asked to recall their previous experiences with mobile advertising. This means there was a possibility of variability in the results. In order to address this situation and assure the uniformity of responses, all the scales used in the research questionnaire were statement-anchored Likert scales. According to (Hair et al. 1998), Likert scales with anchor points help the results gain a higher level of reliability and reduce the chances of variability. Yet, it remains a limitation of the study. Second, the sample of study is composed of people aged 18 to 30 years. It is recommended that future research include a more diverse population by employing respondents from different age groups, with different income levels, or different professional backgrounds.

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Kristina RAKINIĆ*

STRATEGIJE STARŠEVSKEGA POSREDOVANJA IN NJIHOVA VLOGA PRI SEZNANJENOSTI STARŠEV O NEGATIVNIH SPLETNIH IZKUŠNJAH MLADOSTNIKOV**[1]

Povzetek. *Raziskava, izvedena na reprezentativnem vzorcu nemških mladostnikov, proučuje seznanjenost staršev o negativnih spletnih izkušnjah njihovih otrok, pri čemer se osredini na vlogo starševskih strategij posredovanja. V raziskavo je bilo vključenih 710 mladostnikov in njihovih staršev. Starši so relativno dobro seznanjeni z negativnimi izkušnjami, četudi podcenjujejo izkušnje otrok, povezane s spolno vsebino. Starost mladostnikov je negativni napovednik seznanjenosti staršev, medtem ko je aktivno posredovanje pozitivni. Zaznave mladostnikov o aktivnem posredovanju staršev igrajo pomembno vlogo pri napovedovanju seznanjenosti staršev. Naši rezultati osvetljujejo osrednjo vlogo zaznav mladostnikov pri seznanjenosti staršev o negativnih spletnih izkušnjah njihovih otrok.*
Ključni pojmi: *splet, negativne izkušnje, strategije posredovanja, zaznave mladostnikov, aktivno posredovanje.*

UVOD

Uporaba spleta otrokom in mladostnikom prinaša pozitivne in negativne izkušnje. Starši imajo lahko bolj ali manj točen vpogled v negativne izkušnje svojih otrok na spletu, na kar vplivajo številni dejavniki, med drugim tudi strategije posredovanja (Livingstone in Helsper 2008). To so strategije, ki jih starši uporabljajo za uravnavanje in spodbujanje otrokove varne rabe spleta. Namen naše raziskave je razumeti, kako uporaba starševskih strategij posredovanja z vidika staršev in tudi z vidika mladostnikov vpliva na seznanjenost staršev o negativnih spletnih izkušnjah njihovih otrok.

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Seznanjenost staršev o izkušnjah otrok na spletu

Seznanjenost staršev o pozitivnih in negativnih izkušnjah otrok vodi do njihovih pozitivnih psiholoških in razvojnih izidov. Starši otrok, ki v večini uporabljajo avtoritativni stil vzgoje, ki temelji na sočutju, komunikaciji in spodbujanju samostojnosti, izkazujejo številne pozitivne izide (npr. nižjo stopnjo agresivnosti) in boljšo psihološko prilagojenost (Ruiz-Hernandez et al. 2018). Dnevni pogovori staršev z otroki o njihovih aktivnostih so pomemben napovednik seznanjenosti staršev o izkušnjah otrok, kar pa nato negativno napoveduje stopnjo delinkventnosti otrok (Bendezú 2018). Seznanjenost staršev o izkušnjah njihovih otrok na spletu do sedaj še ni bila podrobno raziskana. Večina raziskav namreč vključuje odgovore zgolj staršev ali samo otrok, zato je ocena dejanske seznanjenosti nemogoča. Seznanjenost staršev se lahko oceni kot stopnja enakih odgovorov staršev in otrok o izkušnjah na spletu. Če starši odgovorijo, da je otrok imel določeno izkušnjo, otrok pa o tej izkušnji ne poroča, govorimo, da starši izkušnjo precenjujejo, v obratnem primeru pa govorimo o podcenjevanju (Geržičáková et al. 2023).

Raziskave, ki so se do sedaj ukvarjale s proučevanjem seznanjenosti staršev o izkušnjah njihovih otrok na spletu in jih predstavljamo v nadaljevanju, prinašajo nekaj zanimivih ugotovitev. Raziskave hkrati poročajo o visoki seznanjenosti staršev o negativnih izkušnjah na spletu (Geržičáková et al. 2023) kot tudi o precej nižji (Dehue et al. 2008). V splošnem starši prej podcenjujejo, kot precenjujejo negativne izkušnje svojih otrok na spletu. Starši večinoma podcenjujejo, v kolikšni meri je njihov otrok vključen v izvajanje spletnega nasilja (4,8 % po njihovih ocenah nasproti 17,3 % po poročanju otrok), prav tako pa podcenjujejo, v kolikšni meri je bil njihov otrok žrtev spletnega nasilja (11,8 % po njihovem poročanju proti 22,9 % po poročanju otrok) (Dehue et al. 2008). Sorbring in Lundin (2012) poročata, da tako matere kot očetje podcenjujejo, v kolikšni meri so njihovi otroci prišli v kontakt z neprimerno vsebino, poleg tega matere v splošnem podcenjujejo, očetje pa precenjujejo, v kolikšni meri so njihovi otroci naleteli na vsebino, ki jim je povzročila distres. Seznanjenost staršev se razlikuje tudi glede na vsebino negativne izkušnje, npr. najnižji odstotek seznanjenosti staršev je bil prepoznan pri izpostavljenosti nasilnim (Geržičáková et al. 2023; Symons et al. 2017) in pornografskim vsebinam (Symons et al. 2017). Otroci večinoma staršem zaupajo o manj tveganih dejavnostih (npr. igranje računalniških igric) v primerjavi z bolj tveganimi dejavnostmi (Geržičáková et al. 2023).

Starševske strategije posredovanja: sinergija med starši in otroki

Bronfenbrenner ([1979]; 1994) je avtor ekološke sistemske teorije, ki opisuje posameznikov razvoj kot rezultat interakcij posameznika z različnimi nivoji sistema – okolja, od neposrednega mikrosistema (starši, vrstniki) do makrosistema (družbena ureditev, kultura). Bronfenbrenner (1979) je kritično izpostavil, da se večina raziskav, povezanih z razvojem in značilnostmi otroka, osredotoča bodisi na poročila staršev bodisi otrok, kar pomeni pomembno omejitev. Preučevane

fenomene bolje razumemo, če v raziskavo vključimo starše in otroke, torej vse akterje neposrednih interakcij. Starševske strategije posredovanja se pojavljajo v neposrednih interakcijah med otrokom in staršem v mikrosistemu. Seznanjenost staršev o negativnih izkušnjah njihovih otrok ni nikoli zgolj rezultat starševskih strategij posredovanja, temveč tudi tega, kar so otroci sami pripravljeni zaupati staršem (Kerr in Stattin 2000). Gre za dvosmerni, vzajemni odnos. Predstave o uporabi starševskih strategij se med staršem in otrokom lahko bolj ali manj razlikujejo in imajo kot take lahko specifičen vpliv na seznanjenost. V našo raziskavo smo zato vključili izkušnje in zaznave strategij posredovanja staršev in otrok.

Starševske strategije posredovanja predstavljajo starševske namere zagotavljanja otrokove varne uporabe IKT (Smahel et al. 2020). Izraz posredovanje se nanaša na starševsko uravnavanje odnosa med otrokom in medijem (Livingstone in Helsper 2008). Raziskovalci so najprej raziskovali strategije v povezavi z gledanjem televizije. Livingstone in Helsper (2008) pa sta te strategije prenesli tudi na uporabo interneta. V tej raziskavi uporabljamo delitev na štiri strategije, kot so opredeljene v raziskavah EU Kids Online (Hasebrink et al. 2019). Štiri glavne strategije posredovanja so: aktivno, posredovanje z omejevanjem, nadzor in tehnično posredovanje. Aktivno posredovanje predstavlja strategijo, ki vključuje odprto komunikacijo med otrokom in staršem o uporabi IKT (Young in Tully 2022; Livingstone in Helsper 2008), pri čemer starši in otroci skupaj obravnavajo težave, ki nastanejo pri uporabi spleta in jih tudi skupaj rešujejo (Hasebrink et al. 2019). Posredovanje z omejevanjem vključuje postavljanje pravil, ki omejujejo uporabo medijev (Livingstone et al. 2017). Starševski nadzor se nanaša na preverjanje tega, kar otrok počne na spletu, npr. preverjanje, katere spletne strani je obiskal. Tehnično posredovanje vključuje uporabo aplikacij za nadzorovanje otrokove uporabe spleta, npr. onemogočanje dostopa do določenih spletnih strani, uporaba aplikacij za časovno omejevanje uporabe spleta itn. (Hasebrink et al. 2019).

Aktivno posredovanje je izmed vseh strategij najbolj zaželeno, saj je povezano z višjimi digitalnimi spretnostmi otroka, spodbuja njegovo razumevanje delovanja spleta in omogoča boljše spoprijemanje s težavami in negativnimi izkušnjami na spletu (Livingstone et al. 2017). Rezultati metaanalize (Chen in Shi 2018) so pokazali, da aktivno posredovanje v primerjavi strategijo omejevanja bolj učinkovito zmanjšuje tveganja, povezana z uporabo medijev. Aktivno posredovanje pozitivno napoveduje seznanjenost staršev o negativnih izkušnjah otrok na spletu (Geržičáková et al. 2023), prav tako pa poveča verjetnost, da bo otrok svoje negativne izkušnje delil s starši (Sorbring in Lundin 2012; Cerna et al. 2016). Otroci, ki imajo občutek, da se lahko s starši odprto pogovarjajo o spletu, skupaj proaktivno naslavljajo probleme, ki nastanejo ob uporabi spleta in imajo nasploh pozitivne izkušnje, bodo staršem v večji meri zaupali svoje negativne izkušnje. In nasprotno, težave pri komunikaciji o tveganih vedenjih na spletu med otrokom in staršem vodijo v podcenjevanje tveganih interakcij na spletu

s strani staršev (Byrne et al. 2014). Tehnično posredovanje je bilo prepoznano kot negativni napovednik seznanjenosti staršev (Geržičáková et al. 2023). Otroci lahko občutijo, da jim starši pri uporabi spleta ne zaupajo, in zato uporabljajo naprave, ki beležijo njihove aktivnosti na spletu. Posledično bodo tako manj pogosto tudi otroci zaupali staršem svoje negativne izkušnje, kar vodi do nižje seznanjenosti staršev o spletnih izkušnjah njihovih otrok. Strategije nadzora in postavljanje omejitev ne vplivajo na višjo seznanjenost staršev (Geržičáková et al. 2023; Sorbring in Lundin 2012; Symons et al. 2017). Na podlagi omenjenih raziskav predvidevamo, da bo aktivno posredovanje pomemben pozitiven napovednik seznanjenosti staršev.

Otroci in mladostniki lahko zaznavajo strategije svojih staršev precej drugače, kot jih zaznavajo starši. Starši v primerjavi z otroki večinoma podajajo višje ocene o pozitivnih vidikih njihovega starševstva, kot so npr. zaznana zahtevnost, odzivnost in prizadevanja za otrokov uspeh (Paulson 1992). V večini je med starši in otroci soglasje o prevladujočem slogu vzgoje oz. posredovanja, razlike se pojavijo zlasti pri zaznavi pogostosti uporabe določene strategije, starši namreč podajajo višje ocene v primerjavi z otroki (Koolstra in Lucassen 2004; Nikken in Jansz 2006). Sonck et al. (2013) so na reprezentativnem vzorcu nizozemskih otrok in staršev ugotovili, da starši v povprečju poročajo o pogostejši uporabi vseh štirih strategij posredovanja v primerjavi z njihovimi otroki, največja razlika je bila prepoznana pri aktivnem posredovanju. Starši lahko dejansko mislijo, da otroku aktivno pomagajo pri uporabi spleta in uspešno naslavljajo njegove probleme, medtem ko otrok tega ne zaznava na enak način (Sonck et al. 2013). Otroci aktivno posredovanje, ki naj bi temeljijo na dvosmerni komunikaciji, zaznavajo precej bolj enosmerno (Lwin et al. 2021). Te ugotovitve so pomembne, ker so zaznave otrok o starševskih strategijah, in ne poročila staršev, boljši napovedniki izidov otrok, kot so npr. učni dosežki (Cohen in Rice 1997; Paulson 1992) in neuživanje drog (Cohen in Rice 1997).

Vloga socio-demografskih spremenljivk pri seznanjenosti staršev

Študije, ki so proučevale vpliv spola otroka na seznanjenost staršev o negativnih izkušnjah na spletu, so prinesle različne ugotovitve. Nekatere študije trdijo, da so starši deklic bolje seznanjeni (Cerna et al. 2014), medtem ko druge študije poročajo, da spol otroka ne vpliva na seznanjenost staršev o negativnih izkušnjah (Geržičáková et al. 2023; Byrne et al. 2014; Symons et al. 2017). Študija Sorbring in Lundin (2012) ponuja zanimive ugotovitve, ki kažejo na to, da ima spol otrok različen vpliv na seznanjenost glede na vsebino negativne izkušnje, npr. starši deklic so namreč imeli boljši vpogled v izkušnje z neprimerno vsebino, medtem ko so starši dečkov imeli boljši vpogled v izkušnje ponižanja in nadlegovanja. Raziskovalci so preučevali tudi vpliv starosti otroka. Symnos et al. (2017) in Geržičáková et al. (2023) poročajo o tem, da ni povezave med otrokovo starostjo in seznanjenostjo starša. V nasprotju s tem pa so nekatere raziskave (Cerna et al. 2016; Byrne et al. 2014) prepoznale negativni vpliv starosti na

seznanjenost staršev, kar lahko razložimo z značilnostmi razvojnopsihološkega obdobja. Mladostništvo je obdobje, v katerem posameznik začne aktivno oblikovati svojo identiteto, se vedno bolj diferencira od staršev, vrstniki pa postajajo vse pomembnejši. Razkrivanje staršem tako v primerjavi z obdobjem otroštva upade (Pappini 1990; Smetana et al. 2009). Jeffery (2021) trdi, da tudi starši mladostnikov ne želijo vedeti vsega, kar njihov otrok počne na spletu, saj to vidijo kot vmešavanje v zasebnost in oviranje razvoja samostojnosti.

Študije, ki so proučevale uporabo strategij posredovanja pri starših, so zastavile tudi vprašanje vpliva izobrazbe staršev in socialno-ekonomskega statusa (Livingstone et al. 2015). Starši z nižjo izobrazbo v splošnem redkeje uporabljajo strategije posredovanja (Katz et al. 2018), redkeje uporabljajo različne IKT, so manj pripravljeni za uporabo novih tehnologij, kar pa je nato povezano tudi z njihovimi manjšimi skrbmi o uporabi starševskih strategij posredovanja (Nikken in Opree 2018). Podobne ugotovitve se nanašajo tudi na socialno-ekonomski status. Starši nižjega statusa se v večji meri zanašajo na znanje otrok o uporabi interneta in tako redkeje uporabljajo strategije posredovanja, svojim otrokom pa nudijo tudi manj podpore pri uporabi interneta (Katz et al. 2018).

EU Kids Online in cilj naše raziskave

EU Kids Online predstavlja mednarodno evropsko mrežo raziskovalcev, katere glavni cilj je pridobivanje vpogleda in znanja zlasti o tveganjih in priložnostih evropskih otrok in mladostnikov na spletu (EU Kids Online 2024). Do sedaj so bile izvedene štiri obsežne raziskave (EU Kids Online I – 2009; II – 2011; III – 2014 in IV – 2021). Skupno v projektu sodeluje 34 držav, med drugim tudi Slovenija, ki pa pri zadnji študiji z zbiranjem podatkov ni sodelovala. Raziskave EU Kids Online, ki temeljijo na reprezentativnih vzorcih otrok in mladostnikov in njihovih staršev, ponujajo kakovosten vpogled v izkušnje, ki jih imajo mladi na spletu in hkrati omogočajo meddržavne primerjave in predstavljajo izhodišče za oblikovanje tako nacionalnih kot evropskih politik.

Namen naše raziskave je na nemškem vzorcu podatkov, pridobljenih v okviru podatkov za EU Kids Online IV, prepoznati, kakšen je vpliv socio-demografskih spremenljivk mladostnikov, starševskih strategij posredovanja in zaznav mladostnikov o uporabi teh strategij na seznanjenost staršev o negativnih spletnih izkušnjah mladostnikov. Na podlagi predhodnih raziskav predvidevamo, da bo izmed vseh strategij največjo pozitivno vlogo imelo aktivno posredovanje. Cilj naše raziskave je tako tudi razumeti, kakšna je vloga samih zaznav mladostnikov o strategijah njihovih staršev.

METODA

Zbiranje podatkov in vzorčenje

Raziskava temelji na podatkih, zbranih v okviru projekta EU Kids Online 2020 (Shamel et al. 2020). Podatki so bili zbrani v 19 evropskih državah na

reprezentativnih vzorcih otrok in mladostnikov, starih od 9 do 17 let, in enega izmed staršev. Naša raziskava temelji na podatkih, zbranih na nemškem vzorcu.[2] Vzorčenje v Nemčiji je bilo izvedeno po gospodinjstvih. Podatki so bili zbrani junija in julija 2019. Uporabljena je bila metoda intervjuja CASI/CAWI, kar pomeni, da je otrok sam izpolnil vprašalnik na tablici ali računalniku ob navodilih izurjenega sodelavca raziskave.

Vzorec

V raziskavo je bil vključen reprezentativni vzorec nemških otrok in mladostnikov.[3] Podatki so bili zbrani pri otrocih, starih od 9 do 17 let. V našo raziskavo smo vključili zgolj starejše od 11. leta starosti, saj mlajši na vprašanja o negativnih izkušnjah, povezanih s spolnostjo, niso odgovarjali. Skupno je bilo tako v analizo podatkov vključenih 710 mladostnikov in njihovih staršev. V vzorcu je bilo 51 % mladostnikov in 49 % mladostnic. Povprečna starost je bila 14,6 let (*SD* = 1,7). Matere so prevladovale v vzorcu (80,1 %). Povprečna starost staršev je bila 43,7 let (*SD* = 5,9). Večina staršev je imela srednješolsko strokovno ali poklicno izobrazbo (41,3 %). Povprečna ocena subjektivnega socio-ekonomskega statusa mladostnikov je bila 6,9 (*SD* = 1,9, min = 0, maks = 10).

Merski pripomočki

Vključili smo mere štirih starševskih strategij posredovanja. Aktivno posredovanje je bilo merjeno z osmimi postavkami na petstopenjski odgovorni lestvici (1 – nikoli; 5 – zelo pogosto). Primer postavke: »Z otrokom se pogovarjate o tem, kar počne na spletu.« Strategija nadzora je bila s šestimi postavkami na petstopenjski odgovorni lestvici (1 – nikoli; 5 – zelo pogosto). Primer postavke: »Kako pogosto preverjate, katere vsebine si vaš otrok ogleduje na spletu?« Posredovanje z omejevanjem je bilo merjeno s šestimi postavkami na štiristopenjski lestvici (1 = Moj otrok lahko to počne kadar koli, 2 = Moj otrok lahko to počne le z dovoljenjem ali pod nadzorom, 3 = Moj otrok tega ne sme početi, 4 = Nisem se še odločil/a, ali naj to dovolim svojemu otroku). Odgovore smo prekodirali v dve vrednosti, in sicer smo odgovore 2, 3 in 4 označili kot neomejevalne. Primer postavke »Ali dovolite vašemu otroku uporabo družbenih omrežij (npr. Facebook, Snapchat, Instagram, Twitter)?« Tehnično posredovanje je bilo merjeno z osmimi postavkami na dvostopenjski odgovorni lestvici (0 – ne; 1 – ja). Primer postavke: »Ali uporabljate naprave ali programe, prek katerih onemogočite dostop do določenih spletnih strani ali vsebin?«

Preverili smo štirifaktorsko strukturo strategij posredovanja. Zaradi nizkih faktorskih uteži (< 0,4) smo izločili eno postavko, ki je merila aktivno posredovanje in se je nanašala na to, ali so starši prijatelji z otrokom na spletu z

[2] Inštitut za raziskave medijev v Leibnizu (Hans Bredow Institut) je zbiral podatke prek Inštituta Ipsos Berlin. Slednji inštitut je avtorica članka obiskala v okviru projekta COORDINATE (https://www.coordinate-network.eu/) in programa Transnational Access Visits.

[3] Za opis postopka vzorčenja glej Hasebrink et al. (2019).

namenom, da vidijo, kaj počne na spletu, in eno postavko, ki je merila tehnično posredovanje in se je nanašala na uporabo programov za onemogočenje reklam na spletu. Pregledali smo modifikacijske indekse in dovolili korelacijo med enim parom postavk (MI = 92,52), ki sta merili nadzor – zaradi podobnosti vsebine postavk. Predpostavljena štirifaktorska struktura je zadovoljiva: $\chi2(292) = 1403$, $p < ,001$, CFI = ,91; TLI = ,90; RMSEA = ,06 (90 % IZ ,06–,06), SRMR = ,05. Omega koeficienti zanesljivosti vseh štirih lestvic strategij so zadovoljivi: aktivno posredovanje: $\omega = ,84$; nadzor: $\omega = ,84$; posredovanje z omejevanjem: $\omega = ,91$ in tehnično posredovanje: $\omega = .82$.

Otroci so bili povprašani po uporabi treh starševskih strategij posredovanja: aktivno, omejevalno in tehnično. Aktivno posredovanje je bilo merjeno s sedmimi postavkami na petstopenjski lestvici (1 – nikoli; 5 – zelo pogosto); primer postavke: »Kako pogosto ti starši razložijo, zakaj so določene stvari na spletu dobre ali slabe?« Posredovanje z omejevanjem je bilo merjeno s šestimi postavkami na tristopenjski lestvici (1 – dovolijo vedno, 2 – dovolijo, če prej vprašam, 3 – ne dovolijo). Primer postavke: »Ti starši dovolijo prenašati filme ali glasbo s spleta?« Tehnično posredovanje je bilo merjeno s tremi postavkami (0 – ne, 1 – ja). Primer postavke: Starši uporabljalo naprave ali programe, ki pokažejo, kje se trenutno nahajam (npr. GPS, funkcija lokacije).« Preverili smo trifaktorsko strukturo, ki je zadovoljiva: ($\chi2(101) = 451$, $p < ,001$; CFI = ,93; TLI = ,91; RMSEA = ,07 (90 % IZ ,06–,08); SRMR =,05. Omega koeficienti zanesljivosti za tri lestvice so ustrezni: aktivno posredovanje: $\omega = ,85$; posredovanje z omejevanjem: $\omega = ,89$ in tehnično posredovanje: $\omega = ,77$.

Seznanjenost staršev o negativnih izkušnjah njihovih otrok na spletu smo merili s pomočjo desetih postavk. Tako otroci kot tudi starši so bili povprašani po enakih desetih izkušnjah na spletu, pri čemer so otroci odgovarjali zase, starši pa so poročali, če se je to zgodilo njihovemu otroku. Primer postavke za starše: »Ali je vaš otrok v zadnjem letu izgubil denar zaradi spletne prevare?«; primer postavke za otroka: »Ali se ti je v zadnjem letu zgodilo, da si izgubil denar zaradi spletne prevare?« Izračun stopnje znanja staršev je potekal tako, da če sta tako otrok kot starš odgovorila z da ali z ne, smo temu pripisali vrednost 1 (seznanjenost), v kolikor sta bila odgovora starša in otroka neskladna, pa smo temu pripisali vrednost 0 (neseznanjenost). Odgovore smo sešteli za vseh deset negativnih izkušenj in dobili mero seznanjenosti staršev, pri čemer višja vrednost pomeni višjo seznanjenost staršev.

Analiza podatkov

Analizo podatkov smo izvedli s pomočjo programa SPSS verzija 27 (SPSS Statistics for Windows, Version 27.0; IBM Corp., 2020) in programa Jamovi (The Jamovi Project, 2023). Vse spremenljivke, ki so predstavljale starševske strategije posredovanja in zaznave otrok o starševskih strategijah posredovanja, smo naprej standardizirali, nato pa izvedli štiri- oziroma trifaktorsko konfirmatorno analizo. Pri tem smo izračunali mere prileganja in omega koeficiente zanesljivosti. Za

vsako izbrano strategijo smo izračunali tudi skupni rezultat. Nato smo izvedli analizo korelacij (Spearmanov koeficient) in hierarhično multiplo regresijo. V nadaljevanju smo določene spremenljivke vključili še v analizo poti.

REZULTATI

Seznanjenost staršev o negativnih spletnih izkušnjah mladostnikov

V splošnem so starši izkazovali visoko seznanjenost o negativnih izkušnjah mladostnikov na spletu (M = 7,5; SD = 2,65; min = 0, maks = 10, Mdn = 8, IQR = 4, asimetričnost = –1,19 (SE = 0,09), sploščenost = 0,83 (SE = 0,18)). V Tabeli 1 so prikazani odstotki skladnih in neskladnih odgovorov staršev in mladostnikov za deset izbranih negativnih izkušenj na spletu. V splošnem lahko trdimo, da so starši dobro seznanjeni o pojavnosti negativnih izkušenj njihovih mladostnikov

Tabela 1: SEZNANJENOST STARŠEV O NEGATIVNIH IZKUŠNJAH MLADOSTNIKOV NA SPLETU

	Skladni odgovori			Neskladni odgovori					
Negativna izkušnja	strinjanje DA	strinjanje NE	skupaj	precen-jevanje	podcen-jevanje	skupaj	N	χ^2	ϕ
zloraba gesla	0,3	95,5	95,8	2	2,2	4,2	645	7,48	0,11
prevelika poraba denarja v trgovini za aplikacije/spletne igre	4,2	88,2	92,4	4,1	3,5	7,6	662	157	0,49
izguba denarja na internetu zaradi prevare	0,3	97,5	97,8	1,6	0,6	2,2	672	31,5	0,22
zloraba osebnih podatkov	1,8	90,5	92,3	3,6	4,1	7,7	608	47,1	0,28
osebno srečanje z osebo z interneta	6,9	81,3	88,2	2,9	8,9	11,8	619	152	0,50
ogled spolnih vsebin	14,3	49,6	63,9	1,9	34,2	36,1	567	68,7	0,35
prejemanje spolnih vsebin	8	66,5	74,5	3,6	21,9	25,5	561	54,1	0,31
spraševanje o spolnih vsebinah	5,3	74,0	79,3	2,6	18,1	20,7	585	53,8	0,30
prizadeti drugega na spletu	1,3	91,4	92,7	3,2	4,2	7,4	602	31,8	0,23
biti prizadet od nekoga na spletu	5,6	78,8	84,4	3,7	11,9	15,6	623	81,3	0,36

Vir: lastna analiza podatkov.

na spletu, saj je za vse izkušnje odstotek skladnosti nad 60 %. Starši so najbolj seznanjeni z izkušnjami, ki se nanašajo na izgubo denarja na spletu, zlorabo gesla, preveliko porabo denarja, zlorabo osebnih podatkov in na to, če so njihovi otroci prizadeli drugega na spletu (odstotek skladnih odgovorov nad 90 %). V splošnem so najmanj seznanjeni o izkušnjah, ki se nanašajo na ogled spolnih vsebin; starši le-te podcenjujejo. Starši izkazujejo nižjo seznanjenost tudi o prejemanju in spraševanju po spolnih vsebinah, pojavnost teh dejavnosti prav tako podcenjujejo. Starši, ki so podali neskladne odgovore, v večji meri podcenjujejo pojavnost negativnih izkušenj, kot pa jih precenjujejo, z izjemo prevelike porabe denarja na spletu in izgube denarja. Odgovori staršev in otrok za vseh deset izkušenj so med seboj pozitivno povezani ($p < 0{,}01$).

Napovedniki seznanjenosti staršev

Starši strategijo aktivnega posredovanja uporabljajo v srednji meri ($M = 2{,}86$; $SD = 0{,}76$; min = 1; maks = 5), prav tako tudi strategijo omejevanja ($M = 3{,}49$; $SD = 2{,}41$; min = 0; maks = 6). Nekoliko manj uporabljajo strategijo nadzora ($M = 2{,}05$; $SD = 0{,}85$; min = 1; maks = 5), medtem ko tehnično strategijo posredovanja uporabljajo zelo redko ($M = 0{,}94$; $SD = 1{,}62$; min = 0; maks = 7).

V Tabeli 2 je prikazana korelacijska matrika vključenih spremenljivk. Izračunali smo Spearmanov koeficient korelacije. Spol mladostnika je negativno povezan zgolj z zaznavo aktivnega posredovanja s strani mladostnikov, mladostnice jo zaznavajo višje. Starost mladostnikov je negativno povezana z vsemi štirimi strategijami staršev, pa tudi z zaznavami mladostnikov o aktivnem posredovanju in posredovanju z omejevanjem staršev. Starši pri starejših mladostnikih vse strategije uporabljajo redkeje. Socialno-ekonomski status je negativno povezan s strategijo omejevanja in tudi z zaznavo uporabe te strategije s strani mladostnikov. Vse štiri strategije posredovanja staršev so med seboj pomembno visoko pozitivno povezane, kar pomeni, da pogosteje ko starši uporabljajo določeno strategijo, pogosteje uporabljajo tudi druge. Odgovori staršev o uporabi strategij in zaznave teh strategij s strani mladostnikov so pozitivno povezane ($rs = 0{,}59 – 0{,}62$), kar priča v prid določeni stopnji skladnosti zaznav in odgovorov. Seznanjenost staršev je negativno povezana s starostjo otrok, izobrazbo staršev in pozitivno povezana z aktivnim posredovanjem in posredovanjem z omejevanjem staršev in prav tako z zaznavo otrok o omenjenih dveh strategijah posredovanja.

V nadaljevanju nas je zanimalo, katere izmed vključenih spremenljivk so pomembni napovedniki seznanjenosti staršev. Izvedli smo hierarhično multiplo linearno regresijo. Rezultati so prikazani v Tabeli 3. Prvi model s socio-demografskimi spremenljivkami pojasni 10-odstotne variance seznanjenosti staršev. Starost mladostnikov je pomemben negativni napovednik seznanjenosti, kot tudi izobrazba staršev, medtem ko je višji SES prepoznan kot pozitivni napovednik. Drugi model pojasni pomembno več variance v seznanjenosti staršev (15 %) kot prvi. Vse socialno-demografske spremenljivke so ostale pomembni napovedniki, poleg tega pa sta bili aktivno posredovanje in posredovanje z

Tabela 2: KORELACIJSKA MATRIKA VKLJUČENIH SPREMENLJIVK

	spol (1 = fant)	starost mlad.	SES	izob. staršev	AM	OP	TP	NP	AP – m	OP – m	TP – m
spol (1 = fant)	—										
starost mlad.	–0,01	—									
SES	0,01	0,01	—								
izob. staršev	–0,02	0,03	0,36**	—							
AP	–0,09	–0,37**	–0,06	0,00	—						
OP	–0,00	–0,58**	–0,13**	–0,08	0,42**	—					
TP	0,02	–0,21**	–0,09	0,03	0,27**	0,31**	—				
NP	–0,03	–0,29**	–0,09	0,06	0,38**	0,31**	0,20**	—			
AP – m	–0,14**	–0,28**	0,04	–0,05	0,62**	0,38**	0,21**	0,29**	—		
OP – m	–0,03	–0,40**	–0,15**	–0,05	0,26**	0,59**	0,14**	0,11*	0,22**	—	
TP – m	0,07	–0,10	0,00	0,00	0,16**	0,25**	0,62**	0,13*	0,18**	0,18**	—
seznanjenost staršev	–0,04	–0,30**	0,04	–0,16**	0,22**	0,34**	0,08	0,04	0,30**	0,29**	0,09

Vir: lastna analiza podatkov.

* $p < ,01$, ** $p < ,001$, AP – aktivno posredovanje, OP – posredovanje z omejevanjem, TP – tehnično posredovanje, NP – posredovanje z nadzorom, – m: zaznava mladostnika.

omejevanjem staršev prepoznana kot pomembna pozitivna napovednika seznanjenosti staršev. Tretji model, z vključenimi zaznavami mladostnikov o strategijah posredovanja njihovih staršev, je pojasnil pomembno več variance v primerjavi z drugim (18 %). Pomembna napovednika seznanjenosti sta mladostnikova starost in izobrazba staršev, medtem ko starševske strategije niso več pomembni napovedniki. Pomemben napovednik je torej izmed vseh strategij zgolj zaznava aktivnega posredovanja s strani mladostnikov.

Na podlagi regresijske analize smo želeli bolje razumeti odnos med seznanjenostjo staršev, aktivnim posredovanjem staršev in zaznavo mladostnikov o aktivnem posredovanju, zato smo izvedli analizo poti, pri čemer nas je zanimala vloga izbranih spremenljivk. Model je prikazan na Sliki 1. Model kaže ustrezno prileganje podatkov $\chi2(2) = 5,33$, $p > 0,05$, CFI = ,99, TLI = ,96, RMSEA = ,05 (95 % IZ ,00 – ,10), SRMR = ,02. Mladostnikova starost ima pomemben negativni neposredni učinek na seznanjenost staršev, prav tako pa na starševsko aktivno posredovanje, ki pa nima neposrednega učinka na seznanjenost. Aktivno posredovanje ima posredni učinek na seznanjenost prek zaznave mladostnikov o aktivnem posredovanju staršev. Ta učinek je statistično pomemben ($\beta = 0,11$, $p <$

Tabela 3: HIERARHIČNA MULTIPLA REGRESIJSKA ANALIZA ZA SPREMENLJIVKE, KI NAPOVEDUJEJO SEZNANJENOST STARŠEV Z NEGATIVNIMI SPLETNIMI IZKUŠNJAMI

Seznanjenost staršev	**Model 1**		**Model 2**		**Model 3**	
	B	β	**B**	β	**B**	β
Korak 1: Socio-demografske spremenljivke						
Presečišče	13,72		8,31		8,34	
Spol (1 = fant)	−0,31	−0,06	−0,23	−0,05	−0,11	−0,02
Starost mladostnika	−0,42	−0,28***	−0,20	−0,13**	−0,20	−0,13*
SES	0,15	0,11**	0,19	0,14**	0,15	0,11
Izobrazba staršev	−0,16	−0,12**	−0,14	−0,10*	−0,11	−0,08*
Korak 2: Strategije posredovanj – starši						
Aktivno			0,50	0,15**	0,14	0,04
Tehnično			−0,04	−0,02	−0,01	0,00
Z nadzorom			0,00	0,00	−0,04	0,00
Z omejevanjem			0,20	0,18**	0,05	0,04
Korak 3: Strategije posredovanja – zaznava mladostnikov						
Aktivno					0,68	0,21***
Z omejevanjem					0,06	0,03
Tehnično					−0,17	0,04
ΔR^2			0,05		0,03	
R^2	0,10		0,15		0,18	
F za Δ			0,05***		0,03**	

Vir: lastna analiza podatkov.

0,001). Pomemben pa je tudi posredni učinek mladostnikove starosti na aktivno posredovanje staršev in nato na zaznavo mladostnika o aktivnem posredovanju na seznanjenost ($\beta = -0{,}04$, $p < 0{,}001$).

RAZPRAVA IN SKLEP

Rezultati naše študije so pokazali, da so starši visoko seznanjeni o negativnih izkušnjah svojih otrok na spletu, kar je v nasprotju z raziskavami, ki trdijo, da starši v splošnem pre- ali podcenjujejo negativne izkušnje otrok na spletu (Chao in Chen 2005; Symons et al. 2017). Naši rezultati so skladni z ugotovitvami raziskave Geržičáková et al. (2023), v kateri so ugotovili, da so starši dobro seznanjeni o negativnih izkušnjah, še posebej o manj tveganih in bolj pogostih dejavnosti. V naši raziskavi smo ugotovili, da je seznanjenost staršev najnižja glede aktivnosti, povezanih s spolnostjo (ogled, pošiljanje in povpraševanje po spolnih vsebinah).

Slika 1: ANALIZA POTI (NE)POSREDNIH UČINKOV NA SEZNANJENOST STARŠEV O NEGATIVNIH IZKUŠNJAH MLADOSTNIKOV NA SPLETU



Vir: lastna analiza podatkov.

Prikazani so samo statistično pomembni standardizirani beta koeficienti, pri čemer debelejša puščica prikazuje $p < 0{,}001$ in tanjša $p < 0{,}01$.

Te aktivnosti starši v večji meri podcenjujejo, kot pa precenjujejo. Mladostništvo je obdobje, v katerem se začnejo mladostniki več spraševati o spolnosti, kar je posledica tudi njihovih hormonskih in telesnih sprememb. To lahko posledično vodi v iskanje in deljenje vsebin, povezanih s to tematiko, zlasti pri starejših mladostnikih. Pogovor o spolnosti lahko tako staršem kot mladostnikom predstavlja vir tesnobe in vodi v zadržanost (Ashcraft et al. 2017) ter izogibanje pogovorom o tej tematiki. Pomembno je, da se starši zavedajo, da njihovi otroci na spletu stopajo v stik s številnimi spolnimi vsebinami in da se starši o tem z njimi pogovarjajo, saj pozitivna komunikacija o spolnosti s strani staršev deluje kot dejavnik zmanjšanja tveganih spolnih dejanj mladostnikov (Grossman et al. 2017).

Rezultati regresijske analize so pokazali, da je starost pomemben negativni napovednik seznanjenosti staršev o izkušnjah njihovih otrok na spletu, kar je skladno z nekaterimi raziskavami (npr. Cerna et al. 2016; Byrne et al. 2014), vendar v nasprotju z raziskavo Geržičákove idr. (2023), ki učinka starosti ni prepoznala. Upad seznanjenosti staršev pri starejših mladostnikih lahko razložimo tako z vidika mladostnika kot starša. Zgodnje mladostništvo je obdobje diferenciacije od staršev in iskanje zaupnosti zlasti pri vrstnikih (Puklek Levpušček 2011), tako lahko predvidevamo, da se mladostniki o svojih negativnih izkušnjah prej zaupajo svojim vrstnikom in prijateljem kot pa staršem. Aktivno posredovanje s strani vrstnikov (in ne staršev) je bilo prepoznano kot pomemben napovednik zmanjševanja tveganih vedenj na spletu pri mladostnikih (Shin et al. 2017). Starši vse manj časa preživijo s starejšimi mladostniki, so manj aktivno vpeti v

njihove vsakdanje aktivnosti (Dubbas in Gerris 2002) in imajo posledično o njih tudi manj znanja. Jeffery (2021) je v svoji kvalitativni raziskavi o uporabi strategij posredovanja pri starših ugotovil, da ti pravzaprav ne želijo vedeti vsega, kar počne njihov mladostnik na spletu, saj to vidijo kot vdor v njegovo zasebnost. Zaradi teh razvojnih dejavnikov, ki vplivajo na seznanjenost staršev, je pomembno, da starši zlasti že v obdobju zgodnje rabe spleta z otrokom vzpostavijo odprto komunikacijo tako o pozitivnih kot negativnih izkušnjah na spletu, saj ima to lahko pozitivni vpliv na zaupanje staršem tudi v starejših letih.

Skladno s predhodnimi raziskavami (Geržičáková et al. 2023; Cerna et al. 2016; Sorbring in Lundin 2012) je tudi naša raziskava pokazala, da je aktivno posredovanje staršev pomemben napovednik seznanjenosti staršev (Tabela 3; model 2). Pri čemer pa je bilo tudi posredovanje z omejevanjem prepoznano kot pomemben napovednik seznanjenosti, kar ostale raziskave večinoma niso prepoznale. To je lahko posledica tega, da starši v našem vzorcu to strategijo uporabljajo na bolj vključujoč način in na primer z mladostniki skupaj določijo omejitve ter jih tako posledično tudi mladostniki zaznavajo kot smiselne, kar vodi v bolj pozitiven odnos in posledično boljšo seznanjenost staršev. Uporabi obeh strategij sta bili v našem vzorcu pozitivno povezani. Strategiji tehničnega posredovanja in nadzora nista napovedovali seznanjenosti staršev, kar je v skladu s predhodnimi ugotovitvami (Geržičáková et al. 2023; Sorbring in Lundin 2012). Zanimivo pa je dejstvo, da nobena izmed starševskih strategij posredovanja, potem ko smo vključili zaznave mladostnikov o starševskih strategijah, ni bila več pomemben napovednik seznanjenosti staršev. Kot pomemben napovednik znanja staršev se je izkazala zgolj zaznava mladostnikov o aktivnem posredovanju, kar je skladno z raziskavami, ki so potrdile pomemben vpliv zaznav starševskih strategij s strani otrok na njihove izide (Cohen in Rice 1997; Paulson 1992). Aktivno posredovanje staršev nima neposrednega vpliva na seznanjenost staršev, temveč ima posredni vpliv prek zaznave mladostnikov o aktivnem posredovanju. Starši lahko mislijo, da izvajajo določene aktivne strategije posredovanja, vendar ni nujno, da to tako zaznavajo tudi otroci (Sonck et al. 2013; Lwin et al. 2021). Zaznava uporabljenih starševskih strategij kot aktivnih s strani mladostnikov ima neposredni vpliv na seznanjenost staršev, kar pomeni, da mladostniki v večji meri zaupajo in razkrivajo staršem svoje negativne izkušnje na spletu, če strategije staršev sami zaznavajo kot aktivne, torej če zaznavajo komunikacijo med njimi in starši kot odprto, vključujočo in usmerjeno na reševanje problemov. Starši v naši raziskavi lahko (nenamerno) precenjujejo svojo uporabo aktivnega posredovanja. Znano je namreč, da so ocene staršev o uporabi pozitivnih starševskih strategij višje v primerjavi s poročanji otrok (Paulson 1992).

Omejitve raziskave

Raziskovalci, ki se ukvarjajo z raziskovanjem strategij posredovanja, si niso enotni pri merjenju le-teh, npr. Symons et al. (2017) predpostavljajo šest strategij, medtem ko raziskave EU Kids Online opredeljujejo štiri strategije, prav tako pa

se vprašanja o uporabi strategij med starših in otroki v določeni meri razlikujejo. Neskladnost uporabljenih pripomočkov za merjenje strategij zahteva pazljivost pri primerjavi rezultatov. V prihodnje bi bilo potrebno še več pozornosti nameniti razvoju veljavnih in zanesljivih pripomočkov za merjenje strategij posredovanja tako pri otrocih kot starših. Raziskava je bila izvedena na reprezentativnem vzorcu nemških gospodinjstev, zato bi v prihodnje veljalo preveriti ugotovitve te raziskave tudi na reprezentativnem vzorcu slovenskih otrok in staršev, s posebnim poudarkom na preučevanju vloge socio-demografskih spremenljivk, saj so bile te v slovenskem kontekstu prepoznane kot pomembni napovedniki načinov uporabe interneta (Grošelj in Matjašič 2019). V splošnem sicer ne pričakujemo velikih razlik pri vlogi aktivnega posredovanja pri znanju staršev, prav tako pa so si slovenski in nemški otroci glede na rezultate mednarodne raziskave KIDICOTI (Lobe et al. 2020) v določenih vidikih uporabe spleta in izkušenj podobni.

Praktične implikacije in zaključek

Ugotovitve naše raziskave lahko služijo vsem strokovnjakom, ki se ukvarjajo s svetovalnim delom za otroke, mladostnike in starše. Pomembna je ugotovitev, da mladi stopajo na spletu v stik s spolnimi vsebinami pogosteje, kot to mislijo njihovi starši, zato je smiselno starše o tem ozaveščati in jim ponuditi strategije za konstruktivno obravnavo te tematike z otroki in mladostniki. Zlasti pa je pomembna naša ugotovitev, da je aktivno posredovanje tisto, ki pozitivno vpliva na seznanjenost staršev o negativnih spletnih izkušnjah. Pri tem ima ključno vlogo zaznava mladostnikov o aktivnem posredovanju staršev. Za svetovalne delavce ta ugotovitev lahko pomeni podlago, na kateri usmerjajo svoje intervencije v to, da so predstave o aktivnem posredovanju med otroki in starši usklajene, saj bo to vodilo v pozitiven razvoj otrok in mladostnikov.

Nanašajoč se na Bronfennerjevo teorijo in priporočila (1979; 1994) smo v našo raziskavo vključili tako odgovore staršev kot mladostnikov o uporabi strategij posredovanja, kar nam je omogočilo prepoznati, da so zaznave mladostnikov o aktivnem posredovanju tiste, ki neposredno vplivajo na seznanjenost staršev. Če bi vključili zgolj poročila staršev, bi lahko zmotno zaključili, da ima uporaba strategij staršev neposreden vpliv na seznanjenost. V splošnem smo s socio-demografskimi spremenljivkami, strategijami posredovanja in zaznavo strategij posredovanja mladostnikov pojasnili malo manj kot petino variance v seznanjenosti staršev o negativnih izkušnjah njihovih otrok. Kar nakazuje na to, da bi bilo v prihodnje potrebno vključiti in raziskati še vlogo drugih spremenljivk tako z vidika otrok oz. mladostnikov kot tudi z vidika staršev (npr. stopnja samorazkrivanja v odnosu, vloga vrstnikov pri reševanju težav itn.). Kljub temu pa naša raziskava potrjuje dejstvo, da seznanjenost staršev o negativnih izkušnjah njihovih otrok nikoli ni zgolj rezultat starševskih strategij (Kerr in Stattin 2000), gre namreč za dvosmeren odnos, v katerega tako starši kot otrok vstopajo s svojimi zaznavami, prepričanji in pričakovanji in medsebojno vplivajo drug na drugega.

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Tihana ĐUMIĆ, Božidar VELJKOVIĆ*

THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN EMOTIONAL COMMUNICATION AMONG INDIVIDUALS IN THEIR THIRD AGE**

Abstract. *The study focused on investigating and analysing the perception of Facebook's role, as one of the components in the field of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), namely, social media, on the quality of emotional interaction, particularly among individuals in their third age. The research sample comprised 260 participants of various ages, divided into two age groups – under 50 and over 50 years old. Participants' opinions were obtained through empirical research, employing quantitative methods and surveys as the research technique. The research findings indicate that age influences participants' attitudes to digital communication as a means and medium of emotional communication in various contexts. Participants in the third age exhibit stronger reservations towards Facebook as a tool for emotional communication and are more cautious about the use of modern communication methods offered by new social media techniques. They are also less inclined to abandon traditional interpersonal interactions. The results reveal general distrust in the information circulating on Facebook and underscore the advantage of maintaining each interpersonal communication, encompassing all elements of emotional relationships beyond the realm of the Internet, or the information mediation services offered by ICT, primarily social media.*
Keywords: *Information and Communication Technologies, Facebook, third age, emotional communication, alienation.*

INTRODUCTION

With the advancement of technology, particularly in social interactions like human communication, significant innovations have emerged, notably in Information and Communication Technologies (hereinafter: ICT) and

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digitalisation. Artificial intelligence, which is widely accepted and predominant, has been a special focus. While social media is just one aspect of contemporary electronic media, it encompasses the largest number of communicators, or correspondents. The relentless pace of the ubiquitous technological progress presents a tangible challenge for individuals to keep pace with this development. Moreover, only a small percentage of applications and digital solutions available today are effectively utilised, representing one of the fundamental problems facing modern digital society. Through this lens, the contribution of this research lies in addressing the issue of the emotional life and communication of individuals in their third age, at a time when there is public discourse on the relativisation of the importance of emotional communication among older individuals.

In the context of this research, the term "older participants" refers to individuals who according to Pečjak (2001, 20–21), Gilleard et al. (2007), Martyn and Gallant (2012) and Esgin Günder (2014) belong to the third age, or the last third of life, which begins after the age of 50, with the boundary shifting according to the systematic ageing of the global population (Pečjak 2001, 14). Laslett ([1987] 1991) views life through four stages, without clearly defined boundaries, with the third age being the culmination of life, and his theory of the third age is considered a positive outlook on ageing.

It is essential to stress that ageing is an extremely individual process, which varies for each person and therefore requires an individualised approach, taking three main aspects of ageing into account (Pečjak 2001, 18) – biological, psychological and calendar, to which Featherstone and Hepworth (2005, as cited in Esgin Günder 2014) add the social aspect. The same authors state that all information and definitions about ageing are shaped by social processes, implying that interpretations and evaluations related to the ageing process arise as products of social constructions.

ICT is bringing considerable changes to the lives of older individuals, making them equal participants in online communication options (Martyn and Gallant 2012), providing them with new opportunities, and facilitating their daily existence. It is necessary to emphasise that it also plays a role in improving their quality of life (Hutto et al. 2015; Golden et al. 2009). Through email, social networks, video calls, and messages, it enables them to maintain connections with family and friends (Winstead et al. 2012; Ferreira et al. 2016; Nowland et al. 2017; Bell et al. 2013; Hope et al. 2014; Hutto et al. 2015; Ancu 2012), regarding which research suggests that emotional connection positively affects the quality of life and well-being of older individuals (Gouveia et al. 2016). Despite physical distance (Bell et al. 2013), this technology facilitates their networking (Zhang and Kaufman 2015; Ermer and Proulx 2019; Hutto et al. 2015) and offers an alternative to social support for effective ageing (Silva et al. 2018). It further provides them with access to various information, opens paths for telemedicine (Hope et al. 2014), delivers educational content of their choice, enhances the home

environment, improves safety, and increases overall comfort at home. Finally, yet no less importantly, it also offers them rich entertainment content (Ancu 2012).

Based on observations and perceptions of the environment, along with the analysis of various data on public involvement in technical-technological and digital processes, it is observed that young people easily navigate these processes (Hayes et al. 2015; Hope et al. 2014). On the contrary, older individuals encounter more challenges and difficulties with accessing, adopting and engaging in communication via social Internet platforms (Hope et al. 2014). Since they did not grow up in the digital age, contemporary user interfaces, complex applications, websites, or devices prove quite challenging for older individuals, leading to potential confusion and difficulties in acquiring digital skills (Wilson et al. 2023; Hayes et al. 2015); on the other hand, ICT can be used to enhance their ageing experience (Fang et al. 2017). Some older individuals may feel fear or discomfort with new technologies (Wilson et al. 2023; Hutto et al. 2015). Sensory impairments, such as vision or hearing problems, and motor difficulties (Wilson et al. 2023), along with various chronic illnesses (Bell et al. 2013), can prevent their use of computers, smartphones or other digital devices. Moreover, they often express concerns about the security aspects of using digital technology (Bell et al. 2013; Hope et al. 2014; Hutto et al. 2015). Nevertheless, as Sinclair and Grieve (2017) note, older adults can also establish social connections via the Internet, in a world that is rapidly changing and increasingly digitised, to the same extent as younger users.

Considering the factors mentioned above, participants' opinions on ICT and social media as media for creating and maintaining emotional relationships are questioned. Since the use of social platforms and applications is seen as crucial for social connectedness in our time (Wilson et al. 2023), understanding this dynamic is vital for devising tailored strategies that facilitate the involvement of older individuals in digital communication processes. Further, researching how young people perceive and use technology to build emotional relationships, in relation to the older population, contributes to understanding generational differences in the approach and perception of contemporary communication technologies.

RELATED RESEARCH AND MOTIVATION

As the average age of the population is growing around the world, the proportion of older adults in the demographic composition is increasing significantly, along with the potential user base of the Internet, including social platforms. In 2022, over one-fifth (21.1%) of people in the European Union were aged 65 or over, with half the population being older than 44.4 years (Eurostat 2023), and the average population age of 42.2 years (Worldometer 2023). Between 2012 and 2022, the population of the Republic of Croatia, that is, the sample of this study, aged by 3.2 years (Eurostat 2023). According to a Euronews report (2023), the population of the European Union, which in early 2024 counted just over 448

million people, is expected to peak around 2026, after which it will gradually decline, with a loss of 57.4 million working-age individuals by 2100. Of particular concern is the rise in the proportion of older adults among the working-age population, predicted to reach 60% by the end of the century. The World Health Organization announced that by 2024 individuals aged 65 and over will outnumber those under 15 in Europe, indicating the emergence of new social, economic and health challenges (Phys Org 2023), with one of these challenges being ageing in the context of the current social circumstances.

In October 2023, Northern Europe held the leading position both in Europe and globally in terms of Internet penetration into people's lives, with a high share of 97.3% of the population using the Internet, while Western Europe was the second-most connected region in Europe, where approximately 93.7% are online users, still ahead of other parts of the world (Petrosyan 2023). The number of Internet users in Europe is expected to continue to grow from 2024 to 2028, with a total rise of 60.6 million users (+8.33%), while the number of users is projected to reach 788.2 million, to set a new record in 2028 (Statista 2023).

In the third quarter of 2023, Facebook recorded 408 million monthly active users in Europe, representing a drop of 1 million users compared to the previous quarter (Dixon 2023). Although the platform witnessed an increase in users during 2021, the number of monthly active users had returned to the level at the beginning of 2020. On the other hand, the situation is different for monthly active users globally. Between the fourth quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of 2021, the number of Facebook active users skyrocketed from 100 million to an impressive 2.89 billion, and during that period no decline was seen in the number of monthly active users (Dixon 2023).

Although older adults quickly acquire a certain level of familiarity with current social networking technologies (Hutto et al. 2015), there is a noticeable lack of scientific research on their use and activities in the context of networking for an emotional connection. Many websites, as well as social Internet platforms, seem tailored to certain target groups, adjusting to their specific needs and expectations. On the other hand, little effort has been made to adequately align older individuals with trends and thereby preserve their health and life for as long as possible (Holt-Lunstad et al. 2010; Zhang and Kaufman 2015; Ermer and Proulx 2019; Hamer and Stamatakis 2014; Heo et al. 2015; Seifert et al. 2017; Hunsaker and Hargittai 2018).

The rapid increase in the number of older adults poses a challenge in both scientific and technological terms. Extending the lifespan, regardless of somatic limitations, cognitive and mental issues, represents a necessary motivational factor for promoting and maintaining social relationships as a key factor in the independent functioning of older adults. This means that the active involvement and integration of older adults in social streams are essential elements for maintaining a healthy ageing process. Research by Cornwell and Waite (2009) showed that social isolation and a lack of social networks can constitute a health risk

for older adults, but that Facebook can provide them with an opportunity to create social networks, while the relationship between social participation and the mortality rate was first identified by Berkman and Syme as early as 1979. Numerous studies since then have shown that social connectedness is particularly important for the lifespan of older adults (Haslam et al. 2015; Seeman et al. 1987; Glass et al. 1999; Giles et al. 2005; Bennett 2002; Maier and Klumb 2005) and emotional connectedness, namely, the essence of every quality interpersonal interaction, is also the focus of this research.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The widespread adoption of ICT, together with the rapid increase in the use of social Internet platforms by older adults, motivated our choice of Facebook as the platform for conducting this research. This paper utilises the research concept of mixed methods (Creswell 2018; Ambrož 2023, 178). Public opinion polling is a common tool in relations with various publics. It is most commonly used in the initial phase of public relations – analysing the existing situation, but also in later stages such as evaluating achievements (Ristić 2011, 15).

For the primary empirical research, we employed a quantitative method with the technique of collecting data via a survey on participants' opinions. The research was conducted using a questionnaire made available to participants via a Google Docs form for a full 6 days, between 15 October and 21 October 2023. As a method of qualitative research, the presented analysis relies on the theoretical framework of relevant scientific and professional literature, as well as published results of applied research on the topic under study. As part of this method, we also relied on observation, descriptions, and discursive techniques of analysis.

About the Research Structure

The research problem: The role of social networks in the quality of emotional communication among older adults.

The research subject: Public opinion on the role of Facebook in the quality of emotional communication among older adults.

Elements of the researched subject (dependent variables): Technical and technological solutions offered by Facebook as a social network, people's attitudes to these solutions, and how often people use this social network to achieve quality emotional connections.

The main research question: Considering their age, how do people embrace social networks, specifically Facebook, as a medium for emotional communication among older adults?

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: ICT is developing applications and other communication tools and languages much faster than older individuals can keep up with their usage

and successfully educate themselves to become as proficient in using social networks as younger users.

Hypothesis 2: Compared to the younger population, older adults exhibit greater reservations towards Facebook as a modern electronic medium for practising emotional communication.

Hypothesis 3: People's age influences their value judgement on the role of social networks, especially Facebook, in their personal, intimate and emotional interpersonal communication.

RESEARCH RESULTS

Description and Structure of the Data, Research Results and Validation of the Hypotheses

When using the term research results, we imply a functional and complementary summary of the findings through both quantitative and qualitative methods. The research involved a total of 260 participants from the Republic of Croatia (60.4% females, 39.6% males), ranging in age from under 18 to 79 years. The sample did not include any participants older than 80 years. Participants were categorised in two groups: those under the age of 50 (208 participants, or 80%) and those above 50 years of age (52 participants, or 20%). The sample was dominated by the age group of individuals between 30 and 49 years, accounting for 55.8% of the total sample. In the age group below 50 years, the majority of participants had completed high school (36.5%) and tertiary education (39.9%), while the fewest had completed primary school or held a doctoral degree. In contrast, in the age group above 50 years, the majority had completed high school education (47.2%), with an especially higher percentage of doctoral degrees (15.1%). In both age groups, the majority of individuals were married, although there were more singles in the group under 50 years (21.8%) than in the group above 50 years (9.6%). As expected, the majority of participants in both groups identified themselves as belonging to the Christian faith (nearly 80% of them).

Results and Valuation of the Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: ICT develops applications and other communication tools and languages much faster than older individuals can keep up with and successfully educate themselves to become as proficient in using social networks as younger users.

Graph 1 – Graphic representation for Hypothesis 1: PARTICIPANTS' PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF ICT APPLICATIONS, TOOLS AND LANGUAGES AND THEIR ROLE IN SUCCESSFULLY NAVIGATING SOCIAL NETWORKS DEPENDING ON CHRONOLOGICAL AGE



Source: the authors.

*Legend:

1. Online messages are cold and do not convey the full context of feelings or situations, which makes misunderstandings or arguments easier.
2. On Facebook, users are increasingly replacing verbal communication with drawings, abbreviations, or short videos, thus losing the emotional content they intend to convey.
3. Social platforms (such as Facebook) provide us with a lot of fun content, entertainment, and opportunities for virtual sex, but at the same time, they dull us.

Participants correctly perceive that on Facebook, instead of verbal communication, drawings, abbreviations, and short video clips are increasingly used. This shift leads to a reduction of the depth of message transmission, particularly emotional ones. Interestingly, the age group of participants in the third age perceives these changes more intensively than younger ones. Younger participants, in slightly larger numbers compared to older ones, believe that social platforms offer entertainment and amusement to users but can also contribute to a sense of mental emptiness or a decline in intellectual stimulation. Both age groups, however, equally believe that online messages lack emotional context, potentially leading to misunderstandings or conflicts among users.

Since there are no significant differences in participants' attitudes to the changes offered by ICT, which could negatively affect users' navigation on networks depending on their chronological age, the first hypothesis is not confirmed.

Hypothesis 2: Older adults exhibit greater reservations towards Facebook as a modern electronic medium for emotional communication compared to the younger population.

Graph 2 – Graphic representation for Hypothesis 2: PARTICIPANTS' ATTITUDE TO FACEBOOK AS A SUITABLE MODERN ELECTRONIC MEDIUM FOR EMOTIONAL CORRESPONDENCE



Source: the authors.

*Legend:

1. I find it more satisfying to exchange affections with someone online than in person.
2. I miss real human contact and 'face-to-face' socialising.
3. Going out to dinners, going out to the cinema, etc. are outdated.
4. Today, it is common and much easier to find someone for a sexual adventure or a date on a social network than in person.
5. I get more excited about looking for potential sex or love partners online than in person.
6. I often use Facebook to exchange sexual content (pictures, words, gifs etc.) with other people.
7. I behave (sexually) more freely on Facebook and other social networks than in face-to-face relationships.
8. I met some of my emotional and sexual partners on Facebook.
9. Facebook, as a technical system, greatly facilitates sex trips, fraud, and various adventures.

Both groups of participants, categorised by age below and above 50, equally perceive the possibility of exchanging affection through social media negatively, with the noteworthy emphasis on how older adults express a stronger preference for face-to-face human contact. Interestingly, both age groups do not consider traditional activities such as dinners and going to the movies to be outdated, even though the older age group shows greater disagreement with the possibility of finding a partner for adventures or socialising on social media.

Despite both age groups expressing greater excitement while seeking potential sexual or romantic partners online compared to traditional methods of meeting people, participants in the third age do not use Facebook at all to exchange sexual content with others. Further, both age groups state that they do not exhibit more liberated sexual behaviour on social media compared to 'real-life' contact. A significantly higher number of participants under 50 years of age report having met their emotional or sexual partners through Facebook, unlike older participants.

In addition, a significantly higher number of younger participants believe that Facebook facilitates sexual adventures and infidelity for them. The responses obtained indicate that older participants have greater reservations towards Facebook as a medium that would enable satisfactory and/or appropriate emotional communication, thereby confirming the second hypothesis.

Hypothesis 3: Age influences people's value judgement of the role of social networks, especially Facebook, in their personal, intimate and emotional interpersonal communication.

Graph 3 – Graphic representation for Hypothesis 3: PARTICIPANTS' ATTITUDE TO THE ROLE OF SOCIAL NETWORKS IN PERSONAL, INTIMATE AND EMOTIONAL INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION



Source: the authors.
*Legend:

1. Social networks are a medium that enables the marketing of more false than true information about emotional values and sexuality.
2. It is easier for me to express my feelings, wishes and needs online than in face-to-face interaction.
3. Social networks are a good medium for making sexual acquaintances and a quality emotional connection.

4. Maintaining a love relationship at a distance (via a social network) is more complicated than in person.
5. I trust information on Facebook more than friends or relatives.
6. It's easier for me to talk to someone, especially about love or sex, via chat than in person.
7. I spend most of my time in front of the phone or computer screen precisely because of the exchange of emotional and/or sexual content with someone.

Participants in the third age tend to trust information about emotional values and sexuality disseminated through social networks more than younger individuals do. Still, both age groups equally find it challenging to express their feelings, desires and needs online compared to face-to-face interaction. Participants from both age categories share an equally negative attitude to social networks as a means of forming sexual acquaintances and quality emotional relationships. They believe that maintaining a romantic relationship via social networks is considerably more complicated than in person.

Moreover, both age groups express significant distrust in the information available on Facebook compared to information received from friends or family. They also spend a negligible amount of time in front of phone or computer screens for the purpose of exchanging emotional and/or sexual content with someone or others.

Since age does not affect the assessment of the value of social networks in emotional and intimate interpersonal communication, this hypothesis is not confirmed.

DISCUSSION

Introduction to the Discussion

Contemporary society is digitised, and this inevitable assessment is best characterised by the rapid development of ICT and its significant role in shaping people's lives and their interpersonal relationships. The continuous development of applications and communication tools aligns with the trends and needs of young people, introducing new languages and knowledge. However, this often surpasses older individuals' abilities to keep up, their skills, and the knowledge they have acquired about technologies. In this context, the challenge for older people lies not simply in bridging the technological gap with younger generations but also in improving their skills through adapted education to become experienced users of social networks like younger individuals, which Esgin Günder (2014) also mentions as a necessity in her work.

The perceived sense of powerlessness among older generations in the face of rapid changes today can manifest in reluctance to engage in emotional communication via electronic media, especially on social networks. This restraint could be the result of values acquired through early socialisation, which did not include exposure to new media. Since individuals from various age groups perceive the

role of media differently, chronological age can influence communication style, preferences for certain types of content, and openness to virtual relationships.

Given the scientific perspectives and available research on this topic, this discussion aims to summarise the impact of chronological age on how people from different age groups perceive the role of social networks, with a special focus on Facebook, in personal, intimate and emotional interpersonal communication. Through the prism of these factors, we seek to gain a better understanding of how people's age shapes the value judgments of individuals about modern electronic media, providing a foundation for further research on this complex topic.

Older People Fail to Keep up With the Rapid Development of information and Communication Technology

The research results show that the age of participants does not influence their attitude, yet support the claim that digitally transmitted messages create a greater distance among communicators and are not an effective means of accurately conveying emotions. Consequently, misunderstandings and conflicts can easily arise. Both those under 50 years of age (87.3%) and those older (85.1%) equally agree with this perspective. It is worth noting that older participants cite the increasing use of emoticons, abbreviations and videos instead of verbal expression as the reason for the loss of emotional expression in communication (93.6%). This observation is in line with the findings of Tidwell and Walther (2002) who concluded that computer-mediated communication lacks cues for developing emotional relationships. In addition, such communication offers an obvious absence of nonverbal and vocal cues and, more importantly, a lack of physical closeness and attractiveness (Riva 2002).

A slightly higher percentage of younger participants (94%) than those in the third age (80%) perceive social networks as a means of entertainment and an opportunity for intimacy on a virtual level. On the other hand, they are viewed as potential causes of intellectual decline and manipulation of their users. Interestingly, older users are either more confident in their rational and practical use of social networks or, alternatively, naiver due to their unawareness of the intellectual, emotional and other pitfalls lurking on virtual channels. Regardless of the reason, both age groups are considered sufficiently successful and skilled in overcoming the challenges and obstacles posed by the rapid evolution of digitisation.

Older Adults Refuse to Accept Facebook as an Equal Tool for Emotional Communication

According to the research results, both age groups strongly reject the idea of replacing live affection with virtual affection (over 80%). This finding is consistent with the study by Fox et al. (2013), which confirms that the majority of people meet their potential romantic partners outside of Internet networks. This is also in line with the conclusions of Bell et al. (2013) who argue that there is no

significant difference in the feeling of loneliness between Facebook users and non-users.

Nevertheless, participants in the third age express a stronger longing for authentic, immediate human contact (89.4%) compared to younger individuals (78.6%). Macdonald et al. (2021) note that the latter group considers personal interactions more beneficial than digital or even telephone interactions. Consistent with the findings of Riva (2002), it seems that older participants, more than younger ones, miss nonverbal communication elements in virtual communication, making it a deficient communication channel compared to those that provide users with a comprehensive experience. Spitzer (2019) stresses the importance of a cautious approach to the concept of comprehensive media, arguing that even very modern audio-visual media can give users the impression of complete involvement, albeit they still lack something inherently human.

Both age groups equally strongly reject the claim that dinners out, trips to the cinema, and similar social activities are outdated (86.2% younger, 90% older). Younger participants perceive the relevance and ease of finding someone for adventures or socialising on social media much easier (82.8%) than those in the third age (65%), yet both groups equally deny the excitement that accompanies finding love or sexual partners online (96%). It seems that both age groups do not support the concept of the de-individualisation effect of computer-mediated communication, as discussed by Postmes et al. (1998, 698), which is supposed to facilitate such behaviours.

All older participants in the study stated that they do not often use Facebook as a means of exchanging explicit content with other individuals on Facebook (100%), while younger participants were only slightly more open to such experiences (92%). This suggests the research participants have increased discretion offered by virtual channels (Pauley and Emmers-Sommer 2007) or they do not inspire enough trust to engage in the exchange of 'sensitive' content, or lack enthusiasm for such types of communication with others.

A large share of participants from both age groups state that their expression of sexuality on Facebook and other social networks is not significantly different from that in personal relationships. However, although older participants are somewhat more inclined to express their sexuality in direct contact (94%), younger ones also express it in this way (86%). Almost twice as many younger participants (31.1%) had met their romantic partner through Facebook compared to older participants (17.6%). This corresponds with previous research by Fox et al. (2013) who argue that Facebook plays an interesting role in the development of romantic relationships, giving a certain initial boost to dating, and Goldberg et al. (2022) who state that some users consider this platform favourable for building romantic relationships as it does not make a considerable difference between behaviour in real life and online. This is, in contrast, not the case for older individuals.

As a result, a significantly higher number of younger participants (86%) perceive Facebook as a platform that provides considerable support for easier sexual

encounters, affairs, and various adventures compared to participants in the third age (67%). This finding supports the thesis about the discretion of virtual channels discussed by Pauley and Emmers-Sommer (2007), which is why some people opt for this option with less caution. Yet, it seems that individuals over 50 generally approach the 'conveniences' provided by modern social networks with more caution and are less willing to give up the interpersonal interactions they are accustomed to. It is understandable to assume that they do not want to give up interactions from a time when emotions were less distant, media less complicated, and people more 'human'.

Value Judgment of the Role of Social Networks on Personal, Intimate and Emotional Communication Depending on Chronological Age

Participants in the third age exhibit slightly less scepticism of the information available on social media platforms and to a smaller extent generally consider these platforms to be vehicles for disseminating false information about emotional values and sexuality (80% older, 93% younger). This is in line with the conclusion of Walther's study (1996), which asserts that social media users shape messages to present themselves in a positive, socially acceptable light, rather than necessarily adhering to the truth.

Expressing their emotions, desires and needs via virtual means is somewhat more challenging for participants in the third age than for younger participants (82%), as opposed to younger participants (76%). This supports the findings of Hope et al. (2014), who see Facebook as an auxiliary means of communication for older individuals but recognise that it lacks the power to replace deep and thoughtful conversation and fails to meet their need for active engagement in interpersonal relationships. Still, both age groups consider direct contact as a superior way of conveying their inner experiences to another person, contrary to some earlier findings (Parks and Floyd 1996; Joison 2001) that suggest computer-mediated communication reduces uncertainty and promotes reciprocity in presenting one's personality compared to face-to-face interaction.

Younger participants slightly more than older ones perceive social media as an inefficient medium for establishing intimate relationships and quality connections (79%), a view shared by 70% of participants in the third age. This aligns with the research of Tidwell and Walther (2002) but contradicts the perspective held by Cooper and Sportolari (1997) who claim that online connections can positively contribute to interpersonal relationships, including emotional ones.

Both age groups equally find it challenging to maintain an emotional bond over the Internet compared to in-person interaction, with 82% of younger and 77% of older participants agreeing. Almost all older and younger participants consider the information published on Facebook to be less credible than what they learn from friends or family (98% in both groups). The findings of Walther (1996) and Choi et al. (2015, as cited in Selak and Kuhar 2019) regarding the prevalence of false self-representation on social media and the fertile grounds

for establishing numerous superficial contacts, allowing individuals with narcissistic tendencies to spread their grandiose self-image (Selak and Kuhar 2019), mean that is not surprising that both age groups are sceptical about information which reaches them through this channel.

Both age groups are equally hesitant to communicate about their intimacy via messages and prefer to discuss love or sex in personal contact with another person (87% younger, 90% older). This finding is surprising considering previous findings of Joinson (2001) and Ben-Ze'ev (2003), which point to the less inhibition while self-disclosing and greater sense of security offered by virtual reality compared to physical reality. Both age groups, in very low percentages – 4% for the younger group of participants and 2% for the older group – also admit they spend most of their time in front of the screen exchanging sexual or emotional content with other people online.

Overall, according to the research results, both age groups generally lack trust in the information 'served' to them by social media, although social media has become an integral part of the online public space and, according to Sekloča (2020), trust in them continues to decline and is currently at its lowest level since this construct started to be measured in 2014. This makes it understandable that the participants in this study, regardless of age, are more focused on creating and maintaining emotional relationships outside the online space, which is more familiar to them and thus easier to navigate.

In terms of the culturally specific environment of the study, the results of this research reveal that the traditionalism, culture and spirituality of a given region are equally important factors in the acceptance of new digital technologies in the process and practice of interpersonal communication. This accordingly represents a contribution to scientific thought which, of course, implies an area that researchers are recommended to further research in the future.

The limitation of this study lies in the relatively small number of participants in the third age, which is certainly suggested to researchers in future research. In addition, it is advisable to explore the modes of communication of older individuals on other social platforms that enjoy in wide used today.

CONCLUSION

The relevance of the topic lies in the increasing digitisation of interpersonal relationships and the migration of real-life interactions to social media, including emotional connections among people. Social media (as a result of ICT development and digitalisation processes) are accepted uncritically by people. Their use is not determined by the distances between correspondents but by their advantages, especially those resulting from digital convergence or need due to some form of limitation, which achieves better communication.

Although possessing knowledge and competencies concerning the use of digital technology, especially social media, is today recognised as a crucial means for achieving social, and therefore emotional, interactions, as the results reveal,

it does not play such a significant role in Croatia. This country (as a research sample) is characterised by pronounced traditional values, strong patriotism, and a predominantly Christian faith. Accordingly, the spiritual and cultural tradition, as an important factor in accepting changes in society, can be generalised to other countries in this geographic area since they share the same traditional postulates. This claim is supported by the results of our research, which show that age, a critical socio-demographic characteristic affecting access to digital technology, does not affect the perception of possessing a satisfactory level of competence for adapting to new media forms or the propensity to form and maintain emotional relationships online. The opinions of the participants in this study reflect the public's preference (Supek 1968, 42) for authenticity and a traditional, personal experience of interpersonal relationships, as well as serious doubts in the authenticity of information coming from social media, as a consequence of perceived manipulation by other users and greater trust in information from the immediate social sphere.

The research results show that individuals in the third age, compared to younger members of the communication community, are less inclined to abandon conventional forms of interpersonal emotional communication. They also have certain dilemmas or reservations when it comes to expressing intimacy through social media. Yet, they use social platforms to maintain relationships with family and friends at a distance. Their behaviour on the Internet is likely shaped by a socially conditioned fear of potential inappropriateness, due either to concerns related to age or learned behaviour that prioritises direct social contact as the cornerstone of human society. Finally, the progression of chronological ageing excludes people from the sphere of mass communication with the public and increasingly involves them in the field of social interpersonal communication, which is based on the principles of reversibility, equivalence and solidarity. In this context, direct communication 'in vivo' is emerging as a need that counters the process of people being alienated from their humane essence as social beings.

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Živa ŠKETA*

KORPORATIVNI NAJEMODAJALCI: PRAVNE OSEBE IN STANOVANJSKI NAJEM V LJUBLJANSKIH NOVOGRADNJAH**

Povzetek. *V članku je predstavljena poizvedbena raziskava dejavnosti korporativnih najemodajalcev, torej pravnih oseb, ki prihodke ustvarjajo z oddajanjem stanovanjskih nepremičnin v tržni najem, na ljubljanskem najemniškem trgu. Ker podatki o številčnosti stanovanj, ki jih oddajajo pravne osebe v Ljubljani, zaenkrat ne obstajajo, je v članku narejen pregled kupcev stanovanj v sedmih novogradnjah v Ljubljani, zgrajenih po letu 2020. Na podlagi podatkov iz evidenc GURS, zemljiške knjige, registra AJPES in informacij, ki so jih posredovale posamezne družbe, je pokazano, da se v analiziranem vzorcu pojavljajo tudi nekatere pravne osebe, ki stanovanja kupujejo z namenom, da jih oddajajo v profitni najem.*
Ključni pojmi: *korporativni najemodajalci, nepremičnine, stanovanjski najem, najemniški trg.*

UVOD[1]

Razprave o današnji »stanovanjski krizi« se v veliki meri osredotočajo na pojav splošne nedostopnosti stanovanj, ki je postala problem praktično za vsakogar, ki rešuje svoje stanovanjsko vprašanje (za primer Ljubljane gl. npr. Blagojević et al. 2018; IŠSP in PIC 2022; za Slovenijo pa npr. Klanjšek 2022, 551), hkrati pa tudi pomembna referenca za utemeljevanje državnih politik na stanovanjskem področju. Diskurz o stanovanjski krizi se pogosto uporablja tudi za upravičevanje ukrepov, ki jih mnogi povezujejo z vzroki za nedostopnost stanovanj, kot so na primer deregulacija stanovanjskega področja, njegova nadaljnja privatizacija,

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** Izvirni znanstveni članek.
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[1] Članek je bil v krajši različici in z dotlej dostopnimi podatki objavljen na Radiu Študent dne 27. 4. 2022 in je dostopen na naslednji povezavi: https://radiostudent.si/politika/odprti-politicni-termin/korporativni-najemodajalci.

finančne spodbude za zasebne investitorje itd. (Heslop in Ormerod 2020; White in Nandedkar 2021). Tudi v slovenskem prostoru se med rešitvami za pomanjkanje stanovanj omenja investicije zasebnih korporacij, ki se v tujini pogosto povezujejo z vzroki za stanovanjsko nedostopnost. Klemen Boštjančič, sedanji finančni minister, je v intervjuju za tednik Mladina leta 2022 kot dobro prakso pri zagotavljanju najemnih stanovanj na primer izpostavil družbi Buwog in Vonovia, ki se na avstrijskem in nemškem nepremičninskem trgu ukvarjata z naložbami v stanovanjske nepremičnine in njihovim oddajanjem v profitni najem (Weiss 2022).

Za slovenski nepremičninski trg so bile takšne pravne osebe, se pravi gospodarske družbe, ki prihodke za svoje družbenike oziroma delničarje ustvarjajo z oddajanjem stanovanj v tržni najem, do nedavnega nekaj precej nepoznanega. V zadnjem času pa lahko opazimo nekatere spremembe v aktivnosti pravnih oseb na slovenskem najemniškem trgu. Leta 2021 je bila na primer ustanovljena nepremičninska delniška družba Equinox, d. d., ki od začetka leta 2022 kotira na ljubljanski borzi. Prihod Equinoxa na ljubljanski najemniški trg je bil medijsko zelo odmeven (gl. npr. Weiss 2021) in družba sama je ob oglaševanju svojih delnic večkrat poudarila, da gre za prvo nepremičninsko delniško družbo, torej za nov pojav na slovenskem trgu nepremičnin (Equinox 2022). Večino prihodkov zaenkrat ustvarja z oddajanjem poslovnih prostorov, a ima v načrtu svoj portfelj razširiti tudi z najemniškimi stanovanji. Maja 2022 je družba tako na primer investirala v projekt prenove nekdanje kočevske veleblagovnice Nama v poslovno-stanovanjski objekt. V prenovljeni stavbi naj bi bilo do 40 stanovanj, ki jih bo mogoče kupiti ali najeti (STA 2022). Na podoben način Equinox namerava tudi v delu nekdanje stolpnice Dela urediti garsonjere, novonastala stanovanja pa bodo namenjena izključno najemu (Robežnik 2022b). Poleg tega je iz poročila Equinoxa o poslovanju v obdobju med januarjem in septembrom 2023 razvidno, da je družba podpisala pogodbo o nakupu petih stanovanj, pri čemer njihova lokacija ni znana.

V članku bom k razpravam o stanovanjski krizi poskusila prispevati podatke o pravnih osebah, ki v Ljubljani naenkrat kupujejo večje število stanovanj in jih oddajajo v tržni najem. Najprej bom na primeru aktivnosti družb Blackstone in Vonovia v Španiji in Nemčiji predstavila razloge za pojav korporativnih najemodajalcev v teh državah. Korporativni najemodajalci, ki so aktivni na španskem in nemškem nepremičninskem trgu, imajo različne poslovne strategije, drugačni pa so tudi razlogi za njihovo vzpostavitev v omenjenih državah. Lahko bi govorili o dveh tipih korporativnih najemodajalcev, ki sta v evropskem prostoru tudi med najpogosteje obravnavanimi v znanstveni literaturi. V istem poglavju bom izpostavila nekatere razlike med omenjenima državama in slovenskim stanovanjskim področjem. Sledil bo pregled uporabljenih metod, v katerem bom opozorila tudi na nekatere pomanjkljivosti raziskave zaradi omejene dostopnosti podatkov. V četrtem poglavju bom predstavila pregled kupcev stanovanj v sedmih novogradnjah v Ljubljani, zgrajenih po letu 2020. V petem poglavju

bom na podlagi opravljene analize poskusila odgovoriti na vprašanje, ali se v pregledanem vzorcu pojavljajo korporativni najemodajalci in kakšne so njihove značilnosti.

KORPORATIVNI NAJEMODAJALCI STANOVANJSKIH NEPREMIČNIN

Pri pojasnjevanju fenomena nedostopnosti stanovanj prevladujejo teorije, ki razloge za pomanjkanje vidijo v procesu poblagovljenja, s katerim je ekonomska vrednost stanovanj – njihova pojavnost kot investicija[2] – prevladala nad njihovo uporabnostjo (kot prostor za bivanje) (Madden in Marcuse 2016). Večina novejše literature, ki se ukvarja z vprašanjem poblagovljenja stanovanj, se pri obravnavi tega procesa opira na teorije o financializaciji, ki se osredotočajo na raziskovanje naraščajoče vloge finančnih trgov, institucij in instrumentov. Na področju stanovanjskih študij so teorije o financializaciji pridobile vpliv zlasti po obdobju finančne krize 2008 (gl. npr. Wijburg et al. 2018; Aalbers 2019; Wijburg 2021; Lochlainn 2023).

Eden izmed vidikov financializacije stanovanjskega področja, ki se mu literatura posebej posveča, je pojav »globalnih korporativnih najemodajalcev« (*global corporate landlords*). Kot izpostavlja Nethercote (2020), v obstoječi literaturi še ni izoblikovane jasne definicije globalnih korporativnih najemodajalcev. Izraz tako zajema raznovrstne korporativne investitorje v nepremičnine. Sprva se je izoblikoval za označevanje špekulativnih družb, ki so v obdobju po finančni krizi kupovale večje število stanovanj na močno podcenjenih nepremičninskih trgih, kot je to na primer počel Blackstone s kupovanjem med krizo zarubljenih enodružinskih stanovanj in z njihovim preoblikovanjem v najemniške enote v ZDA (Beswick et al. 2016). Tudi v evropskem prostoru se literatura na tem področju v veliki meri posveča špekulativnim globalnim korporativnim najemodajalcem, ki so stanovanja kupovali v državah, ki jih je najbolj prizadela finančna kriza (na primer v Španiji in Grčiji, glej Beswick et al. 2016). Tako so številni avtorji na primeru vstopa družbe Blackstone na španski nepremičninski trg pokazali, da so bili za prihod transnacionalnih korporativnih najemodajalcev v Španijo ključni mehanizmi, ki so bili vzpostavljeni za reševanje španskih finančnih institucij po finančni krizi,[3] kot sta bili na primer ustanovitev slabe banke SAREB in odpro-

[2] Izraz stanovanjska investicija bom v članku razumela kot vsakršno vlaganje premoženja v stanovanjske nepremičnine z namenom pridobivanja finančnih koristi, pri čemer za investitorja uporabnost stanovanja kot prostora za bivanje ni pomembna. Finančne koristi se lahko v primeru vlaganja v stanovanja pojavijo tako v obliki spremembe v ceni nepremičnine kot v obliki prihodkov od najemnin, ne glede na to, ali gre za kratkoročni (turistični) ali dolgoročnejši najem.

[3] K naložbam globalnih korporativnih najemodajalcev v španski nepremičninski trg so poleg tega pomembno prispevali tudi drugi dejavniki. Prva naložba družbe Blackstone v španski nepremičninski trg je bil na primer sporen nakup privatiziranih socialnih stanovanj od dveh španskih javnih podjetij po finančni krizi. V zvezi s prodajo so bili takratna županja Madrida in šest članov njene administracije leta 2018 obsojeni zaradi namernega podcenjevanja vrednosti nepremičnin, ki so bile predmet prodaje. Pomemben dejavnik pa so bili tudi državni ukrepi, neposredno namenjeni spodbujanju transnacionalnih investicij v nepremičnine po finančni krizi, kot so na primer uvedba in zakonska ureditev t. i. SOCIMI, družb z omejeno odgovornostjo, ki vlagajo v nepremičnine, namenjene oddajanju v najem, različne davčne ugodnosti in deregulacija najemniške zakonodaje (Gil García in Martínez López 2023; Janoschka et al. 2020).

daja portfeljev slabih posojil, zavarovanih z zemljišči, namenjenimi gradnji, in drugimi nepremičninami (Janoschka et al. 2020; Vives-Miró 2018; García-Lamarca 2021).[4]

Kljub temu se je izraz globalni korporativni najemodajalci začel uporabljati tudi za druge pravne osebe, ki ne izkoriščajo zgolj nihanj v cenah nepremičnin, temveč se ukvarjajo z oddajanjem lastnih nepremičnin v najem kot dolgoročnejšo naložbeno strategijo (Nethercote 2020, 856). Tak primer je Vonovia, ki je aktivna predvsem na nemškem najemniškem trgu (Wijburg in Aalbers 2017, 980). Prihod korporativnih najemodajalcev v Nemčijo ni bil povezan z ukrepi za reševanje finančne krize 2008 ali porastom hipotekarnih kreditov pred krizo, ampak je bil predvsem posledica odprodaje socialnih stanovanj in javnih stanovanjskih družb zasebnim kapitalskim družbam med letoma 1999 in 2009, ki ji je sledil prihod večjih nepremičninskih družb, ki kotirajo na borzi, na nemški nepremičninski trg (Wijburg in Aalbers 2017, 970). Privatizirana socialna stanovanja so v obdobju pred finančno krizo kupovale predvsem družbe, ki so nepremičnine kupovale po nizkih cenah, znižale stroške njihovega upravljanja in jih prodale ob rasti cen nepremičnin, torej špekulativne pravne osebe (Wijburg in Aalbers 2017, 978). Ker so bili privatizirani večji sklopi stanovanj hkrati, se pravi v paketu, so jih lažje kupili večji vlagatelji, ki so imeli več možnosti za financiranje tako obsežnih naložb (Fields in Uffer 2016, 1493). Po finančni krizi, ko so se njene posledice že zmanjševale, pa so špekulativne družbe začele prodajati svoje nepremičninske portfelje, tako neposredno kot s preoblikovanjem svojih nemških podružnic v nepremičninske družbe, ki kotirajo na borzi. Na ta način je nastala tudi Vonovia, ki ima drugačno poslovno strategijo kot špekulativne družbe: na trgu namerava ostati dlje časa s ciljem ustvarjanja dolgoročne vrednosti za delničarje (Wijburg et al. 2018; Wijburg in Aalbers 2017, 980; Fields in Uffer 2016, 1496).

Korporativni najemodajalci – kljub različnim poslovnim strategijam za doseganje finančnih koristi za svoje delničarje oziroma družbenike – na položaj najemnikov vplivajo na podobne načine.[5] Glavni vzvod za pridobivanje profita je namreč večanje prihodkov iz najemnin oziroma spreminjanje socialne strukture najemnikov (Janoschka et al. 2020, 134; Wijburg et al. 2018, 1107). Korporativni najemodajalci, ki so aktivni v tujini, se pri tem poslužujejo različnih praks, ki so prilagojene lokalnemu okolju, v katerem delujejo. Najpogostejši so enostranski dvigi najemnin, kar je pogosto tudi taktika najemodajalcev – fizičnih oseb. Medtem ko fizične osebe cene najema načeloma lahko zvišujejo zaradi pomanjkanja stanovanj, večji korporativni najemodajalci zaradi števila nepremičnin v njihovi lasti in obsega njihovega kapitala najemnine lahko zvišujejo tudi prek drugih

[4] V Grčiji po krizi ni prišlo do ustanovitvi slabe banke, ampak so nacionalne banke prevzeli »hedge skladi«, ki so na ta način postali imetniki slabih terjatev (Alexandri in Janoschka 2018).

[5] Oziroma, kot se je izrazil Wijburg (2018, 1103), so strategije nepremičninskih družb, ki kotirajo na borzi, le nadaljevanje »primitivnejših« strategij špekulativnih skladov zasebnega kapitala. Pri tem dodaja, da so nekatere taktike za doseganje profita tudi povsem enake in med njimi ni mogoče postaviti jasne ločnice.

mehanizmov, na primer vlaganja v modernizacijo stanovanj, skupnih prostorov in stavb (Polanska in Richard 2021; Risager 2021, 290; Christophers 2022, 708) ali spreminjanja urbanistične podobe celotnih sosesk ob državni oziroma lokalni finančni podpori (Wijburg et al. 2018, 1111). Pomemben pa je tudi lobistični vpliv korporativnih najemodajalcev na državne stanovanjske politike (Lochlainn 2023, 7–9).

Po drugi strani ravno velikost korporativnih najemodajalcev predstavlja pomembno točko za organizacijo najemnikov. Kot sta se izrazila raziskovalca nemških korporativnih najemodajalcev: »Vonovia je za reprodukcijski sektor to, kar je avtomobilska industrija za produkcijski sektor« (Reichle in Bescherer 2021, 25). Tovrstne akcije so se na primer že zgodile v Nemčiji, kjer so najemniška gibanja s povezovanjem in organiziranjem najemnikov stanovanj v lasti Deutsche Wohnen na različnih lokacijah v Berlinu od najemodajalca zahtevala in v nekaterih primerih tudi dosegla zmanjšanje stroškov modernizacije stanovanj za najemnike (Vollmer in Gutiérrez 2022, 55). Najemniško organiziranje pa je skupaj z drugimi dejavniki, ki sta jih popisala Vollmer in Gutiérrez (2022), nazadnje sprovedlo tudi referendum, na katerem je leta 2021 59 % Berlinčanov glasovalo za razlastitev velikih najemodajalcev.[6]

Za slovenski stanovanjski trg, na katerem prevladujejo lastniška stanovanja in transakcije med fizičnimi osebami, so bile gospodarske družbe, ki se ukvarjajo z naložbami v stanovanjske nepremičnine z namenom, da jih oddajajo v profitni najem, do nedavnega dokaj nepoznan pojav (Ploštajner 2023, 152). V Sloveniji stanovanjska privatizacija za razliko od Nemčije ni pomenila odprodaje večjih sklopov stanovanj, ki bi jih bilo mogoče kupiti hkrati, ampak je Stanovanjski zakon (Ur. l. RS, št. 18/1991), s katerim se je leta 1991 privatiziralo stanovanja v družbeni lastnini, nakup stanovanja omogočil predvsem imetnikom stanovanjske pravice, torej posameznim fizičnim osebam.[7] Do vstopa večjih globalnih korporativnih najemodajalcev na slovenski nepremičninski trg pa ni prišlo niti po finančni krizi 2008. V članku bom izraz korporativni najemodajalci zato uporabljala široko, za vse pravne osebe zasebnega prava, ki se ukvarjajo z oddajanjem stanovanjskih nepremičnin v tržni najem, s čimer označujem samo oddajanje stanovanj na podlagi Stanovanjskega zakona[8] (se pravi tržna najemna stanovanja), ne pa oddajanja stanovanj v okviru nastanitvene dejavnosti oziroma turističnega najema. Analiza korporativnih najemodajalcev v Sloveniji namreč še ne obstaja, zato bom s poizvedbeno raziskavo šele ugotavljala, ali se v določenem vzorcu sploh pojavljajo korporativni najemodajalci in kakšne so njihove

[6] Ker se številna najemniška gibanja organizirajo nasproti korporativnim najemodajalcem, je raziskovanje korporativnih najemodajalcev prek analize najemniških bojev razširjen pristop k tej temi. Skozi (delno) etnografske študije najemniškega organiziranja so se s korporativnimi najemodajalci npr. ukvarjali tudi Polanska in Richard (2021), Risager (2021), Martínez in Gil (2022), González Guzmán (2023).

[7] Za podrobnejši opis stanovanjske privatizacije v Sloveniji glej Mandič (1994).

[8] Stanovanjski zakon (SZ-1), Ur. l. RS, št. 69/03, 18/04 – ZVKSES, 47/06 – ZEN, 45/08 – ZVEtL, 57/08, 62/10 – ZUPJS, 56/11 – odl. US, 87/11, 40/12 – ZUJF, 14/17 – odl. US, 27/17, 59/19, 189/20 – ZFRO, 90/21, 18/23 – ZDU-1O in 77/23 – odl. US.

značilnosti. Osredotočila se bom na večje novogradnje v Ljubljani. Kot kažejo opisani primeri iz tujine, korporativni najemodajalci na nepremičninske trge vstopajo, ko nastane priložnost nakupa več stanovanjskih enot hkrati, kar, sicer v manjši meri, omogočajo tudi novogradnje.

METODOLOŠKI OKVIR

Analiza števila stanovanj, ki jih oddajajo pravne osebe v Ljubljani, zaenkrat ne obstaja. Že podatki o prihodkih, ki jih pravne osebe dobijo prek oddajanja nepremičnin v stanovanjski najem, so precej težko dostopni. Finančna uprava Republike Slovenije (FURS) beleži le višino skupnega dohodka, ki ga družba ustvari prek opravljanja svoje dejavnosti. Iz tega bi bilo sicer mogoče razbrati podatek o višini prihodkov, ki jih ustvarijo gospodarske družbe, ki imajo kot glavno dejavnost zabeleženo oddajanje nepremičnin. A to ničesar ne pove niti o vrsti najema, torej ali se oddajajo poslovni prostori ali stanovanja, niti kolikšen dohodek je družba pridobila na podlagi morebitnega opravljanja drugih dejavnosti, ki niso povezane z oddajanjem nepremičnin. Prav tako bi bile pri takšnem pristopu izpuščene družbe, ki se sicer ukvarjajo tudi z oddajanjem nepremičnin, a to ni njihova glavna dejavnost. Kot bomo videli v nadaljevanju, so takšni primeri zelo pogosti.

Pravnim osebam za razliko od fizičnih oseb najemnih pogodb ni treba prijavljati na FURS. O najemnih poslih morajo korporativni najemodajalci sicer obveščati Geodetsko upravo Republike Slovenije (GURS), ki vodi evidenco trga nepremičnin, a se gospodarske družbe javni objavi podatkov iz najemne pogodbe lahko izognejo s tem, da jih s sklepom družbe opredelijo kot poslovno skrivnost. Nekoliko dostopnejši so podatki GURS o tem, koliko stanovanjskih nepremičnin v Ljubljani je v lasti pravnih oseb. S seznama, ki vključuje vse pravne osebe s stanovanjskimi nepremičninami na območju Mestne občine Ljubljana (MOL), ki ga je posredoval GURS, izhaja, da ima 2.360 različnih pravnih oseb javnega in zasebnega prava v lasti 15.226 stanovanj. Pri tem ima le 112 pravnih oseb v lasti več kot 10 stanovanj. Te imajo skupaj v lasti 11.215 stanovanj. To številko je treba precej relativizirati, saj je 4.469 stanovanj na primer v lasti Javnega stanovanjskega sklada MOL, na vrhu seznama pa so tudi investitorji v novogradnje, ki zgrajenih stanovanj še niso prodali. Dodaten problem za natančno predstavo o tem, koliko stanovanj je dejansko v lasti gospodarskih družb, pa je tudi dejstvo, da je solastniški delež na stanovanju zabeležen enako kot lastniški.

V spodnji tabeli so prikazane pravne osebe, ki imajo na območju MOL v lasti največ stanovanjskih nepremičnin. V tem članku se bom ukvarjala le z gospodarskimi družbami v zasebni, ne pa v državni ali občinski lasti. S seznama sem izpustila tudi investitorje v stanovanjske novogradnje, ki imajo stanovanja v lasti, ker jih še niso prodali oziroma prodaja vsaj še ni formalizirana v zemljiški knjigi. Tak primer je recimo družba Kvartet rezidence, d.o.o., ki ima trenutno v lasti 226 stanovanj. Prav tako sem izpustila 11 družb, ki imajo zaradi neurejene etažne lastnine 32 stanovanj v solastnini skupaj še z več fizičnimi osebami, kar

je bilo mogoče ugotoviti na podlagi tega, da so registrirane na istem naslovu in imajo v lasti enako število stanovanj. To ne pomeni, da tudi katera izmed družb, ki je ostala na seznamu, nima kakšnega izmed stanovanj v solastnini, vseeno pa je seznam uporaben za predstavo o tem, kam se po številu stanovanj umeščajo družbe, ki jih bom obravnavala v nadaljevanju članka.

Tabela 1: ŠTEVILO STANOVANJSKIH NEPREMIČNIN V LASTI ZASEBNIH PRAVNIH OSEB V MOL NA DAN 9. 11. 2023

Naziv pravne osebe	**Št. stanovanjskih nepremičnin v MOL**
GAST GOSTINSTVO, podjetje za trgovino, turizem in gostinstvo, d.o.o.	76
MONETIC, poslovne storitve, d.o.o.	57
GIPOSS, Gradbena podjetja Ljubljana, d.o.o.	52
AKC, podjetje za organizacijo, poslovno svetovanje in finančne storitve, d.o.o.	51
PANDOM, podjetje za trgovino, storitve in proizvodnjo in upravljanje z nepremičninami, d.o.o., Ljubljana	46
ATRIJ CELJE, upravljanje in promet z nepremičninami, d.o.o. – v stečaju	40
UD LIPA, nepremičnine, d.o.o.	37
IMOS, projektiranje, inženiring, tehnično svetovanje in gradnje, d.d., Ljubljana – v stečaju	33
PAMAG, družba za poslovanje z nepremičninami, d.o.o.	30
WEGRAZ-PRO, gradnja nepremičnin, d.o.o.	27
GB PROJEKT, družba za upravljanje z naložbami, d.o.o.	27
E-SOLVENTA LJUBLJANA, finance, svetovanje in posredovanje, d.o.o.	23
CLS TRANSPORTI, prevozi in ostale storitve, d.o.o.	19
GRADBENO PODJETJE GROSUPLJE, d.d. – v stečaju	19
CENTER INVESTICIJE, poslovno svetovanje in inženiring, d.o.o.	19
T. KNEZ, komercialni posli, zastopanje tujih firm in organizacijske, finančne, administrativne in tehnične stanovanjske storitve ..., k.d. Ljubljana	19
ELTIM, d.o.o., vzdrževanje in montaža elektro inštalacij	18
FILIRA, poslovne storitve, d.o.o.	18
GRADNJA NEPREMIČNIN, storitve in projektiranje, d.o.o.	17
REPLIKA INVEST, znanje za investicije, d.o.o.	16

Vir: GURS, 9. 11. 2023.

Dvajset zasebnih družb, ki so na vrhu lestvice, ima v Ljubljani v lasti skupaj 644 stanovanj. Na prvem mestu je družba Gast Gostinstvo, ki se ukvarja z dejavnostjo hotelov in podobnimi nastanitvenimi obrati. Gast Gostinstvo ima v Ljubljani 76 stanovanjskih nepremičnin. Kljub takšni koncentraciji stanovanj

družba ni dejavna na ljubljanskem najemniškem trgu. Vse nepremičnine, ki jih ima Gast Gostinstvo, oddaja izključno v kratkoročni, torej turistični najem (Todorović, odgovor na novinarsko vprašanje, 19. 4. 2022). Tri družbe na lestvici imajo kot glavno dejavnost registrirano prav oddajanje nepremičnin v najem. Gre za družbo UD Lipa, ki ima v Ljubljani 37 stanovanj, družbo Pamag, ki ima v Ljubljani 30 stanovanj, pri čemer ima vsaj nekatera izmed stanovanj v solastnini oziroma so še predmet postopka za vzpostavitev etažne lastnine, in družbo T. Knez, ki ima v Ljubljani 19 stanovanj. Iz registra nastanitvenih obratov, ki ga vodi AJPES, izhaja, da družba T. Knez upravlja z apartmaji »OH Apartments & Rooms« na Celovški cesti, kjer ima v lasti deset stanovanj. Vsaj ta torej oddaja v turistični najem.

Zgolj podatki o lastništvu in glavni dejavnosti družb nam torej sami po sebi ne povedo ničesar o uporabi stanovanj. Poleg tega ima lahko isti lastnik v lasti več stanovanjskih nepremičnin prek več povezanih družb, kar prav tako ni razvidno zgolj z lestvice družb z največ stanovanji. Da bi prišla do vzorca prisotnosti zasebnih pravnih oseb na ljubljanskem najemniškem trgu, bom v nadaljevanju naredila pregled kupcev stanovanj v nekaterih večjih novogradnjah v Ljubljani, zgrajenih po letu 2020. Predmet analize bodo stavbe z več kot 50 stanovanjskimi enotami, katerih lastniško stanje je že evidentirano v zemljiški knjigi. Teh je sedem in imajo med 124 in 61 stanovanj. O kupcih nedokončanih stanovanjskih nepremičnin, ki se gradijo v Ljubljani, zaradi nedostopnosti podatkov še ne moremo povedati prav veliko, nekaj informacij v zvezi s tem pa so posredovale nepremičninske agencije, ki se ukvarjajo z njihovo prodajo. Podatke o novogradnjah in kupcih stanovanj sem pridobivala s prostorskega portala GURS, iz zemljiške knjige, registra AJPES in s portala Erar. Vsi podatki v članku iz naštetih zbirk so z dne 16. 10. 2023. Nekateri podatki, ki jih uporabljam v tem članku, so bili pridobljeni z novinarskimi vprašanji in so med viri označeni kot odgovori na novinarska vprašanja.[9]

KUPCI STANOVANJ V NOVOGRADNJAH

Zelena Šmartinka

Med ljubljanskimi stanovanjskimi nepremičninskimi projekti, ki jih bom obravnavala, ima največje število stanovanj kompleks Zelena Šmartinka. Nahaja se nasproti Finančne uprave na Šmartinski cesti. Investitor projekta je litijsko gradbeno in proizvodno podjetje Trgograd, d.o.o., lastnik družbe pa je Andrej Poglajen, ki je bil v letu 2020 uvrščen na listo stotih najbogatejših Slovencev (Revija Manager 2020). Trgograd je bil sicer ustanovljen leta 1992 in je zrasel skupaj z lokalnimi gradnjami v Občini Litija. Po podatkih Erarja je Občina Litija družbi od leta 2003 za različne gradbene posle nakazala dobrih 49 milijonov evrov; v to

[9] Zanesljivost teh podatkov je omejena, saj odgovorov zaradi nedostopnosti podatkov o uporabi stanovanj, kot je pojasnjeno zgoraj, ni bilo mogoče preveriti.

niso vštete gradnje, ki jih je Trgograd izvedel kot podizvajalec. Trgograd je svojo lokalnost presegel predvsem z nakupom premoženja iz stečajne mase gradbenega podjetja SCT, s katerim je pred tem sodeloval kot njegov podizvajalec (Modic 2014). Leta 2019 je Trgograd ustanovil odvisno družbo TI, d.o.o., ki se ukvarja z nepremičninskimi projekti in ima trenutno v teku še en stanovanjski projekt v Ljubljani, tako imenovani Bežigrajski trojček, ki bo obsegal 90 stanovanj.

Nepremičnina Zelena Šmartinka, ki je prvi stanovanjski projekt Trgograda v Ljubljani, je bila dokončana v letu 2021 in obsega 124 stanovanjskih enot. Od tega jih je trenutno 27 v lasti pravnih oseb. Trgograd ima preko podjetja TI, d.o.o., v lasti še dve stanovanji v kompleksu Zelena Šmartinka, glede katerih ni bil začet še noben zemljiškoknjižni postopek.

Poleg investitorja ima stanovanja v Zeleni Šmartinki trenutno v lasti še šest različnih pravnih oseb. Največ, kar 19 stanovanj, je kupilo podjetje Center investicije, d.o.o., ki ima v poslovnem registru kot svojo primarno dejavnost navedeno »dajanje drugih strojev, naprav in opredmetenih sredstev v najem in zakup«. Podjetje se torej primarno ne ukvarja z nepremičninami. Glede na podatke iz registra nepremičnin GURS so kupljena stanovanja edine stanovanjske nepremičnine v Ljubljani, ki jih ima v družba v lasti. Kljub temu so v podjetju na vodilnih položajih osebe, ki so se včasih ukvarjale z nepremičninami. Eden izmed direktorjev družbe je Rok Mirkovič, bivši direktor nekdanjih Epic nepremičnin, ki so se ukvarjale predvsem s hotelskimi in poslovnimi objekti. Simon Merkač, družbenik in drugi direktor podjetja, mi je na vprašanje, zakaj je družba Center investicije kupila omenjene nepremičnine v Zeleni Šmartniki, odgovoril, da vseh 19 stanovanj oddajajo v najem (Merkač, odgovor na novinarsko vprašanje, 3. 3. 2022).

Vsaka po eno stanovanje sta v Zeleni Šmartinki kupili družbi, ki imata kot glavno dejavnost v poslovnem registru navedeno oddajanje nepremičnin. Eno je kupila družba Relon, d.o.o., katere lastnik je Matjaž Cerjak, ki je tudi zastopnik podjetja Lesnep, investitorja v stanovanjski projekt Regentov Kvart. Gre za projekt izgradnje treh stolpnic v Dravljah, ki naj bi bile dokončane leta 2026 in bodo obsegale 356 stanovanj. Drugo stanovanje je kupila družba J & E Invest, d.o.o., ki je bila za oddajanje nepremičnin ustanovljena leta 2021. Njen edini lastnik in zastopnik je zasebni zobozdravnik, ki ima v isti stavbi tudi ordinacijo.

Dve stanovanji v Zeleni Šmartinki je kupila družba za razvoj nepremičninskih projektov Unihome, d.o.o.; družba je eno stanovanje pozneje prodala fizični osebi. Družba Unihome se je v začetku leta 2023 pripojila k družbi Exiit Group, d.o.o., na katero je bilo preneseno tudi stanovanje v Zeleni Šmartinki. Lastnica prevzemne družbe Exiit Group je Alenka Urnaut, ki je bila tudi družbenica povezane družbe Unihome Real. Alenka Urnaut je bila sicer med letoma 2020 in 2022 članica upravnega odbora DUTB, trenutno pa je članica nadzornega sveta v družbi Petrol. Družba Unihome oziroma Exiit Group med drugim sodeluje pri treh stanovanjskih projektih, v začetku svojega delovanja pa je skupaj še z nekaterimi zasebnimi investitorji gradila tudi stavbi, imenovani »Vila bloka Homški park«, v Slovenj Gradcu, ki sta bili dokončani konec leta 2020. Vili je v celoti odkupil

Slovenski stanovanjski sklad. Unihome oziroma Exiit Group se poleg gradnje ukvarja tudi z odkupom nepremičninskih projektov, zemljišč in objektov.

Dve stanovanji v Zeleni Šmartinki je kupila tudi družba Farmedica, d.o.o., ki se ukvarja s prodajo farmacevtskih izdelkov rastlinskega izvora. Farmedica ima sicer tudi dve stanovanji na drugih lokacijah v Ljubljani, ki ju je kupila med letoma 2016 in 2019. Še tri stanovanja v Ljubljani pa ima Farmedica v lasti prek svoje povezane družbe Verum, d.o.o. Ta je prav tako kupila po letu 2016. Če seštejemo, je ta zdravilniška družba od leta 2016 v Ljubljani kupila sedem stanovanj.

Poleg Farmedice in družbe Center investicije so stanovanja v Zeleni Šmartinki kupile tudi tri druge pravne osebe, katerih glavne dejavnosti niso povezane s stanovanjskim področjem. Eno stanovanje v kompleksu Zelena Šmartinka je kupila družba Trinet, d.o.o., ki se sicer primarno ukvarja z računalniškim programiranjem. Iz podatkov GURS je razvidno, da ima družba Trinet poleg stanovanja v Zeleni Šmartinki v Ljubljani še dve stanovanji. Po eno stanovanje sta kupili še dve različni družbi, ki se ukvarjata s proizvodnjo kovinskih izdelkov in z zavarovalniškim posredništvom, obe pa sta stanovanji pozneje prodali fizičnim osebam.

V evidenci trga nepremičnin, ki jo vodi GURS, sicer ni zabeleženo, da bi se stanovanja, ki so v lasti pravnih oseb, oddajala v najem. Kot rečeno, se pravne osebe objavi teh podatkov lahko tudi izognejo, tako da jih označijo kot poslovno skrivnost. Iz evidence pa je razvidno, da se v letu 2023 v Zeleni Šmartinki oddaja pet drugih stanovanj, ki so v lasti fizičnih oseb.

Stolpnica Peca

Naslednji večji nedavni stanovanjski projekt je Stolpnica Peca, ki stoji zraven študentskega doma v Litostroju. Dokončana je bila leta 2020. Investitor v projekt je družba Lanel Invest, d.o.o. Njen stoodstotni družbenik je Jože Drofenik, ki ima v lasti več nepremičnin po različnih delih Ljubljane. Drofenik je lastnik še treh povezanih družb, ki se prav tako ukvarjajo z nepremičninami, in sicer Lanel, d.o.o. ter Sloving, d.o.o., ki ju ima v lasti prek ciprske družbe Aserada Investments Limited, in Melje d.o.o., ki je bila za dejavnost trgovanja z lastnimi nepremičninami registrirana leta 2023.

Stolpnica Peca ima 100 stanovanjskih enot, od tega jih je 12 v lasti zasebnih pravnih oseb. Osem stanovanj je obdržal investitor, torej Lanel Invest. Kot so mi sporočili iz Lanel Investa, nameravajo stanovanja, ki so jih obdržali, oddajati v najem (Ivanc, odgovor na novinarsko vprašanje, 28. 2. 2022). Dve stanovanji v Stolpnici Peca je kupila družba za poslovno svetovanje Torion, d.o.o., ki je v lasti Tomaža Kmecla, sicer direktorja Kolektorja Etra. Kmecl mi je na vprašanje, s kakšnim namenom je Torion kupil stanovanji, odgovoril: »[S]tanovanji sta bili kupljeni za dolgoročno oddajanje in sta tudi oddani. Mladim slovenskim parom.« (Kmecl, odgovor na novinarsko vprašanje, 15. 4. 2022). Vsaka po eno stanovanje sta kupili še dve različni družbi, ki se ukvarjata z dobavljanjem zdravil in montažo industrijskih strojev in naprav.

V Stolpnici Peca je eno stanovanje kupila tudi ciprska družba Ninaz Limited. Ta je v lasti Roka in Nine Zorko, ki sta se leta 2022 uvrstila na štiriintrideseto mesto na lestvici najbogatejših Slovencev (Revija Manager 2022). Stanovanje je družba pozneje prodala fizični osebi. Poleg tega sta vsaka po eno stanovanje v stolpnici kupili še dve družbi, ki se primarno ukvarjata s poslovnim svetovanjem in gradnjo objektov infrastrukture za elektriko in telekomunikacije, stanovanji pa sta pozneje prav tako prodali fizičnim osebam.

Jurčkova 96

Na Rudniku je leta 2021 družba Jurčkova, d.o.o., dokončala gradnjo osmih stanovanjskih stavb, ki obsegajo vsaka po 12 stanovanjskih enot. Družba je povezana s podjetjem Prva hiša, d.o.o., katere največji stanovanjski projekt so Tacenski vrtovi s 316 stanovanji. Kompleks Jurčkova vključuje 96 stanovanj, od teh jih je trenutno sedem v lasti pravnih oseb. Dve stanovanji sta še vedno v lasti investitorja. Dve stanovanji je kupila družba BG Consulting, d.o.o., ki se ukvarja s poslovnim svetovanjem, vsaka po eno stanovanje pa so kupile še pravne osebe, ki se ukvarjajo z alternativnimi oblikami zdravljenja, dezinfekcijo, dezinsekcijo in deratizacijo ter s poslovnim svetovanjem. Slednja je sicer lastniško povezana z družbo, ki se ukvarja s trgovanjem z nepremičninami, njen lastnik pa je Branko Drobnak, nekdanji multimilijonar (Cimermančič 2016).

Šumijev kvart

Leta 2021 je bil v centru Ljubljane dokončan projekt Šumijev kvart, ki je bil v medijih predstavljen kot priložnost za »[…] vrhunsko izkušnjo modernega meščanskega bivanja […], ki bo zadovoljila tudi najzahtevnejše kupce« (Finance PR 2020). Cene za to izkušnjo so se gibale med 380.000 in 1,2 milijona evrov (Krivec in Božin 2020). Investitor v projekt je družba Šumijev kvart, d.o.o. Ta je del skupine KD Group, d. d., ki je zrasla skupaj z nabiranjem lastniških certifikatov med privatizacijo (Ekstravisor 2021). Kompleks Šumijev Kvart obsega 95 stanovanj in hotel s 151 sobami. 21 stanovanj je trenutno v lasti pravnih oseb, od tega ima investitor v lasti še šest stanovanj, glede katerih še ni začet noben zemljiškoknjižni postopek.

V Šumijevem kvartu so vsaka po eno stanovanje kupile tri različne družbe, ki imajo kot glavno dejavnost navedeno oddajanje nepremičnin. Prva je Ikebana Brinc, d.o.o., nekdanje cvetličarsko podjetje. Družba je prek verige podjetij del lastniške strukture še dveh drugih družb, katerih glavna dejavnost je prav tako oddajanje nepremičnin, lastniško pa je povezana tudi z Belokranjskim gradbenim podjetjem (BGP). Glede na podatke GURS ima v Ljubljani še dve stanovanji. Druga je Rusimpex, inženiring in trgovina, d.o.o., tretja pa družba NEA, upravljanje z nepremičninami, d. o. o., ki je bila ustanovljena leta 2020. Lastnika družbe NEA sta kapital za investiranje v nepremičnine dobila iz dejavnosti montaže in prodaje klimatsko-prezračevalnih sistemov in toplotnih črpalk. Poleg njih je eno stanovanje kupila tudi družba Bitermo nepremičnine, d.o.o., ki je sicer registrirana za dejavnost gradnje stanovanjskih in nestanovanjskih stavb, a

je lastniško povezana tudi z leta 2019 ustanovljeno družbo Bitermo alfa, d.o.o., katere glavna dejavnost je oddajanje nepremičnin.

Poleg njih sta vsaka po eno stanovanje kupili še dve družbi, ki se prav tako ukvarjata z nepremičninami. Družba Stan nepremičnine, d.o.o., je nepremičninska agencija, stanovanje v Šumijevem kvartu pa je kupila skupaj z edino družbenico agencije, Stanko Solar, ki ima enočetrtinski solastniški delež na stanovanju. Družba Ahasver, d.o.o., pa je registrirana za dejavnost trgovanja z lastnimi nepremičninami. Lastnik slednje je eden izmed direktorjev družbe Europapier Alpe, d.o.o., ki se ukvarja s prodajo pisarniškega papirja.

Tri različne družbe so v Šumijevem kvartu kupile po dve stanovanji, kar je tudi največje število stanovanj, ki jih je v tem kompleksu hkrati kupila posamezna pravna oseba. Dve izmed njih, Percon, d.o.o., in Sekavčnik in družbenik, d.n.o., se ukvarjata s poslovnim svetovanjem. Eden izmed družbenikov slednje je Aleksander Sekavčnik, predsednik upravnega odbora KD Group, torej investitorja v novogradnjo. Družba Karantanija Cinemas, d.o.o., pa se ukvarja s filmsko distribucijo. Poleg njih so po eno stanovanje kupile še družbe, ki se ukvarjajo z nespecializirano trgovino na debelo, poslovnim svetovanjem in zasebnim zobozdravstvom.

Rezidenca Masarykova

Nasproti glavne železniške postaje v Ljubljani je bila v letu 2022 zgrajena stavba, poimenovana Rezidenca Masarykova. Investitor je družba M. Rezidenca, d.o.o., ki je v večinski lasti družb Iskra Impuls, d.o.o., in Kolektor Koling, d.o.o., vsaka po en odstotek pa imata v družbi še podjetji TDM fond, d.o.o., in nepremičninska agencija Stoja. Novogradnja obsega 81 stanovanj, 19 jih je trenutno v lasti pravnih oseb. Štiri stanovanja zaenkrat ostajajo v lasti investitorja, 15 stanovanj pa je kupilo enajst različnih pravnih oseb.

Največ, vsaka po tri stanovanja, sta kupili družbi Aleja skupina, d.o.o., in Bema Trade, d.o.o. Obe imata kot glavno dejavnost prijavljeno oddajanje nepremičnin. Lastnik družbe Aleja skupina je trenutno družbenik v Privatni kreditni agenciji PKA, d.o.o., pred tem pa je imel delež tudi v podjetju Aleja finance, d.o.o., ki ga je leta 2021 prevzela NKBM (Finance 2021). Aleja skupina je eno izmed kupljenih stanovanj pozneje sicer prodala fizični osebi. Družba Bema Trade pa je lastniško povezana z družbo Bema its, d.o.o., ki ima v lasti poslovalnice Svet metraže. Glede na podatke GURS ima poleg stanovanj, ki jih je kupila na Masarykovi, v lasti še dve stanovanji.

Dve stanovanji v Rezidenci Masarykova je kupila družba Gromet, d.o.o., ki se ukvarja z inženirskimi dejavnostmi in tehničnim svetovanjem. Eno stanovanje je kupila družba Torion, d.o.o., ki je kupila in v najem oddaja tudi dve stanovanji v Stolpnici Peca. Poleg omenjenih nepremičnin ima glede na podatke GURS v Ljubljani še eno stanovanje. Eno stanovanje je kupila tudi družba za nepremičninsko posredovanje Akamai, d.o.o., katere lastnica je nepremičninska agentka pri agenciji Stoja. Ta je sicer posredovala pri prodaji stanovanj v Rezidenci

Masarykova. Družba Akamai ima v Ljubljani v lasti še eno stanovanje, in sicer v novogradnji Devana Park I, pri kateri je kot ekskluzivni prodajalec prav tako posredovala agencija Stoja. Vsaka po eno stanovanje je kupilo še šest različnih družb, ki se ukvarjajo z gradnjo stanovanjskih in nestanovanjskih stavb, proizvodnjo pohištva, računovodstvom, poslovnim svetovanjem in snemanjem ter izdajanjem glasbe.

Soseska Rakovnik

Ob Dolenjski cesti na območju Rakovnika je družba Unifin v letu 2020 dokončala izgradnjo štirih stanovanjskih blokov z 62 stanovanji. Družba je v lasti podjetja Finance realiteta, katerega družbenika sta Boštjan Vidmar in Kazimir Mavko. V novogradnji je še eno stanovanje v lasti investitorja, eno stanovanje pa v lasti družbe TTN Tovarna transportnih naprav. Še eno stanovanje je kupila družba, ki se ukvarja z gradnjo in montažo ograj, a je stanovanje pozneje prodala fizični osebi.

Vila Šmartinka

Ob Šmartinski cesti je bila leta 2020 zgrajena tudi tako imenovana Vila Šmartinka, nepremičninski projekt ptujskega gradbenega podjetja Drava GP. Družba je v lokalnem okolju med drugim zgradila prvo ptujsko poslovalnico McDonalds – franšizo, ki je tudi prepoznavni element Vile Šmartinka. Lastnik podjetja Drava GP je Sašo Kovačec, poleg njega pa je direktorica družbe še Patricija Kovačec, njegova žena (Cirman et al. 2022).

Vila Šmartinka obsega 61 stanovanjskih enot, 19 jih je v lasti zasebnih pravnih oseb. Dve različni pravni osebi imata trenutno v lasti vsaka po sedem stanovanj. Prva je družba za upravljanje nepremičnin Kanaka. Kanaka je v novogradnji sicer kupila še eno stanovanje, ki pa ga je v začetku leta 2023 prodala fizični osebi. Poleg sedmih stanovanj ima Kanaka v Vili Šmartinka v lasti tudi prostore, v katerih obratuje McDonalds. Lastnik podjetja Kanaka je avstrijski holding Golddraht Beteiligungs GmbH, ki ima v lasti tudi podjetje Alpe-Panon. Slednje upravlja z mrežo poslovalnic McDonalds po Sloveniji. Ena izmed poslovnih enot Alpe-Panona je med drugim tudi omenjeni McDonalds v Vili Šmartinka. To ni edini skupni projekt avstrijske družbe Golddraht Beteiligungs z Dravo GP. Alpe-Panon je recimo tudi lastnik in investitor v nepremičnini, v katerih sta locirana celjski in ptujski McDonalds, ki ju je prav tako zgradila družba Drava GP.

Dejansko je torej lastnik poslovalnice McDonalds in sedmih stanovanj v Vili Šmartinka ista oseba. Iz podatkov evidence trga nepremičnin, ki jo vodi GURS, je razvidno, da v letu 2023 Kanaka v najem oddaja vsaj eno stanovanje, ki je veliko 26,8 kvadratnih metrov, v letih 2021 in 2022 pa je v najem oddajala tudi pet drugih stanovanj. Najemnina za stanovanje, ki ga družba trenutno oddaja, glede na prijavljeno najemno pogodbo znaša 550 evrov na mesec brez stroškov, pogodba pa je sklenjena za 13 mesecev. Leta 2021 je prijavljena najemnina za isto stanovanje znašala 500 evrov.

Družba za upravljanje z nepremičninami Kanaka v Ljubljani nima nobene druge stanovanjske nepremičnine, ima pa nekaj stanovanjskih in drugih nepremičnin v drugih delih Slovenije. Družba je bila ustanovljena leta 2019, kar bi lahko nakazovalo na to, da bo kot hčerinsko podjetje Golddraht Beteiligungs, namenjeno nepremičninam, na ljubljanskem najemniškem trgu aktivno še v prihodnosti.

Prav tako je sedem stanovanj kupil nizozemski holding Leco Corporation B. V., glede na podatke iz evidence trga nepremičnin pa vsa oddaja v najem. V prijavljeni najemni pogodbi višina najemnine za štiri stanovanja, velika od 26,6 do 26,9 kvadratnih metrov, znaša 600 evrov na mesec brez stroškov. Prijavljena najemnina za eno stanovanje, ki prav tako meri 26,8 kvadratnih metrov, znaša 550 evrov. Za stanovanje, ki meri 27 kvadratnih metrov, pa je v pogodbi določena najemnina v višini kar 750 evrov mesečno. To stanovanje je tudi oddano za najdaljše obdobje, in sicer za 37 mesecev. Leco Corporation ima v lasti še eno stanovanje v izmeri 61,5 kvadratnih metrov, prijavljena najemnina za to stanovanje pa prav tako znaša 750 evrov mesečno brez vključenih stroškov. Vsa stanovanja imajo poleg bivalnega prostora tudi balkon, garažni parkirni prostor in klet.

V Vili Šmartinka sta več stanovanj kupili še dve nepremičninski družbi. Prva je ptujska družba za oddajanje nepremičnin Vigapa, ki ima v lasti tri stanovanja, druga pa ljubljanska družba za nepremičninsko dejavnost Vaga NEP, ki ima poslovno enoto tudi v Hajdošah pri Ptuju in ima v lasti dve stanovanji. Družba Vaga NEP je poleg omenjenih stanovanj v Vili Šmartinka sicer kupila še eno, ki pa ga je pozneje prodala fizični osebi. Poleg njiju je dve stanovanji kupila še računovodska družba eINFO, ki je prav tako registrirana v Hajdošah, eno pa ptujska družba Aventura nepremičnine, a sta stanovanja pozneje prav tako prodali fizičnim osebam.

Bežigrajska 5ka

Nekaj informacij sem pridobila tudi glede prihajajoče novogradnje v bližini soseske Ruski car. V napovedani Bežigrajski petki, ki nastaja v okviru družbe Sindrom investicije in bo obsegala 92 stanovanj, naj bi investitor v celoti obdržal eno izmed petih stavb. Iz agencije Century 21, ki posreduje pri prodaji, so pojasnili, da bodo ta stanovanja namenjena oddajanju v najem (Škrbec Laimiš, odgovor na novinarsko vprašanje, 1. 3. 2022). Družba Sindrom je sicer v večinski lasti Andreja Ramovža, lastnika lokala Horse's Pub, ki se nahaja zraven načrtovane novogradnje, leta 2022 pa je v projekt kot soinvestitor vstopil tudi Zoran Dragić (Robežnik 2022a).

UGOTOVITVE

V omenjenih novogradnjah je torej v lasti pravnih oseb med približno 3,2 in 31,1 odstotka stanovanj. Lastništvo je načeloma razpršeno, saj večina družb kupuje po eno do dve stanovanji v posameznem objektu. Najboljši primer tega je Farmedica, ki ima sedem stanovanj na šestih različnih lokacijah v Ljubljani. Izjema so investitorji, ki po zaključku projekta nekatera stanovanja obdržijo v

lasti, na primer Lanel, in družbe Center investicije, Kanaka in Leco Corporation, ki so naenkrat kupile 19 oziroma sedem stanovanj. Omenjene pravne osebe so se z nakupi, ki so jih opravile v letu 2021, povzpele med zasebne družbe, ki imajo v lasti največ stanovanjskih nepremičnin v Ljubljani, kar nakazuje na to, da gre pri investicijskih nakupih stanovanj s strani pravnih oseb za relativno nov trend.

Da so pravne osebe v zadnjem času povečale vlaganja v nepremičnine lahko sklepamo tudi na podlagi podatka, da je bilo pet izmed desetih družb, ki so bile obravnavane in se ukvarjajo z oddajanjem nepremičnin, ustanovljenih precej nedavno, med letoma 2019 in 2021. Družba J & E Invest je bila na primer ustanovljena leta 2021, njen lastnik pa ima od leta 2017 registrirano samostojno podjetje za zobozdravstveno dejavnost. Podobno se je družba Golddraht Beteiligungs, ki je leta 2019 ustanovila podjetje za oddajanje nepremičnin Kanaka, v Sloveniji do sedaj ukvarjala z ustanavljanjem in upravljanjem poslovalnic McDonalds. Tudi sicer se večji del družb, ki kupujejo stanovanja v novogradnjah, primarno ne ukvarja z nepremičninsko dejavnostjo. Če izvzamemo investitorje v stanovanjske komplekse, se 25 izmed 41 pravnih oseb, ki so v obravnavanih novogradnjah kupovale stanovanja, ukvarja z dejavnostmi, ki so povsem nepovezane z nepremičninami. Kar nekaj družb na primer deluje na področju zdravstva oziroma farmacije. V nepremičnine se torej večinoma vlaga sredstva iz drugih dejavnosti.

Iz podatkov, zbranih iz nepremičninske evidence GURS, in odgovorov, ki so jih posredovale posamezne družbe, je mogoče razbrati, da štiri pravne osebe, ki so skupaj kupile 35 stanovanj, ta oddajajo v tržni najem. Poleg teh stanovanja oddaja še en investitor, Lanel, ki je za ta namen v lasti obdržal osem stanovanj. Na ta način namerava do stanovanj, namenjenih oddajanju, priti tudi družba Sindrom, ki je investitor v projekt Bežigrajska 5ka. Za ostale pravne osebe je, tudi če imajo kot glavno dejavnost določeno oddajanje nepremičnin, težko ugotoviti, s kakšnim namenom so stanovanja kupila, saj so podatki o morebitnem najemu zakriti. Tako je na primer družba Aleja skupina, ki se sicer ukvarja z oddajanjem, eno izmed stanovanj, ki jih je kupila v kompleksu Rezidenca Masarykova, že prodala naprej fizični osebi. Enako velja tudi za obratno situacijo, saj tudi nekatere družbe, ki se ukvarjajo z dejavnostjo, nepovezano z oddajanjem nepremičnin, stanovanja, ki so jih kupile, oddajajo v tržni najem. Najboljši primer je družba Center investicije, ki je s tem namenom kupila kar 19 stanovanj, kot glavno dejavnost pa ima prijavljeno dajanje drugih strojev, naprav in opredmetenih sredstev v najem in zakup.

Veliko družb stanovanja kupuje zato, da jih pozneje proda naprej. V novogradnjah so pravne osebe kupile 13 stanovanj, ki so jih že prodale fizičnim osebam. Ob pregledu zemljiškoknjižnega stanja je sicer opaziti, da tudi kar nekaj fizičnih oseb hkrati kupuje več stanovanj, pogosto so to osebe, ki se redno znajdejo na spiskih najbogatejših Slovencev. Investicijskih nakupov stanovanj je v novogradnjah torej precej.

Podjetja, ki investirajo v nepremičnine, so večinoma slovenska. Kljub temu sta prav družbi Kanaka in Leco Corporation, ki oddajata vsaka po sedem

stanovanj, v tujem lastništvu. Pri družbi Kanaka je zanimivo tudi to, da ima njen lastnik prek druge družbe v lasti obrat hitre prehrane v pritličju stavbe, v kateri oddaja stanovanja. V tujini že več let obstaja podoben model. V Združenem kraljestvu, zlasti v Londonu, supermarketi, kot so na primer Lidl, Tesco, Sainsbury's in Morrisons, nad svojimi poslovalnicami že dlje časa gradijo stanovanja (Butler 2013; Butler 2018). Na ta način svojo mrežo poslovalnic širijo tudi supermarketi v Nemčiji, zlasti v Berlinu (Fabricius 2019). Stanovanja nad trgovinami so namenjena tako prodaji kot najemu. Trgovine tako množijo število poslovalnic v mestih, kjer sicer primanjkuje prostora za nove stavbe, hkrati pa stanovalci nad supermarketi zanje predstavljajo zanesljive stranke. V Ljubljani na podoben način svoj tržni delež veča Lidl. Poslovalnice ima v kar štirih (prihajajočih) stanovanjskih novogradnjah: v Rezidenci Masarykova, Šumijevem kvartu, Celovških dvojčkih in v kompleksu Bellevue Living. Glede na dostopne podatke pa nima v lasti nobenih stanovanj nad svojimi trgovinami.

Vpliv privatizacije na strukturo ljubljanskih korporativnih najemodajalcev ni bil tako neposreden kot na primer v Nemčiji, kjer se je privatizirane sklope stanovanj že v devetdesetih prodalo večjim zasebnim družbam. Tudi družbe, ki so v novogradnjah kupovale stanovanja za namen oddajanja, niso povezane s privatizacijo. Vseeno je treba izpostaviti, da so vse tri pravne osebe s seznama lastnikov z največ stanovanji v Ljubljani GURS, ki imajo kot glavno dejavnost navedeno oddajanje nepremičnin, povezane s procesom privatizacije oziroma denacionalizacije v devetdesetih. Družba UD Lipa je v večinski lasti delniške družbe Murka, kot njena dejanska lastnika pa sta v registru AJPES navedena Uroš Glavan in Daniel Viljevac. Gre za nekdanja tesna sodelavca Igorja Laha (Rankov et al. 2011), enega izmed tako imenovanih »zmagovalcev pidovske privatizacije« iz začetka devetdesetih (Ekstravisor 2021). Družbenika družbe Pamag sta Alenka Gregorc Puš in Peter Gregorc, ki je eden izmed dedičev več nepremičnin, ki so bile v postopku denacionalizacije vrnjene Ivanu Gregorcu (Revija Manager 2011). Tudi premoženje družbe T. Knez, ki ima v Ljubljani 19 stanovanj, je bilo predmet denacionalizacijskega postopka, ki je bilo njenemu nekdanjemu lastniku Tomu Knezu leta 1947 zaplenjeno v kazenskem postopku (odločba US RS Up-969/08-20 z dne 13. 5. 2010).

SKLEP

Čeprav trend korporativnih najemodajalcev pri nas še ni tako prisoten kot v nekaterih tujih mestih, sem identificirala nekaj pravnih oseb, ki se tudi v Ljubljani začenjajo ukvarjati z oddajanjem stanovanj v tržni najem. Kljub temu da obseg stanovanj, ki jih imajo v lasti, ni primerljiv s portfelji globalnih korporativnih najemodajalcev, bi predvsem prisotnost tujih holdingov in nepremičninske delniške družbe, pa tudi investitorjev, ki stavbe gradijo z namenom, da del stanovanj oddajajo v tržni najem, lahko nakazovala na spremembe na ljubljanskem najemniškem trgu, na katerem trenutno prevladujejo fizični najemodajalci, ki se z oddajanjem stanovanj ne ukvarjajo poklicno in načeloma razpolagajo z manjšimi kapitali.

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(RE)AKTUALIZACIJA OSMIŠLJANJA RAZSEŽNOSTI POLITIKE V LUČI BIBIČEVE MISLI

THE DIMENSIONS OF POLITICS IN THE LIGHT OF BIBIČ'S THOUGHT: AN UPDATE

Marko HOČEVAR, Blaž VREČKO ILC*

ADOLF BIBIČ'S INNOVATIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE MARXIST CONCEPTUALISATION OF POLITICS**

Abstract. *The article analyses the innovative Marxist conceptualisation of politics proposed by the Slovenian political scientist Adolf Bibič. The latter built on the contributions of Heglo-Marxists and Gramsci to political theory. At the core of his theory, he placed the question of the political power–class exploitation relationship. He distinguished political politics from self-managing politics, and problematised the dominant Western understandings of politics as well as the theories of elitism and pluralism. Moving away from such theories and dogmatic Marxist notions about the withering away of politics, he formulated his project of humanising politics beyond class exploitation and capitalist relations of production. This project assumed a necessary transformation of political practice in terms of the dialectical process of the socialisation of politics and the politicisation of society.*
Keywords: *Adolf Bibič, politics, political science, class relations, economic exploitation.*

INTRODUCTION

Although the study of politics dates back at least to ancient Greece, political science departments at universities around the world and the institutionalisation of studying politics only emerged after the Second World War (Bibič 1972; Meiksins Wood 2016; 2017; Hočevar 2022; Lukšič 2022).[1] This was also the period when a similar project was being gradually attempted by Yugoslav and Slovenian society and politics (Pikalo 2022).[2] If political science were to achieve

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[1] Lukšič claims that political science is "a young science if measured looking at programmes of modern universities, but at the same time among the oldest if its age is measured considering the works of ancient political thinkers ..." (Lukšič 2022, 196).

[2] For an analysis of political theory in Slovenia, see Pikalo (2022). For a historical reflection on the role and development of the Slovenian Political Science Association (established in 1968), see Toplak (2022).

independence as an individual scientific discipline, the field of study had to be clearly defined. The first political scientists abroad began establishing the core of studying politics in much the same way as the scientists in Yugoslavia and Slovenia. In this region, the pioneering work of making political science a scientific discipline in its own right was done by Adolf Bibič who in the 1960s started to research and establish an independent study of political science. Yet, in this process, he encountered an important challenge. For political science to be/become separate from sociology, history, law and economy, he needed to define the object of study of political science extremely well. A separate object of study is namely what legitimises each science relative to the other sciences. However, the question of what politics is has caused intense debate ever since.

Bibič's understanding of politics was strongly influenced by various Marxist classics and the Yugoslav self-management experience. Always in the core of his political research project, the relationship between the state and (civil) society was most explicitly addressed in *Zasebništvo in skupnost: »civilna družba« in država pri Heglu in Marxu* (The private sphere and the community: "civil society" and the state in Hegel and Marx), where he focused on the relationship and dialectic between the state and society, not merely the class–state relationship (Bibič 1972, 9). His research on the relationship between civil society and the state in Hegel and Marx moved to researching the political theory advocated by the Italian Marxist theorist and practitioner Antonio Gramsci. Another especially interesting and important influence on his research was the work by Rosa Luxemburg, an often overlooked Marxist theorist and revolutionary who, in the early 20th century, was considered one of the most original Marxist theorists of all times. A further key influence was the work by Edvard Kardelj and his concept of self-management (Bibič 1979a; 1979b; 1980), which formed the basis of Bibič's more theoretical and Marxist explanation of the political in self-management socialism. Bibič understood politics in a historical context and with a rich theoretical background. His Marxist conceptualisation of politics is characterised by two different forms of politics: 1) politics in a capitalist class society; and 2) politics in a self-management system, where it was anticipated that class conflict would gradually dissipate.[3] For Bibič, the double nature of politics in two distinct modes of production opened the space not only for a critical analysis of politics based on class conflict, but also for affirming politics in a society committed to the gradual abolition of classes and the withering away of the state.

The goal of this article is to analyse Bibič's oeuvre and reflect on his contribution to Marxist political theory and understanding of politics. The article initially delineates Bibič's early research concerning the question of what politics

[3] Bibič himself admitted that Yugoslav society did not reach the level of a classless society. It was, however, founded on the political and economic emancipation of the working class and held the potential to develop a type of mode of production different from capitalism and Soviet socialism. The concepts of self-management and social ownership were the great theoretical and practical innovation that democratised the process of production (Samary 2017; Kržan 2017).

is, namely, his central focus in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Then, his double conceptualisation of politics in the capitalist system and in the self-management system is explained. The following section analyses Bibič's critique and his rejection of elitist and pluralist conceptions of politics. Finally, the concluding part reflects on the importance of Bibič's Marxist understanding of politics in the 21st century under the hegemony of the capitalist mode of production and its neoliberal incarnations.

ESTABLISHING A NEW SCIENCE: POLITICS AS THE OBJECT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

In the most general sense, Bibič separated the narrow and wide understandings of politics. In the narrow sense, politics relates to the state and authority; it is also connected to the influence exerted from the level of the state onto society and from the level of society to the level of the state. In the wide sense, politics encompasses the dialectic relationship between the state and society, "any governance of the society or its parts that is based on conflicts of interest and the harmonisation of parts with the whole of society" (Bibič 1985, 789). While Bibič stresses that politics is "on the one hand even narrower than state activities (it does not involve the routine carrying out of state affairs)", simultaneously, in its wide sense, it encompasses the effects that various social elements have on the authorities together with the specific relations between different elements of the society, organising coexistence, conflict or consensus (Bibič [1969] 2021, 35–36). By expanding his definition, Bibič anticipates Foucault's gesture of cutting the king's head off (Foucault 2015) yet remains aware of the meaning of public authorities and emphasises that in the study of politics, the state and the state apparatus must be expanded and amended with elements that are not political in a narrow sense or not tied to the state and governance in the strict sense of the word.

Bibič divided politics into four interconnected elements: 1) the social division of work and class structure of society; 2) subjects active in society or in an international arena; 3) the political ideologies or aims of political activity; and 4) political action. He wrote, "[p]olitical subjects work in given objective conditions and from them; they consciously realise certain aims with political action, which – in historically furthest reaches – leads the socialisation of politics into negating its own assumptions" (Bibič [1969] 2021, 38).

In another text, Bibič defined politics as a "dynamic disentanglement between the objective and the subjective, a dialectic of 'social forces' and 'political forces'". He also held the Gramscian conviction that politics is a "flow of structures into superstructures and a flow of superstructures into structures" and a Hegelian belief that politics is an action of political liberation in a dialectic relationship and fight "between the master and the slave, in which the slave is realising that it is his work that is enabling the master and that work is what is liberating the slave and society" (Bibič 1978, 6). Bibič added that politics is "a dialectic

historical process of fighting, of conflicts of interest, but also of their surpassing, coordination, unification" and that politics – much like democracy or freedom – cannot be defined in general. Politics "in general is neither good nor bad, but quite simply empty and undefined" (Bibič 1978, 5).

These general definitions of politics do not, however, contain the fundamental elements of Bibič's thinking. These were closely connected to his definition of the tasks and the goals of political science. Bibič believed that the task of political science is to discover and help bring an end to the exploitation and unequal power relations in society. This is why he, as he claimed, had founded a "humanist political science"[4] (Bibič 1978; [1969] 2021). In this regard, he faced a dual task: while he defined the specifics of political science in relation to other disciplines, he had to explain what makes the object of political science so special and what is so important in studying politics that political science can contribute to the humanist goals of all of humankind. Along these lines, he took on the task of developing not only Marxist political science but, in turn, also a Marxist understanding of politics.

POLITICS AND THE CAPITALIST MODE OF PRODUCTION

Drawing on Hegel and Marx, Bibič posited the contradictory relationship between state and society along with the relationship between "social structures and political processes" as the fundamental problem of politics in capitalist societies (Bibič 1978, 26; Bibič 1985; [1969] 2021). In a different text, he stated that the core of understanding politics is the conflict between particular and universal interests, which lies at the heart of the capitalist class conflict (Bibič 1972, 14). The dialectic between the particular and the universal and the state–society dialectics are specific to capitalism and the capitalist mode of production or the social and political order based on class exploitation. Following this line of thought in his work *Kaj je politična znanost?* (What is political science?), Bibič defined politics as a

> *social activity based on social division of labour and the social structure based on it (in a class society, mainly on classes); it is an activity relating to the regulation of the human condition and the structural elements of society (in a class society, many of classes) in their fundamental relations of production and work in general, as well as to making decisions about the general affairs of a given society or international community.* (Bibič [1969] 2021, 35)

[4] Political science should help a person "experience themselves more and more as a community, while the community would feel itself as a part of the person; that a person would become less a meaning and more the goal to another person; and that group, national, racial, economical and other particularistic egoisms would be replaced by interpersonal collaboration in a human community, where there would be no more differences between the rulers and the ruled" (Bibič 1978, 45).

The key aspect of this definition is Bibič's specific gesture of making class conflict the core of politics. Bibič believed that the issue of class – i.e., the issue of class exploitation and abolishing it – was a political issue and the heart of politics in capitalist societies. He highlighted that politics in capitalism – the functioning of government and state structures – cannot be understood without accounting for class conflict and the class nature of society (Bibič 1981; [1969] 2021).

At this point, it should be stressed that Bibič rejected the reductionist and instrumentalist understanding of the state as a mere tool of the ruling class(es) (Bibič 1972; 1981). Drawing on and following Hegel and Marx, he saw the class structure of society as the basis for the separation of state and society (Bibič [1969] 2021) or for the political form of capitalist rule itself.[5] He saw the centre of political science as lying in the study of the relationship between the state and civil society as this dualism is highly specific for capitalist class societies (Bibič 1972). He clearly defined that "it would not be an exaggeration to argue that a clear awareness of the origins and development of the distinction between 'civil society' and the state is a necessary prelude to the modern, sociological and philosophical study of politics"[6] (Bibič 1972, 11).

Capitalism is marked by a typical separation of political authority from direct economic exploitation, which is only possible when the property of the means of production is concentrated in the hands of a minority. In contrast to feudalism, direct political authority is no longer needed to ensure exploitation, which means the minority can let go of it. Thus, the change in property relations – the concentration of capital in the hands of a minority and the pauperisation of workers with no property or wealth who are forced to sell their labour power on the market – has also been translated into the form of exploitation and the relationship between political authority and exploitation, which is seemingly most evident in the field of economics, but is actually embedded in the entire social and political reproduction of capitalism.[7] In the "dualism of state and society", Bibič saw an "accompanying and forming phenomenon of emerging modern bourgeois epoch" (Bibič 1981, 17).

He carefully pointed out that class conflict overdetermines all other social conflicts and is as such the key to understanding politics.[8] Bibič did not propose

[5] The first to translate James Madison's *Federalist Papers No. 10*, Bibič understood the origins of party democracy and the conflicts between different parities extremely well. He clearly delineated the fundamental point of federalist political thinking: differing amounts of wealth are a permanent source of social conflict, whereby Federalists never fought for these differences to be abolished but to be mitigated (Bibič 1992).

[6] In another text, he wrote: "It was not until the emerging bourgeois society in the more developed countries of West Europe began re-establishing (this time with important consequences) the commodity economy, in which feudal political institutions are nothing but an obstacle that needs to be overcome /.../, that the heads of the most enlightened thinkers began conceiving political sphere as a field that is not equal to socio-economic life" (Bibič [1969] 2021, 17).

[7] Bibič stated that the differentiation between the civil society and the state was the outcome of the capitalist market economy (the separation of economic exploitation and political dominance) and the French Revolution, which established the "principle of 'pure' politics" (Bibič 1981, 55).

[8] In doing so, Bibič also explicitly rejected pluralist and elitist theories. For more on this, see below.

a vulgar mechanism in the relation between the state and the ruling class, but a wider understanding of politics. Instead of presupposing a uniformity of interests, he insisted that it is vital to understand the "dialectic between the components of the state itself on the one hand, and the dialectic between the state and the society on the other" (Bibič 1972, 260). Such conceptualisation of politics opens the door to understanding the frequently heterogenous interests of the ruling class and the ruled classes and allows for the possibility of understanding the state with reference to the crystallisation point of the class relationships of power.[9]

POLITICS IN SOCIALIST SOCIETY

One of Bibič's biggest contributions to the Marxist conceptualisation of politics is his reflection on politics in socialist self-management. The fundamental assumption of vulgar Marxism was that politics itself would wither away with the abolition of capitalism. Bibič therefore wondered whether "socialist self-management, and thus the 'withering away' of the state, does not also mean that the specific object of political science, politics itself, is withering away?" (Bibič 1985, 789).

Bibič did not agree with a simplified understanding of Marxist thought and observed, from the self-management practice itself, that politics is not disappearing. In his attempt to explain the specific features of politics in socialist society, he followed his initial narrow and wide definitions of politics to roughly distinguish political politics from self-management politics. While political politics was the classic, narrowly defined politics in the sense of the organisation and activities of public authorities, self-management politics meant the entire broad sphere that had opened with the introduction of self-management and had gradually brought economic and political self-management together (Bibič 1978; 1981). Bibič underscored that three elements were particularly noteworthy for the understanding of politics in self-management.

First, Bibič claimed that self-management by itself does not mean that "all elements of class society have been overcome"; although they are "as a rule […] of secondary meaning, they might acquire larger power in special circumstances" (Bibič [1969] 2021, 72). This of course means that politics as such is not disappearing (in neither the wide or narrow sense), inasmuch as the existence of classes results in class conflict and the existence of the state as an institution that is separated from every class and regulates different class interests and relations.

Second, the element of conflict between various social groups can also be seen in self-management: "The social division of labour is becoming an increasingly more direct and essential factor of social differentiation, while conflicts of interest and conflicts between social groups, based primarily on social division

[9] With his definition of politics and the relationship between the state and the civil society, Bibič followed in the footsteps of the renowned Marxist theoretician Nicos Poulantzas, who defined the capitalist state as "a specific material condensation of forces, which is itself a class relation" (Poulantzas 2014, 129).

of labour, are becoming more and more central to professional decision-making" (Bibič [1969] 2021, 72). If the conflict of interest is the essential assumption in the existence of the state (politics in the narrow sense of the word) as well as the consequential existence of various ways of influencing public authorities (politics in the wider sense of the word), then it becomes clear that politics is not disappearing.

Third, international relations and international circumstances have thus far always been such – the Cold War – that even a society which pursues "self-management politics" had to "preserve certain functions to safeguard national political integrity" (Bibič [1969] 2021, 72). However rarely Bibič mentions it, this third element is therefore the positioning of societies in global political and economic flows. With no state, i.e., with no state protection of borders, socialist self-management would hardly have survived the strong pressures from both the West and the East (the USA vs. the USSR) to change the mode of production in Yugoslavia.[10]

In this context, Bibič linked self-management politics to greater democratisation and democracy. He envisioned the concept of socialist self-management as a phase of the socialisation of politics and the politisation of society, and not as the negation of politics in general or negation of the political' politics, i.e., the politics that is narrowly linked to government and state. On the other hand, he saw a tendency in self-management politics to abolish the dualism of the state and society or the state and the economy, which is the crucial element of capitalist rule: "Self-management democracy is mass democracy by its nature and direct democracy by its essential tendency. As an openly class conception of democracy, it is principally oriented towards overcoming the class nature of society and politics and towards revealing and establishing an authentic pluralist nature of socialist society and politics ('pluralism of self-management interests') while overcoming class society" (Bibič 1985, 806). Bibič believed that the withering away of the state was synonymous with self-management and defined it as a possibility for overcoming political alienation as this process gave the option of political decisions back to individuals and the community. The socialisation of politics was a key element of self-management and the politisation of society (Bibič 1981, 273).

Bibič was one of those Marxist theoretics who did not see self-management and the historical tendency towards the abolition of class exploitation through the various forms of socialist socialisation as the demise of politics (and, hence, of political science). Instead, he emphasised that the decline of liberal politics

[10] This emphasis given by Bibič raises numerous questions about the very nature of the SFRY and the possibility of developing self-management as a different stage of the socialist mode of production. What he slightly overlooked is the positioning of Yugoslavia in a bipolar Cold-War order and the specific relationship between the SFRY and the USA or the West, as well as the importance of cooperation and the credit that came to Yugoslavia and was crucial for the establishment of self-management. For more on this, see Jakovina (2011).

does not mean the decline of politics as such. Where there is a tendency to abolish class exploitation, there is space for new forms of political action and participation. Even if class society and the state–society dualism were to be completely abolished, Bibič did not believe this was the road to the demise of politics but instead a space for affirming politics beyond the alienation of political authority and class exploitation. From this premise, he argued that, after the introduction of self-management, the space for political action was not shrinking but expanding because self-management had opened a space for the masses to enter politics, for the sphere of production to be politicised and, with it, for the possibility of people being emancipated beyond class exploitation (Bibič, 1981; 1969/2021).

BIBIČ'S CRITIQUE OF ELITISM AND PLURALISM

A Marxist understanding of politics and the stress on class conflict as the basis of politics led Bibič to critically reflect on political science in Western bourgeois socio-political contexts. He identified two fundamental and prevailing theories of how politics, political relations, structures, institutions and actions are conceived: elitist theories and interest group theories (pluralism). Given that these reflections were made in the late 1960s, one might expect them to be anachronistic and interesting especially from the perspective of political ideas present in the specific historical moment of the Yugoslav and Slovenian context. To rephrase: one might expect Bibič's insights not to be relevant for a contemporary, seemingly much more complex, heterogenous, multilayered and ambivalent political (politico-economic) context of globalised capitalist liberal democratic societies. Yet, Bibič's critical thinking on elitist theories and the theories of interest groups (pluralism) from that period[11] proves not only to be extremely lucid in itself, but also and especially useful for critically reflecting on trends in political science today.[12]

Bibič ([1969] 2021, 40) claimed that elitist theories derive from the supposedly empirical fact of the transhistorical existence of the rulers and the ruled in organised societies.[13] The fundamental assumption of both older and more contemporary elitist theories is that the ruler–ruled relationship is inevitable.[14]

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[11] His further theoretical development notwithstanding, the basic coordinates of his critique in this period were retained in Bibič's later dealing with the question of pluralism in the West (Bibič 1989).

[12] Far from these theoretical topics having given way to radically different frameworks in contemporary thinking and analysis of political reality; on the contrary, as contemporary political science analyses show, these two sets of theories are still extremely important, if not dominant, in the analysis of contemporary politics. For example, one of the most influential and cited political science articles of the last 10 years, *Testing Theories of American politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizen* by Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page (2014), defines elitist theories and theories of pluralism (interest groups) as two of the prevalent theories of politics.

[13] He never doubted the empirical fact of this starting point – which is very questionable or factually incorrect in the light of modern anthropological findings (see Graeber and Wengrow 2021) – but his acceptance of this non-fact does not make his critique of elitist theories any less valid: he is initially problematising the controversial conclusions that elitist theories draw from this very non-fact.

[14] Older elitist theories assumed that this relationship is tied to the nature of people itself: to their natural characteristic (be it moral, intellectual and/or physical) that inevitably lead to the mentioned du-

Bibič ([1969] 2021, 40) stressed that the emergence of contemporary elitist theories is inextricably linked to the emergence of capitalist society, which established the political sphere as a relatively autonomous sphere, closely connected to the sphere of production yet formally separate in the sense of the creation and functioning of specific elites pursuing particular interests linked to the public good and thus to wider social reproduction.

The development of bourgeois (capitalist) society produced large bureaucratic organisations led by elites. These organisations were formed in the framework of the state as a series of state apparatuses, in the context of the economy as a series of central oligopolist corporations, and in the context of political mediation in the form of numerous parties and their extensive bureaucracies. Bibič contended that the consolidation of bourgeois society was defined by general bureaucratisation and nationalisation, which have subverted the pre-existing dualism of state–civil society into a bureaucratic-institutional subordination of civil society to the state. The leaderships of bureaucratic institutions in all fundamental spheres of society have thus acquired power over the community that was unattainable in previous eras (Bibič 2021, 41). However, this fact led the elitist theoretics to wrongly assume that formal politics is not only relatively, but absolutely, autonomous, and that political elites are free from fundamental social (class) contradictions and the relations of social forces. To demonstrate the indicators of this trend of thought, Bibič uses concepts that remain popular nowadays: mass society, managerial revolution, oligarchisation, bureaucratisation and technocratisation (Bibič [1969] 2021, 42).

The starting point of Bibič's analysis is the critique of the determinism of elitist theories. This determinism rearticulates certain facts of a given historical socio-political context as inevitable and never changing, as unalterable basic coordinates of modern-society and state activities: that an organised minority is always already dominating the unorganised majority of society and that this organised minority is always already ruling due to its larger inherent capacity, more expansive knowledge, higher intelligence, and ingenuity. Such a position consequently both disables the imagining of resistance and delegitimises the practice of resistance, the latter always already being understood not only as meaningless, but actually utopistic since there is no escaping from the shackles of this dualism.

As Bibič ([1969] 2021, 42–43) caustically remarked, elitist theories set a specific political programme that declares a certain historical-empirical political relation to be a trans-historical fact, while overlooking the specificity of the

alism. Contemporary elitist theories, in contrast, contribute the inevitability of this relationship to technical and organisational reasons, which propagate and deepen the distance between the elites and the masses in the same way of not more. For classic elitist theories see Gaetano Mosca *The Ruling Class* (1939), Vilfredo Parreto *The Mind and Society: A Treaties on General Sociology* (1935) and Robert Michels *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy* (1915).

capitalist political form – the dualism of state–(civil) society – and understanding it as always existing. The problem here, of course, is that such a conception of politics, such a political programme, emerges and is popularised within political science precisely in the context of the "penetration of the masses onto the scene of history" (Bibič 2021, 43), especially in the form of an organised labour movement. Beyond the Western context and in the context of colonialism, such a programme is popularised when the anti-colonial struggles begin and intensify. What is fundamental in both contexts is that elitist theory is a weapon of the forces that wish to preserve the *status quo* as it 'assumes' that the final results of both movements will be new elites and that they will continue (potentially in an even stricter way) with the radical division between the rulers and the ruled. This would, in turn, quash any hopes of the basic coordinates of this dualism being abolished.

Similar to his structured critique of elitist theories, Bibič ([1969] 2021, 46–53) systematically launched a critical reflection on the theories of interest groups (pluralism) as the second fundamental or prevailing set of theories that constitute a framework for understanding and acting in politics in liberal-democratic capitalist regimes. He initially conceptualised interest group theories (pluralism) as theories that refer to a specific political dimension of the liberal-democratic capitalist order.[15] Originally, interest group theories refer to the existence of various social interests that encourage the formation of different interest groups. These are the basic unit of analysis because they are conceived as the factor that defines, forms and directs political processes in liberal-democratic capitalist regimes.

Interest group theories assume that the political reality is defined by the struggle or competition among various interest groups that try to apply pressure on political decision-makers to assert their particular interests. Bibič ([1969] 2021, 47) asserts that the basic unit of analysing and understanding political reality is therefore no longer a liberal autonomous individual of classical liberalism, who is on their own the main source of political power (in both direct and representative forms). In contrast to classical liberalism, interest group theories do not problematise but valorise the aggregation of individual interests into groups that then mediate between the individual and the state authorities. Bibič ([1969] 2021, 48) believes that this epistemological shift from an individualistic to a collectivistic understanding of politics follows the ontological transformations of liberal capitalist societies, in which various processes (e.g., workers' struggle, the intensification of the division of labour, the emergence of large corporations and workers' organisations, the multiplication of state functions, and the diversification of state bureaucracy and its power of intervention) have transcended the strictly individualist conceptions of politics. Here, it must be noted that interest

[15] Bibič claims ([1969] 2021, 46) that the theory of interest groups (pluralism) refers to the horizontal dimension, while elitist theories refer to the vertical structure of political relationships and processes.

group theories (pluralism) can be traced back to the period when modern liberal-democratic representative systems were formed, as they can be found as early as James Madison's *Federalist Papers: No. 10*, where he analyses politics through the concept of factions (see Madison 1992). These theories, however, reach their theoretic maturity with Arthur Bentley's *The Process of Government* (1908) and David Truman's *The Governmental Process* (1951).

Bibič ([1969] 2021, 48) claims that, from the perspective of numerous social groups organised to influence direct or indirect political decision-makers, the theory is realistic – it reflects political reality. At the same time, it is relevant from the perspective of analysing a concrete political situation as it points to polyvalence and the need to focus on the multilayered and complex "relationship of powers" as the fundamental assumption of real political action in any society. Rather than a static perception of political reality, it is a basic assumption regarding its dynamics and changeability in terms of constantly (dis)appearing and changing interest groups or interest structure, which is inextricably linked to new divisions of labour in capitalist liberal-democratic regimes. Like in the case of elitist theories, an integral understanding of politics therefore needs to address and integrate the mentioned central insights and emphases of interest group theories in its critical analytical apparatus.

On the other hand, the theory of interest groups is problematic mostly from the perspective of its real political or political reality establishing implications. These theories are no mere cameras but machines to produce particular realities. They are not just a description of a political structure but have become integral parts of political visions and 'interests' that they were only supposed to interpret. Bibič claims that pluralist theories assume that

> *at least the potential power of various, especially the fundamental social groups in a class society is about the same and that, consequently, any effort to change the structural bases of the existing society and politics is anachronistic: the essence of politics is not a transformation of the world, but a balance between various interest and the search for a compromise between them.*
> (Bibič [1969] 2021, 50)

Pluralism accordingly falls into a vulgar empiricism of aggregating individual and collective interests based on the assumption that all interests have the same influence and the same power (Dahl 1963). This is in complete contrast with the reality of the capitalist mode of production where the state or the authorities might not just be the tool of one capitalist class fraction or the other but is most certainly the tool of the entire capitalist class, where it always works to preserve the integrity of the system or, as Engels (1987, 222) claimed, the state often functions as an "ideal collective capitalist". The main task of the capitalist state is to ensure the reproduction of capitalist society as a whole, while sometimes directly pursuing the interests of individual capitalist blocs and sometimes giving the

appearance of working primarily for the interests of the exploited. This does not mean that every interest carries equal weight or equal power, but that the state can sometimes pursue heterogeneous interests precisely because it is concerned with the reproduction of capitalism as a whole and due to the historically particular constellation of class power relations.

Bibič's critique of the two prevalent political theories in the West in the 1960s and 1970s is hence fundamentally connected to his understanding of politics through the prism of class struggle and capitalist exploitation as well as the humanisation of politics. Elitist theory is directed against true democratic politics and especially against a socialist vision of politics – the socialisation of politics and the elimination of the state–society dualism through abolishing economic exploitation and the private property of the means of production – while implicitly defending the 'natural' fundamental transformations of capitalist liberal-democratic societies, which have helped reinforce and increase the gap between the rulers and the ruled.[16] Pluralist theories, on the other hand, are practically blind to the problems of exploitation, inequality and the relationship between the rulers and the ruled. This blindness of pluralism is at the service of consolidating an unjust and exploitative order. Pluralist theories thus propagate the delusion of equality in capitalism, which does not exist. At the same time, they attribute the failure to promote those public interests that oppose the interests of the concentration of capital to the subjective weaknesses of politics that is unable to compromise while losing focus on the structural radical asymmetry in the power of interests on both the local/national and global levels.

CONCLUSION: POLITICS IN NEOLIBERAL CAPITALISM AND THE RELEVANCE OF BIBIČ'S MARXIST POLITICAL THEORY

Bibič's scientific project was closely linked to the humanisation of society and politics, which in essence meant tackling inequalities and class exploitation. The basis of his research of politics was tied to a social vision that "tries to diminish and eliminate the gap between those who 'rule' and those who are 'ruled'; [there is] an understandable intimate need for the structural laws between the state and the society – and in politics in general – to be defined and researched. Those are the core interests of political science" (Bibič 1978, 26–27). This explains why he founded a new scientific discipline and introduced something new to Marxist political theory: along with the critique of politics and exploitation in capitalism, Bibič sought to affirm politics as a social activity aimed at abolishing classes. Simultaneously, this led him to critique two of the most established political

[16] Bibič ([1969] 2021, 45) nevertheless also stresses the positive sides of elitist theories: directing attention to those dimensions of politics that used to be or still are neglected by other prevalent theories of politics but are important to shape a more integral class understanding of politics. Among others, he stresses the questions related to the reproduction of political elites and class representation, to the procedural and formal dimension of political mandates, to the relationships between various political elites pertaining to various political institutions and to the range of techniques or instruments of power that those elites can access.

science approaches of the time: he rejected pluralism and elitism because they naturalised exploitation and were blind to the inequalities that act as the foundation of capitalism.

With the end of the Cold War and the domination of liberal-democratic capitalist political and economic order, but mostly with the transition from a socialist to a capitalist order and the concurrent deepening of the integration into regional and global political and economic structures, the possibilities for the critique of the dominant understanding and acting in politics were drastically narrowed. It could be said that the integral critique of politics pertinent to the liberal-democratic capitalist order gave way to a more or less explicit reproduction of elitist and pluralistic understandings of politics – which, of course, also led to the preservation of the established inequality of political, economic and wider social relations (including gender, religion and ethnicity).

Bibič pointed out that, despite the changes in the world which call for the questioning and re-analysing of both the Marxist theoretical premises of politics and the practice of politics itself, certain fundamental features of the contemporary world still determine politics itself:

> *Above all, there is still class conflict as a factor of social development and the determinant of the social content in political structures, especially the state /…/ Including the theoretical and methodological contribution of Marxist critique of political economy is therefore the fundamental condition of analysing the state and politics.*[17] (Bibič 1981, 389)

It should be emphasised that focusing on class conflict in no way flattens political-science research or makes it uniform, nor does it cling to old concepts that hold no analytical or practical value in the new material reality. Quite the opposite: it is only by placing class conflict in the centre of political science that can we attempt a true theoretically and empirically rich research of political phenomena. Only such political science can really reveal the fundamental contradictions in society, connecting them to other phenomena related to class exploitation (e.g., racism, sexism, patriarchy). This is the framework that requires epistemological and methodological innovation as the modalities of class relations in capitalism are ever changing, while the more radical patterns of class exploitation are being replaced by more subtle ones.

Bibič's research project that positions class relations as the fundamental element of politics, political community and political action in the project of humanising politics creates the possibility for political science to escape from its own entrapment in the shackles of vulgar empiricism, liberal-mechanical

[17] Bibič rarely explicitly defined himself as Marxist even though it is clear that he was one. As we have demonstrated in the article, he grounded his theory of politics and the definition of political science in Marx's critique of political economy, placing class conflict in the centre of politics and its research.

assumptions and the 'supra-ideological' common-sense market consciousness. As Bibič explained, this is the only way for political science to move away from "new mythology, which is, in the micrology of details, losing its sense of the large issues of the political cosmopolis" (Bibič 1972, 260). In this context, it is also true today that, if political science wishes to contribute to the humanisation and emancipation of society and politics, and thereby remain a critical science, then it must once again place at the centre of its analysis the unequal distribution of property and wealth and the resulting class conflict, which is the most fundamental conflict in society and in the political cosmopolis of the 21st century.

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Marinko BANJAC*

REFLEKSIJA AFIRMIRANJA POLITOLOGIJE KOT ZNANSTVENE VEDE IN NJENE ŠIRŠE DRUŽBENE RELEVANTNOSTI: PRISPEVEK ADOLFA BIBIČA**

Povzetek. *Politična znanost je neprestano podvržena refleksiji svojega delovanja, saj se prepleta z drugimi družboslovnimi vedami in iz njih črpa specifične raziskovalne prakse, metodologije in spoznanja. Ta introspekcija je ključnega pomena, saj politologija proučuje pojave z različnih vidikov, ki izhajajo iz različnih raziskovalnih tradicij. Razumevanje lastnega okvira in vpliva na druge discipline omogoča politični znanosti, da bolje razume svoj kontekst ter prispeva k osmišljenemu raziskovanju in razpravi. Članek obravnava razmisleke politologa Adolfa Bibiča o odnosu politične znanosti do drugih družboslovnih ved in njenem družbenem pomenu, pri čemer proučuje njeno zgodovinsko pogojenost, avtonomijo in navezavo na druge discipline. Obravnava tudi, kako lahko politična znanost prispeva k (političnemu) izobraževanju v smislu teorije in prakse ter širšemu razumevanju politike.*
Ključni pojmi: *politologija, Adolf Bibič, družboslovje, politika, družbena vloga znanost.*

UVOD

Za politično znanost je, kot ugotavlja Grossman (2021), pomembna stalna samorefleksija, ker stoji na presečišču drugih družboslovnih znanosti in tem ponuja svoje raziskovalne prakse in spoznanja, hkrati pa si jih od drugih znanosti tudi sposoja oziroma jemlje. Zazrtje vase je za politično znanosti pomembno tudi zato, ker obravnava številne fenomene z različnih perspektiv, ki izhajajo iz mnogih raziskovalnih tradicij. Nenazadnje, kot pravi Grossman (2021, xiii), politična znanost za človekovo delovanje »nikoli ni bila bolj pomembna«, kot je sedaj, kar

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je povezano z večjo kompleksnostjo družb. Samorefleksija je za vsakršno znanost pomembna, ne le za politologijo, ker prek nje lahko ugotavlja, kakšne so prakse v njenem okviru in kakšen je njen vpliv v znanosti tudi onkraj njenih meja. Poznavanje delovanja in njenih možnosti kot discipline pomaga razumeti kontekst, v katerega je vpeta. V tem zelo širokem smislu lahko vodi k boljšim raziskavam, utemeljenim razpravam in izsledkom. Pomembna pa je tudi zato, ker ne zgreši relevantnosti oziroma ni slepa za svoj emancipatorni potencial; tega za vse družbene vede izpostavlja tudi Fay (2015, 96), ko predlaga, da bi morala znanost voditi v spremembe v družbi s tem, da razkriva izkoriščanja in perpetuiranje neenakih razmerij »kot posledico določenih strukturnih konfliktov v družbenem redu, in poskuša te konflikte – ter s tem trpljenje in občutene potrebe – pojasniti […]«.

Ključni projekti politologa Adolfa Bibiča skozi praktično celotno obdobje njegovega znanstvenega delovanja so bili prav refleksija, postavitev in utrditev politične znanosti na zemljevid družboslovnih ved. Vse od sredine 60. let prejšnjega stoletja je artikuliral mnoge ugotovitve o obstoju in razvoju politologije, obenem pa je, kot poudarja Lukšič (2021, 7), »utemeljeval tudi potrebnost politologije za družbeni razvoj in politično zorenje takratne socialistične družbe in države«. V tem smislu je Bibičeva ost dvojna. Prvič, politično znanost je premišljal kot znanstveno vedo, prepoznaval, kaj jo kot tako opredeljuje in kateri so njeni elementi ter značilnosti. Drugič, artikuliral je ne le njeno pozicijo v znanosti, temveč je osmišljal in dokazoval razsežnosti njene širše družbene in politične vloge. Središčno vprašanje je torej relevantnost politologije navznoter (v znanosti) in navzven (v širše družbenopolitično okolje). Skratka, Bibič je bil senzibilen in je neprestano osmišljal vlogo politične znanosti kot tiste, ki »prispeva k učinkovitosti uresničevanja [družbenih] ciljev z iskanjem najbolj ekonomičnih, najbolj humanih in demokratičnih sredstev« (Bibič 1982, 26).

V času, ko je politična znanost vse bolj relevantna in je treba njeno relevantnost tudi reflektirati in krepiti (Peters, Pierre, in Stoker 2010), je vpogled v pretekle refleksije toliko bolj smiseln. Pričujoči članek se poglobljeno loteva premišljanja politologije v smislu njenega razmerja do drugih družboslovnih ved in družbene relevantnosti, pri čemer izhaja iz nekaterih sodobnih razprav in Bibičeve misli glede vloge in možnosti politologije kot znanstvene discipline. Razdeljen je na štiri dele. V prvem delu naslovimo razmerje politologije do širšega družbenega okolja in njene relevantnosti v njem, pri tem pa v tem kontekstu aktualiziramo tudi Bibičevo misel in se osredinimo na nekatere dileme, ki jih je izpostavljal. Med drugim obravnavamo vprašanje historične pogojenosti politologije s širšimi družbenopolitičnimi tokovi, njeno utemeljenost z obstoječimi formacijami in s politično organiziranostjo družbe in države ter možnost in pomen (relativne) avtonomnosti *vis-à-vis* družbenopolitičnim konstelacijam. V drugem delu preizprašujemo, kako razumeti razmerje politologije do drugih (družboslovnih) ved, pri čemer nekatere sodobne premisleke (Warleigh-Lack in Cini 2009) postavimo v razmerje z idejami Bibiča glede tega vprašanja, ki je bilo ravno tako njegov pomemben fokus. Ob tem se postavlja vprašanje, ali je Bibič

videl to razmerje kot tekmujoče ali pa je videl več prednosti v sodelovanju onkraj meja disciplin. Ali je videl kakšne podobnosti med družboslovnimi vedami ali so ga zanimale predvsem razlike in specifičnost politologije? V tretjem delu nato preidemo na polje izobraževanja, pri čemer ne pokažemo in interpretiramo le, kako je razumel visokošolsko (politološko) izobraževanje in njegove funkcije, temveč tudi, kako lahko politična znanost prispeva k izobraževanju nasploh in, še bolj konkretno, k izobraževanju o politiki in političnem v različnih kontekstih formalnega in neformalnega izobraževanja. V zaključku govorimo o Bibičevi refleksiji pomenskih razsežnosti pojma politike, vendar ne kot samostoječega ter oposamljenega vprašanja, temveč v razmerju do vprašanja vloge politične znanosti. Proučevanje širše (javne) podobe politike in nove konceptualizacije politike, za kar mora skrbeti politična znanost, so bili zanj namreč ključni tudi za relevantnost politične znanosti in za utemeljevanje njenega (produktivnega) mesta v širši družbi.

O *RAZMERJU* POLITOLOGIJE IN ŠIRŠEGA DRUŽBENOPOLITIČNEGA OKOLJA

Bibič je politologijo ves čas premišljeval v razmerju do širšega družbenega in političnega okolja, pri čemer je vedno znova dokazoval, na kako kompleksen način je to razmerje razumel. V naravi tega razmerja ni videl ničesar enostavnega, nič premočrtnega ali samoumevnega. Tega razmerja ni dojemal simplificirano, in torej v tem smislu kot nekaj, kar bi bilo mogoče orisati, razložiti ali prikazati prek reduciranja kompleksnosti. Njegova izhodišča predpostavka je, da politologija ni ločena od zunanjega okolja – širše družbe, političnih vzorcev, ureditev, kulturnih miljejev, ekonomskih razmerij (Bibič 1984; 1989; 1993), temveč jo je videl kot artikulirano v kompleksnem prepletu s tem okoljem. Bibič (1989) izhaja iz prepričanja, da je politična znanost povezana z realnostmi, da je produkt teh kontekstov in da jo determinirajo prav njena »zgodovinska zakoreninjenost, njena dejanska vezanost na pomembne sklope interesov v družbi kot tudi njeno učinkovanje na družbo in politiko« (Bibič 1989). Zatrjuje torej, da je politologija zgodovinsko umeščena v družbeno in politično okolje na podlagi preteklih realnosti, historičnih kontekstov, ki so oblikovali načine delovanja politične znanosti, njene vsebine ipd. Če želimo prepoznavati politično znanost v njenih raznolikih dimenzijah, je zanj bistveno, da »ne moremo predočiti razvoja politične znanosti v nekakšni njeni ločenosti od družbene oziroma politične prakse. Dejansko se nobena družbena znanost ni razvijala in se ne razvija v nekakšnem 'čisto' znanstvenem inkubatorju, marveč dobiva spodbude, probleme, celo del svojega jezika iz družbenega in političnega življenja […]« (Bibič 1984, 1032).

Zgodovine – in tukaj namenoma govorimo v množini – so nujna značilnost diskurza politične znanosti, saj obstajajo bistvene povezave med zgodovino, identiteto in dejanskimi praksami vsake napredujoče oziroma, kot pravi Bibič (1984, 1032), razvijajoče se znanstvene discipline. Uporabnost takšnih zgodovin za razumevanje identitete politične znanosti je torej zanj pomembno vprašanje.

Pri tem pa je relevantna tudi dilema, ki jo odpreta Dryzek in Leonard (1988, 1246; glej tudi Adcock in Bevir 2005), ki opozarjata, da je ena od težav presojanja disciplinarnih zgodovin, da imajo zgodovine družbenih ved, s tem seveda tudi politologije, drugačen značaj kot zgodovine v naravoslovju. Medtem ko imajo naravoslovne znanosti na splošno hegemonske zgodovine, ki jim pripadajo njihovi praktiki, ima politologija več zgodovin. Izkazalo se je, da ta razlika izhaja iz družbeno konstituirane in zgodovinsko določene narave predmetov političnega raziskovanja. Za ustrezno razumevanje razmerja med zgodovino in identiteto v političnih znanostih je torej treba upoštevati zgodovinsko in kontekstualno pogojen značaj disciplinarnih praks. Prav na to pa opozori tudi Bibič (1993, 345), ko pravi, da »politična znanost ni nikjer popolnoma osvobojena kulturno-vrednostnih determinant, njen položaj pa se razlikuje po tem, v kolikšni meri ima avtonomen prostor – in ga zna tudi izkoristiti – za čim bolj objektivno razkrivanje resnice o političnem življenju«. Ker je torej politična znanost vsakokrat zgodovinsko pogojena, je za Bibiča (1993, 345) »raziskovanje zgodovine politične znanosti ena izmed pomembnih poti k refleksiji položaja in funkcije sodobne politične znanosti«.

Politična znanost je torej utemeljena in izhaja iz konkretnih preteklih družbenopolitičnih okoliščin, vendar to ne pomeni, da so sodobni konteksti kaj manj relevantni. Pomembna dimenzija ali pogoj možnosti politične znanosti sta tudi politični sistem in usmerjenost specifične družbe: »[…] [D]a bi lahko politična znanost poslanstvo dejansko uresničevala, je življenjsko vezana na demokratično usmerjenost socialistične družbe, ki edina zagotavlja, da se vzpostavlja tisto razmerje med politično znanostjo in politično prakso, pri katerem je znanost kot znanost sploh mogoča« (Bibič 1968, 635). Zdi se, da Bibič na tem mestu pokaže ne le na prepletenost političnega sistema in politične znanosti, temveč da politični ustroj države, torej njen sistem, daje možnost delovanja in vzpostavlja pogoje politične znanosti. Pri tem ima zanj ključno vlogo konkretna družbenopolitična ureditev, namreč socializem. In na tej točki bi lahko bil možen ugovor, da je predpostavljena družbenopolitična ureditev (ideološki) temelj znanosti, in torej točno tisto, kar onemogoča znanost. Takšen ugovor bi izhajal iz predpostavke o nujnosti ločenosti družbenopolitičnih kontekstov, ureditev in sistematizacij, kar kritično naslovi tudi Taylor (1967), ki argumentira, da politična znanost ter v njenem okviru teorije in konceptualizacije niso nikoli vrednotno nevtralne, temveč vedno artikulirane na podlagi določenih vrednot, pogosto široko sprejetih v družbi (glej tudi Grossmann 2021). S tem te teorije očitno izhajajo iz specifičnih družbenih vrednot in zahtev, pri čemer je »zadevna zahteva ali cilj lahko vzdrževanje političnega sistema, ki je za človeka bistvenega pomena, ali zagotavljanje nekaterih koristi, ki jih politični sistemi lahko dosežejo za stabilnost, varnost, mir, izpolnitev nekaterih želja in tako naprej« (Taylor 1967, 43). V okviru politične znanosti obstajajo raznolike teorije in pristopi k razlagi fenomenov in procesov, vsak od njih se osredini na tisto, za kar predpostavlja, da je relevantno. »Ti različni pristopi si pogosto nasprotujejo, saj različno opisujejo značilnosti, ki

so ključne za razlago, in vzročne odnose, ki veljajo. O njih, skupaj z njihovimi analogijami v drugih znanostih, lahko govorimo kot o 'konceptualnih strukturah', ali 'teoretičnih okvirih', saj trdijo, da razmejujejo področje, na katerem bo znanstveno raziskovanje plodno« (Taylor 1967, 30).

V tem smislu tudi Bibič situira politično znanost v družbenopolitično ureditev takratnega časa; demokratična socialistična praksa in misel pomenita zaslombo ali izhodišča politične znanosti: »demokratična socialistična praksa in misel, ki jo ta praksa poraja, je bila in je ne samo bistvena spodbuda za konstituiranje politične znanosti, marveč je sama često prispevala pionirski delež k poznavanju politične strukture […]« (Bibič 1968, 635). S tem ovrže idejo striktne ločenosti realnosti ali družbenih struktur, v katero je politična znanost umeščena (Bibič 1968, 635). Na ta način postavi in zasidra perspektivo, da politična znanost ni zaprta v slonokoščeni stolp in je ne smemo misliti kot sfero produkcije dokončnih in absolutnih resnic prav na podlagi ločenosti od družbenopolitičnega okolja, ki bi ji omogočala objektivnost. Po drugi strani pa Bibič opozarja, da politična znanost, kljub temu da izhaja in je vezana na družbenopolitično okolje, slednjemu ni totalno podrejena in ne dela po nareku prevladujoče politične prakse: »Med politično mislijo prakse in med profesionalno politično znanostjo gre torej za dialektični odnos relativne samostojnosti, ki predpostavlja tudi kritično distanco politologije nasproti politični misli prakse in politični praksi […]« (Bibič 1968, 635).

V tej relativni samostojnosti in kritični distanci ima politična znanosti tudi specifične naloge, med katerimi je po Bibiču (1984, 1032) tudi, da mora »čim bolj objektivno, ustrezno zahtevam znanstvene metode, spoznavati in pojasniti, zakaj potekajo določeni politični procesi, kako potekajo in v kolikšni meri se uresničujejo zastavljeni politični cilji«. Še dodatna funkcija politične znanosti so tudi teoretizacije in motrenje političnih fenomenov na ravni konceptov. S tem so temeljne »kategorije in teorije politične znanosti, ki jih oblikuje, konstitutivne za politično prakso« (Bibič 1984, 1032).

Nadaljnjo razpravo je mogoče narediti v kontekstu refleksije Bibičevega (1972) razumevanja razmerja politologije do širših družbenih kontekstov, vendar ne na splošno, temveč konkretno na Slovenskem. Očitno pozornost namenja tudi konkretnostim, med katerimi identificira okoliščine, kot sta pomanjkanje politično-državne tradicije in odsotnost dolgotrajnejše demokratične izkušnje. Gre za identifikacijo negativnih širših procesov, ki so omejevali ali zavirali (Bibič 1972) razvoj politične znanosti oziroma jo usmerjali v specifično smer. Toda obenem to niso edini dejavniki, ki bi bili značilni zgolj za takratni jugoslovanski in/ali slovenski prostor, temveč so podobni procesom drugod po svetu, med katerimi je pomembna interesna pluralizacija političnega sistema, ki je po mnenju Bibiča »pomembno povečala količino političnih subjektov in odločitev« (Bibič 1972, 560). Znova lahko vidimo, kako družbenopolitično življenje predstavlja humus politične znanosti, ki v novih oblikah ureditev najde materijo oziroma objekt proučevanja, refleksije in razlage. Še enkrat več pa tudi tovrstne interne

družbenopolitične okoliščine ne predstavljajo zgolj enega samega vpliva, temveč so ti heterogeni. Tako Bibič (1972, 560) poudarja, da imajo poseben pomen tudi odnosi »na mednarodnem področju«, kjer se »kaže nujna potreba, da politična znanost raziskuje delež, ki ga ima Slovenija pri oblikovanju zvezne zunanje politike in, tudi, v katerih oblikah in s kakšnim učinkom nastopa kot samostojen subjekt v mednarodnih odnosih« (Bibič 1972, 560).

Doslej smo se primarno osredotočali na vidike, razsežnosti in domene vplivanja širšega družbenopolitičnega okolja ter političnih praks in misli, izhajajočih iz teh praks, na politično znanost. V tem kontekstu smo izpostavili, da je politična znanost nujno aspekt družbenega in političnega življenja, vendar je obenem ne moremo istovetiti s politično prakso, ki med drugim pomeni tudi institucionalne ureditve, procese odločanja in tenzije med različnimi akterji, ki imajo enake ali različne interese (glej Bibič 1984). Čeprav je ne moremo istovetiti, pa politična znanost, tako kot je produkt zgodovinskih in trenutnih konstelacij, tudi transformira politične prakse ali pripomore k njihovemu osvetljevanju.

V tem kontekstu se lahko vrnemo na slovensko okolje; če smo predhodno že pokazali, da je Bibič prav za jugoslovanski in specifično slovenski kontekst pokazal njihov vpliv na politično teorijo, pa ta tok ni enosmeren, temveč lahko zasledimo tudi vpliv v drugi smeri, torej od politične znanosti k političnim praksam. Tako Bibič (1972, 561) vidi pomen in vlogo politične znanosti, ob njenem primernem razvoju, v tem, da omogoča večjo participacijo v političnem življenju, prispeva k večji učinkovitosti političnih odločitev, ima vlogo pri procesih politične socializacije v družbi (politična kultura) in koncipiranju vloge Slovenije v kontekstu jugoslovanske federacije ter na mednarodnem področju. Pri tem je ključna vloga politologov, ki so po eni strani dejavni znotraj znanstvene discipline, po drugi strani pa tudi »izredno aktivni v redakcijah strokovnih in splošnih družbenih revij in v družbenem življenju nasploh. To sicer dokazuje, da so družbeno angažirani […]« (Bibič 1972, 556).

S tem je nakazan vstop v razpravo o mestu in angažmaju politologov ter njihovih intervencij ne zgolj v akademskem okviru, temveč tudi širše. Po eni strani mora biti politologija relativno neodvisna od političnih praks in ideoloških formacij v družbi, vendar to za Bibiča ne pomeni neopredeljenosti ali indiferentnosti: »politična znanost je torej izrazito družbeno-ideološko opredeljena predvsem z dejstvom, da ne more biti ravnodušna do ciljev družbenega in političnega razvoja, do procesov, ki terjajo in pomenijo osvobajanje dela in narodov in njihovo čedalje tesnejše povezovanje« (Bibič 1976, 831). Po drugi strani pa angažiranost za Bibiča ne pomeni slepega podrejanja: »Takšna družbena opredeljenost politološkega poklica pa seveda ne pomeni in ne sme pomeniti, da bi politično znanost razumeli kot nekakšnega eksekutorja poljubnih praktičnih političnih sklepov in jo tako spreminjali v njihovega nekritičnega apologeta« (Bibič 1976, 831). Angažiranost je vse kaj drugega in jo je potrebno pri Bibiču razumeti kot iskanje in vpeljevanje novih teoretizacij, metodologij v politično znanost z namenom boljšega razumevanja emancipatornih potencialov specifičnih družbenopolitičnih ureditev.

O *RAZMERJU* POLITOLOGIJE DO DRUGIH (DRUŽBOSLOVNIH) VED

Premislek o razmerju politične znanosti do drugih znanstvenih disciplin je pomemben s številnih vidikov, med drugim zato, da se kontinuirano reflektira, kam se umešča kot specifično vednostno polje, kakšna je njena identiteta v smislu osvetlitve družbenopolitičnih vprašanj, kje so stične točke in kje razhajanja *vis-à-vis* drugim znanstvenim disciplinam. Pri vsaki refleksiji znanstvenih disciplin in njihovih razmerij do drugih (sorodnih) disciplin je ključno, da prepoznavamo izhodiščno idejo in prakso razdeljenosti (družbenih) ved v partikularne okvire. Ko se je v 19. in 20. stoletju uveljavila ideja o partikularnih akademskih disciplinah kot ločenih sklopih znanja, ki se lotevajo različnih vprašanj, problemov in fenomenov, ki jih je treba raziskovati z raznolikimi metodami, se je razmahnil obseg »samostojno« opredeljenih in diskretnih znanstvenih področij (Klein 1990). Takšna področja so bila pogosto opredeljena napram drugim sklopom znanja. Na tej poti so se nove »discipline« razvile kot mehanizmi izključevanja in vključevanja, pri čemer so se sčasoma izoblikovali ne le partikularni interesi in žargon, temveč tudi moč za nadzor dostopa do znanstvene skupnosti (Warleigh-Lack in Cini 2009). Že sam izraz *disciplina* je pomenljiv, saj ima dvojni pomen: lahko se nanaša na akademsko specializacijo, lahko pa tudi na dejavnosti prisile in podreditve. V slednjem pomenu gre za izvajanje moči. Tudi izvor besede (znanstvene) discipline jo povezuje z močjo in hierarhijo: iz latinske besede disciplina, ki se nanaša na poučevanje učencev s strani starešin. Pri disciplinah gre torej za moč, hierarhijo in nadzor pri organiziranju znanja (Moran 2006). Bistveno vprašanje, ki se poraja, je, kako razumeti to prevladujočo prakso delitev družboslovja: jo ohranjati ali presegati. Bibič je ponujal neprestano refleksijo prav tega.

Že sredi 60. let prejšnjega stoletja je bila politologija na Slovenskem pred pomembnimi koraki, ko se je vzpostavljalo politološko društvo, katerega namen je bil med drugim tudi konstituiranje politologije kot posebnega znanstvenega polja: »Politološko društvo, ki ga ustanavljamo, […] ne bo združevalo zgolj politologov v ožjem pomenu besede, marveč tudi vse druge, ki prispevajo k bogatenju politične misli« (Bibič 1968, 636). S tem je nakazano, da sta potrebni širina in odprtost znanosti navzven, vključno v razmerju do drugih znanosti, vednostnih okvirov in form spoznavanja: »Ozko cehovsko zaprtost, ki je včasih nevarna strokovnim društvom, bo novo društvo lahko presegalo tudi na ta način, da bo spodbujalo tesne stike s sorodnimi društvi in znanstvenimi disciplinami« (Bibič 1968, 637). Toda katere discipline naj bodo povezane, s katerimi znanstvenimi panogami naj išče politična znanost sinergije, skupna naslavljanja fenomenov in procesov ter drugih aktualnosti? Pri tem je Bibič izjemno širok in vidi prednosti v povezovanju mnogih disciplin, vključno s pravom, ki »posreduje politični znanosti zelo pomembna spoznanja glede institucionalne strukture sodobnih pravnih in političnih ustanov in njihovega delovanja«, in ekonomijo, ki ponuja »s svojo analizo ekonomske strukture družbe nepogrešljivo izhodišče za situiranje političnega« (Bibič 1968, 636). Poleg tega pa omeni tudi filozofijo, ki je zanj

pomembna, ker »prispeva z razvojem dialektičnih kategorij, etične in spoznavne teorije pomembno spodbudo za oblikovanje«; poleg filozofije omenja še socialno psihologijo in sociologijo (Bibič 1968, 637).

Povezovanje številnih družboslovnih disciplin je pomembno, ker omogoča politologom, da si pri reševanju in poskusih razumevanja družbenih problemov izposojajo znanje iz različnih teoretičnih in metodoloških tradicij ter sodelujejo prek subdisciplinarnih in disciplinarnih meja. To lahko spodbudi tudi »nove načine razumevanja ključnih problemov«, ter obenem »tudi nove načine njihovega preučevanja«, kar je še posebej pomembno pri vprašanjih, ki so se »pred kratkim pojavila na radarju politične znanosti« (Warleigh-Lack in Cini 2009, 10). Po eni strani prav disciplinarni okvir, sestavljen iz skupnih tradicij, kodeksov in praks, omogoča smiselno delitev dela in olajša skupne poskuse motrenja identificiranih problemov (Goodin 2011). Po drugi pa je v skladu z naravo proučevanih problemov smiselno povezovanje disciplin onkraj njihovih lastnih meja in se v tem smislu interdisciplinarnost nanaša na prečenje znanstvenih področij, in sicer s sodelovanjem in medsebojno uporabo spoznanj znanstvenikov iz različnih disciplin z možnostjo refleksivnosti, ki »velja tako za metodologijo kot za teorijo in empirično literaturo« (Warleigh-Lack in Cini 2009, 10).

Tudi za Bibiča (1972, 565) je politološko polje kot specifičen vednostni okvir sestavljen iz mnoštva pogledov in delovanj ter pristopov k političnim problemom, saj naslovi sodelovanje posameznih politoloških (pod)disciplin, obenem pa kljub interni heterogenosti polja zagovarja prečenje meja in integracijsko delovanje različnih znanosti, saj »si je težko zamisliti kompleksno proučevanje političnih sistemov brez poznavanja skupinske strukture posameznih družb (ki jih proučuje sociologija), gospodarskih procesov (ki jih proučuje ekonomija), pravne strukture (ki so predmet juridičnih disciplin) itd.« (Bibič 1972, 565). Ravno razmerje politologije do prava kot znanstvene vede je posebej upoštevano in relevantno, saj se Bibič (1972; 1981a) večkrat giblje med koristnostjo prava za politologijo in kritiko prava kot vede, ki postavlja pod vprašaj relevantnost in celo eksistenco politologije: »[…] [n]i pa sprejemljiva teza, ki politologiji odreka pravico do 'avtonomije'. Pravne vede vsekakor pokrivajo normativni in pomemben del politične realnosti. In političnega razmerja ni mogoče reducirati na pravno razmerje. Je veliko bolj obsežna […]« (Bibič 1981a, 251). Zdi se, da prek vsaj deloma konfliktnega razmerja s pravom pokaže na razsežnosti politologije in njeno prekrivanje z drugimi vedami, ko argumentira, da morajo tudi druge vede prepoznati relevantnost politologije, ki pa obenem upošteva dognanja drugih ved. Če je iz tega bolj ali manj jasno, da je v sodelovanju in doprinosu drugih znanosti videl krepitev politologije, pa je obenem razmerje med različnimi disciplinami razumel kot družbenopolitično pogojeno. Z drugimi besedami, razmerja med (družboslovnimi) disciplinami ni videl samostoječe, temveč situirano v konkretne kontekste, pri čemer so slednji pogoj možnosti; narekujejo in vzpostavljajo to razmerje.

Doslej smo v tem razdelku prispevka pokazali pomembnost povezovanja politologije z drugimi vedami ter, morda še bolj relevantno, da je politologija

veda, ki lahko smiselno črpa koncepte, raziskovalne metodologije, metode in ne nazadnje tudi ugotovitve drugih ved. Toda s tem nikakor niso izčrpane vse dimenzije razmerja politične znanosti do drugih znanstvenih področij, saj je za Bibiča pomembno prepoznavati konstitutivnost politologije za celotno družboslovje ter v tem okviru tudi za druge sorodne vede. Zakaj? Primarno zato, ker »politika eden osrednjih družbenih pojavov sodobnega sveta, ki postaja kot zavestno usmerjanje družbe celo čedalje pomembnejša, nujno narekuje, da drugi družboslovni profili, zlasti tisti, ki se ukvarjajo s temeljnimi problemi naše družbe in sodobnega sveta, vsebujejo tudi politološko znanje« (Bibič 1975, 228). Politika je prepoznana kot temeljna človekova dejavnost. Zgolj z njo in prek nje družbe urejajo odnose in skupne zadeve in za celostno uresničevanje družboslovnih obveznosti je torej ključnega pomena poznavanje sodobnih političnih odnosov in procesov: »iz zahtev sodobnega družboslovnega študija izhaja potreba, da morajo sorodne smeri vsebovati tudi moderna in teoretična, komparativna znanja, znanja iz političnega sistema, novejših političnih idej in mednarodnih odnosov« (Bibič 1991, 1137). S tem odpre pomembno sporočilo, in sicer, da je kritično ukvarjanje s prakso bistvo večine politoloških pristopov in teorij. Velik izziv za politologe ni v tem, ali imajo vpliv, temveč v tem, da premagajo klasično splošno skepso glede relevantnosti vpliva ugotovitev in rezultatov raziskav, ki jih lahko ponudijo. Zato vztraja, da je usidranost politologije v temelju nujna tudi v drugih vedah, celo tistih onkraj družboslovja: »mehanizme, funkcije in delovanje političnih institucij in socialnih gibanj morajo poznati ne samo strokovnjaki družboslovci (politolog, sociolog, ekonomist itn.), marveč tudi strokovnjaki z nedružboslovnih področij (inženirji različnih strok, arhitekti, agronomi, fiziki, kemiki, elektrotehniki, strojniki, zdravniki itn.)« (Bibič 1975, 229).

POLITOLOGIJA IN IZOBRAŽEVANJE

V okviru moderne politične znanosti, vsaj od njene institucionalne afirmacije in razvoja konkretnih (pod)disciplin, obstaja tradicija tematiziranja njene vloge v izobraževanju in še posebej pri izobraževanju o politiki. Pri tej refleksiji vloge politologije ne gre le za vprašanje intervencij na področju (državnih) izobraževalnih politik, temveč tudi za vprašanje osmišljanja ter konceptualiziranja možnih pristopov. Tako Schachter (1998) pokaže, da je bila od konca 19. stoletja, ko se je v Združenih državah Amerike uveljavljala Ameriška politološka zveza (APSA), politična oziroma državljanska vzgoja pomembno polje, na katero je APSA intervenirala z analizami ustreznega pristopa k državljanski vzgoji na osnovni- in srednješolski ravni. V začetku 20. stoletja je bila, tako kot še danes, formalizacija politične vzgoje v izobraževalnem in šolskem sistemu pomembna v smislu zagotavljanja »dobrih« državljanov (Heater 2003) in kot taka del oblastnih mehanizmov, katerih del je tudi produkcija vednosti (Foucault 1980).

Vprašanje vloge politične znanosti v kontekstu njenih intervencij na polju političnega izobraževanja in vzgoje je stalnica, ki se kar naprej vrača. V obdobju 60. in 70. let je bil eno najvidnejših imen britanske politologije Bernard Crick

del reanimacije zanimanja politične znanosti glede izobraževanja o politiki na različnih ravneh formalnega izobraževalnega sistema. Skupaj z Derekom Heatherjem je Crick (1977) objavil serijo mestoma tudi (do takratnih ureditev političnega izobraževanja) kritičnih člankov, kako in na kakšen način sistematizirati izobraževanje o politiki ter kakšno vlogo naj ima v družbi. Kot pravi Crick (2012, 19), je eden od pomembnih ciljev krepitev politične aktivnosti mladine, »saj smo sedaj v času, ko nas skrbi, da je naša mlada generacija vse bolj aktivno odtujena ali povsem nezainteresirana za naše politične institucije« (Crick 2012, 19). Hunter in Brisbin (2003, 759) ugotavljata, da je zahodna liberalna politična misel utrjena v prepričanju o nepogrešljivosti političnega in državljanskega izobraževanja. Slednje je širša javna naloga politične znanosti, še posebej, kot pravi Putnam (2003, 253), v kontekstu potrebne revitalizacije politične vzgoje oziroma izobraževanja. Prisega na problemsko orientirano politično znanost, ki bo angažirana in bo ponujala rešitve.

Tradicija kontinuirane refleksije vloge politične znanosti (v liberalnodemokratičnih ureditvah) pri zamišljanju, oblikovanju in tudi implementaciji politik ter praks (političnega) izobraževanja napotuje k vpogledu, kako se je Bibič kot ena osrednjih osebnosti v politologiji na Slovenskem (v kontekstu socialistične ureditve) loteval premisleka te vloge.

Brez dvoma Bibič največ pozornosti glede izobraževanja namenja tistemu na visokošolski ravni in njegovi premisleki gredo predvsem v smeri oblikovanja politoloških profilov. V tem kontekstu je osmišljanje izobraževanja politologov podobno kot osmišljanje politologije in njene družbenopolitične relevantnosti nasploh, pri čemer je ena od ključnih determinant njena zgodovinska situiranost. Tako pravi (Bibič 1975, 221), da je nujna sestavina politološkega profila tudi politično zgodovinske narave, kamor sodita novejša socialna in politična zgodovina. Ta vidik je pomemben, ker »daje slušatelju, bodočemu politologu, dokaj obsežno znanje« in ker »bodoči politolog ne pogleda samo v politiko, v politične procese, odnose in institucije, marveč tudi v odnose med politiko in drugimi družbenimi področji, kot so ekonomija, pravo, družbeni razredi in družbeni sloji« (Bibič 1975, 221). Toda zakaj je zgodovinska perspektiva – poleg tega, da daje vpoglede tudi v druga področja – tako konstitutivna za politološki profil? Eden od pomembnih razlogov je v tem, da bo »sposoben analizirati sodobne družbene procese in politične pojave v tej zgodovinski perspektivi, da bo tudi sam sposoben prispevati k njenemu uresničevanju« (Bibič 1975, 223). Izobraževanje je vedno pred konkretnimi dilemami ali pastmi, ki jih je mogoče detektirati v fenomenih, kot so nevarnost empiricizma (zgolj faktično in pravno-formalistično znanje oziroma vednost) in normativizma, avtoritarizma in političnega pragmatizma ter avtarkičnega akademizma (Bibič 1975, 223). Sploh slednje je za Bibiča venomer pomembno vprašanje, ki ga je potrebno zastavljati in obravnavati tudi prek sistematizacije in izvajanja izobraževanja. V tej smeri ugotavlja, da je politološka izobrazba podobna kot drugi družboslovni profili, kot so sociolog, ekonomist, pravnik. Vendar se hkrati od slednjih pomembno razločuje in ima

svoje specifike, med drugim, da politolog ni zgolj čist in tehnični strokovnjak, temveč je »družbeno angažiran, prizadet ob temeljnih problemih naše družbe in zavzet za njihovo razreševanje. Pedagoški proces na visokošolski ravni mora torej formirati politologe, ki bodo sposobni strokovno analizirati politične procese in posredovati politična znanja […]« (Bibič 1975, 221). Vlogo izobraževanja usmerja h konkretnim dejanskostim in spodbuja idejo, da morajo politologi v družbo tudi intervenirati.

Čeprav je torej Bibič osmišljal izobraževalni proces na visokošolski ravni, predvsem na področju politologije, prek njegove utemeljenosti in skladnosti ter povezanosti s socialističnimi idejami (samoupravljanja) in praksami, pa to ne pomeni, da je pri tem hermetičen in ne dopušča heterogenosti perspektiv, pozicij in naborov vednostnih okvirov. O tem nenazadnje govori (Bibič 1981b, 514), ko izpostavlja, da politološki izobraževalni proces nujno pomeni upoštevanje vseh dosedanjih izkušenj in njihovo bogatenje z novimi rešitvami (Bibič 1981b, 514). Pri tem pa ne gre le za interno heterogenost pogledov znotraj politologije, temveč tudi preseganje meja politične znanosti, kar se mora prevajati tudi v izobraževalne procese. Zato je potrebno »presegati tako pritiske za ozko, zgolj politološko profiliranje, ki bi izključevalo druge discipline (politična ekonomija, sociologija, filozofija, zgodovina marksizma itd.), kot tiste, ki bi politološki študij radi razumeli kot nekakšen zgolj splošen zbir družboslovnega znanja, brez nekaterih bistvenih politoloških disciplin« (Bibič 1981b, 514).

Še nadaljnji vidik spodbujanja heterogenosti v okviru sistematizacije politološkega izobraževanja je internacionalizacija, in sicer primarno v smislu širjenja ter razvoja politične znanosti. Tako pravi, da je internacionalizacija »[…] dejansko zakonit pojav sodobnega sveta. O tem priča dejstvo, da je čedalje več dežel, ne glede na politične sisteme, ki uvajajo politično znanost v strukturo svojih raziskovalnih in pedagoških institucij« (Bibič 1981b, 514). Pri tem opaža, da je gonilna sila Mednarodno združenje za politične vede (IPSA), v okviru katerega se spodbuja razvoj politične znanosti ne le v zahodnem svetu, temveč tudi v deželah v razvoju. Kasneje je Bibič (1991 1137–38) še dodatno utrdil prepričanje, da mora ureditev izobraževanja oziroma politološkega študija izvirati tudi iz izkušenj in študijskih ureditev nekaterih razvitih evropskih držav in ZDA. Pri tem je kot bistveno izpostavil predvsem nujnost refleksije in samorefleksije, ki je pogojena z novimi realnostmi postindustrijske informacijske družbe. Slednja zahteva »politično znanost, ki bo ustrezno odgovorila na zahteve 'postmoderne' družbe: zahtevo po novem vrednotenju urejanja in samourejanja družbenih procesov […]« ter politično znanost, ki bo odgovorila na potrebo »po novem vrednotenju razmerja med načelom večine in med demokracijo, ki vključuje priznavanje temeljnih pravic in svoboščin človeka in manjšin; ki politiko vrednoti kot kontinuiran proces med posameznikom, asociacijo, narodom in svetom« (Bibič 1991, 1137–38).

Poleg usmerjenosti na izobraževanje v okviru politološkega študija je Bibič (1975) obravnaval tudi vlogo politične znanosti in političnih vsebin v razmerju

do drugih nivojev (političnega in družboslovnega) izobraževanja, predvsem srednješolskega. Utrjeval je prepričanje, da so sicer vsi predmeti pomembni z vidika njihovih vzgojnih funkcij, vendar imajo v tej luči posebno mesto nekateri družboslovni predmeti, ki imajo že tradicionalno mesto v učnem načrtu, kot so na primer filozofija, zgodovina, slovenski jezik s književnostjo ter geografija. Ob tem si zastavlja vprašanje, kakšno je mesto in prisotnost politoloških vsebin (na primer v učnih načrtih), še bolj pa, kakšna je usposobljenost učiteljic in učiteljev za posredovanje politoloških vsebin v okviru obstoječih (in morebitnih bodočih) družboslovnih predmetov (Bibič 1975, 230–31). Pri tem je povsem neposreden in pravi, da bo v »pedagoški praksi takšen učitelj potreboval temeljno znanje iz novejših in sodobnih političnih doktrin, mednarodnih ekonomskih in političnih odnosov […]« ter tudi »naravo politike, teorijo političnih subjektov, teoretične probleme politične ideologije in oblike in metode politične aktivnosti« (Bibič 1975, 231).

Nadalje Bibič (1975) odpre vlogo politične znanosti in politologov v splošnoizobraževalnih procesih, ki segajo onkraj formalnega izobraževalnega sistema. Ne omeji se torej le na učilnice in predavalnice ter pedagoške procese v državnih izobraževalnih institucijah, temveč pokaže, da je izobraževalni proces mnogo širši in da je pomembno in potrebno afirmirati tudi politološka znanja. Tako pravi, da je funkcijo politologije potrebno obravnavati tudi z vidika njene »splošne političnokulturne vloge, ki jo ima zunaj uresničevanja omenjenih [izobraževalnih] smotrov in ciljev«, in sicer ima politična znanost posebne naloge »v množičnem idejno-izobraževalnem procesu in v procesu 'politične socializacije' nekaterih skupin, ki glede na svojo poklicno ali drugo družbeno vlogo potrebujejo dodatno ali aktualizirano politično znanje« (Bibič 1975, 232). Politološka znanja so tako nujen element številnih neformalnih izobraževanj.

SKLEP: PERCEPCIJE O POLITIKI, KONCEPTUALIZIRANJE POLITIKE TER VLOGA POLITIČNE ZNANOSTI

Po besedah Warrena (1999, 208) je potrebno v okviru politične znanosti na konceptualni ravni vedno znova premišljati, kaj je politika. Mogoče je reči, da je to najbolj splošno vprašanje in odgovarjanje nanj najbolj osnovno početje v okviru politologije (Heywood 2021), toda po drugi strani spreminjajoči se družbenopolitični konteksti sprožajo, zahtevajo, pogojujejo nove koncepcije politike in se odzivajo nanje. V okviru teh izzivov in možnosti lahko govorimo (Warren 1999) o treh možnih premislekih, kaj pravzaprav počnemo, ko skušamo konceptualizirati politiko. Prvič, koncepcija politike lahko pomagati razjasniti naše normativne interese v politiki, ki so seveda vezani na okoliščine in kontekste ter konkretne družbene formacije in politične sisteme. Drugič, koncepcije politike lahko orišejo, predstavijo in izražajo vsakdanje in prevladujoče razumevanje politike, zlasti ko to kaže na spreminjajoča se področja politike ter spreminjajoče se normativne omejitve in možnosti. Tretjič, da koncepcija zajema opredelitev področij politike na način, ki je dovolj specifična, da je podlaga za razlago oziroma

interpretacijo. V vseh treh primerih ali smereh premisleka o ozadju razčiščevanja in konceptualiziranja politike je implicitno prisotna tudi pozicija politične znanosti in njene vloge ter namena. Glede na prvi premislek je politična znanost razumljena kot usidrana v historične in sodobne kontekste in intervenira v politično, bodisi implicitno bodisi eksplicitno. Pri drugem premisleku je predpostavljena vloga politične znanosti predvsem osvetljevanje hegemonskih predstav o politiki, oblastnih odnosov, prek katerih se vzpostavlja politično. Pri tretjem premisleku pa je predpostavljena vloga politične znanosti predvsem interpretirati konkretne politične prakse, fenomene, procese in institucionalne ureditve, v in prek katerih delujejo posamezniki ter skupnosti (Warren 1999). Tudi Bibič je vprašanje, kaj je politika, ter poskuse konceptualizacije politike pogosto obdeloval v navezavi na vprašanje vloge politične znanosti.

Eden od vidikov konceptualizacije politike, ki jih ponuja Bibič (1981c) v navezavi na vprašanje vloge politične znanosti, je podoba politike kot sfere odtujevanja. Pri tem je opozoril, da je depolitizacija v takratnem kontekstu pomenila dve stvari, ki nikakor nista identični. Na eni strani depolitizacija označuje padanje interesa za politiko in beg iz politike, iz sfere javnega delovanja v sfero ožjih skupinskih ali zgolj zasebnih interesov. Na drugi pa je t. i. samoupravna depolitizacija, ki ne pomeni upada zanimanja za politiko, temveč pomeni pripravljenost ljudi, da z osebnim angažmajem sodelujejo v oblikovanju in gradnji skupnosti. Samoupravna depolitizacija ne osamlja človeka in ga ne individualizira, temveč povezuje ljudi v kolektiv; s tem ne gre za antipolitično pozicijo, temveč globoko družbeno ozaveščeno težnjo: »skupnost lahko živi in se oblikuje kot svobodna skupnost le, če raste iz pravic in svoboščin človeka in občana, iz delovnih in življenjskih kolektivov kot aktivnih subjektov, ki se hkrati zavedajo dolžnosti in odgovornosti do drugih« (Bibič 1981c, 887). S tem je Bibič postavil politizacijo in depolitizacijo kot dva obraza politike v središče politične znanosti. Pri tem vlogo politične znanosti glede tega politološkega in političnega izziva opredeli prek Antionia Gramscija, ki je: »po ugotovitvi, da je prvi element politike, 'da zares obstajajo vladani in vladajoči, upravljalci in izvrševalci', svojo misel dopolnil s pomembno zgodovinsko napotnico: 'Pri vzgoji upravljalcev je temeljnega pomena načelo: ali želimo, da bodo vedno vladani in vladajoči, ali želimo ustvariti pogoje, v katerih bo izginila nujnost takšne delitve?'« (Bibič 1981c, 888). V tem je za Bibiča tudi ena od funkcij politične znanosti, ki mora razvijati specifično teorijo družbenega usmerjanja, tako da bodo razmerja in organiziranost družbe horizontalna in bo temeljila na skupnosti: »Ena izmed bistvenih nalog politične znanosti je ravno v tem, da sooblikuje takšen koncept politike, v katerem bo tematika usmerjanja in »vodstva« organsko povezana s perspektivo razvoja samoupravljanja in podružbljanja interesov in politike« (Bibič 1981c, 890). Gre za konceptualno širitev pojma politike, izhajajoč iz prepoznanja, da politika, tako kot drugi družbeni pojavi, ne more biti označena zgolj z eno ali nekaj značilnostmi. Politična znanost pa je polje, kjer so možne refleksije in konceptualizacije politike onkraj prevladujočih predpostavk, kar je relevantno tudi

v kontekstu sodobnih družb, pri čemer prevladuje upad zanimanja za politiko (Gamble 2006) in je slednja utemeljena na ekonomski racionalnosti kot tehtanje stroškov in koristi posameznika (Giroux 1993).

Refleksijo pojma politike je Bibič (1983) nadalje razvijal tudi v smeri enega ključnih vprašanj (če že ne najpomembnejšega) v okviru politologije, in sicer razmerij moči in delovanja oblasti. Pomemben izhodiščni uvid glede tega je splošna percepcija politike kot sfere zatiranja, manipuliranja, vladanje ene družbene skupine nad drugo. Skozi in prek te percepcije je politika nekaj kar a priori nasprotuje svobodi, emancipaciji, enakosti. Politiko se povezuje z zvijačnostjo, nemoralnostjo, posluževanjem umazanih sredstev (Bibič 1983, 1641). Kot odgovor na te izrisane prevladujoče podobe politike najprej zoperstavi analitično razčlenjene koncepte politike, med katere umesti antični, liberalni in marksistični koncept, za katere pravi, da se razlikujejo glede družbeno-ekonomske, socialno-strukturne in politično-institucionalne ter individualno-človeške komponente (Bibič 1983, 1642). Pri vseh treh koncepcijah ponudi oris glede osmišljanja razmerja moči in emancipacije, vendar naloga politične znanosti ni zgolj orisovanje obstoječih konceptualizacij politike ter prikaz njihove heterogenosti, temveč tudi zavrnitev osmišljanja politike kot (zgolj) nasilja in dominacije prek artikulacije alternativnega pogleda: »Nova sinteza […] zahteva, da politike ne obravnavamo zgolj kot sredstva v boju za družbeno moč in politično oblast, marveč hkrati kot cilj, v uresničevanju katerega se z nekega pomembnega vidika konstituira človek kot skupnostno bitje« (Bibič 1983, 1646). Novo sintezo črpa iz več obstoječih konceptov, med drugim iz antične koncepcije politike, ki pravi, da je politika tudi prizadevanje po »boljšem življenju«, še bolj pa se pri novi sintezi nasloni na Karla Marxa in na koncepte politike, ki se sklicujejo na njegovo ime. V tej luči izpostavi množični značaj politike ne samo po obliki, marveč tudi po vsebini: »Nova sinteza politike, ki ji gre za emancipacijo, vsebuje množično komponento, ki se razlikuje tako od antične manjšinske množice kot od liberalnodemokratičnega formalnega univerzalizma po tem, da osveščena in artikulirana množica v njej dejansko deluje oziroma naj bi čedalje bolj delovala kot aktivni zgodovinski subjekt« (Bibič 1983, 1646). Se je pa zavedal, da politika ni zgolj emancipacija in da je potrebno razumevati tudi specifične formacije oblastnih odnosov ter heterogenosti načinov izvajanja oblasti. Na tej točki se nasloni na Michela Foucaulta, za katerega Bibič (1983 1647) pravi, da je opozoril na problematiko »mikrofizike gospostva« ter s tem na kapilarno strukturo oblasti: »področja politike ne moremo omejiti zgolj na klasične globalne predstavniške institucije in na njihove odnose do razredov in družbe, marveč so politični odnosi vtkani v vse tiste institucije, kjer se srečujemo z razmerji nadrejenosti in podrejenosti, disciplineiranja, kaznovanja in »normalizacije« ljudi« (Bibič 1983, 1647). Vloga politične znanosti je torej kompleksno razumevanje politike skozi njene raznolike obraze.

Ob koncu izpostavimo še naslednje: če je Bibič, kot smo pokazali v prispevku, obravnaval politologijo v številnih elementih in premišljal predvsem negativne in problematične vidike politike, ki posledično pod vprašaj postavljajo tudi

politično znanost, pa tozadevne tematike ni puščal na abstraktni ravni. Obratno, zanimalo ga je, kako sta politika ter občutek krize politike širše razumljena (Bibič 1986, 1407) in kako je antipolitizem konkretno artikuliran (Bibič 1981c). V povezavi s tem je znova jasno videl konkretno vlogo in naloge politične znanosti, ki ima »v takih kriznih razmerah ne samo dolžnost, da analizira vzroke in fenomenologijo krize, marveč da tudi ugotavlja globlje vzroke in tista družbena sredstva, ki naj prispevajo k izhodu iz krize« (Bibič 1986, 1407). In konec koncev je za Bibiča (1995) tudi po prehodu Slovenije v demokratično ureditev osrednji smoter politične znanosti naslavljati in ugotavljati, kakšen je odnos ljudi do politike, ker so nujni uvidi v politično kulturo in politično življenje, kako biva politika in kakšno vlogo se ji pripisuje v družbi. Politična znanost se mora v tem kontekstu ves čas zazirati vase, še posebej v času permanentnih kriz, ki smo jim priča tudi dandanes. In v tem smislu mora politologija spodbujati kritike obstoječega reda in situiranost politike v njem, če naj ohranja in krepi svojo relevantnost.

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Žiga VODOVNIK*

POLITICAL SCIENCE OF THE FUTURE: ADOLF BIBIČ AND THE FUTUROLOGICAL COMPONENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE**

Abstract. *The article presents an attempt to make sense of Adolf Bibič's* oeuvre *as a whole. It reveals his broader intellectual (and also political) project along with his coherent and systematic analysis of what may also be understood as the 'possibilities' of political science. We claim that Bibič's various analyses and interventions actually pivot on the question of the future or, even better, the role and position of political science in it. We name this aspect of Bibič's oeuvre the 'political science of the future', which necessarily returns to the history of political ideas and political history to even be able to understand the current political relations and their contradictions. The ambition and capacity of the 'political science of the future' is not merely an explanation of what exists since, as Bibič states, political science is the key science for facing the challenges of the future and, accordingly, vital for our existence – political and physical.*
Keywords: *Adolf Bibič, political science, future, state, democracy, citizenship.*

INTRODUCTION

When I was a student at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana I did not have the privilege of getting to know Professor Adolf Bibič in the lecture room. Nevertheless, as a freshman in 1997, namely, 1 year after Bibič's death, his *oeuvre*, meeting all the criteria of academic excellence (broadness, depth and originality) was available to me. The reference points on my journey of intellectual development were not only Bibič's 'key works', such as *Kaj je politična znanost?* ([1969] 2021), *Zasebništvo in skupnost* ([1972] 1984), *Politična znanost, ideologija, politika* (1978), Civilno društvo i politički pluralizam (1990) and *Civilna družba in politični pluralizem* (1997)[1] – these came much later. The first

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[1] This book, edited by Niko Toš, consists of Bibič's articles and discussions from his later period and its full title is Politološki preseki: civilna družba in politični pluralizem.

'consultations' came in the form of his contribution to the history of (American) political thought in his article *Politična misel federalistov (posebej glede na Madisonov esej št. 10)* (1992a), accompanied by Bibič's *lege artis* translation of *The Federalist Papers No. 10*. For a student negotiating the twists and turns of political science (and the study of political science), there followed further "one-to-one tutorials" when it came to contemplating the role, state and prospects of the discipline (*Študij politologije: nekaj izhodišč k njegovi vsebini, členitvi in funkcijah glede na reformo študija* 1991) or a more in-depth understanding of the processes of political pluralisation in Slovenia (*Nekateri vidiki pluralizacije družbe in države na Slovenskem* 1992b; *Politika – še vedno umazana pesem* 1995). Moreover, we should not forget Bibič's 'macro' analyses of the ideological transformations in the second half of the 20th century, which still provide the much-needed context for understanding the current crises of capitalism and the state (*Konec zgodovine?* 1992c; *Civilna družba in demokracija* 1993).[2]

Let us stress already in the introduction that this paper does not deal with Bibič's contribution to the development of political science in Slovenia. On the contrary, we are interested in the position of political science today and its relationship with other social sciences, but especially its prospects, as Adolf Bibič already discussed and anticipated in his works. We claim that Bibič's various analyses and interventions actually pivot on the question of the future or, even better, the role and position of political science in it. That is why we name this aspect of Bibič's *oeuvre* the 'political science of the future'. In his *Politična znanost, ideologija, politika*, Bibič thus notes that it is precisely the "futurological component, anticipation, planning and the vision of the future … that is one of its essential elements" (Bibič 1978, 52). According to Bibič, the 'political science of the future' necessarily returns to the history of political ideas and political history to even be able to understand the current political relations and their contradictions. Given that, in Bibič's view, "the past already includes an anticipation of the future" (ibid., 52) and that "the present with its tendencies towards the future is its main field of research" (ibid., 55), the ambition and capacity of the "political science of the future" is not merely to provide an the explanation of what exists, that is, the current division of labour and the social structure based on it, the subjects living here, the known political motivations and conceptions (ideologies) or the established modes of political operation. Instead, Bibič understands the 'political science of the future' as a key science for facing the challenges of the future because it is necessary for our existence – political and physical. Even more so in the apocalyptic times we are living in.

It is becoming ever clearer that the climate crisis is not threatening us only with environmental and economic destruction. Primarily, it threatens to cause – and therein also lies its direct, albeit often overlooked danger – our political

[2] In these articles, Bibič discusses the "fundamental contradictions of the contemporary 'post'-era" (1992c, 527).

destruction. The contours of the climate crisis can already be traced in the slow, but persistent inhibition of politics and the undermining of political communities, the very idea of community or the commons and, last but not least, civilisational achievements, we could even claim decency itself. Today, we can already see the new territorial constellations, nexuses and vectors that are producing a new "geography of strategic spaces" and a "new geography of centrality" (Sassen 2012), where the position and role of the state are significantly redefined. In her analyses of the new configurations of territoriality and transnational politics, Saskia Sassen poses an important, if not even the crucial question: *Are we able to detect the formation of new* political *forms within the old or existing* political *conditions?*

Adolf Bibič also asked this question countless times in his works. Still, we cannot and should not understand Bibič and the 'political science of the future' in the sense of futurological conjectures, let alone eschatological claims. Bibič's 'political science of the future' proceeds from the simple, yet infinitely complicated thesis that, in a period of the unimagined transformation of the world and political breakdowns, political science assumes the role of "anticipating, planning and envisioning the future". In addressing the "conceptually broader circle of problems" before us, however, the 'political science of the future' cannot remain immune to the changes the world is undergoing, which, according to Bibič, is why it must maintain its analytical edge by constantly redefining the object of its research along with its fundamental concepts, approaches and methods.

BACK TO POLITICS

As Igor Lukšič (1996, 873) wrote in an obituary following Bibič's death, Bibič "belonged to the great republic of the spirit whose citizens are also all political scientists". In light of the current deviations of political science, we can of course polemicise whether it is still the case that *all* political scientists belong to this republic. Frances Fox Piven (2004) argues that contemporary political science is increasingly more often reduced to policy science or uncritical, instrumental social research.[3] It is not insignificant that, in his *Kaj je politična znanost?*, Adolf Bibič ([1969] 2021, 28) highlighted the danger of "nationalising politics" or the unjustified equation of politics and the state. It is also not insignificant that, in (re)defining the limits of research in political science, he argued that political science is a science about power, drawing on the concept of *cratology*. Bibič thus does not limit the object of political science merely by the logics and regimes of

[3] With this, Fox Piven not only refers to the excessive fragmentation of the political science community into individual subdisciplines and theoretical and methodological orientations, but chiefly draws attention to the loss of its autonomy and mission since the research policies – for example, the underfunding of basic, theoretical research and the pauperisation of certain parts of the political science community, with which we are very familiar – force it into its tacit collaboration in the defence of the existing socio-economic relations and inhibitions of politics itself.

governing (so *arkhē*), but places in the essence of political science the broader conception of politics – political power or capacity (so *krátos*). He wrote the following on this view of the object of political science:

> *The advantage of this starting point lies especially in it not being limited to studying merely state structures, but, as a rule, including a conceptually broader circle of problems. Attention thus shifts from the purely institutional system of state bodies, which hold in the monopoly of physical coercion the last sanction of their highest political power, to a series of other social lines of force, which operate in close connection with state power or in relation to it, but also have their specific functions; and sometimes it even encompasses questions that are not related to the functioning of the state at all.* (ibid., 29)

In the above quote, we find not only Bibič's call for a broader and deeper understanding of the very object of political science, but also his call to rethink the role and position of political science and its community. He was even more direct in this regard in the foreword to the reissued *Zasebništvo in skupnost*, where he wrote:

> *If social scientists were robots examining society and politics in a completely disinterested way, where would they find the strength to persist on the rocky road of science? And if, on the other hand, we expected them to work only as propagandists, why, then, would they not choose that profession instead?* (Bibič [1972] 1984, 9)

Bibič claims that the purpose of research in political science is not an "escape from reality" (Shapiro 2002), with scientificalness being erroneously equated with non-involvement and disinterest in the social struggles occurring outside our offices and lecture halls. It is clear that such "robotisation" of political science entails not simply the lack of interest and the "strength to persist on the rocky road of science", but also a path of moving away from a better understanding of political phenomena. On the other hand, according to Bibič, political science must not lead to a partisan defence or interpretation of partial theories and ideological explanations when, either with their creative and selective reading or their uncritical exegesis, it loses the distance sorely needed for critiquing and overcoming them.

In order for political science to "systematically and continuously study the genesis, structure and function of politics in the contemporary world" (Bibič [1969] 2021, 75), it must overcome the "envy towards other sciences" (Dahl 2004). The latter too often try to conceal their deficiencies with a thin veneer of scientific rigidity, as best illustrated by the dominating mantra of positivism and its attempts at a mechanistic and econometric explanation of reality. The consequences of this short-sightedness and uncritical imitation can be fatal.

Thus, in affirming political science, Bibič also points out precisely the incredible complexity of the field, which cannot be eliminated by way of reductionism in the understanding of the political and attempts at simplifying the operation of complex systems. With the constitution of political science and all of its heterogeneous and plural – that is, dialectical – approaches (with which it establishes itself and which it requires), the complexity of the field is not understood as a problem that needs to be resolved/eliminated, but as an opportunity that should be taken advantage of both academically and politically.[4] Bibič hence claims that the affirmation of political science as an independent scientific discipline is not important only for "science, but also for the political life of contemporary societies and the contemporary world" (Bibič [1969] 2021, 9).

EXCURSIONS

Not only due to space limitations, but mainly due to the aim and purpose of this contribution, the 'excursions' set out below are not conclusive, but speculative. Speculative not in the sense of conjecture, but in the sense of anticipating and imagining the current discussions on the dilemmas and challenges that political science faces at the beginning of the 21st century and in which Bibič would have participated or which he actually predicted in his contributions decades ago. This reveals the topicality of Bibič's 'political science of the future', which raises its ambition from a positivistic description, which is unstoppably becoming a thing of the past, to clarifying, explaining and co-creating the political future. That is why Bibič was right when claiming that political science can retain its topicality only by constantly redefining its object of research while persistently rethinking its fundamental concepts and recalibrating its approaches and methods. In view of the new conditions and challenges, they can quickly become outdated and useless when they lose touch with the dynamics of political events. They often no longer offer answers to the questions we are ourselves asking or, at best, only help us solve problems that no longer exist. Moreover, it is only with constant self-reflection and recreation that political science can remain or become a "scientific discipline that will not examine political activity in instalments, but will capture it as a whole" (Bibič [1969] 2021, 25; *cf.* Bibič 1991).

In the following sections, attention is paid to understanding the state, democracy and citizenship, with the *first excursion* problematising the predominant (geographic) explanations of the state in political science according to which the state is still limited to or even defined merely as a geographically delimited and unchangeable territory. We stress the loss of analytic sharpness in such considerations of the state as they completely overlook the processes of redefining and

[4] This is a simple realisation that political science addresses the key problems of contemporary societies and that, in the methodological and theoretical discussion on the latter, it allows itself or demands the innovativeness, improvisation and eclecticism that the research of a particular problem requires. Expressed differently, in discussing the political, political science subordinates its methods and theories to the problems and not vice versa, which Shapiro (2002) labels problem-driven research.

redistributing the state and thereby the processes of its de-/reterritorialisation and rescaling when the state is forced to adapt to the economic dynamics and no longer the other way round. The danger of the 'territorial trap' that is often unconsidered in examinations of the state is the simultaneous delimitation of the chronotope for understanding and researching democracy. This leads us in the *second excursion* to analyse the main theories of democracy and identify their biggest limitations – the erroneous equation of democracy and the rule of the people, which is realised only through state-forming projects.

Excursus I: the State

In recent decades, the state has encountered the growing power of (global) cities, corporations, intergovernmental organisations, non-governmental organisations and social movements. We are therefore witness to the gradual emergence of new territorial vectors, which make today's political topography more complex than ever before.[5] The state still functions as the main form of the territorialisation of capitalism, although the expansion of the capitalist economy and its rescaling of territoriality demand a simultaneous de-/reterritorialisation of the state on various levels. In his works, Bibič ([1969] 2021; 1991) justifiably cautioned that the political science community has to return to the question of how to (again) understand and re-conceptualise the state and adapt its categorial and methodological arsenal. Within the mainstream of political science, studies on the state remain split between excessive traditionalism and normativism, overlooking the current changes that demand new explanations, methods and approaches. They are thus still based on (geographical) assumptions that limit the state and its execution of power to a geographically demarcated and fixed territory or even define them in those terms.[6] Instead of political science understanding the state in its various historical mediations, as a rule it has resorted to a naïve reification of the state, which Edward W. Soja and Costis Hadjimichalis (1978) labelled "spatial fetishism" and John Agnew (1994) a "territorial trap".[7]

Neil Brenner (2004) also claims that political science lost its analytical edge when it considered the state as a "reconstituted geographical unit of analysis". It understood the state as "the self-enclosed geographical container of socioeconomic and politico-cultural relations" and often as the only one, which prevented researchers from going beyond the state-centric modes of working and researching. In his attempt to construct "new modes of analysis", Brenner combines fragments of heterodox, interdisciplinary and even post-disciplinary

[5] Because these processes globalised and at the same time localised the state, the latter now faces the challenge of "multi-level meta-governance" (Jessop 2009) in adapting to the current spatial and scalar restructurings.

[6] For a broader and more in-depth critique of "spatial fetishism" in contemporary theories of the state, see Vodovnik (2022).

[7] In his elaboration of the "territorial trap", Agnew notes that a reified understanding of the state predominates in contemporary political science, which is "too geographical and not sufficiently historical".

methodologies that reject *spatial fetishism*, *methodological territorialism*, *methodological nationalism* and, thereby, state-centric epistemologies.

In fact, many studies have managed to move beyond the state-centric geographical presupposition. However, as Brenner (1999, 41) notes, the old errors have been eliminated by introducing a new one: the state's conceptual negation. In other words, these new re-conceptualisations have detected the emerging spatial forms and consequently new political geographies, but have completely overlooked the role of the state in them – i.e., the new position of the state and, hence, the novel forms of its de-/reterritorialisation and rescaling. Brenner claims that the expansion of capitalism should be seen as a complex, conflictual process that not only includes the transcending of regulatory systems on the national scale – which is what we typically see and study – but also simultaneously produces the new sub- and supra-national modes of accumulation and the (state) control required to strengthen and coordinate this process.

By referring to the "scalar shift", Brenner (ibid., 62) indicates that the present wave of globalisation means that the global scale depends on the simultaneous reterritorialisation on a sub-global scale, mostly the new sub- and supra-national scales, and no longer exclusively on the national one. Moreover, we are witness to the inversion of the capital–state relationship since "it is no longer capital that is to be molded into the (territorially integrated) geography of state space, but state space that is to be molded into the (territorially differentiated) geography of capital" (Brenner 2004, 16). (Post)modern statehood thus means a complex and continuous rescaling "at once upwards, downwards and outwards", resulting in polymorphic institutional geographies (ibid., 66–67). Globalisation processes and the expansion of capitalism should be considered as a contradictory socio-spatial dialectic, constantly creating new configurations of territoriality. The studies on the emerging spatial and political forms therefore reveal that the contradictions of neoliberalism (short-term) on one hand and the broader project of modernity (long-term) on the other simultaneously are leading to: i) the expansion and acceleration of movements of goods, services, labour and capital; and ii) the creation and imposition of a (relatively) fixed socio-territorial infrastructure for enabling and controlling these processes (Brenner 1999, 43).

We can thus easily conclude that Bibič's theories anticipated the discussions on the state which the political science community is involved in today and that, even years and decades later, they can still easily and creatively enter into a fruitful dialogue with them.[8] Especially relevant in this regard are Bibič's warnings that what political science needs today is not only conceptual clarity and theoretical thoroughness, but a broader epistemological transformation that will enable a holistic research of political reality, while being able to cross and combine disciplinarily confined theoretical and methodological registers. To comprehensively

[8] For instance, his explorations of the contradictory relationship between state and society. See also Lukšič (2023).

understand the processes of de-/reterritorialisation and redefinition of the state, we need new concepts, methods and even research logic "where conceptual tools and methodological strategies are adopted with reference to the challenges of making sense of particular social phenomena rather than on the basis of traditional disciplinary divisions of labor". Such words we might easily ascribe to Bibič even though we actually find them in *New State Spaces* (2004), the arguably fundamental and epochal work by Neil Brenner.

Excursus II: Democracy

With a great deal of scepticism and reservation, Bibič observed the academic discussions on the triumph of (liberal) democracy supposedly brought about at the end of the 20th century by the end of history or rather the domination of a very specific economic and political paradigm. Bibič (1993, 772) noted that "the question of democracy is still an open problem for political science", warning about its simplified explanations or theories with which the political science community tried to subjugate it. As he remarked, "democracy (politics included) has sunny and shady sides, a dignified and efficient image, an institutional, value and behavioural reality" (ibid., 771). According to Bibič, democracy is hence neither a technique, procedure nor mechanics since there "is no serious discussion on democracy that would not also reflect on freedom, equality, human rights, brotherhood (solidarity) and, more recently, also the environment, welfare and peace" (ibid., 772). Despite this, a cursory overview of the current theoretical examinations of democracy quickly shows that recent discussions on democracy still suffer from the same illness diagnosed by Bibič years ago.

As Francesca Polletta (2002, vii) acknowledged, democracy is a most elusive concept that, with time, only becomes increasingly more difficult to study because, with the inflation of the word "democracy", the concept starts to lose its meaning. It comes as no surprise that Finley (1999, 15) even concluded that, due to all the semantic (ab)uses, democracy as a concept has been devalued to the point of analytical uselessness. Democracy is thus an empty signifier. Jacques Rancière (2014, 53) pointed out an even deeper problem in understanding democracy given that, in the current discussions, representative democracy is considered only as a pleonasm even though it has actually always been an oxymoron. What does he mean by that? In order to understand this paradox and the fateful consequences it holds for our conceptions of democracy, we must return to the discrepancy between the etymological origin or the original meaning of democracy and the use of this term today. Democracy never really meant the rule of the people, but was born as a word referring to the power or ability (*krátos*) of the people (dēmos).[9]

[9] More precisely, democracy became a substitute for republicanism only in the 18th and especially 19th century when it also assumed the meaning that it has today – namely, the rule of the people manifested through political representation, elections and majority.

In his analysis of democracy, Bibič (1981) returned to its duality. He does not discuss and demarcate direct democracy and representation only on the basis of their different physical modalities, so the (in)directness of bodies and space, but first and foremost deals with their own political and interest (in)directness. In this respect, Bibič reaffirmed the original understanding of democracy as direct democracy and thereby anticipated the revolutionary work of Bernard Manin (1997), which prompted the political science community to begin readdressing the principles of representative government and their (un)democraticness. Manin believed these principles do not entail a departure from the idea of (direct) democracy only in the moment of physical presence or absence, rather a deeper discontinuity is actually at stake, which the hegemonic theories of democracy do not even detect. What is at stake is the very understanding of a political community and the eligibility to be inscribed in the political process. According to Bibič and Manin, the key difference between the 'representative' and the 'direct' model thus lies not in the number of people participating in political decision-making but in the very method of selecting them. Representative systems are therefore not 'representative' due to the small number of persons ruling in the name of the people but due to the way the representatives are selected (elections) and interests mediated.

It is quite clear that democracy had always had a problematic relationship with the state. It was only later that it became involved in the state-forming projects and solidified the belief that there is no difference between them. According to James C. Scott (2009, 3–4), politics beyond the state is no exception, but instead a rule of history. The concept of uniform, homogeneous state politics is an invention of the modern age and emerged as a political or, better yet, depoliticising tool, which contemporary explanations of the state and democracy in political science usually forget. Scott claims that the tension between politics and the state should be understood as an "uneasy bargain", which has led to completely new forms of political membership and legibility:

> *Statecraft proved difficult in these conditions of vernacular measures and vernacular resistance to assessment … It is no exaggeration to claim that the conquest of illegibility is the most momentous achievement of the modern state. This required the standardization of weights and measures against determined local resistance. It required elaborate censuses and population rolls, cadastral surveys of landed property, and, not least, the institution of individual freehold properly adapted to cadastral science. The project of legibility allowed the state to "see" the human activity of interest to it through the simplified approximation of documents, lists, and statistics.* (Scott 2013, 97)

Here, Bibič's thesis that, paradoxically, the question of the state and democracy remains unresolved also in socialism, with the state becoming even the

only subject of political and social activity, is not insignificant: "Insofar as the state was becoming not only an important, but practically the only subject of the development of the socialist society, it seemed that all dialectics between the state and society disappeared" (Bibič 1981, 267). In his short and rough sketch of his extensive work *De l-État*, Henry Lefebvre claims something similar when stating that the modern state is founded precisely on the "principle of equivalence", which secures unity, identity and political integration. In his thinking about the state in the modern world, he opposed the prevailing Marxist theorisations of the state which, in the 1970s too, perceived the state as a form of "heavenly life" in contrast to the "earthly life" of civil society. Lefebvre noted:

> *Foundations of the modern State: The (forced) equivalence of non-equivalents: the (forced) equalization of the unequal, the identification of the non-identical… The logic of homogenization and identity as the logic and strategy of State power. The State as reducer (of diversities, autonomies, multiplicities, differences) and as integrator of the so-called national whole.* (Lefebvre 2009, 108)

This means it is not surprising that the 'uneasy bargain' between the state and democracy has always called for various strategies and policies aimed at pacifying the unruly *dēmos*. It has striven towards "synoptic legibility", as Scott would say, which enabled the efficient performance of its main functions – e.g., taxation, conscription, monopoly of coercion. The subsumption of democracy under the state and citizenship did not remain without further unwanted consequences. It also led to theoretical purism and anti-intellectualism, which rejected every in-depth reflection on concepts like political power and especially citizenship. Originally, citizenship was never related to the state or nation, but meant exclusively a specific 'urban relationship' between the rights and duties in the city. Citizenship therefore meant membership in a city. This explains why, according to Bibič (1997, 38), it is erroneous to talk only about a "citizen of the state", we should instead also shed light on the other forms of "citizenship" that are constituted according to other – for example, territorial or functional – criteria. The concept of citizenship should hence be returned to its place which, according to Bibič, can also be taken literally since political membership was first related to the local community.[10]

CONCLUSION

Political science is a relatively young science that became established as an independent discipline in Slovenia later than in other countries. Nevertheless,

[10] The etymological origin of the word citizenship – from the concept of civitas, civitatis all the way to the modern citoyen – linked political membership to smaller and more fluid polities. For more on the genealogy of citizenship, see Turner (2002, 199–226).

we cannot claim that we have remained historical latecomers. Quite the opposite. Political science's path to an independent scientific discipline was specific because it managed to develop theoretical and conceptual excellence despite or precisely due to the political, social and economic divisions in this territory and the numerous state formations that have marked it. It was also often defined by the unpleasant and exhausting coexistence with the centres of power, which found the autonomous scientific production disruptive. Nonetheless, political science in Slovenia has managed, primarily based on Bibič's insightful input and works, to claim a unique position in the international political science community, having actively co-created the discipline over the decades and, by developing completely new theories, importantly influencing political science discussions across the world. Put differently, while political science abroad was preoccupied with the bipolar division and related research aspirations and priorities, political science in Slovenia was engaged in original theoretical production and was examining possibilities outside and beyond the mentioned division.

That is probably one of the central reasons that political science in Slovenia was able to produce original analyses in a wide range of different contexts – from the narrower field of institutional politics and praxeology to political theory and philosophy and political anthropology. We could also say that the result of such positioning was a quite different, authentic envisioning of the role and position of political science in society, as evidenced by Bibič's *oeuvre* and his 'political science of the future'. With 'political science of the future', we suggest that Bibič's diverse analyses have a common thread. That is, his interventions should be understood as a well-considered and systematic attempt at re-conceiving and repositioning political science while searching for radically different political and economic models, proceeding from past and current perturbations in order to be able to overcome their own limits in the future. All of this requires that we again thoroughly think about how to establish a completely new relationship between life and work, creation and consumption and, last but not least, the individual and the communal. As Bibič stated:

> *Such a task can be performed only by a political science that will not limit itself to counting election results and repeating political programmes. A science that will meticulously collect facts without becoming empirical, that will co-discover the purposes of revolution without becoming utopian; that will search for the means of their realisation without becoming instrumentalist. A science that will – while taking into account the contribution of other social sciences – connect a meticulous analysis of a political phenomenon from the sociological, historical perspective with its deontological (self-managing) perspective. In short, only a historically and humanistically oriented political science will be able to perform such a task.* (Bibič [1969] 2021, 75)

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ASSOCIATIONAL PLURALISM – IS IT POSSIBLE TO BUILD ON THIS CONCEPTUAL HERITAGE?**

Abstract. *The article reflects on a key category introduced by Adolf Bibič in his 1990 theoretical work* Civil Society and Political Pluralism; *namely, association pluralism. Bibič introduced this concept into Slovenian political thought to grasp the diverse social and political developments of the 1980s and to open up a new view of political pluralism that moves beyond party pluralism. The author therefore asks whether the notion of associational pluralism still holds sufficient explanatory potential and is worth preserving and developing further, or whether it can be used to deal with a new social and political reality, i.e., political pluralism, which is also strongly marked by multifaceted environmental issues.*
Keywords: *associational pluralism, political pluralism, party pluralism, civil society, state.*

INTRODUCTION

During the 1980s, the end of the period of self-governing socialism was condensed into two concepts: "civil society" and "political pluralism". Each concept was the subject of fierce political and scientific controversies, both heralded major social and political changes and acted as a prism via which the contours of the Slovenian future could be seen (Kardelj 1977).

Adolf Bibič's 1990 theoretical work *Civilno društvo i politički pluralizam* (Civil Society and Political Pluralism) summarises this diverse social and political developments in a precise political science way and opens up a new vantage point to view political pluralism, which was re-emerging on the historical stage in a new guise. Bibič does not conflate political pluralism only with party pluralism, which is an important, even substantive, element of contemporary pluralism. In fact, he argues that the notion of political pluralism is not worn out by party pluralism. To grasp the tectonic shifts in civil society, its fragmentation and pluralisation, along with all the dimensions of political pluralism, he had to introduce a new concept that he labelled "associational pluralism".

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It is important to note here that in the 1960s Bibič had already been dealing with the question of civil society and political pluralism, from both historical-philosophical and theoretical points of view, and that this problem was his central preoccupation following his doctoral thesis (Pikalo 2009 and 2022). In 1972, he published *Zasebništvo in skupnost* (Private Property and Community), translated into Serbo-Croatian in 1983 under the title *Građansko društvo i politička država kod Hegela i Marxa*, and again in an updated edition in 1984. In the mid-1980s, when the debate on 'socialist civil society' in Slovenia was heating up, he entered the debate to remind those attributing a "bourgeois" provenance to civil society that Gramsci had also written about civil society, as reflected in the proceedings *Gramsci, civilna družba in država* Gramsci (Civil Society and the State) published in 1987 under his editorship.[1]

Yet Bibič's engagement with civil society raised another canonical thesis: that of the withering away of the state. His experience and in-depth research of liberalism led him to conclude that the dialectic between civil society and the state will continue to be a subject of political science and to determine political practice for a long time to come. The withering away of the state can hence only be understood in the light of the diminishing coercion and violence in contemporary society and politics (Močnik 2003).

Thirty-three years later, the question naturally arises: to what extent is his understanding of civil society and political pluralism still relevant for understanding political practice in Slovenia, and to what extent does it still hold democratising potential in itself given that during this period of time the political practice in Slovenia was primarily built on the basis of party pluralism (partitocracy) and within the framework of the globally recognised neoliberal understanding of the relationship between civil society and the state? And, of course, to what extent can associational pluralism as a democratic strategy be linked to the question of ecological democracy, which reconceptualises the question of democracy by extending it to the growing social and environmental problems and the looming global ecological catastrophe? There is no doubt that the question of the relationship between civil society and political pluralism is a recurrent moment in history when it is necessary to reflect on the way forward; responding to the challenges of history in the same old manner, that is, within existing institutions and dominant frameworks of thought, will not suffice. We address the extent to which we can rely on Bibič's legacy to respond to the historical challenges of the present by first tracing the internal structure and line of thought that Bibič develops in *Civilno društvo i politički pluralizam* (Civil Society and Political Pluralism), then by pointing to the basic contours of the development of civil society in Slovenia after 1990, which was shaped by the underlying

[1] For more on the overall context of the state–civil society theme in Bibič, see Lukšič, Igor: *Heglovstvo v politologiji Adolfa Bibič* (2023) where the author shows that associational pluralism, as Bibič develops it in *Civilno društvo i politički pluralizam* (Civil Society and Political Pluralism), has deep Hegelian roots and lies at the core of Bibič's understanding of politics and political science.

neoliberal understanding of the state–civil society relationship and, finally, we highlight the turning point of 2019, marked by introduction of the concept of ecological modernisation in the EU. This refers to a development concept that relies on the participation of 'green' civil society in solving environmental problems and defines a new relationship between civil society and the state also in Slovenia.

RECONSTRUCTION OF THE FRAMEWORK

In his book *Civilno društvo i politički pluralizam* (Civil Society and Political Pluralism), Bibič approaches political pluralism from two perspectives, that is, from the position of civil society and developments within it, and from the position of the transitional movement from monism to pluralism, in order to more deeply understand the social and political processes underway in Slovenia and Yugoslavia in the 1980s.

In the first eight-chapter part of the book, Bibič provides a concise overview on civil society, while in the second seven-chapter part of the book he focuses on the transition from monism to pluralism.

Civil Society

In the first chapter on civil society, Bibič initially introduces his own way of thinking by noting that civil society had become a megatrend since it had come to be conceptualised relative to the state by those who were thinking in terms of the 'neoliberal revolution', especially in the West, with its beginnings in the late 1970s, and those who were thinking of the re-democratisation of various parts of the world, from Latin America to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and not least Yugoslavia, also in the late 1970s.

In the second chapter, Bibič first answers the question: why has the thematisation of the relationship between civil society and the state reappeared on the historical stage with such vehemence. He seeks an answer in the protests against social tendencies that could be called the Leviathanisation of the contemporary world or the étatisation of society. No matter where protests are taking place in the world, be they against military juntas, traditional-authoritarian regimes or liberal democratic systems, the demand for the empowerment of civil society is always at the forefront; a new constitution of the relationship between civil society and the state, greater autonomy for civil society, shifts towards greater rationalisation, democratisation, and transforming the traditional state are being demanded, and so on. Therefore, under the label of civil society anti-statist forces are grouped together demanding de- or post-étatisation.

While various civil society actors are united in their diagnosis, they vary when it comes to strategies for how to resist these tendencies. Bibič here refers to the neoliberal strategy, which depends on reprivatisation in general, as well as various left-wing strategies, which rely on socialisation, self-management, participation, co-determination, industrial democracy, partial privatisation, a

plurality of ownership etc. What all these strategies have in common is that they want to limit the state – whether in liberal democratic regimes to limit the 'secret' state or in real socialist countries to limit the political monopoly – and to find new ways of its legitimation. The demands for civil society are therefore moving in the direction of the demonopolisation of political life and introduction of new forms of political participation and political control by means of the introduction of human rights and new concepts of democracy and an autonomous economy.[2]

Historical Perspective

Another question that Bibič addressed and answered in Chapters III, IV and V concerned the essential aspects dealt with by the three different traditions of thought: the pre-Marxist, the Marxist, and contemporary social sciences. In this part, Bibič draws attention to different traditions of thought, each with its own way of thinking about the historically specific relationship between civil society and the state, and the political pluralism that had been developed and practised up to that point. This insight into the history of political thought allows Bibič to reconceptualise the relationship between civil society and the state through a redefinition of political pluralism, and not to fall into the temptation of merely justifying and defending a dominant concept that maintains the status quo, instead of looking for internal transformative tendencies in the civil society–state relationship itself. On the other hand, the reader is given an insight into the genesis of the problem of civil society, a historical perspective that even today prevents a generalised and ideological understanding of the problem – e.g., between the neoliberal and the 'democratising' tendency that is imposed on us daily through public and political debates; nevertheless, it is possible to grasp the problem in a historical perspective in a more complex, multilayered and, most importantly, transformative way.

Debates on Civil Society and the Affirmation of Pluralism as a Fundamental Aspect of Contemporary Democracy

The third question Bibič addresses in Part I of the book and is dealt with in Chapters VI, VII and VIII concerns a reflection on the worldwide debates on civil society in the 1980s in the light of the affirmation of pluralism, which Bibič regards as a fundamental aspect of contemporary democracy, including democracy under socialism. He first reflects on civil society as a concept that was very much in the media's focus during the 1980s in Yugoslavia, then retreats into the

[2] The tendency towards the étatisation of society has not changed, it has only taken the form of "post-democracy", which means the strengthening of executive power on one hand, and "partitocracy", which means the strengthening of party pluralism on the other; all of this is played out on neoliberal demands for a lean state, the introduction of a third (non-governmental yet market-oriented) sector and the strengthening of the repressive apparatuses of the state, and the limited participation of NGOs with executive public power and the hollowing out of the public sphere.

field where he reflects on deliberations of civil society in the context of political pluralism, before turning in Part VIII to the elements and characteristics of civil society and (political) pluralism.

The breadth of Bibič's conception of civil society is captured in his definition of the individual elements and characteristics of civil society, which we briefly describe here because they are relevant for our further considerations.

In civil society, Bibič includes: the overall economic and social structure of society (ownership, market, exchange relations, class-social differentiation etc.); free association or associationism, namely, the free association of citizens in a wide variety of associations, including political ones; and the sphere of classical and new rights and freedoms of man and citizen, including the right to privacy, the right to political determination as well as economic and other related rights etc. For him, civil society implies: the key role of direct elections where the citizen as voter enjoys full recognition; citizens' spontaneous initiatives and social movements; the sphere of the public, or non-state actors that shape and affirm autonomous public opinion, including autonomous publishing, newspapers etc.; the everyday life and political culture, along with its beliefs, customs, traditions, moral norms etc. that influence the consciousness and actions of individuals and collective actors; the sphere of the family and intergenerational relations; autonomous international contacts (non-state contacts, NGOs etc.); and socio-political organisations, albeit only in so far as they are independent of the state and relatively independent in their relations with each other.

Such a structure of civil society, Bibič argues, is a condition and constitutive part of a pluralist civil society; "pluralism arises from civil society as a necessity of the modern age, which requires the recognition of the subjectivity of the individual and of the actors of collective action" (Bibič 1990, 95).

As long as there is a detachment between civil society and the state, the question of mediation between the two will remain relevant. During this period, the autonomy of the individual and the association as a vehicle for articulating and integrating interests in civil society is necessary; moreover, influence and participation of civil society in the management of public affairs, including economic affairs. Of course, this also applies to a specific spectrum of interests: political ones. These are articulated and mediated via political associations where Bibič also includes political parties; that is to say, political parties are not the only political associations that are called upon to manage economic and other public affairs. For Bibič, the need for political pluralism derives from the very structure of modern civil society, "from the very nature of modern civil society" (Bibič 1990, 9) and its dialectic with the state; the need for political pluralism also includes participation in politics and in control of the state's repressive institutions. Bibič understands those demands, in short, as demands for the introduction of modern democracy.

From Monism to Pluralism

In the second part of the book *Civilno društvo i politički pluralizam* (Civil Society and Political Pluralism), Bibič thus quite logically addresses the issue of pluralism, which he places in the title as one end of a continuum, while on the other end he places monism, to which he no longer attributes any significant historical role. The question of democracy and pluralism is not self-evident; in the 1980s, Bibič argued, it was possible to defend democracy without also defending pluralism. This link was rejected especially in the countries of real socialism in Central and Eastern Europe, while elsewhere in the developed world the understanding of this relationship appeared in various thought derivations: from liberal, to Eurocommunist, to the Yugoslav equation of self-governing pluralism. Gradually, however, pluralism made its way from liberal democratic countries and academia into the political practice and academia of socialist countries. Bibič notes hesitantly that "the fundamental law of socialism is not socio-political monism, but pluralism, including political pluralism" (Bibič 1990, 100).

Since it is clear from historical insight that there is no single political pluralism, Bibič quite rightly asks: what kind of political pluralism is most appropriate if political life and the political system are to be seriously reformed? Bibič builds an answer to this question by defining pluralism as an essential condition and key aspect of modern democracy, without which it is impossible to imagine versatile creativity. He establishes a causal chain, namely when claiming "without free (including political) creativity there can be no democratisation of public life, and without it there can be no way out of the crisis and to enter the developed world" (Bibič 1990, 100).

The issue of pluralism is a vast one with a long (not only liberal) history, causing Bibič to limit himself to discussing just a few aspects of three-faced pluralism (ibid., 100) by highlighting aspects of political pluralism. In Chapter I, he examines the genesis and development of different approaches to pluralism in the world. In Chapter II, he focuses on the relationship between pluralism and socialism, which should be read in closer detail by those concerned with ecosocialism these days, while in Chapter III he discusses the specifics of this relationship in Yugoslavia. He then turns to the scientific community before in Chapter IV giving an overview of some understandings and types of pluralism in political science. Chapter V discusses those experiences of party pluralism that can be usefully incorporated into democratic pluralism, whereas in the next chapter on "associational pluralism" Bibič argues the case for it and, finally, in Chapter VII addresses the problems that the debate on political pluralism and democracy has brought to the surface.

In this paper, we are not interested in Bibič's reception, which today belongs to the historical part. We instead focus mainly on the last two chapters and try to find in them 'emancipatory' settings that would be useful while considering the transformation of public and political life in Slovenia today.

Pluralisation, states Bibič, establishes not only a political sphere, but a social

and economic sphere as well; the principle of autonomy introduces autonomous enterprises into the economic marketplace, competing with each other, with no form of ownership taking precedence (e.g., social property); while a "political marketplace" is introduced into political life, where several autonomous political entities compete to take over the governance of public affairs. In this definition of pluralism, Bibič does not subscribe to the liberal distinction between political and economic spheres and based on the discussion underway at that time he concludes that the economy can be reformed and market initiative introduced only if political pluralism is introduced: "the pluralism of forms of ownership... must be adequately echoed in the pluralism of political life; the abolition of the monopoly of ownership is followed by the abolition of monopartism…" (Bibič 1990, 194).

Contemporary political pluralism, as mentioned, cannot be entirely bounded to political parties, to party pluralism; it must also include other forms of civil society integration. If we were to accept a narrower definition of political pluralism, Bibič argues, democracy could only be defined as a "partitocracy", and politics would be reduced to a power struggle between parties. This leads him to argue for a broader definition to avoid the mentioned pitfalls. The broader meaning is an order in which several entities compete to participate in the governance of public affairs, which includes participation in political government. This term includes the power struggle, although it is not only this power struggle in the classical organs of the state that is driving politics (parliament, government etc.). Namely, politics is also "the governance of economic, expert, and communicative resources, and above all the governance and disposition of extended reproduction in society or national institutions" (Bibič 1990, 196).

For our discussion, it is important to note that "non-partisan pluralism" is a partial hypothesis of the development of political pluralism, as Bibič puts it, which assumes that the power struggle in human society will become less and less important, but this does not mean that it will not exist. This is confirmed by certain empirical tendencies given that non-partisan associationism is playing an increasing role in certain societies, including Slovenia, and appearing in various forms such as: the establishment of various associations and their federations as a result of general technological, cultural and social development; various professional associations whose primary concern is the development of their own disciplines, and the consolidation of the role of science in society and politics; and cultural and writers' societies which, alongside their activities, also engage in debate on the most pressing political and developmental issues. New social movements, ad hoc groups or grassroot committees are also emerging as a factor in the self-regulation of society; policy networks are being established to promote different partial interests and various professional perspectives (e.g., interdisciplinary) in the making of single public policies instead of lobbying; the role of scientific institutions in the making of political agendas is being ever more emphasised as well, and so on.

On this basis, Bibič rejects both those who reject any discussion of the elements of non-partisan pluralism and those who offer "non-partisan political pluralism" as a comprehensive strategy of political pluralisation. Bibič is hence no longer able to insist on the label "non-partisan pluralism" as a strategic category against "party pluralism" and is forced to find a new concept. He believes that a comprehensive strategy of political pluralism must be formulated in such a way that it can be accepted as credible by the democratic public and that it must therefore be treated in the context of the democratisation of society.

To this end, Bibič proposes the notion of associational pluralism, which is the most appropriate term for a positive definition of a strategy for the political pluralisation of society, referring to the autonomous functioning of organisations.

Associational Pluralism

The political theory of any pluralism (including political pluralism) recognises the centrality of the notion of "association", it is a fundamental category or one of them, Bibič notes while claiming that this can be justified on historico-genetic, politico-theoretical as well as politico-strategic grounds.

The historico-genetic arguments Bibič adduces fall into four traditions of thought: the political theory of pluralism (Althusius, Gierke, Figgis, Maitland, Barker, Durkheim etc.) put the category of association in the foreground or it had a significant role to play; the socialist theory of pluralism (founded by Harold Laski) placed autonomous associations as the basis of its theory; the liberal-democratic theory (from Tocqueville onwards) has also located autonomous associations at the core of its thinking; and Gramscianism (with Gramsci at the centre) attached great importance to associationism.

The politico-theoretical arguments developed in political sciences and other social science disciplines are above all present in the thought tradition of pluralist theories of politics. Here, autonomous associations (organisations) are understood as an essential element of pluralism and a specific feature of the modern era. Bibič does not equate an association with an organised interest group. He views an association as being more than that; in this respect, he joins David Truman (who also includes political parties), Max Weber (who thinks of a wide range of subjects: from cobblers' clubs, political parties to religious groups, art circles, literary sections etc.), Albert Meister (who defines an association as a group that is voluntarily recruited and combines the knowledge of its members or their activities so as to achieve some objective other than the acquisition of profit), Robert A. Dahl (who uses associations very broadly, speaking of organisational pluralism), John E. Chapman (a political scientist who put voluntary associations at the heart of his work Voluntary Associations and the Political Theory of Pluralism; for him, association is a key civilisational category); and Karl Marx (who introduces the concept of association in the sphere of economic democracy, which the concept of pluralism cannot bypass). On the basis of these currents of thought, Bibič concludes that association is an umbrella term that encompasses all "forms

of voluntary association" (Bibič 1990, 202); namely, interest groups, political unions, political parties, self-governing associations in economic life, i.e., also political associations, therefore, which include political parties as well as specific interest associations that perform certain functions of political parties (e.g., at the time of elections, referenda etc.) – in short, everything that falls within the field of associationism.

The politico-strategic argument for the introduction of associational pluralism is derived from Bibič's assessment that it underlines the importance of a strong and mixed associational infrastructure for the justification of the process of political pluralisation "in the conditions of contemporary civil society and political democracy". Associational pluralism as a political strategy is important, Bibič argues, because it prevents "a reductionist understanding of political pluralism and directs practical action towards a positive goal" (Bibič 1990, 203); associational pluralism directs activity to the heart of the matter by suggesting that the autonomisation of the old and the creation of new associations (including political associations) and their involvement in the process of forming, making and implementing political decisions is the way in which the political pluralisation of society must move. This notion, of course, relies on the potential of associations, i.e., the "independent and creative role of autonomous political organisations" (Bibič 1990, 203), which is of paramount importance, Bibič states, in order to consolidate political democracy.

Bibič regards associational pluralism as an expression of the laws of the modern era, which is no longer an era of atomised and isolated individuums (which is the liberal assumption), but an era in which people are increasingly working together to solve communal problems (which is the communitarian assumption); associational pluralism is hence not something to be imposed as a postulate from the outside, but grows out of the "nature of human beings", who are ennobled by civilisation precisely by coming together as associated individuals and their efforts to pursue their personal and common interests as well as their collective goals through free association.

In this process of interconnection and highlighting human sociability, individuality is not abolished; the individual remains at the core of the matter. The individual here should not be understood as a person who only engages with others as a political citizen but as a bearer of his concrete interests, as a co-creator of the association and not simply as a formal member or member of it. This means its internal dynamics are far from an idealised model and are linked to real communicative relations (from opposition to support, from conflicts to alliances etc.). Associations are accordingly something that is by intention linked to the individual, to their needs, interests and aspirations, but also to their social being, which is not only essentially selfish, yet also community-oriented; it is oriented towards concrete and authentic interests, which in the association are also subject to the pathologies of the organisation, which must be faced (e.g., leadership-membership split). On the other hand, historical experiences remind

us that associations can work in different directions – conservative, civilisation retrograde, anti-humane etc., and should thus also be reflected upon in the light of broader social interests.

Associations, as associations of specific interests, not only have a social dimension, but a political one as well. This is not solely about helping to create human capacity to act in the collective for community interests, but also about socialising individuals to take responsibility in the governance of community affairs. It is this '*transcendence*' of the individual into the collective that is the political process in the broadest sense of the word. Bibič argues that if, simultaneously, community ties are formed in such a way that the individuality of what passes into the community is preserved, then we are talking about a democratic political process (Bibič 1990, 204). The community in this case is a concretely articulated whole that recognises the autonomy of labour and of the human being and derives its power and legitimacy from recognition of the individual and associations.

Bibič distinguishes political associations from other specific interest associations according to the degree of generality of the interests the political associations stand for. Of course, specific interest associations also have a political function, yet their view on community interests is via the prism of their given interests, with Bibič saying this is crucial because it is through this perspective of particular interest that the general interest can be rationally defined at all. For example, if farmers do not connect into associations and there is thus no autonomous articulation of the interests of private farmers, it is possible that errors will exist in the formulation of general political interests, according to which an 'inadequate' policy on agriculture is created.

In a heterogeneous society, political associations can emerge in different forms (political organisations, political federations, political parties, clubs etc.), with all being an important and even necessary part of a democratic political structure. Their basic task is to aggregate and select the interests of various segments of civil society, to give these interests the form of political interests (synthesised interests) to be pursued in the political system, especially in representative organs of the state, and in the wider social system. In this sense, political associations must be understood as a fundamental factor in any contemporary political democracy.

At first glance, it would seem entirely reasonable if there were only one political association for the whole of society, synthesising competing interests into a single common political interest. This is the logic on which one-party systems and one-party states are based, yet its assumptions have not historically been borne out in practice, declares Bibič (1990, 205), which means the monistic, monopolistic formation of political interest must be transcended by recognising the "rationality of political pluralism" as, on the one hand, a civilisational form of governance of society's public affairs and, on the other, as an essential precondition for, and a constitutive part of, political democracy.

The governance of complex social issues (which more recently include environmental and ecological issues) can only occur by way of political pluralism operating through several general political associations (or at least two) since this is the only way of ensuring the degree of rationality of politics required by the contemporary governance of society. A political system that does not have embedded possibilities to effectively control political government and the turnover of political elites cannot avoid major strategic errors in the formulation of political interests, as is perhaps most evident in the formulating of political interests linked to addressing environmental and ecological issues. Opposition is thus a technique that has no adequate substitute in a modern democratic state, albeit it can be expressed in various forms in both civil society and the state, and it is to be expected to evolve in the light of the new means of subjugation. Bibič argues that political opposition, whose structural precondition is the existence of multiple political associations, is a "necessary politico-technical instrument" allowing those who hold political power to be constantly exposed to criticism, scrutiny and alternatives, and to be confronted with competent arguments and counter-arguments on the one hand and that, on the other hand, behind all of this there is an organisation of expert and professional resources, as well as real organisational potential that can be harnessed to challenge the established ruling elites and actually replace them. This is the essence of power struggles. Liberalism has acknowledged the rationality of this struggle, which makes sense in modern societies where the governance of public affairs is also indirect, through elected representatives who occupy important positions. The question of the procedure for selecting those who assume the mandate of civil society to govern the state is accordingly an important question of political pluralism and political democracy.

However, with associational pluralism Bibič assumes a broader concept of politics than power struggle, and a broader concept of democracy than electoral democracy. Associational pluralism, in addition to competition between political elites, calls for the participation of the widest possible range of people in politics, organised in different political associations; it is precisely political associations that allow democracy to develop, with participation on the largest possible scale. Such pluralism therefore does not reject the principle of representation (in a complex society, this must remain one of the basic principles in the governance of society), nor does it reject the principle of direct participation in political life, or participation on the basis of the functional-interest articulation of society, or participation in the regulation of socio-economic relations. In order to define the general relationship between associational pluralism and democracy, Bibič turned to Eisfeld who defined this relationship through the ultimate goal of introducing "as much direct democracy as possible and as much representative democracy as necessary" (Bibič 1990, 210).

In this sense, associational pluralism could be said to derive from the fact that it recognises: basic human rights and freedoms (with the right to free political

association); the plurality of voluntary associations as the fundamental form in which people express their social, economic, cultural, political, existential etc. interests; the large number of political associations which play an important role in defining political interests (interests that express in a synthetic way – after aggregation and selection – the various aspects of politics that form part of the basic strategy of social development); specific interest associations, which have a political role in both the governance of social affairs and the articulation, aggregation and selection of interests in civil society and their transfer to the state (Bibič even argues that these associations will grow in importance relative to general political associations); and that 'non-partisan' forms of pluralism will play a role in the development of political pluralism, and general political associations (parties, unions, clubs etc.) will not lose their specific role in associational pluralism.

Finally, we emphasise a further thought relevant for our perception of present politics. Associational pluralism, Bibič writes, is a critique of politics that relies on bipolar confrontations, a critique of politics as a "friend–enemy" relationship, and a critique of politics that negates the meaning of the political citizen; instead of bipolar polarisation, it relies on a new synthesis (not eclecticism) that requires the recognition of a multiplicity of contradictions and conflicts through which social and political life appears much more colourful, but the search for solutions to which is much more complex and complicated. Rather than "friend–enemy" politics that generate ever more enemies, for existential reasons it is essential to strive for new alliances and connections (discursive coalitions) whereby the enemy will be recognised as an adversary that has its place in both civil society and the public sphere and where, in principle, the way is open to the structures of the state.

By linking historical developments and simultaneously actualising a theoretical concept that is supposed to help with understanding these historical developments, Bibič inscribes himself in that tradition of thinking which believes that thought has arisen as a necessity of practice and that practice needs a corresponding thought (Vodovnik 2022 in Toplak 2022) in order to be able to assert itself as something else as an alternative to the existing one. Moreover, he believes that it is vital to stand on the side of that alternative thought that democratises the existing democracy. This is a tradition of thought shared by the author of this paper as well, who approaches the problem from the existential need to survive on this planet.

THE POTENTIAL OF THE NOTION OF ASSOCIATIONAL PLURALISM

Let us recall just a few thoughts or theses that come to mind while considering the relevance of the notion of associational pluralism as developed by Bibič, with the ambition that they might become the subject of another article.

1. The discussion on the autonomy of civil society, with its emphasis on human rights and freedoms and the importance of autonomous associations as

specific interest and general political associations, which are a needed part of the infrastructure of contemporary pluralism, has shown that this is where the potential for 'democratisation' should be sought when it comes to the transition from a liberal democratic state to a 'green' state, which Eckersley (2019) develops as a state that 'both maintains and transcends' the liberal-democratic pledge.

2. The field of political pluralism must not end within the confines of the state apparatus, but must extend to civil society itself, to the distribution of social power within it, and to the effects of this distribution on political government. Such an understanding allows moving beyond the two extremes of "party" and "non-partisan" pluralism; only by looking at the overall dialectic of the relationship between civil society and the state, and at the role of associations (political and specific interest) in transmitting the interests of particular groups in civil society to the state, and at the role of associations in civil society itself and in the state, can one go beyond the unproductive bipolarity of conflict, and of course open up new complex questions such as political power and the legitimacy that those who govern have/do not have; political power and the social power in which it is rooted etc.

3. It is also important to bear in mind the transformation of civil society brought about by the neoliberal revolution of the 1980s, which began to replace the public sector with a "third sector" in which NGOs played a central role, with the task of replacing the public services that had been lost and underfunded by the public sector up until that point. NGOs, independent of the state yet financially linked partly to it and partly to the sale of their services on the market, became the dominant form of association in civil society, and were sometimes equated with the whole of civil society by the ruling discourse; reduced the whole spectrum of pluralism to them and to political parties.

4. The non-partisan component of public life in Slovenia is growing and elements of non-partisan democracy and non-partisan pluralism are increasingly present, but it would be wrong to conclude that political party pluralism is receding from the political scene despite the ongoing crisis. These elements of a non-partisan form of collective life and non-partisan political pluralism are the subjective expression of the current stage of development of the social structure, the degree of social conflict and the need for the existence of a political power which, through its policies, seeks to regulate all of these contradictions. Here, one must agree with Bibič when he argues that the strategy of the political pluralisation of society has to be understood in the context of the democratisation of society.

5. If we agree with those who claim that in the last three decades – also thanks to the neoliberal principle of the 'lean state' – civil society in Slovenia has become even more pluralised and institutionalised, and that the public sphere – also thanks to the development of information and communication technology – has also become more pluralised and simultaneously more inward-looking, then it is also reasonable to ask whether the concept of "associational pluralism"

still holds enough explanatory potential and is worth preserving and developing further, and whether it can be used to deal with the new social and political reality, i.e., political plurality, which is also strongly marked by the multifaceted environmental issues, which calls for different policy arenas that are more open to civil society. After all, this is also called for by the concept of ecological modernisation, which represents the EU's development framework from 2019 onwards.

6. In the 1990s, environmental and ecological issues, which are even more complex and global, were added to the public agenda and that cannot be left to the parties alone. Nonetheless, when it comes to environmental policymaking in Slovenia it seems that 'partitocracy' has been reinforced above all; this situation needs a thorough correction by the various civil society associations and the 2021 water referendum may be seen as a conflict between political party pluralism and non-political pluralism, which represents a break with 'partitocracy' in the field of environmental policymaking (Kuzmanić 1996). This, of course, raises the question of how to institutionally reorganise the entry of civil society associations into the processes of environmental policymaking, i.e., how to introduce an ecological democracy based on deliberative principles of communication. Some new institutional solutions have already emerged: the creation of the Centre for Sustainable Construction and Renovation of Buildings (*Stičišča za trajnostno gradnjo in obnovo stavb*), which should bring all the actors involved together (professionals, the public, civil society, investors, public authorities) in order to minimise the implementation deficit; the Eco-Chamber (*Eko-zbornica*) that should, among others, solve the problem of market-based environmental impact assessments; a new concept of river basin management that, on the basis of an understanding of the hydro-social territory, should solve the problem of the systemic involvement of the most affected people in the management of river basins etc..

7. More recently, plurality has emerged on the level of environmental discourses, which have experienced different modes of institutionalisation (from global to national, from economic to civil society and NGOs, from various movements to spontaneous grassroots and initiatives etc.) and various articulations in public spheres (Pinter 2005 in Splichal 2020); these institutionalised discourses are in themselves a problem as they are often contradictory "in thought, word and deed", and together they oppose other institutionalised discourses that minimise or even ignore environmental issues.

CONCLUSION

In the last three decades civil society – also thanks to the neoliberal principle of the "lean state" – has become even more pluralised and institutionalised, and that the public sphere – also thanks to the development of information and communication technology – has become pluralised as well and at the same time segmented in on itself. The new political pluralism is even more complex and raises a whole new set of theoretical and practical problems which go in the direction

of rethinking both the different conceptualisations and institutionalisation of deliberative democracy and the transformation of the liberal-democratic state into the green state.

These can all serve as a framework in which complex environmental issues have a special place, which will need to be thoroughly thought through politically from the perspective of associative pluralism. Bibič launched associational pluralism as a concept for re-establishing the institutional relationship between civil society and the state at a historical moment of a divided society that raised the question of new actors from civil society entering the communication and decision-making processes controlled by the public authorities.

Today we are once again living in a moment of a divided society, and the concept of associational pluralism can help us to rethink a new institutional arrangement that allows new civil society actors to enter into communication and decision-making processes in order to participate in decisions that are this time of even more existential importance (environmental issues as a precondition for life in general). The concept of associational pluralism thus functions as an emancipatory concept that will only be emptied as such once its premise, i.e., the separation of the state from civil society, is abolished; until then, it will continue to function as a frame of reference for the search for new institutional solutions linking civil society and the state.

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Mihai DRAGNEA, Adriana CUPCEA, Joseph FITSANAKIS, Darko TRIFUNOVIC, John M. NOMIKOS, and Vasko STAMEVSKI (eds.)
ASPECTS OF ISLAMIC RADICALIZATION IN THE BALKANS AFTER THE FALL OF COMMUNISM
Peter Lang Publishing Inc.
New York, 2023. 279 pp.,
EUR 74.62 (ISBN 1433198681)

Aspects of Islamic Radicalisation in the Balkans after the Fall of Communism may be described as a comprehensive and thorough book presenting the current state of Islamic radicalisation in the Balkans. Each chapter offers a unique analysis of different countries in the region, moving beyond simplistic stereotypes to offer an insightful account of Islam in the mentioned area. The book provides a deeper and more critical engagement with the diverse and complex realities of Muslim communities in this historically rich region.

In the preface, Isa Blumi critically assesses the widespread misunderstanding of Islam in the Balkans. His compelling narrative invites the reader to see Balkan Muslims in a new, more profound way, recognising their unique experiences and deep-rooted presence in the region.

The introduction by Mihai Dragnea focuses on the post-communist Balkans and highlights how the fall of the socialist regime triggered a security crisis fuelled by ethnic and religious conflicts, especially during the Yugoslav wars. The way this instability prompted Islamic communities in the Balkans to move closer to the wider Islamic world and fill a gap in religious education and practice is described. The influx of Islamic organisations, including radical groups, into the region is noted along with the fact that previous research on Islamic radicalisation in the Balkans overlooks important aspects such as local traditions.

In the first chapter, Joseph Coelho examines how Islam became a security problem in post-war Kosovo. The combined efforts of local elites and international actors in Kosovo are investigated, portraying foreign Islamic influences and devout Islam as a threat to political communities. The author relies on the theory of securitisation to understand how Islam was transformed into a security problem, drawing on political speeches and strategic documents. International actors are shown to view Islam as a threat to the liberal order of the West, while Kosovar elites are attempting to maintain their power and depict Albanians as secular, "European Muslims" detached from global Islam.

In the second chapter, Henriques Schneider applies the "multilayered identity" concept to analyse Islamic radicalisation in Kosovo. It is argued that individuals and social groups can possess and harmonise several identities at once and adapt them depending on the context. Schneider assumes that while religiosity, including radical forms of Islam, is on the rise, this is more of a shift in narrative than any active change. He concludes that

the possible Islamic radicalisation of Kosovo should be seen as an additional layer of identity rather than a direct turn to religious-political militancy.

Gianfranco Bria's chapter deals with Salafism in Albania, particularly in Tirana, and examines how Salafists are challenging local Islamic traditions and the secular values of Albanian society. The Salafists' doctrinal critique of Sufi practices and their efforts to create a strict, normative Islamic identity are outlined. Bria attributes the rise of Salafism in post-socialist Albania to the disillusionment of young Albanians with Western and local culture, which they regard as corrupt. In his view, Salafism offers a higher moral order and a strong, empowering identity that differs from the secular and traditional Islamic practices in Albania.

In her chapter, Iris Luarasi analyses how mainstream and online media can be used to counter violent extremism in Albania. The author emphasises the influence of online propaganda while recruiting young people for terrorism. She addresses the alarming trend of young isolated or marginalised Albanians being targeted by extremist groups online. Luarasi underscores the media's crucial role in promoting awareness and countering extremist narratives. It is suggested that by using alternative narratives and teaching media literacy the media can help disrupt the radicalisation process among young people.

The chapter by Marko Savić and Almedina Vukić Martinović considers why the Muslim community in Montenegro has largely stayed away from Islamic radicalism. The authors examine various factors, including the community's deep-rooted integration and the country's strategic domestic and foreign policy. The importance of the historical and socio-political context, the role of soft power and public diplomacy, notably in relation to Türkiye, is highlighted. It is concluded that Montenegro's multidisciplinary approach, encompassing comprehensive strategies and co-operation between different sectors of society, has been key to fostering a community that resists radical influences.

In the sixth chapter, Bogdana Todorova considers the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Bulgaria and how the fall of communism created a vacuum that led to the search for alternative concepts of social order. Todorova analyses the influence of Salafist jihadism from neighbouring countries and Ankara's neo-Ottoman policies using case studies and a phenomenological approach. The chapter underlines that the concern with Islamic radicalism in Bulgaria is shaped by the centuries-long politicisation and ideologisation of Islam. It also examines the influence of Turkey on Bulgarian Muslims and the influence of foreign organisations on local Islamic traditions. In the conclusion, it is suggested that the unique Bulgarian model of Islam faces new challenges from foreign influences.

In Cornel Andrei Crișan's chapter, the significant changes in Romania's Muslim community over the last 30 years are analysed. Focus is given to the influence of Islamic non-governmental organisations (NGOs) from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait that have introduced ultra-conservative Islamic

values through literature and an online presence. These organisations have increased interest in conservative Islam among Romanian Muslims. The chapter adopts a socio-anthropological perspective, which includes a documentary analysis of Islamic content in Romanian communities and reveals the considerable influence of these external NGOs in determining the religious landscape in Romania.

In chapter eight, Mijo Beljo and Lucija Zadro analyse the Mujahideen's engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) between 1992 and 1995, detailing how the Mujahideen as foreign Islamic fighters cooperated with the Muslim-Bosniak political and military leadership, which led to them being officially included in the BiH army. The activities of the Mujahideen in central BiH, including crimes against Croats, and the difficulties faced by the Bosniak leadership in dealing with the Mujahideen presence are outlined. The authors conclude that the role of the Mujahideen, while significant, was complex and has not been thoroughly researched. Their religiously motivated military actions had an impact on inter-ethnic relations and raised fears about links to global terrorist networks.

The next chapter by Michalis Marioras examines the role and influence of foreign fighters in global jihad, concentrating on BiH. The influx of foreign fighters into Syria and Iraq, in particular to join ISIS, are discussed while tracing their historical involvement in conflicts like in Afghanistan during the 1980s and later in regions such as BiH, Chechnya, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Somalia and Mali. Emphasis is given to the concept of transnational identity and its development within the Islamic Ummah, which unites Muslims around the world. The considerable threat posed by returning foreign fighters, who often return with radical ideologies and combat experience, which can lead to the spread of radicalised Islam in their home countries, is highlighted as well.

The chapter by Zhidas Daskalovski examines the factors that have limited Islamic radicalisation in North Macedonia. The multi-ethnic and multi-confessional composition of the country, notably the relationship between the Macedonian majority population and the Albanian Muslim community, plays an important role in maintaining stability. The author considers the response of Muslim officials, government and party leaders in preventing the spread of radicalisation and presents the influence of Islam in the socio-political struggles. It is pointed out that while North Macedonia experienced a rise in Islamic radicalism and saw its citizens join the foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, the likelihood of future radicalisation is low. The conclusion describes how future radicalisation is unlikely largely due to the Albanian elite's pragmatic support for the policies of the USA against jihadism and terrorism.

The chapter by Klemen Kocjančič examines the involvement of the Balkan Muslim diaspora in Europe in Islamist terrorism and looks at their connections and activities from Central to Northern Europe. The historical presence of Islam in Europe, its development and the growing radicalisa-

tion in the Balkan diaspora, especially among Bosniaks and Albanians, are outlined. The author examines the role of this diaspora in terrorist activities and its involvement in attacks. He also discusses the interconnectedness of organised crime and terrorism and presents various sources to paint a comprehensive picture of Islamic terrorism in Europe, stressing its importance alongside terrorism in North Africa and the Middle East.

In the concluding chapter, John Nomikos and Joseph Fitsanakis refer to the rise of Islamist militancy in the Balkans and emphasise the role of terrorism as a strategy for provoking fear for political ends. They note the spread of militant Islam in the region after the 1990s, as fuelled by ethnic conflicts, economic changes and influences from Saudi Arabia. Pointing to concerns about the return of jihadists, the influence of foreign fighters and the role of Türkiye, the authors suggest that the future of Islamist radicalism in the Balkans depends mostly on broader global political and social dynamics.

This book is not simply a historical account, but a powerful reminder of the ongoing global fight against extremism and the crucial role of integration and deradicalisation strategies in securing the future of a fragile region.

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Maruša T. VEBER: **THE PALESTINIAN–ISRAELI CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL LAW – *QUO VADIS*?**

Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2024, Vol. LXI, No. 1, pp. 7–40

The Palestinian–Israeli conflict raises several pertinent international legal questions that are analysed in the paper from the perspective of the right of peoples to self-determination, the prohibition of the use of force (*jus ad bellum*), the law of armed conflict (*jus in bello*), rules governing individual criminal responsibility and state responsibility (*jus post bellum*), and rules governing obligations of the international community. Understanding these areas of law is essential for determining the potential responsibility of the various actors involved and simultaneously also discloses two aspects of modern international law. On one hand, situations of the use of force by non-state actors require careful analysis and raise a number of questions to which 'state sovereignty-centred' international law provides no clear-cut answers. On the other hand, deriving from the *erga omnes (partes)* nature of some obligations, there is growing recognition that all states in the international community are entitled to respond and invoke the responsibility of wrongdoing states in such situations. The paper concludes, however, that in the absence of political will, the selectivity of implementation remains a fundamental weakness of international law.

Keywords: Palestine, non-state actors, responsibility, the right of peoples to self-determination, the right of self-defence, international law of armed conflict, *erga omnes (partes)*.

Andreja ANTOLIĆ, Igor LUKŠIČ: **LEGITIMNOST: MIT IN POLITIKA PRIMER POLITIČNIH GOVOROV FRANJA TUĐMANA**

Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2024, let. LXI, št. 1, str. 41–56

Članek poskuša raziskati pomen, ki ga imajo politični miti za legitimnost in politiko. V ta namen proučujemo politični mit v skladu s sodobno teorijo, ki razume politične mite kot sestavni del vseh političnih skupnosti, ki ni lasten samo avtoritarnim in totalitarnim režimom. Vsaka politična skupnost ima svoje zgodbe/pripovedi, ki jih sprejema večina prebivalstva in tvorijo osnovo legitimnosti politične ureditve, pa naj gre za demokratično ali nedemokratično politično ureditev. V sklepnem delu skuša članek z analizo političnih govorov Franja Tuđmana raziskati, katere naracije v času njegovega vladanja so imele takšno legitimacijsko moč.

Ključni pojmi: legitimnost, politika, politični mit, analiza političnega govora, Tuđman.

Sabrina P. RAMET: **POLITIČNI LIBERALIZEM VS. DESNI LIBERTARIZEM: JOHN RAWLS PROTI ROBERTU NOZICKU**

Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2024, let. LXI, št. 1, str. 57–72

Med političnimi filozofi 20. stoletja sta Američana John Rawls in Robert Nozick splošno priznana kot velikana – tako zaradi drznosti njunih argumentov kot zaradi njunega vpliva. Avtorja orisujeta nasprotujoči si viziji. Rawls, ki se navdihuje pri Immanuelu Kantu, zagovarja svet, za katerega so značilni strpnost, enakost in pravičnost kot poštenost. Nozick, ki izhaja iz lockeovske dediščine, dejansko pa ga navdihujeta Adam Smith ("nevidna roka") in Herbert Spencer ("preživetje najmočnejšega"), pa je orisal program minimalne države z minimalnimi davki, ki ne ponuja nobenih ublažitev revščine in nobene državne pomoči za revne, bolne, ljudi z oviranostjo ali ovdovele. Rawlsova vizija je seveda del liberalne tradicije, medtem ko Nozickova, ki zagovarja minimalno državo, vsebuje iliberalne elemente.

Keywords: John Rawls, Robert Nozick, politični liberalizem, libertarizem, davki, enakost, pravičnost.

Viljem MERHAR: **TOPICALITY OF THE THEORETICAL SOLUTIONS BY ADAM SMITH (1723–1790)**

Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2024, Vol. LXI, No. 1, pp. 73–92

The article analyses the topicality of theoretical solutions that the Scottish *economic thinker* Adam Smith proposed for the era of late capitalism. It advocates the re-topicalisastion of all those Smith's theoretical solutions that have recently been ignored, including the suggested Smith's motivational income-profit and systemic market-planning duality of economy. It strives for the revival of Smith's economic thought with the help of which it needs to be identified how to more fully engage the less fully engaged economies. The article upgrades Smith's theory with Keynes' solutions of economic crises. It highlights the importance of the re-affirmation of political economy as social science related to socially responsible economy.

Keywords: economy, economic theory, Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Alfred Marshall, John M. Keynes, Paul A. Samuelson, Thomas Piketty.

Nauman ZAHEER, Muhammad KASHIF, Samo KROPIVNIK:
PREUČEVANJE DEJAVNIKOV VPLIVA NA NAMERE PAKISTANSKIH ŠTUDENTOV GLEDE SPREJEMANJA IN UPORABE MOBILNEGA OGLAŠEVANJA IZ PERSPEKTIVE UTAUT2
Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2024, let. LXI, št. 1, str. 93–114

V članku preučujemo dejavnike, ki vplivajo na namene anketirancev, da sprejmejo in uporabljajo mobilno oglaševanje. Izhajamo iz dopolnitve obsežnega modela Enotne teorije sprejemanja in uporabe tehnologije (UTAUT) z zaznanim zadovoljstvom, zaznanim vznemirjenjem in potrebo po personalizaciji. Skladno z dopolnjenim modelom tako analiziramo številne indikatorje namena in vedenja anketirancev glede mobilnega oglaševanja, da bi izpostavili dejavnike, ki najbolj vplivajo na sprejemanje in posledično tudi uporabo mobilnega oglaševanja. Obsežni podatki so bili zbrani s spletnim anketiranjem na neverjetnostnem vzorcu 446 študentk in študentov v Pakistanu, analizirali pa smo jih z multivariatno metodo strukturnih modelov na osnovi delnih najmanjših kvadratov (PLS-SEM). Rezultati so izpostavili ključne dejavnike, kot so pričakovani trud, pričakovana uspešnost, zadovoljstvo, vznemirjenje in personalizacija, ki vplivajo na namene anketirancev, da sprejmejo mobilno oglaševanje. Hkrati so potrdili povezavo med nagnjenostjo anketirancev, da sprejmejo mobilno oglaševanje in namenom uporabe le tega. Ta članek razkriva, da anketiranci pričakujejo, da jim bodo prikazana bolj prilagojena promocijska sporočila glede na njihove potrebe in želje. Za to morajo biti oglaševalci pozorni na kontekstualno relevantnost oglasov, saj nerelevantni mobilni oglasi vznemirijo potrošnike, spodbujajo negativen odnos in odvračajo od uporabe mobilnega oglaševanja.

Ključni pojmi: mobilno oglaševanje, nameni potrošnikov, vedenje potrošnikov, Enotna teorija sprejemanja in uporabe tehnologije (UTAUT), strukturni modeli na osnovi delnih najmanjših kvadratov (PLS-SEM), Pakistan.

Kristina RAKINIĆ: **PARENTAL MEDIATION STRATEGIES AND THEIR ROLE IN PARENTAL KNOWLEDGE OF ADOLESCENTS' NEGATIVE ONLINE EXPERIENCES**
Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2024, Vol. LXI, No. 1, pp. 115–132

This article examines parental knowledge of negative online experiences among adolescents, focusing on mediation strategies within a representative German sample. Analysing data from 710 adolescents and their parents, the results show that parents have a relatively high level of knowledge, although they mostly underestimate experiences related to sexual content. Adolescents' age was a negative predictor of parental knowledge, whereas active mediation was a

positive predictor. Importantly, adolescents' perceptions of their parents' active mediation positively predicted parental knowledge. This highlights the central role of adolescents' perspectives in shaping parents' knowledge of their children's negative online encounters.

Keywords: Internet, negative experiences, mediation strategies, adolescents' perceptions, active mediation.

Tihana ĐUMIĆ, Božidar VELJKOVIĆ: **VLOGA DRUŽBENIH MEDIJEV PRI ČUSTVENEM KOMUNICIRANJU MED POSAMEZNIKI IN POSAMEZNICAMI V TRETJEM ŽIVLJENJSKEM OBDOBJU**

Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2024, let. LXI, št. 1, str. 133–152

Članek se osredini na raziskovanje in analizo dojemanja vpliva Facebooka kot ene izmed sestavin področja informacijsko-komunikacijskih tehnologij (IKT), natančneje družbenih medijev, na kakovost čustvene interakcije, še posebej med posamezniki v tretjem življenjskem obdobju. Raziskovalni vzorec je zajemal 260 udeležencev različnih starosti, razdeljenih v dve starostni skupini – mlajše od 50 let in starejše od 50 let. Mnenja udeležencev so bila pridobljena s pomočjo empiričnega raziskovanja, pri čemer so bile uporabljene kvantitativna metoda in ankete kot tehnika raziskovanja. Rezultati raziskave kažejo, da starost vpliva na stališča udeležencev glede digitalne komunikacije kot sredstva in medija za čustveno komunikacijo v različnih kontekstih. Starejši udeleženci kažejo več rezerviranosti glede Facebooka kot orodja za čustveno komunikacijo in so bolj previdni glede uporabe sodobnih metod komuniciranja, ki jih ponujajo nove tehnike družbenih medijev. Prav tako so starejši manj nagnjeni k opuščanju tradicionalnih medosebnih interakcij. Rezultati poudarjajo splošno nezaupanje anketirancev v informacije, ki krožijo na Facebooku. Vprašani tudi dajejo prednost ohranjanju žive medosebne komunikacije, ki vključuje vse elemente čustvenih odnosov. Torej, prava čustvena komunikacija je po mnenju vprašanih mogoča samo zunaj področja interneta oziroma storitev posredovanja informacij, ki jih ponujajo informacijsko-komunikacijske tehnologije, predvsem družbeni mediji.

Ključni pojmi: informacijsko-komunikacijske tehnologije, Facebook, tretje življenjsko obdobje, čustvena komunikacija, odtujenost.

Živa ŠKETA: **CORPORATE LANDLORDS: LEGAL ENTITIES AND RESIDENTIAL RENTAL IN LJUBLJANA'S NEW-BUILDS**

Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2024, Vol. LXI, No. 1, pp. 153–172

The article presents exploratory research on the existence of corporate landlords, i.e., legal entities that generate income by renting out residential properties in the Ljubljana rental market. Noting the absence of data concerning the volume of apartments leased by corporate entities in Ljubljana, the article gives

an overview of the buyers of apartments in seven new buildings in Ljubljana constructed after 2020. Based on data from the Surveying and Mapping Authority of the Republic of Slovenia, the land register, the Slovenian Business Register and information provided by individual companies, it is demonstrated that in the analysed sample some legal entities also appear in Ljubljana that are buying apartments with the intention of renting them out for profit.

Keywords: corporate landlords, real estate, rental of residential properties, rental market.

Marko HOČEVAR, Blaž VREČKO ILC: **MARKSISTIČNA KONCEPTUALIZACIJA POLITIKE V LUČI INOVATIVNIH UVIDOV ADOLFA BIBIČA**

Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2024, let. LXI, št. 1, str. 175–190

Članek analizira inovativno marksistični konceptualizacijo politike slovenskega politologa Adolfa Bibiča. Slednji je v razvoju svojega marksističnega razumevanja politike sledil tokovom heglomarksizma in Gramscijevemu prispevku k politični teoriji. V jedro svoje politične teorije je postavil vprašanje razmerij med politično oblastjo in razrednim izkoriščanjem ter vlogo politične oblasti pri urejanju odnosov med razredi. Razlikoval je politično politiko in samoupravno politiko ter celovito problematiziral prevladujoča zahodna razumevanja politike, in sicer teorije elitizma in pluralistične teorije. Nasproti slednjim in dogmatičnim marksističnim pojmovanjem o postopnem odmiranju politike je oblikoval svoj projekt humanizacije politike onkraj razrednega izkoriščanja in kapitalističnih produkcijskih odnosov. Ta projekt pa je temeljil na predpostavki nujnega preoblikovanja politične prakse v smislu dialektičnega procesa podružbljenja politike in politizacije družbe.

Ključni pojmi: Adolf Bibič, politika, politična znanost, razredni odnosi, ekonomsko izkoriščanje.

Marinko BANJAC: **REFLECTION ON THE AFFIRMATION OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AS A SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINE AND ITS WIDER SOCIAL RELEVANCE: ADOLF BIBIČ'S CONTRIBUTION**

Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2024, Vol. LXI, No. 1, pp. 191–206

Political science is constantly self-reflexive as it intertwines with other social sciences and draws specific research practices, methodologies and insights from them. This introspection is crucial because political science studies phenomena from different perspectives, stemming from different research traditions. Understanding its own context and its impact on other disciplines allows political science to better understand its own context and contribute to informed research and debate. The article discusses Bibic's reflections on the relationship of political

science to other social sciences and its social significance, examining its historical conditioning, autonomy and relation to other disciplines. It also considers how Bibič contributed to understanding how political science can add to (political) education theory and practices and to a broader understanding of politics.

Keywords: Political science, Adolf Bibič, social sciences, politics, social role of science.

Žiga VODOVNIK: **POLITOLOGIJA PRIHODNOSTI: ADOLF BIBIČ IN FUTUROLOŠKA KOMPONENTA POLITIČNE ZNANOSTI**

Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2024, let. LXI, št. 1, str. 207–220

Članek je poskus celostnega branja opusa Adolfa Bibiča. Razkriva njegov širši intelektualni (in tudi politični) projekt in koherentno ter sistematično analizo tega, kar bi lahko razumeli tudi kot »možnosti« politologije. V prispevku namreč trdimo, da je osišče Bibičevih heterogenih analiz in intervencij v resnici vprašanje prihodnosti oziroma, bolje, vloge in položaja politične znanosti v njej. Ta vidik Bibičevega opusa imenujemo »politologija prihodnosti«, ki se nujno vrača v zgodovino političnih idej in politično zgodovino, da bi sploh lahko razumela aktualna politična razmerja in njihova protislovja. »Politologija prihodnosti« pa nima ambicije in kapacitete le za pojasnjevanje obstoječega, saj je po Bibiču ključna znanost za soočanje z izzivi prihodnosti in je kot taka nujna za naš obstoj – politični in fizični.

Ključni pojmi: Adolf Bibič, politologija, prihodnost, država, demokracija, državljanstvo.

Andrej LUKŠIČ: **ASOCIACIJSKI PLURALIZEM – ALI LAHKO GRADIMO NA TEJ KONCEPTUALNI DEDIŠČINI?**

Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2024, let. LXI, št. 1, str. 221–236

Avtor članka razmišlja o ključni kategoriji, ki jo je v svojem teoretskem delu *Civilna družba in politični pluralizem* leta 1990 uvedel Adolf Bibič, in sicer gre za asociacijski pluralizem. Bibič je ta pojem v slovensko politično misel vpeljal, da bi zlahko razumel raznovrstno družbeno in politično dogajanje 80. let prejšnjega stoletja in da bi odprl nov pogled na politični pluralizem, ki presega strankarski pluralizem. Avtor se zato sprašuje, ali ima pojem asociacijski pluralizem še dovolj pojasnjevalne moči, da ga je vredno ohranjati in razvijati naprej oziroma ali bi ga bilo mogoče uporabiti za obravnavo nove družbene in politične realnosti, tj. političnega pluralizma, ki ga močno zaznamujejo tudi večplastna okoljska vprašanja.

Ključni pojmi: asociacijski pluralizem, politični pluralizem, strankarski pluralizem, civilna družba, država.

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Primeri navajanj:

Knjige

Geertz, Clifford. 1980. *Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Zborniki

Featherstone, Mike, ur., in Mike Hepworth, ur. 1991. *The Body: Social Process and Cultural Theory*. London: SAGE Publications.

Poglavje v zborniku

Palan, Ronen. 1999. »Global Governance and Social Closure or Who is to Governed in an Era of Global Governance?« V *Approaches to Global Governance Theory*, urednika Martin Hewson in Thimothy J. Sinclar, 55–72. Albany: State University New York Press.

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Geertz, Clifford. 1980. *Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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Featherstone, Mike, ed., and Mike Hepworth, ed. 1991. *The Body: Social Process and Cultural Theory*. London: SAGE Publications.

A chapter in a monograph

Palan, Ronen. 1999. "Global Governance and Social Closure or Who is to Be Governed in an Era of Global Governance?" In *Approaches to Global Governance Theory*, edited by Martin Hewson and Timothy J. Sinclair, 55–72. Albany: State University New York Press.

An Article in a Scientific Journal

Bachrach, Peter, and Morton S. Baratz. 1963. "Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework". *American Political Science Review* 57 (3): 632–42. https://doi.org/xxx.

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